s 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


THE 

POMP  OF  POWER 


: 


"My  son,  you  will  be  surprised  with 
how  little  wisdom  the  world  is  governed" 

Axel  Oxenstiern. 


new  ^tar  YORK 

GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


COPYRIGHT,    1922, 
BY  GEORGE   H.   DORAN    COMPANY 


THE   POMP  OF  POWER.   I 


PRINTED   IN   THE   UNITED   STATES  OF   AMERICA 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I     THE    ENTENTE I 

II     PLAN     XVII l8 

III     THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE 44 

IV     THE    NIVELLE    OFFENSIVE 57 

V     UNIQUE    COMMAND 91 

VI     THE  ASQUITII   DEBACLE 110 

VII     THE  FRENCH   POLITICAL   WORLD 122 

VIII     CAILLAUX I38 

IX     MR.   LLOYD   GEORGE   AND    PARTY   POLITICS       ....  1 54 

X     LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND   HIS  PRESS 183 

XI     THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT  AND  MR.   KRASSIN    .        .        .  201 

XII     THE   TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES 21 5 

INDEX 277 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


THE  POMP  OF   POWER 


CHAPTER   I 
The  Entente 

The  co-operation  between  Great  Britain  and  France  which 
was  destined  to  save  civilisation  had  its  origin  in  the  Entente 
between  the  two  countries  concluded  by  Lord  Lansdowne  and 
M.  Delcasse  in  1904. 

That  understanding  was  the  logical  sequence  of  German 
policy  and  of  Germany's  resolution  to  impose  her  will  upon 
Europe.  It  was  the  inevitable  result  of  the  use  Germany 
made  of  her  victory  in  the  War  of  1870:  which  should  for 
all  time  serve  as  a  reminder  to  the  conquerors  of  a  day  not 
to  forget  that  their  grandsons  will  pay  for  their  errors.  Bis- 
marck alone  amongst  the  rulers  of  his  nation  saw  the  danger. 
But  von  Moltke  and  his  supporters  were  able  to  override  him, 
and  he  was  forced  to  go  with  the  tide. 

It  was  in  1875  tnat  Great  Britain  received  her  first  shock 
respecting  the  extent  of  German  ambitions.  The  Times  cor- 
respondent in  Paris,  the  celebrated  de  Blowitz,  was  able  to 
expose  the  design  then  being  hatched  to  attack  France  again 
solely  because  she  was  recovering  too  quickly  from  the  effects 
of  her  defeat.  It  required  the  intervention  of  both  England 
and  Russia  to  prevent  that  outrage;  and  possibly  also  to  open 
the  eyes  of  the  Emperor,  Wilhelm  I.,  to  the  machinations 
of  his  Chancellor.  Bismarck  never  forgot  nor  forgave  the 
letter  which  Queen  Victoria  wrote  his  sovereign  on  this 
occasion. 

In  his  Reflections  and  Reminiscences  Bismarck  accuses 
Prince  Gortchakoff  of  having  concocted  the  whole  story  in 

1 


2  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

order  to  get  the  credit  of  being  the  preserver  of  peace. 
Gortchakoff,  who  by  that  time  was  jealous  of  the  great  repu- 
tation of  the  younger  man,  was  not  sorry  when,  on  May  ioth, 
1875,  he  was  able  to  send  from  Berlin  (where  he  had  gone 
with  the  Czar)  the  famous  telegram,  "Maintenant  la  paix  est 
assuree."  But  the  statement  and  the  inference  were  founded 
on  fact,  however  unacceptable  Bismarck  may  have  thought 
the  form  in  which  they  were  conveyed  to  the  world.  The 
real  cause  of  the  bitter  reproaches  with  which  he  then  and  later 
assailed  Gortchakoff  was  his  annoyance  at  Russia  having 
sounded  the  alarm.  His  reply  when  his  own  Emperor  sent 
him  Queen  Victoria's  letter  two  months  later  was  in  Bis- 
marck's weakest  style.  He  made  no  serious  case  for  the 
defence.  But  so  far  as  possible  he  cleverly  shifted  the  ground, 
which  was  one  of  his  favourite  proceedings  when  dealing  with 
the  rather  slow-witted  Wilhelm. 

In  1879  Germany  laid  the  basis  of  the  group  of  Central 
Powers  by  her  treaty  with  Austria-Hungary.  Three  years 
later  Italy  was  taken  into  the  German  fold.  This  consum- 
mation of  the  Triple  Alliance  put  Germany  at  the  head  of  a 
Coalition  with  a  population  aggregating  170  million. 

The  Triple  Alliance  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  offensive 
in  its  nature.  It  forced  Europe  (and  upon  more  than  one 
occasion)  to  accept  its  decisions  by  a  clear  warning  that  the 
only  alternative  was  to  fight.  But  obviously  such  a  policy 
was  a  certain  road  to  war.  Any  reasonable  knowledge  of 
history  or  any  ordinary  comprehension  of  human  nature 
should  have  led  to  the  conclusion  that  (despite  geographical 
obstacles)  this  offensive  Alliance  would  undoubtedly  bring 
into  being  a  defensive  Alliance  of  other  Great  Powers,  and 
that  the  final  result  would  be  a  test'of  strength. 

It  was  only  in  1892  that  France  emerged  from  an  isola- 
tion which  had  lasted  for  more  than  twenty  years.  While  even 
the  treaty  which  was  then  made  with  Russia  stipulated  that 
it  was  dependent  upon  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  ter- 
ritorial situation :  for  Russia  made  it  plain  that  she  would 
not  support  France  in  any  attempt  to  recover  Alsace  and 
Lorraine. 


THE  ENTENTE  3 

But  Germany  was  still  able  to  be  coercive.  In  1905  she 
demanded  and  obtained  the  retirement  from  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
of  M.  Delcasse,  whose  part  in  certain  conversations  with  Eng- 
land she  had  not  pardoned.1  Though  it  is  fair  to  add  that 
had  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  day  (that  eminent  interna- 
tional financier  but  much  less  praiseworthy  politician,  M. 
Rouvier)  supported  his  colleague,  had  he  refused  to  allow 
his  country  to  be  humiliated,  had  he  acted  as  did  M.  Clemen- 
ceau  three  years  later,  when  Germany  again  attempted  to 
dictate  in  the  same  fashion  about  the  Casablanca  deserters, 
the  result  would  have  been  different. 

In  1906  came  Algeciras.  While  in  1908,  when  Austria- 
Hungary  annexed  Bosnia  and  Herzgovinia,  the  Kaiser,  in  a 
speech  of  rare  impudence,  dared  Russia  to  move. 

The  latter  incident  was  the  high-water  mark  of  German 
domination  in  Europe.  It  is  probable  that  the  Panther  was 
sent  to  Agadir  primarily  in  order  to  test  the  firmness  of  the 
understanding  between  Great  Britain  and  France :  although 
that  is  a  question  which  cannot  be  elucidated  until  certain 
documents  which  have  not  yet  seen  the  light  of  day  are  pub- 
lished. In  any  event,  from  that  time  the  German  Government 
realised  that  unless  it  reversed  its  own  policy  (and  that  course 
was  never  contemplated)  the  bond  between  Great  Britain  and 
France  was  likely  to  become  stronger  year  by  year.  In  the 
ultimate  result  this  consideration  was  not  without  its  effect 
in  fixing  the  date  of  the  conflict — a  date  chosen  by  Germany 
to'  suit  her  own  interests.  But  in  the  meantime  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  did  what  it  could  to  soothe  British  apprehensions, 
mainly  through  its  unwitting  tool,  Lord  Haldane. 

On  the  other  hand,  Agadir  turned  the  tide  in  France.  All 
who  followed  the  course  of  national  feeling  in  that  country 
were  struck  by  the  significant  change  that  was  apparent  in 
the  years  immediately  preceding  1914.  The  catastrophe  of 
1870  left  a  depressed  race  which  had  little  faith  in  its  own 

1  Since  the  above  was  written  M.  Maurice  Paleologue  has  disclosed 
in  a  letter  to  Lc  Temps,  dated  15th  March,  1922,  how  M.  Rouvier 
deliberately  sacrificed  M.  Delcasse.  The  revelations  made  by  M. 
Paleologue  more  than  confirm  the  strictures  I  ventured  to  make  upon 
Rouvier's  conduct  in  this  matter. 


4  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

rulers,  and  which  only  wanted  to  avoid,  at  any  cost,  another 
clash  with  Germany.  When  that  danger  threatened  either 
an  appeal  was  made  to  the  other  powers,  or  concessions  were 
granted  which  could  never  have  been  wrung  from  France 
before  1870  or  after  1910.  M.  Andre  Tardieu  has  rightly 
said  that  the  men  of  his  generation,  those  who  arrived  at 
maturity  about  1900,  were  too  often  prone  to  practise  a 
patriotism  of  resignation. 

This  revulsion  was  a  natural  reaction.  Agadir  merely 
served  to  make  it  clear  to  observers  that  a  new  sentiment  had 
taken  possession  of  the  nation.  The  late  Comte  Albert  de 
Mun,  in  a  book  written  at  this  period,  told  of  the  difference 
to  be  found  throughout  the  country.  There  was  no  longer 
the  cry  of  peace  at  any  price.  Certainly  there  was  no  thirst 
for  military  adventures.  But  the  predominant  idea  was  that 
Germany  had  too  often  exacted  too  much  by  clanking  the 
sword;  that  the  time  had  come  to  settle  matters  once  and  for 
all;  that  it  was  better  to  fight  than  constantly  to  yield  to 
blustering  from  Berlin. 

The  country  as  a  whole  was  finally  convinced  that  war 
within  a  short  time  was  inevitable;  that  it  was  made  in- 
evitable by  the  determination  of  Germany  to  dominate. 

Upon  this  point  the  judgment  of  the  people  coincided 
with  that  of  their  political  leaders.  M.  Poincare  and  M. 
Clemenceau  would  doubtless  have  agreed  upon  that  question 
more  whole-heartedly  than  they  have  agreed  about  anything 
else  then  or  since:  Poincare  whom  Clemenceau,  aided  by  the 
late  Camille  Pelletan,  did  his  utmost  to  defeat  in  the  presi- 
dential election  of  1913.  M.  Briand  and  Paul  Deroulede 
would  have  been  at  one.  M.  Barthou  gave  a  practical  ex- 
pression of  his  opinion  when  he  had  the  courage  to  sacrifice 
his  popularity  in  order  to  secure  the  enactment  of  the  Three 
Years  Service.  Even  M.  Leon  Daudet  was,  upon  this  subject, 
in  accord  with  men  with  whom  he  saw  eye  to  eye  about  noth- 
ing else.  All  thought  that  war  was  probable;  the  majority 
thought  it  was  certain.  An  understanding  with  Great 
Britain  was  therefore  of  the  first  importance. 

Unfortunately  those  in  political  power  in  England  held  an 


THE  ENTENTE  5 

entirely  different  view  about  the  future.  They  did  not  believe 
that  Germany  would  ever  attack  France;  and  only  admitted 
that,  if  the  improbable  did  occur,  German  troops  would  doubt- 
less seek  a  passage  through  Belgium.  At  the  beginning  of 
1 9 14  they  saw  no  force  in  the  contention  that  Germany  was 
not  overtaxing  herself  to  maintain  an  Army  and  a  Navy  which 
she  did  not  mean  to  use  the  day  when  she  could  no  longer 
get  her  own  way  without  resort  to  force  of  arms.  To  give 
these  politicians  credit  they  were  entirely  sincere.  Otherwise 
they  would  never  have  spoken  with  such  freedom.  In  Janu- 
ary, 1 9 14,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  publicly  derided  the  idea  of  any 
possibility  of  war;  and  urged  that  it  was  the  opportune  time 
to  reduce  the  naval  estimates.  He  would  have  uttered  very 
different  words  had  he  imagined  that  Germany  nurtured  any 
aggressive  designs.  For  upon  a  previous  occasion — at  the 
time  of  the  Agadir  trouble  in  191 1 — he  had  not  hesitated  to 
warn  that  country  of  the  risk  she  was  running  in  language 
so  strong  and  so  plain  that  it  had  alike  startled  and  halted 
the  Kaiser's  Government.  But  in  1914  the  Liberals  believed 
that  the  European  situation  was  clearer  and  calmer ;  and  many 
lesser  political  lights  spoke  and  thought  like  Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

These  being  the  diverse  views  held  in  England  and  in 
France,  it  is  interesting  to  examine  what  was  in  fact  the 
agreement  or  arrangement  which  existed  between  the  two 
countries  at  that  time. 

In  November,  191 2,  Sir  Edward  Grey  wrote  the  French 
Ambassador,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  as  follows : 

"On  different  occasions,  during  recent  years,  the  French 
and  British  Military  and  Naval  General  Staffs  have  ex- 
changed views.  It  has  always  been  understood  that  these 
exchanges  of  views  do  not  affect  the  liberty  of  either  Govern- 
ment to  decide,  at  any  time  in  the  future,  whether  or  not  it 
should  support  the  other  by  force  of  arms. 

"We  have  admitted  that  our  exchanges  of  technical  views 
do  not  constitute  and  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as  constituting 
an  engagement  which  obliges  either  Government  to  intervene 
in  an  eventuality  which  has  not  yet  presented  itself,  and  which 
may  never  occur.     For  instance,  the  present  division  of  the 


6  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

French  and  English  Fleets  does  not  rest  upon  an  engagement 
to  collaborate  in  case  of  war. 

"You  have,  however,  remarked  that  if  either  Government 
had  grave  reasons  to  fear  an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  part 
of  a  third  power,  it  would  be  essential  to  know  whether,  in 
that  event,  one  power  could  count  upon  the  military  assistance 
of  the  other. 

"I  agree  that  if  either  Government  has  reason  to  fear  an 
unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  power,  or  any  other  event  threat- 
ening the  general  peace,  this  Government  will  immediately  ex- 
amine with  the  other  as  to  whether  they  ought  not  to  act  to- 
gether to  prevent  the  aggression  and  to  maintain  peace ;  and,  in 
that  case,  to  seek  the  measures  that  they  might  be  disposed  to 
take  in  common.  If  these  measures  necessitate  military  action, 
the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs  will  at  once  be  considered,  and 
the  two  Governments  will  then  decide  upon  the  effect  which  it 
may  be  desirable  to  give  to  them." 

This  tells  the  whole  tale.  There  was  no  further  or  other 
diplomatic  understanding1.  Sir  Edward  Grey's  letter  calls 
for  only  one  comment.  While  it  was  stipulated  that  the  di- 
vision of  English  and  French  Fleets  (whereby  the  latter  was 
kept  almost  in  its  totality  on  guard  in  the  Mediterranean  so 
as  to  allow  the  former  to  concentrate  in  the  North  Sea)  did 
not  place  any  obligation  upon  Great  Britain,  yet  obviously  the 
result  might  be  to  put  France  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  event 
of  a  sudden  declaration  of  war.  That  is  exactly  what  did 
occur  in  August,  19 14,  when  the  French  Channel  coast  was 
virtually  without  any  naval  protection. 

General  Lanrezac  has  written  2  that  England  had  promised 
her  support  to  France  in  the  twofold  event  of  Germany  being 
the  aggressor  and  also  violating  Belgian  neutrality;  but  that 
this  undertaking  was  subject  to  such  reserves  that  it  might 
possibly  only  become  effective  too  late.  That  statement  is  not 
in  accord  with  the  facts.  M.  Andre  Tardieu  gave  a  clearer 
and  more  accurate  account -of  the  situation  when  he  said: 

2  Le  Plan  de  Campagnc  Francois,  P.  17  note.  A  similar  statement 
was  made  in  the  Chambre  de  Deputes  during  the  debate  on  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  in  1919. 


THE  ENTENTE  7 

"Even  in  the  years  preceding  the  war,  in  spite  of  the  German 
danger  which  was  felt  to  be  rising,  Great  Britain  was  not 
bound.  On  August  2nd,  19 14,  she  was  free,  and  could,  in 
full  independence,  choose  her  own  path." 

While  in  19 19  the  French  Government,  in  a  memorandum 
upon  the  Rhine  Boundary  which  it  submitted  to  the  Peace 
Conference,  referred  to  "l'engagement  militaire  defensif  tres 
limite,  qui  en  19 14  liait  a  la  France  la  Grande-Bretagne."  3 

The  truth  was  that  upon  several  occasions  during  the  years 
preceding  1914  (and  notably  at  the  time  of  the  Agadir  crisis 
in  191 1 )  the  General  Staffs  of  the  two  countries  had  made 
plans,  which  had  been  changed  from  time  to  time,  for  the 
possible  participation  of  British  troops  in  a  war  between 
France  and  Germany. 

But  there  was  no  certitude  that  these  plans  would  ever  be 
used,  for  absolute  reliance  could  not  be  placed  upon  English 
assistance.  The  Quai  d'Orsay  and  the  French  General  Staff 
held  identical  views  upon  this  point.  They  thought,  and 
hoped,  that  in  any  German  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
Great  Britain  would  see  an  unavoidable  casus  belli.  But  the 
General  Staff  was  obliged  to  make  its  plans  without  counting 
entirely  upon  this  support ;  or,  at  best,  alternatively. 

The  evidence  given  by  General  de  Castelnau  and  Marechal 
Joffre  before  la  Commission  d'Enquete  sur  le  Role  et  la  Situ- 
ation de  la  Metallurgie  en  France,  fully  confirms  this 
statement. 

General  de  Castelnau  said  : 

"Put  yourself  in  the  position  of  the  person  who,  in  1912-13, 
established  the  plan  of  war.  Had  a  prophet  foretold  that  Eng- 
land would  join  with  us  and  America  also?  Germany  held  at 
that  moment  all  England  and  all  America  to  feed  her. 

"The  President  of  the  Commission  :  Did  our  General 
Staff  make  its  plan  having  the  idea  that  in  the  event  of  war 
Germany  might  be  fed  by  England  and  America? 

"General  de  Castelnau  :  It  was  a  current  idea. 

"The  President  :  Nevertheless  there  was  an  agreement 
(accord)  between  France  and  England. 

8  See  Rapport  General  sur  le  Trait  e  dc  Paix,  P.  75. 


8  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

"General  de  Castelnau  :  Agreement?  I  don't  think  so. 
What  do  you  mean  by  England  ? 

"The  President  :  The  British  Empire  taken  as  a  whole. 
There  was  an  understanding  (entente). 

"General  de  Castelnau:     What  understanding? 

"The  President  :  An  understanding  that  should  have  en- 
sured at  least  a  benevolent  neutrality  in  case  of  a  declaration 
of  war. 

"General  de  Castelnau:  I  don't  about  that  understand- 
ing. There  had  been  interviews,  conversation  with  the  Eng- 
lish General  Staff,  yes.  But  never  with  the  English  Govern- 
ment, at  least  not  to  my  knowledge."  4 

Some  days  later  the  President  of  the  Commission  asked 
Marechal  Joffre :  "How  could  General  de  Castelnau  say  that 
he  did  not  know  of  the  agreement  made  with  the  English  Gen- 
eral Staff  upon  the  subject  of  an  eventual  participation  of  the 
English  Army?"  5 

Joffre  replied :  "I  cannot  tell  you  what  General  de  Castel- 
nau said.  It  is  certain  that  this  agreement  existed  condition- 
ally, that  is  to  say  that  England  had  not  made  any  engagement. 
Therefore  the  measures  to  be  taken  if  England  joined  and  if 
England  did  not  join  were  both  considered.  There  were  agree- 
ments between  the  General  Staffs,  but  there  were  no 
diplomatic  agreements,  but  only  between  the  General  Staffs. 
You  know  that  England  only  came  in  some  days  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  war.  Personally,  I  was  convinced  that  she 
would  join,  but  after  all,  there  was  no  engagement  on  her 
part.  There  were  only  the  plans  on  the  means  of  embarking 
and  disembarking,  and  the  places  which  should  be  reserved 
for  the  troops." 

The  remainder  of  Joffre's  evidence  on  this  point  was  (as 

on  so  many  others)   confused  and  contradictory.     But  upon 

> 

*  De  Castelnau,  as  the  President  of  the  Commission,  M.  Maurice 
Viollette,  subsequently  remarked,  was  so  scrupulous  in  his  statements 
that  whereas  he  had  here  used  the  word  "Entente"  in  giving  evidence, 
he  changed  it,  in  correcting  the  shorthand  proof,  to  "Entrevues." 

5  As  a  matter  of  fact,  de  Castelnau  did  not  exactly  say  that  he  knew 
of  no  agreements  between  the  General  Staffs.  He  stated  that  he 
knew  of  no  agreement  between  the  two  countries :  but,  as  shown  above, 
refers  specifically  to  interviews  between  the  General  Staffs. 


THE  ENTENTE  9 

the  whole,  while  admitting  that  there  was  no  certainty  of 
British  aid,  he  sought  to  excuse  himself  for  not  extending 
his  Left  further  by  suggesting  that  he  counted  upon  six 
British  Divisions.6 

But  the  French  General  Staff  was  also  hampered  by  not 
knowing  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  Belgium  in  the  event 
of  her  territory  being  invaded  by  German  troops.  This 
remained  an  enigma  until  the  last  moment.  Lord  French  has 
said  with  reason  that  it  is  regrettable  that  Belgium  did  not 
decide  earlier  upon  the  line  she  should  adopt  in  the  hypothesis 
of  a  general  war.  Joffre  has  declared  that  he  relied  upon  the 
collaboration  of  the  Belgian  Army  since  it  was  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  certain  forts  would  not  have  been  constructed 
except  for  the  express  purpose  of  repelling  any  attack  by 
Germany.  But  at  best  this  was  a  supposition  based  upon  prob- 
abilities. The  question  was  always  considered  so  doubtful 
that  amongst  the  more  important  matters  which  the  French 
General  Staff  had  noted  for  special  inquiry,  in  any  period  of 
political  tension  preceding  a  possible  war  with  Germany,  was 
whether  the  Belgians  were  making  preparations  in  their  for- 
tresses on  the  Meuse.  No  better  refutation  could  be  given  of 
the  German  falsehood  that  Belgium  had  been  lacking  in  loyal 
observance  of  the  treaty  that  guaranteed  her  independence. 
But  the  resulting  uncertainty  was  a  handicap  to  the  French 
General  Staff. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  only  in  July,  1914,  that  the  Chief 
of  the  Staff,  General  de  Selliers  de  Moranville,  submitted  to 
the  Minister  of  War  the  plans  for  the  mobilisation  of  the 
Belgian  Army  in  the  case  of  a  German  invasion ;  while  these 
plans  contemplated  not  the  defence  of  the  Meuse,  but  "la  posi- 
tion de  Gethale."  7 

It  was  only  when  Germany  had  served  notice  that  she 
intended  to  disregard  the  neutral  rights  which  she  had  guar- 
anteed that  the  attitude  of  Belgium  was  definitely  known. 

The  decision  of  the  British  Government  rested  upon  more 

6  Eventually  only  four  divisions  were  sent. 

7  Letter  from  General  de  Selliers  de  Moranville  in  Ponrquoi  Pas? 
August  8th,  1919. 


10  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

complex  grounds.  Whether  or  not  England  should  support 
France  was  a  question  which  gave  rise  to  a  certain  division  of 
opinion  throughout  the  country;  but  to  a  much  more  acute 
and  more  dangerous  one  within  the  Cabinet  itself. 

Mr.  Asquith  saw  from  the  outset  the  risk  of  allowing  France 
to  be  overwhelmed;  but,  always  a  parliamentarian  rather  than 
a  statesman,  he  did  not  press  his  view  forcibly  upon  his  col- 
leagues; nor  is  it  certain  that  he  would  have  done  so  in  any 
event.  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  was  throughout  in  favour  of 
standing  side  by  side  with  France.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  (then 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer)  was  at  first  undecided,  although 
upon  the  whole  he  seemed  likely  to  be  won  over  by  the  argu- 
ments of  Mr.  Churchill.  But  on  Thursday,  July  30th,  a 
deputation  of  bankers  and  financiers  represented  to  him  that 
the  interests  both  of  the  country  and  of  the  world  at  large 
demanded  that  Great  Britain  should  stand  aside  and  should 
not  take  part  in  any  conflict.8  Such  a  decided  opinion,  coming 
from  such  a  quarter,  naturally  had  its  effect  upon  Mr.  Lloyd 
George.  In  the  critical  days  which  followed  he  still  hesitated, 
but  his  tendency  was  then  to  favour  the  policy  of  non-inter- 
vention. This  was  also  in  accord  with  the  view  held  at  that 
time  by  the  majority  of  the  Cabinet. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  seemed  to  be  hoping  against  hope  that 
war  might  be  averted.  It  was  to  this  sincere  statesman  a  real 
tragedy  to  see  the  structure  which  he  had  built  to  maintain 
peace  dissolving  before  his  eyes.  M.  Paul  Cambon  has  said  9 
that  during  this  terrible  week  there  were  in  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
two  men,  struggling  against  each  other :  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs,  who  realised  by  the  reports  from  all  the 
Embassies  that  a  war  seemed  inevitable,  and  the  Idealist,  who 
could  not  bring  himself  to  take  any  step  which  might  seem  to 
bear  the  nature  of  a  threat,  for  fear  that  he  might  thereby 
involve  England  in  the  struggle. 

The  part  taken  by  Lord  Haldane  is  hot  so  clear.  As  Sec- 
retary of  State  for  War  (in  1914  he  was  Lord  Chancellor) 

8  A   list   of   those   who   composed   this    deputation,   together   with   their 
explanations  to-day,  would  make  interesting  reading. 

9  La  Revue  de  France,  July  1st,  1921,  page  34. 


THE  ENTENTE  11 

he  had  some  years  earlier  been  responsible  for  changes  of  a 
far-reaching  nature  in  the  Army  and  in  the  military  system 
of  the  country.  Those  who  are  qualified  to  speak  with 
authority  upon  such  matters  differ  in  their  opinion  of  his 
work  at  the  War  Office.  Others  who  after  1914  criticised 
Lord  Haldane  upon  different  grounds  were  perhaps  some- 
times too  sweeping  in  their  condemnation.  But  to  some  extent 
he  brought  this  upon  himself.  For  while  the  value  of  his 
reforms  may  be  a  subject  for  discussion,  it  is  a  fact  (proved 
by  his  own  statements)  that  he  was  befooled  by  the  German 
Emperor  and  his  entourage. 

On  account  of  his  supposed  knowledge  of  German  men- 
tality, and  his  actual  friendship  with  many  German  politicians, 
Lord  Haldane  was  relied  upon  to  advise  Downing  Street  about 
the  real  intentions  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  and  the  state  of 
public  opinion  in  what  he  had  once  called  his  spiritual  home. 
It  is  on  record  that  he  told  the  country  that  Germany  had  no 
warlike  intentions,  and  that  there  was  no  reason  to  be  alarmed. 
Later,  but  subsequent  to  the  outbreak  of  war,  he  stated  that 
he  had  really  been  uneasy  ever  since  his  last  visit  to  Berlin. 
Whether  or  not  he  told  that  to  his  colleagues  is  less  clear.  But 
it  is  also  less  important.  That  only  affects  the  question  of 
Lord  Haldane's  sincerity.  If  he  told  the  Cabinet  and  the 
country  the  same  thing  it  means  that  he  was  hoodwinked  in 
Berlin.  That  is  the  more  probable,  the  most  charitable,  and 
on  the  whole  the  pleasanter  explanation,  though  it  is  one  which 
Lord  Haldane's  vanity  would  never  allow  him  to  proffer.  But 
if  he  disclosed  the  danger  to  the  Cabinet,  and  at  the  same  time 
lulled  the  public  into  a  false  sense  of  security,  his  fault  is 
greater  and  his  responsibilities  graver. 

The  attitude  adopted  by  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition,  Mr. 
Bonar  Law  and  Lord  Lansdowne,  in  voluntarily  promising 
to  support  the  Government  if  it  went  to  war,  undoubtedly  had 
an  effect  upon  some  members  of  the  Cabinet.  Nevertheless, 
the  division  of  opinion  (Lord  Morley,  Mr.  John  Burns,  and 
Lord  Beauchamp  being  unalterably  opposed  to  any  forcible 
intervention)  still  prevented  a  definite  decision.  On  July 
27th,  M.  de  Fleuriau,  then  Charge  d'Affaires  in  London,  tele- 


12  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

graphed  to  Paris  that  the  German  and  Austrian  ambassadors 
were  letting  it  be  understood  that  they  were  "sure"  that  Eng- 
land would  remain  neutral.  While  as  late  as  Saturday, 
August  ist,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  after  a  Cabinet  Council  held 
that  day,  informed  M.  Cambon  that  the  Government  did  not 
feel  able  to  decide  in  favour  of  taking  part  in  a  European  war. 
The  French  Ambassador,  in  protesting,  dwelt  at  length  upon 
the  gravity  of  such  a  course;  and  referred  in  particular  to  the 
fact  that  it  was  as  a  result  of  the  arrangement  between  the 
General  Staffs  of  the  two  countries  that  the  French  Channel 
coast  was  left  open  to  German  assaults. 

The  Cabinet  met  again  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  August 
2nd.  There  is  some  reason  to  believe  (although  any  absolute 
confirmation  is  lacking)  that  Sir  Edward  Grey,  while  reiter- 
ating that  he  had  taken  no  engagement  as  Foreign  Minister 
which  bound  the  country,  and  while  himself  not  urging 
British  participation  in  the  conflict,  intimated  that  if  the  Gov- 
ernment decided  to  take  no  action  in  the  event  of  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality,  his  usefulness  in  Downing  Street  might 
be  gone.  There  is  likewise  some  ground  for  thinking  that 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  less  than  ever  disposed  to  support 
those  who  favoured  acting  closely  with  France.  But  one  thing 
certain  is  that  the  meeting  came  to  an  end  without  any  further 
decision  having  been  reached.  One  Cabinet  Minister  subse- 
quently told  me  that  he,  Lord  Beauchamp  and  others,  who  were 
in  favour  of  England  remaining  neutral,  left  the  meeting  con- 
vinced that  their  view  would  prevail.10 

But  later  in  the  day  there  was  another  council.     Matters 

then  came  to  a  head;  and  the  Cabinet  decided  that  a  German 

10  In  a  recent  interview  (La  Revue  de  France,  July  ist,  1921,  p.  40) 
M.  Cambon  has  stated  that  a  great  city  financier,  "Lord  X,"  was  sum- 
moned to  this  morning  meeting  and  asked  to  gi*ve  his  opinion.  M. 
Cambon  adds  that  "Lord  X"  has  since  often  told  him  that  he  advised 
intervention,  but  that  he  has  every  reason  to  believe  the  contrary. 
One  would  naturally  think  that  "Lord  X"  referred  to  the  late  Lord 
Cunliffe,  then  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England,  and  as  such  the  finan- 
cial adviser  of  the  Government.  But  M.  Cambon's  words  rather 
indicate,  without  however  making  it  absolutely  clear,  that  it  is  a  peer 
who  is  alive  to-day.  M.  Mermeix  has  recently  affirmed  that  it  was 
Lord  Rothschild,  though  his  account  of  the  view  expressed  by  the  latter 
differs  somewhat  from  that  of  M.  Cambon.  (See  Le  Combat  des  Trois, 
p.  70.) 


THE  ENTENTE  13 

attack  on  the  French  Coast  would  be  considered  a  casus  belli, 
and  that  the  British  Fleet  would  co-operate  to  repel  it. 

In  the  course  of  the  evening  this  decision  was  communi- 
cated to  the  French  Ambassador.  During  his  twenty  years 
at  Albert  Gate  M.  Cambon's  greatest  hope  had  been  for  an 
effective  alliance  with  Great  Britain,  his  greatest  fear  that  it 
might  not  be  forthcoming  at  the  supreme  moment.  That  Sun- 
day night  he  judged  the  situation  with  his  habitual  discretion 
and  acumen.  He  knew  that  his  cause  was  won ;  that  a  great 
nation  did  not  wage  war  by  halves.  The  moment  she  decided 
to  join  forces  at  sea  it  inevitably  followed  that  Great  Britain 
would  likewise  support  France  on  land.  If  anyone  had  doubts 
on  that  point  they  vanished  when  Germany  waved  aside  her 
guarantee  of  Belgian  neutrality,  and  Sir  Edward  Goschen 
asked  for  his  passports. 

Unfortunately  the  military  authorities  were  not  of  one  mind 
about  the  use  to  be  made  of  the  Expeditionary  Force.  Some 
time  was  lost  in  awaiting  the  arrival  of  a  French  Military 
Mission.  It  then  appeared  that  Sir  Douglas  Haig  was  in 
favour  of  delaying  the  despatch  of  the  British  troops  until 
events  showed  whether  it  would  be  better  to  send  them  to 
Belgium  or  to  France.  While  Lord  Kitchener  (who  had  be- 
come Minister  of  War)  thought  that  it  would  be  wiser  to 
concentrate  them  near  Amiens.  But  Sir  John  French,  Gen- 
eral Wilson,  and  the  majority  agreed  with  the  representative 
of  the  French  General  Staff,  Colonel  Huguet,  that  it  was  wiser 
to  abide  by  the  original  plans,  made  before  the  war,  whereby 
the  British  would  take  their  stand  behind  Maubeuge  in  the 
Cambrai-Le  Cateau  zone. 

This  indecision  showed  in  the  very  first  days  of  the  war  the 
vital  weakness  of  Allies  who  had  no  complete  preconceived 
plans  of  joint  action.  It  was  the  basic  error  which  was  des- 
tined to  prolong  the  war;  and,  at  times,  to  jeopardise  the 
issue. 

Germany  began  the  struggle  with  the  advantage  of  being 
the  aggressor,  who  knew  exactly  what  she  meant  to  do,  and 
had  arranged  how  to  do  it. 

For  some  time  after  1870  von  Moltke  (who  remained  Chief 


14  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

of  the  Staff  until  1888)  thought  that  Germany  would  be 
strong  enough  to  take  the  offensive  against  both  France  and 
Russia  in  the  event  of  a  simultaneous  war  with  each  of  those 
countries.  It  was  his  growing  fear  that  the  rapid  recovery 
of  France  might  render  that  plan  unsafe,  which  led  to  the 
attempt  to  fasten  another  quarrel  on  that  country  in  1875. 
When  that  plot  was  exposed,  von  Moltke  changed  his  plan  to 
one  which,  devoid  of  all  technical  details,  consisted  in  a  de- 
fensive campaign  as  regards  France,  and  an  offensive  one 
against  Russia. 

In  1888  von  Moltke  was  succeeded  by  Count  Waldersee, 
who  as  Quartermaster-General  had  been  his  active  coadjutor 
since  1882.  At  one  time  Waldersee  favoured  an  offensive 
against  France.  But  finally  he  maintained  von  Moltke's  plan, 
with  the  reservation  that  if  the  time  of  year  when  hostilities 
broke  out  rendered  a  full  offensive  against  Russia  imprac- 
ticable, France  would  be  attacked  between  Toul  and  Epinay. 

Three  years  later  von  Schlieffen  (the  greatest  German 
strategist  since  von  Moltke)  succeeded  Waldersee.  He  was 
soon  called  upon  to  reconsider  the  whole  situation  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  an  alliance  between  France  and  Russia  had  actu- 
ally been  concluded.  For  some  years  he  also  maintained  von 
Moltke's  plan,  although  more  through  necessity  than  by 
conviction.  But  finally  he  adopted  one  which,  in  brief,  con- 
templated an  attack  against  the  French  centre,  combined  with 
an  envelopment  of  the  French  Left.  This  naturally  involved 
the  invasion  of  Belgium. 

But  later  von  Schlieffen  evolved  a  second  plan.  As  the  years 
went  by  he  constantly  strengthened  his  Right;  the  very  gist 
of  his  project  being  the  envelopment  of  the  French  Left.  By 
degrees  he  ultimately  arrived  at  the  idea  of  throwing  nearly 
four-fifths  of  his  mobilised  forces  upon  the  left  wing  of  the 
French  Army,  while  the  invasion  of  Holland  was  not  entirely 
eliminated  from  these  calculations. 

The  younger  von  Moltke,  who  became  Chief  of  the  Staff 
in  1906,  inherited  this  plan.  While  he  did  not  change  its 
character  he  does  not  appear  to  have  adopted  it  with  any  en- 
thusiasm.    He  had  neither  the  courage  nor  the  resolution  to 


THE  ENTENTE  15 

sweep  it  aside,  but  he  nibbled  at  it.  Von  Schlieffen  had 
constantly  worried  his  assistants  to  make  the  Right  stronger, 
but  von  Moltke  strengthened  his  Left  at  the  expense  of  his 
Right.  Undoubtedly  von  Schlieffen's  plan  was  an  audacious 
conception;  and  it  required  a  strong  and  bold  man  to  put  it 
into  execution.  But  von  Moltke  was  naturally  feeble  and 
vacillating.11 

Any  country  which  does  not  ensure  that  its  diplomatic  and 
military  authorities  work  closely  together  is  courting  disaster. 
Military  measures  taken  without  proper  regard  for  the  diplo- 
matic results  (which  again  may  entail  military  consequences) 
are  equally  as  dangerous  as  diplomatic  conventions  made  with- 
out due  reflection  upon  their  military  repercussion.  It  may 
be  impossible  always  to  hold  an  even  balance;  but  to  do  so 
ought  to  be  the  constant  endeavour.  Bismarck  was  always 
mindful  of  this  national  necessity.  His  action  in  altering 
in  the  very  presence  of  von  Moltke  the  Kaiser's  telegram  from 
Ems  (which,  in  its  original  form,  dashed  the  hopes  of  a  war 
for  which  both  had  schemed  and  prepared)  is  an  outstanding 
if  unpleasant  example  of  a  Foreign  Office  and  a  War  Office 
really  working  together.  In  the  settlement  of  the  terms  of 
peace  Bismarck  and  von  Moltke  each  made  concessions  to  the 
other ;  although  the  statement  that  the  former  was  entirely 
opposed  to  the  retention  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  must  be  taken 
with  some  reserve.  But  certainly  the  Chancellor  and  the  Chief 
of  the  Staff  were  in  full  accord  when  in  1875  they  would 
wantonly  have  attacked  France  had  it  not  been  for  the  inter- 
vention of  Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

After  war  had  actually  been  declared  Germany  twice 
abandoned  this  sound  policy;  and  acted  upon  Bernhardi's 
theory  that  the  diplomatists  should  shape  their  course  in  such 
a  way  as  will  best  carry  out  and  second  the  designs  of  the 
High  Command.     In  both  instances  the  result  was  disastrous. 

11  It  is  noteworthy  that  while  von  Tirpitz,  and  at  one  moment  von  der 
Goltz,  urged  the  capture  of  Calais  and  Boulogne,  so  as  to  cut  off  the 
British  troops  from  their  base,  the  idea  never  found  favour  with  the 
General  Staff,  because  the  very  soul  of  its  plan  was  the  conviction  that 
the  success  of  the  overwhelming  blow  it  had  prepared  would  entail  the 
fall  of  all  other  objectives. 


16  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  had  the  effect  of  immediately  bring- 
ing England  into  the  war.  Great  as  was  the  initial  advantage 
to  be  gained  through  entering  France  by  way  of  the  Meuse, 
it  was  more  than  offset  by  having  the  British  Empire  as  an 
active  foe  from  almost  the  first  day  of  the  war.  While  what 
little  the  diplomatists  could  do  afterwards  only  aggravated 
the  situation  and  increased  the  final  reckoning.  Germany  still 
pays  for  those  unfortunate  statements  that  a  treaty  is  a  scrap 
of  paper,  and  that  necessity  knows  no  law,  in  the  distrust  with 
which  she  is  viewed  by  the  world  at  large.  Bismarck,  always 
more  adept  than  his  successors,  put  the  contention  in  a  more 
convincing  light  when  he  once  said  "All  contracts  between 
great  states  cease  to  be  unconditional  and  binding  as  soon  as 
they  are  tested  by  'the  struggle  for  existence.'  No  great  na- 
tion will  ever  be  induced  to  sacrifice  its  existence  on  the  altar 
of  fidelity  to  contract  when  it  is  compelled  to  choose  between 
the  two."  The  soundness  of  that  statement  was  illustrated 
more  than  once  during  the  war.  But  it  is  one  thing  to  de- 
nounce a  treaty  because  it  affects  the  safety  of  the  State,  and 
another  for  years  deliberately  to  prepare  to  violate  it  for 
aggressive  ends. 

Equally  fatal  was  the  military  decision  ruthlessly  to  press 
the  submarine  warfare  regardless  of  the  diplomatic  conse- 
quence ;  which,  in  that  case,  was  the  addition  of  the  United 
States  to  the  list  of  Germany's  opponents. 

These  examples  are  glaring.  But  the  British  Government 
committed  (and  seems  likely  again  to  commit)  a  fault  of  an 
exactly  similar  nature.  Indeed,  in  July,  1914,  one  vital  dis- 
tinction between  the  position  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany, 
to  the  disadvantage  of  the  former,  was  that  there  was  a  prac- 
tical gap  in  the  field  which  should  have  been  closely  covered  by 
the  combined  work  of  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  War  Office. 
Since  there  was  no  defensive  alliance  between  England  and 
France  the  latter  was  forced  to  draw  its  plan  of  campaign  not 
only  in  ignorance  of  the  eventual  attitude  of  Belgium  (that  it 
was  perhaps  impossible  to  avoid),  but  not  knowing  even  until 
after  the  actual  outbreak  of  hostilities  whether  there  would 
be  any  British  troops  in  the  French  line :  not  knowing,  there- 


THE  ENTENTE  17 

fore,  to  what  point  it  would  be  necessary  to  extend  the  French 
Left.  The  evidence  of  Joffre  and  of  de  Castelnau,  and  above 
all  Sir  Edward  Grey's  letter  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  show  that 
while  there  had  been  conversations  between  the  General  Staffs 
there  was  no  diplomatic  agreement.  Even  the  interviews  be- 
tween the  staffs  were  so  little  binding  in  their  nature  that  after 
the  war  began  the  question  of  where  the  British  troops  should 
make  their  junction  with  the  French  Army  was  again  a  subject 
of  discussion;  while  in  the  end  only  four  divisions  were  sent 
instead  of  the  six  upon  which  the  French  General  Staff  had 
partially  relied. 

At  first  sight  the  result  of  this  limping  policy  would  seem 
to  bear  hardly  upon  France.  But  the  brunt  was  bound  to 
fall  with  equal  weight  upon  England.  British  troops  were  sent 
to  try  to  carry  out  a  plan  of  campaign  which  had  been  drafted 
without  the  assistance  or  assent  and  without  engaging  the 
responsibility  of  any  Englishman :  a  plan  of  campaign  which 
foresaw  nothing  which  did  happen,  and  which  made  little  or 
no  preparation  for  much  that  was  bound  to  happen :  a  plan 
of  campaign  which,  in  the  words  of  a  French  critic  12  who 
speaks  with  some  authority,  was  "humanly  impossible." 

UM.     Fernand     Engerand,     Deputy     for     Calvados.       See    his     work 
Le  Secret  de  la  Fronticre. 


CHAPTER    II 
Plan   XVII. 

Thirty  days  of  warfare  sufficed  to  prove  that  the  strategy 
of  the  French  General  Staff  was  defective  at  every  point. 
When  this  became  apparent  Joffre  unfairly  and  ungenerously 
tried  to  throw  the  blame  on  his  lieutenants  and  their  men.  But 
the  facts  are  against  him.  General  Bonnal  has  succinctly  de- 
fined strategy  to  be  the  art  of  conception.  It  is  now  admitted 
by  all  except  some  of  those  responsible  that  the  whole  concep- 
tion of  the  plan  of  campaign  was  erroneous. 

Germany's  declaration  of  war  did  not  take  France  by  sur- 
prise. For  more  than  a  generation  she  had  prepared  for  the 
struggle.  It  is  true  that  during  the  forty-three  years  between 
1871  and  1914  there  had  been  forty-one  Ministers  of  War; 
and  undeniably  such  frequent  changes  were  not  in  themselves 
favourable  to  the  development  of  military  plans.  Yet  despite 
this  constant  stream  of  arrivals  and  departures  at  the  rue 
Saint  Dominique  the  General  Staff  continued  its  work  without 
any  great  interruption.  During  the  period  immediately  pre- 
ceding the  war  there  was,  indeed,  little  or  no  undue 
interference  on  the  part  of  politicians. 

France  spent  more  on  her  Army  than  did  any  other  country 
except  Germany.  From  1872  to  1895  the  expenditure  of  each 
was  about  14  milliards  of  francs.  From  1896  to  191 2  Ger- 
many spent  16  milliards  875  millions,  and  France  11  milliards 
418  millions.  When  the  difference  in  population  and  in  wealth 
is  taken  into  account  these  figures  show  the  extraordinary 
effort  which  France  made  to  keep  pace  with  her  traditional 
enemy. 

Unfortunately  the  money  of  the  French  tax-payers  pro- 
duced less  than  did  that  collected  in  Germany.  The 
departmental  system  of  the  War  Office  was  complicated,  cum- 

18 


PLAN  XVII.  19 

bersome,  and  lacking  in  unison.  The  German  Minister  of 
War  had  only  four  immediate  subordinate  departments.  The 
French  War  Office  had  no  less  than  fourteen,  each  independ- 
ent of  the  other.  In  an  attempt  to  check  the  resulting 
confusion,  another  branch,  the  Direction  of  Control,  was 
created.     But  this  in  no  way  lessened  the  evil. 

However,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that  the  war  did  not  take 
France  by  surprise.  If  she  was  unprepared,  it  was  only  in 
the  sense  that  the  General  Staff  had  staked  everything  on  a 
plan  which  was  humanly  impossible;  while  it  counted  so  ab- 
solutely upon  the  success  of  that  plan  that  it  neglected  to 
take  even  ordinary  precautions  to  meet  the  situation  which 
was  bound  to  arise  in  the  event  of  a  reverse. 

In  191 1  General  Michel  was  Vice-President  of  the  Conseil 
Superieur  de  la  Guerre,  and  also  the  designated  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  French  armies  in  the  event  of  war.  In 
February  of  that  year  he  submitted  to  the  then  Minister  of 
War,  Messimy  (himself  a  soldier),  a  plan  of  campaign,  based 
upon  the  theory  that  the  Germans  would  invade  France  by 
the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  and  would  execute  a  turning  move- 
ment on  such  a  vast  scale  as  would,  from  the  outset,  necessitate 
putting  their  reserves  in  the  first  line.  Michel,  therefore,  pro- 
posed taking  strategic  safeguards  against  this  movement,  and 
also  making  a  much  more  extensive  use  of  the  French  reserves 
than  had  been  previously  contemplated.  A  month  later  Michel 
gave  a  conference  in  which  he  criticised  and  opposed  the  idea 
of  an  offensive  a  I'outrance,  which  was  then  so  popular  in 
certain  French  military  circles.  He  thereby  incurred  the  hos- 
tility of  the  younger  members  of  the  Staff  as  well  as  some 
of  his  own  immediate  colleagues;  while  even  Petain,  then  a 
colonel,  was  heard  to  say  that  Michel  had  lost  the  confidence 
of  the  Army. 

In  July  Messimy  obliged  the  latter  to  place  part  of  his  pro- 
posal before  the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre.  He  received 
no  support  whatever,  and  Messimy,  therefore,  forced  him  to 
resign  the  vice-chairmanship  as  well  as  the  eventual  leadership 
in  time  of  war.  It  is  fair  to  add,  however,  that  (as  appeared 
later)  Michel's  report  to  the  Minister  of  War  was  never  sub- 


20  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

mitted  in  full  to  the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre,1  and  that 
it  was  only  the  suggestions  about  the  utilization  of  the  reserves 
upon  which  that  body  deliberated. 

It  is  questionable  whether  Michel  was  a  strong  man.  Mes- 
simy  never  had  any  belief  in  his  competency.  Later,  when  the 
war  broke  out,  he  was  Military  Governor  of  Paris.  Messimy 
said  plainly  that  he  thought  him  to  be  incapable  and  demanded 
his  resignation,  and  when  Michel  demurred,  he  threatened  to 
send  him  forthwith  as  a  prisoner  to  the  Cherche-Midi.  But, 
whatever  may  be  the  measure  of  Michel's  ability,  later  events 
proved  that  his  vision  of  the  future  was  correct.  He  foresaw 
both  what  Germany  would  do  and  what  was  necessary  for  the 
protection  of  France. 

Messimy  considered  appointing  either  Pau  or  Gallieni  as 
Michel's  successor.  But  the  fact  that  both  would  retire  in 
1 9 1 2,  on  account  of  age,  told  against  them :  although  by  a 
special  decree  Gallieni  was  later  retained  on  the  active  list 
without  limit  of  age,  upon  the  ground  that  he  had  held  chief 
command  in  front  of  the  enemy.  Moreover,  Pau  (who  was  a 
veteran  of  the  war  of  1870)  imposed  the  condition  that  he 
should  have  the  sole  power  of  appointment  to  the  higher 
commands. 

Messimy,  therefore,  finally  offered  the  post  to  Joffre,  who 
was  already  a  member  of  the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre, 
and  who  would  not  come  under  the  age  limit  for  several  years. 
It  was  a  decision  which  he  regretted  later.  In  January,  1916, 
he  wrote  Gallieni  that  he  was  sorry  he  had  not  appointed  him 
instead  of  Joffre ;  while  his  subsequent  evidence  before  a  par- 
liamentary committee  seemed,  upon  the  whole,  to  support  the 
view  that  this  was  not  an  empty  compliment,  but  the  expres- 
sion alike  of  his  sincere  regret  and  of  his  real  opinion. 

Joffre  was  an  engineer  officer.  He  had  served  under  Gal- 
lieni in  Madagascar,  and  had  had  other  colonial  experience. 
But  he  knew  little  or  nothing  of  the  interior  working  of  the 
General  Staff,  and  he  would  have  refused  the  proposal  had 

*It  was,  of  course,  the  General  Staff,  and  not  the  Conseil  Superieur 
de  la  Guerre,  which  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  drafting  the  plan  of 
campaign. 


PLAN  XVII.  21 

not  Pau  encouraged  him  to  accept  it.  It  was  Pau  who  sug- 
gested to  him  that,  with  the  aid  of  de  Castelnau,  he  would  be 
able  to  meet  the  difficulties  of  the  routine  which  he  dreaded. 
Joffre,  therefore,  made  it  a  condition  of  his  acceptance  that 
de  Castelnau  should  be  named  as  his  assistant;  and  after 
twenty- four  hours'  reflection  Messimy  agreed. 

Joffre  is,  by  birth  and  nature,  a  Catalonian.  His  tranquil 
and  unshakable  confidence  in  himself  made  him  regard  col- 
leagues (in  the  true  sense  of  that  word)  as  unnecessary,  while 
his  love  of  secrecy  rendered  them  distasteful  to  him.  As 
Vice-President  of  the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre  he  seems 
to  have  been  omnipotent.  At  the  meetings  he  would  state  at 
the  same  time  both  the  question  to  be  decided  and  his  own 
decision  :  and  it  was  rare  that  there  was  any  opposition. 

He  had  never  directly  commanded  any  body  of  troops.  He 
was  incapable  of  directing  any  operations  in  the  field.  In 
giving  evidence  after  the  war,  Messimy  said  it  was,  of  course, 
known  to  everyone  that  it  was  General  Berthelot,  and  not 
Joffre,  who  had  commanded  the  operations.  It  is  also  highly 
improbable  that  he  was  able  to  evolve  or  draft  any  plan  of 
campaign.  Neither  his  previous  career  nor  experience  give 
any  ground  for  thinking  that  he  could  do  so.  While  his  own 
testimony  before  the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie  shows 
that  he  was  hopelessly  at  sea  about  the  whole  matter. 

But  he  was  capable  of  taking  a  decision  upon  the  advice 
given  to  him  by  the  subordinates  who  surrounded  him  and 
in  whose  attachment  to  himself  he  had  confidence:  and  equally 
capable  of  holding  to  that  decision  with  great  tenacity.  The 
very  fact  that  he  had  few  original  ideas,  but  an  imposing  and 
massive  exterior,  made  him  exactly  the  man  whom  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  wanted  as  an  exponent  of  the  theories  with  which 
it  provided  him.  General  Lanrezac  has  aptly  said  that  Joffre 
was  really  not  an  individual,  but  a  "raison  sociale."  It  was 
a  firm  which  bore  his  name,  but  in  which  he  was  not  the  most 
active  partner.  For  the  General  Staff  was  dominated  by  a 
group  of  comparatively  young  and  extremely  ambitious  offi- 
cers, who  were  entirely  possessed  by  the  conviction  that  an 
offensive  a  Voutrance  would  win  the  next  war  with  Germany 


22  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

and  that  nothing  else  could ;  that  the  conflict  would  be  of  short 
duration2  and  the  first  battles  decisive;  which  latter  opinion 
was  also  held  by  von  Schlieffen. 

The  chief  protagonist  of  this  doctrine  was  a  brilliant  and 
determined  man,  whose  name  was  little  known  to  the  public, 
but  who  played  an  important  part  in  shaping  the  plans  of  the 
French  General  Staff:  Colonel  (later  General)  Loyseau  de 
Grandmaison,  who  was  killed  at  Soissons.3  In  the  light  of 
what  the  war  taught,  the  theories  of  this  heroic,  but  mistaken, 
officer  make  strange  reading  to-day.  There  seems  to  be  an 
almost  hysterical  strain  running  through  such  sentences  as : 
"The  least  caution  in  the  offensive  destroys  all  its  efficacy  and 
loses  all  its  advantages.  In  the  offensive,  imprudence  is  the 
best  safeguard.  Only  the  offensive  method  can  force  the  vic- 
tory. It  is  necessary  to  prepare  it  and  to  prepare  others  for 
it.  Cultivating  with  passion,  with  exaggeration,  and  even  to 
the  smallest  details  of  instructions,  all  that  is  marked  by  the 
offensive  spirit;  let  us  go  to  excess,  and  perhaps  that  will  not 
be  enough." 

The  instructions  issued  to  the  Army,  from  time  to  time 
before  1914,  during  the  period  when  Joffre  was  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  bore  out  this  teaching.  For  instance,  in  December, 
1 91 3,  it  was  even  laid  down  that  artillery  should  not  prepare 
the  way  for  infantry  attacks,  but  should  support  them.  For, 
as  General  Ruffey  subsequently  testified  before  the  Commis- 

2  Bankers  and  economists  likewise  held  the  view  that  under  modern 
conditions  a  general  European  war  would  be  so  onerous  and  so  costly 
that  the  world  could  not  support  it  for  more  than  a  few  months.  These 
calculating  machines  forgot  to  make  allowance  for  certain  elements 
in  aroused  human  nature.  The  best  prophet  respecting  the  kind  of 
warfare  which  would  ensue  was  Bloch,  a  Polish  banker,  who  in  the 
'nineties  practically  predicted  trench  warfare  and  many  other  things 
which  came  to  pass.  But  neither  the  work  in  which  he  propounded 
his  theories,  nor  the  museum  which  he  established  at  Lucerne  to  illus- 
trate them,  were  taken  very  seriously. 

3  The  anonymous  author  of  Le  Plan  XVII.  (Payot,  Paris),  who 
is  favourable  to  the  General  Staff,  states  (pp.  38-9)  that  nothing  con- 
tributed more  to  render  the  doctrine  of  the  defensive  a  Voutrance  popular 
in  the  Army  than  two  lectures  given  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Grand- 
maison in  the  spring  of  191 1.  He  asserts  that  there  is  no  doubt  that 
these  lectures  had  such  an  effect  upon  the  High  Command  that  it 
embodied  in  Plan  XVII.  the  principles  which  Grandmaison  had  laid 
down. 


PLAN  XVII.  23 

sion  sur  la  Metallurgie,  Joffre  "was  entirely  subjugated  by 
the  young  men  of  his  entourage,  and  listened  complacently  to 
their  views,  which  were  often  childish." 

In  one  sense  it  is  true  that  only  an  offensive  can  lead  to 
a  decision.  But  that  dictum  does  not  mean  that  an  offensive 
will  always  succeed.  The  time,  to  some  extent  the  number 
of  the  opposing  forces,  and,  in  these  days,  above  all,  the 
comparative  artillery  strength  must  be  taken  into  account. 
But  while  the  French  General  Staff  adopted  the  doctrine  with 
enthusiasm,  it  entirely  lost  sight  of  these  considerations.  It 
might,  with  advantage,  have  remembered  that  after  1870  von 
Moltke  said :  "The  French  never  having  attacked  me,  I  was 
obliged  to  take  the  offensive  myself.  But  I  only  did  so  against 
my  own  will,  for,  in  my  opinion,  I  thus  obtained  less  decisive 
and  more  dearly-bought  successes  than  I  would  have  been  able 
to  get  by  a  method  more  in  conformity  with  my  own  ideas."  4 

While,  elsewhere,  von  Moltke,  after  referring  to  the  heavy 
price  which  had  always  to  be  paid  for  an  offensive  a  I'outrance, 
added :  "I  prefer  the  proceeding  which  consists  in  passing 
to  the  offensive  after  having  repulsed  several  attacks."  That, 
as  Lieutenant-Colonel  Thomasson  has  pointed  out,  is  the  very 
method  by  which  Foch  eventually  won  the  war. 

Even  Bernhardi,  the  great  apostle  of  the  offensive,  has 
written :  "If  we  want  to  count  upon  military  successes,  we 
must  not  forget  that  attack  is  infinitely  more  difficult  than  ever, 
and  that  the  assailant,  to  obtain  the  victory,  needs  to  have  a  very 
marked  superiority.     It  is  the  task  of  strategy  to  assure  it." 

It  was  the  greatest  fault  of  the  French  General  Staff,  before 

1 9 1 4,  that  it  entirely  neglected  or  ignored  that  task,  apparently 

believing  that  material  disadvantages  could  be  overcome  by 

engendering,   through  constant  teaching  and  orders,   a  spirit 

joi  aggression. 

Nor  did  all  British  military  authorities  share  the  blind 
faith  of  the  French  General  Staff  that  an  offensive  a 
I'outrance  was  a  sure  road  to  a  speedy  victory.  In  August, 
1 9 1 4,  Lord  Kitchener  not  only  warned  the  French  military 
mission  that  the  war  would  be  a  long  one,  but  he  also  expressed 

4  Critique  dcs  Travaux  du  Grand  Etat-Major. 


24  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

the  opinion  that  the  French  plan  was  dangerous.  The  French 
Military  Attache  in  London  wrote  to  the  rue  St.  Dominique 
that  Kitchener  was  "entirely  opposed  to  the  offensive;  if  we 
listened  to  him  we  would  remain  on  the  defensive  and  await 
three  successive  attacks  by  the  German  forces;  he  is  imbued 
with  the  principles  of  colonial  warfare  and  knows  nothing 
of  the  material  and  moral  advantages  of  the  offensive."  5 

In  191 3  a  pamphlet  appeared,  entitled  La  Concentration 
allemande,  which,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  gave  utterance 
to  the  view  and  plans  of  the  General  Staff.  Although  it  was 
published  anonymously,  military  circles  were  generally  aware 
of  the  identity  of  the  author.  But  it  was  not  until  191 5  that 
Le  Temps  informed  the  public  that  it  was  Lieutenant-Colonel 
(now  General)  Buat,  who  had  been  a  professor  at  the  ficole 
Superieure  de  Guerre,  who  was  then  on  the  General  Staff,  and 
who  subsequently  served  throughout  the  war  with  great  dis- 
tinction, being  Major-General  of  the  French  Armies  when  the 
armistice  was  signed. 

In  order  to  strike  the  imagination,  Buat  pretended  that, 
while  travelling  in  Germany,  he  had  found  a  copy  of  the  Ger- 
man plan  of  campaign,  which  had  been  left  in  a  railway 
carriage.  According  to  this,  the  Germans  would  enter  France 
with  twenty-two  army  corps — that  is,  one  million  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men — of  whom  nine  hundred  thousand  would 
belong  to  the  active  army  and  four  hundred  thousand  would 
be  reservists,  who  would  be  given  only  such  secondary  mis- 
sions as  the  occupation  of  conquered  territory.  Part  of  these 
forces  were  to  come  by  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse.  Buat, 
therefore,  concluded  that  the  French  forces  ought  to  face 
north-east  on  a  line  extending  from  Bel  fort  to  Mezieres.  In- 
cidentally, he  thus  disclosed  to  the  Germans  the  French  plan 
of  concentration.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  then  existing  plan 
XVI  bis  provided  for  a  concentration  exactly  from  Bel  fort  to 
Mezieres,  although  its  successor,  the  more  famous  Plan 
XVII.,  extended  the  line  to  Hirson.6 

6  See  Rapport  de  la  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie  en  France,  p.  57 
a  Plan  XVII.  was  approved  by  the  Government  in  the  spring  of   1913, 
and  became  operative  in  April,  1914. 


PLAN  XVII.  25 

At  the  same  time  Buat  entirely  misconceived  both  the  Ger- 
man plan  and  the  numbers  they  intended  to  use.7  It  is  true 
that  German  authorities  had  previously  written  that  their 
forces  would  be  divided  into  an  army  of  shock  and  an  army 
of  occupation.  Apparently  Buat  (as  well  as  the  General  Staff) 
accepted  this  statement  without  hesitation.  It  is  impossible 
to  say  now  whether  it  was  ever  sincere  or  whether  it  was  made 
simply  in  order  to  induce  the  German  people  to  accept  more 
readily  the  military  taxation  and  burdens  imposed  upon  them. 
The  probability  seems  to  be  that  it  was  the  real  plan  until 
1 91 2.  But  there  are  many  indications  that  from  that  time  the 
intention  was  to  use  the  reservists  in  the  first  line  immediately. 
However,  the  French'  General  Staff  accepted  the  German 
statements  all  the  more  readily  because  they  fitted  in  with  its 
own  conviction  that  the  French  reservists  would  be  useless  in 
the  first  line. 

But  in  the  work,  Quatre  mois  de  Guerre,  published  at  the 
end  of  1914  by  the  French  General  Staff  for  the  use  of  the 
representatives  of  France  abroad,  it  is  calculated  that  the  total 
German  forces  mobilised  and  actually  used  against  the  French 
armies  during  the  first  weeks  numbered  one  million  four 
hundred  thousand  men.  The  difference  (one  hundred 
thousand)  between  this  figure  and  that  in  Buat's  pamphlet  is 
not  enormous.  But  the  real  distinction  lies  in  the  use  made 
of  these  troops.  Buat  calculated  upon  a  shock  army  of  about 
nine  hundred  thousand.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  were 
thirty-four  corps  in  the  first  line.  For  the  reserves  were  used 
there  from  the  beginning;  and  the  work  which  the  French 
General  Staff  had  imagined  would  occupy  them  was  done 
mainly  by  the  Landwehr  or  other  troops.  The  difference,  as 
Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Thomasson  has  pointed  out,8  was  just 
equal  to  the  two  armies  of  von  Kliick  and  von  Biilow,  which 

7  The  author  of  Le  Plan  XVII.,  while  favourable  to  the  General 
Staff,  admits  (page  177)  that  its  miscalculation  about  the  German  forces 
was  the  cause  of  the  incomplete  state  of  the  French  fortresses  and  of 
the  insufficient  preparation  of  the  Army  and  of  the  entire  country  for 
war. 

8  See  Le  Revcrs  de  1914  ct  ses  Causes,  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  de 
Thomasson,  pp.  114  and  126.  See  also  Le  Plan  XVIL,  which  gives  a 
slightly  different  estimate. 


26  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

were  destined  to  pass  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse.  In 
brief,  the  French  General  Staff  made  an  error  of  fifty  per  cent, 
in  estimating  the  German  shock  effectives.9 

Moreover,  the  General  Staff  did  not  think  that  the  Germans 
would  come  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  precisely  because 
it  was  convinced  that  Germany  would  not  put  her  reserves 
in  the  first  line.  Thus  one  error  led  to  another.  "Le  com- 
mandement  frangais  ne  pensait  pas  que  le  movement  debordant 
a  travers  la  Belgique  dut  s'etendre  sur  la  rive  nord  de  la 
Meuse,  parce  qu'il  ne  croyait  pas  que  les  Allemands  em- 
ploiraient  leurs  divisions  de  reserve  en  premiere  ligne  des  le 
debut  des  operations."  These  are  the  words  of  General 
Mangin,  a  critic,  who,  other  things  being  equal,  is  inclined 
to  hold  the  scales  somewhat  in  favour  of  Joffre. 

It  was,  therefore,  in  vain  that  Gallieni  had  warned  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  that  Mauberge  should  be  further  fortified;  and 
while,  apparently,  a  little  more  heed  was  paid  to  his  advice 
about  making  greater  provision  for  the  defence  of  the  left 
bank  of  the  Meuse,  between  Verdun  and  Mezieres,  yet  the 
Staff  began  to  study  the  question  so  tardily  that  nothing  had 
actually  been  accomplished  when  war  broke  out. 

The  tale  is  the  same  about  heavy  artillery.  The  records  of 
the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre  show  that  Gallieni  drew 
attention  to  this  crying  need  (as  did  also  General  Ruffey  and 
General  Dubail)  in  October,  1913,  and  again  in  March,  1914, 
as  he  had  previously  done  in  191 1  in  a  report  to  the  Minister 
of  War.  No  attention  was  given  to  these  remonstrances. 
It  was  thought  that  the  lighter  75  would  do  everything.10  It 
needed  a  war  itself  to  enforce  Gallieni's  contention.  In  the 
early  days  of  the  conflict  nothing  was  more  severely  felt  and 
no  negligence  was  more  dearly  paid  for  than  this  lack  of 
heavy  artillery.     It  was  only  in  191 5  that  it  was  finally  sup- 

9  According  to  General  Percin's  evidence  before  the  Commission 
sur  la  Metallurgie,  the  total  of  the  German  forces  was  two  million,  as 
compared  to  Buat's  estimate  of  one  million  three  hundred  thousand. 
But  it  is  not  clear  exactly  what  Percin  took  into  account  in  arriving  at 
this  figure. 

10  The  75  was  adopted  when  the  late  General  Galiffet  was  Minister 
of  War. 


PLAN  XVII.  27 

plied,  and  that  the  necessary  officers  and  men  were  instructed 
in  its  use.11 

In  191 3  Joffre  gave  a  lecture  to  the  former  scholars  of  the 
ficole  Polytechnique.  The  text  of  his  discourse,  which  did 
not  deal  much  with  strategy,  was  the  necessity  of  preparation 
in  time  of  peace :  "In  our  days  'to  be  ready'  has  a  meaning 
which  it  would  have  been  difficult  for  those  who  formerly  con- 
ducted war  to  understand.  Everything  must  be  organised, 
everything  foreseen.  Once  hostilities  have  begun,  no  impro- 
visation will  serve.  What  lacks  then  will  lack  definitely.  The 
least  omission  may  cause  a  disaster." 

Excellent  words.  But,  in  the  way  of  material  preparation, 
Joffre  and  the  General  Staff  were  grossly  at  fault  in  respect 
both  to  artillery,  air  armament,  and  many  other  minor 
matters. 

It  has  been  contended  that  the  General  Staff  was  restricted 
because  successive  Governments  would  not  allow  a  sufficient 
expenditure.  Naturally  there  always  is,  and  always  will  be, 
some  contest  upon  the  subject  of  expenditure  between  the 
Treasury  and  the  heads  of  the  military  establishment :  it 
would  be  an  unhealthy  sign  were  it  otherwise.  But  the  figures 
do  not  show  that  the  French  Parliament  was  niggardly.  What 
is  more  apparent  is  that  the  money  was  often  ill  spent.  While, 
in  any  event  it  is,  in  the  last  analysis,  the  duty  of  the  General 
Staff  to  cut  its  coat  according  to  its  cloth,  and  not  to  attempt 
what  it  knows,  or  ought  to  know,  is  impossible  of  achievement 
on  account  of  lack  of  means. 

But  one  of  the  very  writers  who  has  advanced  this  defence 
of  Joffre  and  the  General  Staff  has  written  elsewhere,  in  the 
same  work,  that  in  191 4  French  soldiers  "were  still  dressed 
as  they  were  in  1830,  when  rifles  only  carried  to  a  distance  of 

11  Colonel  de  Thomasson  docs  not  attribute  a  "very  great  influence" 
on  the  result  of  the  frontier  battles  to  "the  overwhelming  German 
superiority  in  heavy  artillery."  But  he  admits  that  the  French  troops 
were  often  greatly  shaken  "by  these  great  cannon,  to  which  they  could 
not  reply."  See  Lc  Revcrs  dc  1914  et  scs  Causes,  p.  38.  This  weakness 
of  the  French  Army  was  well  known  in  Germany.  Tirpitz  has  even 
recorded  that  on  6th  July,  1914,  the  Fmperor  predicted  that  France 
would  hold  Russia  back  partly  on  account  of  her  own  lack  of  heavy 
artillery. 


28  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

200  paces,  and  God  knows  how  many  losses  were  imposed 
upon  us  by  the  kepi  and  the  red  trousers ;  we  had  no  machine- 
guns,  few  big  cannon,  and  hardly  any  aeroplanes ;  our  cavalry 
thought  only  of  brilliant  charges,  and  our  cavalry  chiefs  acted 
as  if  they  did  not  know  that  horses  must  drink  during  the 
day  and  must  rest  in  their  stables  at  night-time;  the  majority 
of  our  infantry  officers  were  badly  trained;  the  tactical  in- 
struction of  their  units,  left  at  the  free-will  of  each  individual 
when  it  was  made  at  all,  lacked  method  and  intensive  training. 
The  steps  of  progress  when  the  combat  was  engaged,  the  nec- 
essary infantry  period,  the  permanent  use  of  cover,  the  close 
liaison  between  infantry  and  artillery,  formations  diluted  to 
the  extreme  limit  under  shell  fire,  carefully  prepared  instead 
of  premature  attacks,  etc.,  etc.,  all  these  practices  were  for- 
gotten because  they  were  neglected  in  time  of  peace."  12 

Certainly,  for  the  errors  enumerated  in  the  latter  part  of 
this  sweeping  condemnation  it  was  the  General  Staff  and  those 
whom  it  directly  commanded  which  was  at  fault,  and  not  any 
Government. 
-^.  Plan  XVII.  was  defective  because  it  eliminated  all  idea  of 
manoeuvre :  and  yet  it  was  manoeuvre  which  eventually  won 
the  battle  of  the  Marne  after  the  General  Staff's  theory  of 
I' offensive  brutde  et  a  I'outrance  had  completely  broken  down 
on  its  first  trial.  It  might  possibly  have  had  some  chance  of 
success  against  a  weaker  enemy.  It  had  none  whatever  against 
one  who  was  stronger  in  numbers  and  who  in  all  material 
respects  was  better  prepared. 
-?«s~This  blind  faith  in  a  short  war  and  a  quick  victory  based 
on  an  offensive,  and  the  consequent  neglect  of  any  provision 
for  defensive  warfare,  led  to  an  error  of  almost  incalculable 
consequences.  France  drew  about  90  per  cent,  of  her  ore 
production  and  86  per  cent,  of  her  cast  iron  from  the  district 
of  the  Briey.  Yet,  incredible  as  it  seems,  the  plan  of  concen- 
tration did  not  provide  any  defence  of  that  region.13  It  was 
left  outside  of  the  territory  to  be  protected: 'v' Jo ff re  himself, 
in  giving  evidence  on  this  subject,  said :     "Plan  XVII.,  as 

"See  Le  Plan  XVII.,  by  XXX  (Payot,  Paris),  pp.  184-5. 
13  Previous  plans  had  been  guilty  of  the  same  omission. 


PLAN  XVII.  29 

well  as  preceding  plans,  left  the  Briey  district  outside  of  the 
zone  to  be  occupied  by  the  covering  troops."  The  excuse 
proffered  was  that  Briey  was  almost  under  the  guns  of  Metz, 
and  that  its  protection  would  have  necessitated  the  investment 
of  that  fortified  place — a  difficult  and  dangerous  operation. 
But  that  reply  does  not  disclose  the  whole  story.  The  report 
of  the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie  en  France  properly  states 
that  "the  General  Staff  considered  the  problem  of  the  Briey 
from  an  exclusively  strategic  point  of  view,  upon  the  hypoth- 
eses of  a  short  war,  with  an  absolute  faith  in  victory,  and 
without  having  even  contemplated  the  possibility  of  a 
reverse.14 

If  the  General  Staff  had  foreseen  a  four  years'  war  it  cer- 
tainly would  never  have  abandoned  to  the  enemy  the  metal 
of  which  France  had  such  sore  need.  But  it  could  see  only 
one  thing — the  necessity  for  an  offensive.  It  did  not  take 
even  elementary  precautions  to  guard  against  the  effect  of  a 
temporary  check  or  defeat.  In  the  result  France  was  obliged 
to  bring  metals  from  across  the  seas  to  replace  what  had  thus 
been  given  to  the  enemy.  While  Germany,  on  her  own  ad- 
mission, was  able  to  prolong  the  conflict  as  long  as  she  did 
because  these  mines  were  in  her  possession.*  M.  Loucheur  has 
rightly  said  that  the  loss  of  Briey  for  the  period  of  the  war 
was  a  catastrophe. 

The  parliamentary  commission  appointed  to  examine  why 
Briey  was  left  unprotected  drifted  somewhat  far  afield  in  the 
course  of  its  inquiry.  It  was  thus  that  Joffre,  Messimy,  and 
others  were  given  an  opportunity  to  make  what  explanation 
they  could  or  would  of  their  mistakes  of  judgment  or  execu- 
tion. 

To  do  Messimy  justice,  he  did  not  seek  to  diminish  his  own 
responsibility  as  Minister  of  War  during  part  of  the  period 
preceding  1914.  He  told  the  Commission  that  from  191 1  the 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  had  been  considered  as  certain, 
although  it  was  thought  that  it  would  only  be  partial,  and 

"  See    Rapport    de    la    Commission    sur    le    Metallurgie    en    France, 
Part  II.,  p.  11. 


30  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

would  not  affect  the  heart  of  Belgium.15  He  admitted  that  it 
had  been  a  great  mistake  not  to  make  more  use  of  the  reserves. 
But  he  declined  responsibility  for  the  circulars  of  1913  and 
1 9 1 4,  whereby  Joffre  had  authorised  commanding  officers,  in 
their  discretion,  to  reduce  the  number  attached  to  each  active 
regiment;  and  had  likewise  laid  down  that  reservists  should 
only  be  employed  for  secondary  duties,  such  as  keeping  ways 
of  communication  and  the  guarding  of  prisoners.16 

Finally,  Messimy  said  that  he  thought  it  was  useless  to 
discuss  whether,  if  it  had  to  be  done  over  again,  he  would 
"impose  upon"  Gallieni  the  post  which  the  latter  had  "nobly 
refused"  in  191 1.  He  admitted  that  he  was  far  from  being 
"in  rapt  admiration"  of  Joffre,  who  in  August,  191 4,  had 
been  unable  to  realise  that  the  German  Right  was  turning  his 
Left,  and  who  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne  had  persisted  in 
useless  partial  attacks ;  but  he  summed  him  up  as  having  a  sure 
if  slow  mentality,  and  as  possessing  many  of  the  qualities  of 
a  great  chief. 

Joffre's  testimony  upon  the  same  points  differed  somewhat 
from  that  of  Messimy,  while  it  was  neither  so  clear  nor  so 
convincing.  The  questions  and  answers  are  worth  quoting, 
if  only  because  they  show  that  his  main  anxiety  seems  to  have 
been  rather  to  make  no  admission  of  error  than  to  help  the 
Commission  by  throwing  light  upon  the  past. 

Referring  to  the  fact  that  prior  to  191 4  Joffre  had  ignored 
certain  warnings,  the  President  of  the  Commission  said : 

"It  has  been  explained  to  us  that  the  plan  of  concentration 
aroused  the  criticism  of  several  members  of  the  Conseil  Su- 
perieur  de  la  Guerre,  and  notably  of  General  Ruffey  and  Gen- 
eral Gallieni,  because  it  did  not  contemplate  the  hypothesis  of 
the  invasion  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  and  especially  by 
Lille. 

15  The  reason  (which  seems  obscure)  for  this  belief  must  have  been 
entirely  of  a  military  nature,  for  in  no  other  respect  could  it  make  any 
difference  whether  the  violation  of  neutrality  extended  to  the  whole  or 
to  part  of  the  country. 

"I  purposely  do  not  discuss  the  contention  that  an  increased  use  of 
the  reserves  would  have  rendered  the  Three  Years'  Service  unnecessary. 


PLAN  XVII.  31 

"Joffre  :  That  greatly  astonishes  me,  since  in  the  General 
Staff  we  always  had  that  idea  of  the  attack. 

"The  President  :  I  did  not  have  that  impression  when  you 
read  your  memorandum,  for,  even  allowing  for  the  variant, 
Plan  XVII.  places  the  extreme  Left  of  the  French  Army  at 
Hirson.  ...  It  has  been  explained  to  us  precisely  that  at  the 
moment  when  you  submitted  this  plan  to  the  Conseil  Superieur 
de  la  Guerre  General  Ruffey  and  General  Gallieni  observed 
that  it  was  disturbing,  because  in  their  opinion  it  was  beyond 
discussion  that  the  invasion  of  France  would  be  by  a  large 
turning  movement  of  the  German  Army,  one  which  would 
embrace  Lille  and  perhaps  Dunkirk.  Do  you  remember  the 
remarks  of  General  Ruffey  and  of  General  Gallieni  ? 

"Joffre:  I  have  no  recollection  of  them,  but  I  do  not  say 
that  they  were  not  made. 

"The  President:  At  the  very  moment  when  the  Three 
Years'  law  was  discussed — and  I  remember  it  very  well  my- 
self— observations  were  made  to  you  regarding  the  hypothesis 
of  the  invasion  by  way  of  Belgium,  and  the  vast  movement 
which  was,  in  fact,  executed.  Did  not  that  lead  you  to  reflect 
that  Plan  XVII.  was  perhaps  not  sufficiently  prudent? 

"Joffre  :  All  that  is  so  vague  that  I  cannot  answer  you." 

Joffre's  evidence  regarding  the  reserves  was  equally  im- 
precise. He  was  indeed  forced  to  admit  that  he  had  given 
orders  which  allowed  a  reduction.  But  when  he  suggested 
that  all  the  reserves  were  utilized,  figures  were  placed  before 
him  showing  irrefutably  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  the  depots 
were  crowded  with  reservists,  and  that,  moreover,  there  was  no 
provision  of  rifles  for  them.  Joffre's  only  comment  was,  "I 
would  not  dare  to  contradict  you;  I  do  not  say  either  yes 


or  no." 


Equally  fruitless  were  the  efforts  of  the  Commission  to 
discover  who  were  the  authors  of  the  plan  of  operations.  No 
one  seemed  desirous  to  claim  that  distinction.  Joffre's  testi- 
mony is  at  least  curious,  if  not  illuminating: 

"The  President  :  Was  the  plan  of  operations  discussed  by 
the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre? 

"Joffre:  No,  that  is  not  the  business  of  the  Conseil  Su- 
perieur de  la  Guerre. 


32  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

"The  President:  How,  then,  was  the  plan  of  operations 
elaborated  ? 

"Joffre:  The  plan  of  concentration  is  the  function  of  the 
plan  of  operations. 

"The  President:  By  whom  was  the  plan  of  operations 
elaborated  ? 

"Joffre  :  By  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army  under  my  di- 
rection. 

"The  President  :  General  de  Castelnau  has  testified  that  as 
Sub-Chief  of  the  General  Staff  he  was  ignorant  of  the  plan  of 
operations. 

"Joffre  :  I  cannot  tell  you  about  that. 

"The  President  :  Who  elaborated  the  plan  of  operations, 
and  who  collaborated  with  you  in  this  work  if  the  first  Sub- 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  did  not  have  any  part  in  it? 

"Joffre  :  My  recollections  are  too  imprecise  for  me  to  an- 
swer you.  If  General  de  Castelnau  has  told  you  that  he  was 
ignorant  of  it,  it  must  be  so. 

"The  President  :  I  looked  over  his  deposition  again  this 
morning,  because  this  detail  had  struck  me,  and  I  desired  to 
put  the  question  to  you. 

"Joffre  :  I  don't  remember. 

"The  President  :  Who  took  part  in  elaborating  the  plan  of 
operations  ? 

"Joffre  :  I  don't  remember. 

"The  President  :  It  seems  that  you  ought  to  be  able  to  re- 
member the  officers  with  whom  you  worked;  it  was,  in  brief,  a 
matter  which  must  have  caused  you  a  great  deal  of  worry. 

"Joffre  :  But  all  the  General  Staff  participated.  A  plan  of 
operations  is  an  idea  that  one  has  in  one's  head,  but  that  one 
does  not  put  on  paper." 

The  examination  on  this  point  proceeded  for  some  time 
with  no  further  result,  until  Joffre  finally  declared,  "You  are 
asking  me  a  bundle  of  things  which  I  can't  answer.  I  know 
nothing." 

Much  clearer  is  what  actually  did  happen.  The  war  found 
the  General  Staff  firm  and  consistent  in  its  adhesion  to  the 
doctrine  that  an  offensive  should  be  persisted  in,  even  if  based 
upon  incomplete  information.  An  ill-advised  advance  was 
made,  and  the  first  practical  result  of  these  teachings  began  to 


PLAN  XVII.  33 

be  seen.  According  to  M.  Hanotaux  (who  may  be  regarded 
as  an  official  historian  of  the  Grand  Quartier  General),17  "mad 
bayonet  charges  were  launched  at  a  distance  of  a  mile  from  the 
enemy  without  artillery  preparation";  and  the  ill-regulated 
spirit  of  the  offensive  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  French 
reverses. 

But  the  General  Staff  clung  to  its  erroneous  preconceptions 
in  the  face  of  facts  which  convinced  everyone  else. 

In  April,  191 4,  General  Lanrezac  had  been  appointed  to 
succeed  Gallieni  (who  had  then  reached  the  age  limit)  on  the 
Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre;  and  the  following  month  he 
received  an  order  which  invested  him  with  the  command  of 
the  Fifth  Army  in  the  event  of  war.  This  was  the  army 
which,  according  to  Plan  XVII.,  held  the  French  Left.  Lan- 
rezac did  his  utmost  to  persuade  Joffre  to  give  him  the  First- 
Army  (the  army  of  the  Vosges),  on  the  ground  that  as  he 
had  been  its  Chief-of -Staff  for  five  years  he  was  thoroughly 
familiar  with  that  theatre  of  operations.  When  Joffre  re- 
fused to  do  so  he  began  to  study  the  situation  in  the  north. 
He  soon  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  the  Germans  would 
unblushingly  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and,  making 
the  most  of  that  act,  would  come  by  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse. 

After  Lanrezac  had  taken  the  command  of  the  Fifth  Army 
in  August,  1 91 4,  he  discerned  indications  which  confirmed 
this  opinion.  He  was  convinced  that  the  German  Right  was 
stronger  than  Plan  XVII.  had  anticipated  it  would  be,  and 
that  it  meant  to  make  a  turning  movement  by  the  left  bank 
of  the  Meuse.  On  August  7th  he  sent  his- Chief -of-Staff  to 
communicate  this  opinion  to  Joffre.  But  the  only  reply  he 
got  was  that  the  "responsibility  of  stopping  a  turning  move- 
ment against  his  Left  was  not  his."  On  August  8th  Joffre 
actually  issued  an  order  for  "an  offensive  of  all  forces  united, 
with  the  Right  flank  on  the  Rhine."  The  role  of  the  Fifth 
Army  was  left  undecided;  but  it  was  to  be  ready  for  either 
an  offensive  or  defensive  facing  east. 

"  See    Rapport    dc    la    Commission    sur    la    Mitallurgie    en    France, 
Part  II.,  p.  47,  Note  II. 


34  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Another  order  from  the  Grand  Quartier  General,  on  August 
13th,  showed  that  Joffre  still  thought  that  the  danger  lay  in 
the  east.  On  the  following  day  Lanrezac  himself  went  to 
see  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  urge  his  belief  that  an  over- 
whelming German  attack  would  come  by  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse.  Joffre  replied,  "We  have  a  feeling  that  the  Germans 
have  nothing  ready  on  that  side" ;  a  view  likewise  expressed  by 
his  Chief-of-Staff. 

During  all  this  period  Lanrezac's  advice  was  received  with 
equal  scepticism,  whether  he  sent  it  by  one  of  his  staff  or  him- 
self spoke  to  Joffre.  Various  incidents  show  that  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  thought  Lanrezac  was  a  nuisance,  while  he  thought 
that  they  were  fools;  and  that  neither  took  any  pains  to  con- 
ceal their  respective  convictions. 

On  August  15th  Lanrezac  was  finally  allowed  to  make 
preparations  for  the  possible  execution  of  the  movement 
towards  the  north  which  he  had  urged  as  a  necessary  measure 
of  safety.  But  even  on  August  16th  Joffre  was  responsible 
for  a  proclamation  in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  German 
attack  by  way  of  Belgium  had  "lamentably  failed."  18 

While  as  late  as  August  18th  or  19th  General  Berthelot,  the 
real  director  of  operations,  telephoned  to  the  Minister  of  War, 
Messimy  (who  was  getting  anxious  about  the  Left)  :  "The 
more  we  have  against  our  Left  the  better  it  will  be,  as  it  will 
give  us  more  chance  to  break  their  Centre."  For,  as  Gallieni 
had  discovered  when  he  spent  some  hours  at  the  Grand  Quar- 
tier General  on  August  14th,  Joffre  and  his  subordinates  were 
obsessed  by  the  idea  that  they  would  break  the  German  Centre 
and  then  make  a  turning  movement  against  the  German  Right : 
an  idea  which  was  Napoleonic  in  its  conception,  but  in  nothing 
else,  for  it  was  based  upon  ignorance  of  or  deceptive  informa- 
tion respecting  the  enemy's  forces  and  plans. 

The  battle  of  Charleroi  completed  the  demolition  of  the 
strategy  of  the  General  Staff,  and  forced  Joffre  to  abandon 

18  In  giving  evidence  before  the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgic,  Joffre 
was  asked  about  this  announcement.  He  made  his  favourite  reply, 
"I  don't  remember."  But  when  he  seemed  to  question  the  authenticity 
of  the  document,  the  President  of  the  Commission  placed  it  before 
him. 


PLAN  XVII.  35 

Plan  XVII.  As  Sir  John  French  soon  discovered,  he  was 
not  immediately  able  to  substitute  another  in  its  place. 

It  has  been  stated  that  after  that  engagement  the  British 
retreated  before  the  French.  But  it  is  now  definitely  estab- 
lished that  the  contrary  was  the  case.  M.  Gabriel  Hanotaux 
has,  indeed,  written  that  the  British  order  was  given  at  five 
p.m.  on  August  23rd,  and  Lanrezac's  order  only  at  nine  p.m. 
But  he  omitted  to  state  that  while  it  was  Joffre  who  tele- 
graphed to  the  British  Commander-in-Chief  warning  him 
of  the  extent  of  von  Kliick's  pressure,  and  announcing  the 
French  retreat,  the  latter  retirement  had  already  actually  be- 
gun at  that  hour ;  while  the  British  only  commenced  to  retreat 
on  the  morning  of  August  24th,  after  fighting  all  night. 
French  was  so  much  taken  aback  by  this  proceeding  that  when, 
during  a  meeting  at  Compiegne,  on  August  29th,  he  was  urged 
to  co-operate  in  a  certain  movement,  he  recalled  with  feeling 
that  only  some  days  earlier  the  Fifth  Army  had  commenced 
to  fall  back  hours  before  Joffre  had  communicated  to  him 
that  he 'had  been  forced  to  abandon  his  plan. 

On  the  contrary  M.  Fernand  Engerand  has  written  that 
"the  retreat  of  the  British  followed  ours,  and  did  not  pre- 
cede it :  it  is  a  duty  of  loyalty  to  say  so,  as  also  to  admit  that 
in  the  frontier  battles  the  British  Army,  which  its  commander 
put  on  the  defensive,  was  the  only  one,  besides  the  French 
First  Army,  which  could  hold  the  enemy."  10 

M.  Hanotaux,  however,  has  repeated  his  misstatements  in 
the  face  of  various  corrections.  But  the  eminent  academician 
can  no  longer  be  taken  as  an  unprejudiced  authority  on  this 
subject.  In  its  report  the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie 
pointed  out  20  that  he  may  be  regarded  as  an  official  historian 
of  the  General  Staff.  As  such  he  might  have  employed  his 
time  to  better  advantage  had  he  explained  how  it  was  that 
practically  at  the  same  time  that  Joffre  advised  the  British  of 
the  danger  and  of  the  French  retreat,  which  was  then  in  prog- 
ress, he  telegraphed  (at  4.40  p.m.)  to  Lanrezac  in  the  follow- 

19  See   he   Secret    des   Frontieres,   by    Fernand    Engerand,    Deputy    for 
Calvados. 

20  See  Rapport  dc  la  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie,  Part  IT.,  p.  47. 


36  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

ing  terms :  "I  request  you  to  give  me  your  opinion  on  the 
situation  and  what  you  count  upon  doing.  You  are  in  touch 
with  Marshal  French.  How  do  you  regard  the  situation,  and 
what  support  is  he  able  to  give  you?" 

The  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie  concluded,21  with  great 
reason,  that  these  two  messages  are  "absolutely  contradictory," 
and  that  they  give  rise  to  "an  obscure  point  which  history  will 
have  to  elucidate." 

The  General  Staff  subsequently  blamed  Lanrezac  for  order- 
ing the  retreat  (as  he  did  on  his  own  responsibility)  and  break- 
ing off  the  conflict  of  Charleroi.  That  criticism  may  be  left 
on  one  side  with  the  remark  that  it  has  given  rise  to  a  dis- 
pute which  bids  fair  never  to  be  settled.  Lanrezac's  sup- 
porters contend  that  by  his  action  he  avoided  a  second  Sedan. 
While  the  report  of  the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie  says, 
without  qualification,  that  "the  battle  of  Charleroi  was  lost 
before  it  was  begun;  the  great  merit  of  the  Commander  of 
the  Fifth  Army  was  to  have  dared  to  prevent  it  from  turning 
to  a  disaster  and  to  have  taken  upon  himself  to  break  the  battle 
before  the  whole  left  wing  of  the  Allies  was  enveloped." 

Upon  the  other  hand,  Lanrezac's  opponents  contend  that 
the  battle  was  never  really  engaged,  and  that  he  avoided  it. 

Before  the  war  Lanrezac  had  achieved  fame  as  a  military 
professor.  He  was  one  of  the  oracles  of  the  French  Army, 
although  his  theories  were  in  contradiction  with  the  doctrine 
of  the  offensive  a  I'outrance,  to  which  the  General  Staff  was 
wedded.  Moreover,  as  has  been  shown,  he  was  equally  at 
variance  with  the  views  of  the  General  Staff  about  the  German 
plan  of  campaign.  Events  proved  that  he  was  right  and  the 
General  Staff  wrong. 

On  September  3rd  Lanrezac  was  relieved  of  his  command. 
The  reason  given  by  one  who  apparently  spoke  for  Joffre 
was  that  he  did  not  adopt  the  views  of  the  General  Staff, 
while  M.  Hanotaux  has  written  that  it  was  because  of  his 
lack  of  liaison  with  the  English.  Certainly  Lanrezac  made 
an  unfavourable  impression  upon  Sir  John  French,  with  whom 
he  had  several  unpleasant  clashes.     While  his  ejaculation  on 

21  See  Rapport  de  la  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie,  Part  II.,  p.  108. 


PLAN  XVII.  37 

August  29th,  when  Haig  (acting  under  French's  orders)  did 
not  give  him  the  support  which  he  had  conditionally  offered, 
was  something  worse  than  indiscreet.22  But  though  French 
and  Lanrezac  were  temperamentally  antipathetic  the  one  to 
the  other,  the  root  of  evil  (as  Lanrezac  has  since  admitted) 
was  that  French,  unknown  to  him,  was  bound  by  his  instruc- 
tions never  to  place  himself  under  the  orders  of  any  Allied 
general,  and  was  restrained  by  the  warning  that  he  could 
not  count  upon  any  great  or  speedy  reinforcements. 

In  considering  the  case  of  Lanrezac,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  even  M.  Hanotaux,  the  apologist  for  the  General  Staff, 
has  written  that  "from  the  outset  General  Lanrezac  insistently 
indicated  the  danger  of  a  turning  movement  by  Lower  Bel- 
gium, but  the  Command  was  intent  upon  holding  to  its  con- 
ception of  an  advance  against  the  enemy's  Centre." 

But  even  if  a  Commander-in-Chief  is  wrong  in  his  strategy, 
he  cannot  afford  to  have  a  lieutenant  who  is  inclined  to  dis- 
cuss rather  than  to  execute  his  orders.  It  is  at  least  ques- 
tionable whether  Lanrezac,  although  undoubtedly  a  great  and 
brilliant  military  theorist,  is  capable  of  leading  troops  in  the 
field.  The  late  General  de  Maud'huy  proclaimed  vigorously 
that  Lanrezac  had  proved  his  worth  in  this  respect  while  he 
commanded  the  Fifth  Army  in  August,  1914.  Certainly  his 
action  in  breaking  off  the  battle  of  Charleroi  showed  that  he 
was  willing  to  shoulder  responsibility.  Possibly  that  course 
avoided  a  great  disaster.  But  equally  certainly  it  showed 
more  prudence  on  Lanrezac's  part  than  he  had  exhibited  during 
the  earlier  days  of  the  campaign,  when  he  urged  Joffre  to 
allow  him  to  sally  northwards.  While  I  am  bound  to  add  that 
the  only  member  of  his  staff  with  whom  I  have  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  discuss  the  matter  stated  vigorously  and  in  detail 
that,  although  Lanrezac's  preconceived  theories  were  undoubt- 
edly right,  he  impressed  him,  after  the  first  few  days  of  the 

23  When  the  news  was  brought  to  him,  Lanrezac  said :  "It  is  treason" 
("C'est  une  felonie").  Lanrezac  himself,  without  quoting  his  own  words, 
admits  that  he  expressed  his  ill-humour,  and  adds :  "Of  course,  I 
never  thought  that  General  Haig,  a  true  gentleman  and  a  real  soldier, 
was  responsible."     See  Le  Plan  de  Campagne  Franqais,  page  231. 


38  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

campaign,  as  temperamentally  unfitted  to  command  in  the  field 
in  time  of  war.23 

On  August  25th  Joffre  acknowledged  the  failure  of  his  plan 
by  issuing  a  General  Instruction,  stating  that  it  had  been  found 
impossible  to  execute  the  projected  offensive.  It  is  regrettable 
for  his  own  fame  that  then  and  later  he  attempted  to  place 
the  blame  upon  those  who  had  done  their  best  to  execute  his 
orders,  and  who  had  sacrificed  themselves  or  who  had  been 
sacrificed  in  attempting  to  carry  out  the  plans  of  the  General 
Staff.  All  the  generals  commanding  and  their  subordinates 
were  not  incompetent;  nor  was  there  any  serious  fault  to  be 
found  with  the  troops.  But  the  General  Staff's  strategy  had 
broken  down  at  all  points.  All  attempts  since  made  to  reha- 
bilitate it  have  been  of  the  weakest  nature.  The  majority  of 
French  military  critics  admit,  more  or  less  openly,  the  vital 
defects  in  Plan  XVII.  They  wisely  think  that  there  is  glory 
enough  for  the  French  Army  in  the  great  strategic  successes 
of  the  latter  part  of  the  war.  But  occasionally  some  of  Joffre's 
friends  make  a  feeble  effort  to  prove  that  the  General  Staff 
was  not  guilty  of  any  faulty  dispositions.  A  recent  instance 
of  this  kind  was  an  article  by  General  Dupont  in  La  Revue 
Militaire  Frangaise.24  The  whole  burden  of  his  excuse  may 
be  summed  up  by  saying  that  the  General  Staff  thought  that 
Belgium  would  make  some  compromise  with  Germany,  and 
that  the  violation  of  the  former's  territory  would  only  be  par- 
tial. He  advances  several  interesting  reasons  which  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  had  for  holding  that  belief.  But  he  seems  to  be 
unaware  that  he  is  thereby  not  refuting  the  charge  of  the 
basic  error,  but  on  the  contrary  is  confirming  it.  Much  more 
to  the  point  is  the  judgment  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Grouard, 
who,  in  the  same  number  of  La  Revue  Militaire  Frangaise,24 
makes  the  categorical  pronouncement  that  "le  haut  commande- 

23  But  in  reply  to  a  direct  query,  his  Chief-of-Staff,  General  Hely 
d'Oissel,  wrote  to  Lanrezac  in  December,  1916,  denying  that  he  had 
ever  said  that  Lanrezac  "had  lost  his  head,"  and  rendering  credit  to 
the  latter's  strategic  dispositions  for  the  fact  that  the  Fifth  Army  was 
still  intact  at  the  time  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

21  La  Revue   Militaire  Francaise,   July,    1921. 


PLAN  XVII.  39 

ment   frangais  avait  fait  preuve  d'un  defaut  absolu  de  sens 
strategique." 

In  giving  evidence  before  the  Commission  sur  la  Metal- 
lurgie  Joffre  asserted  that  the  battle  of  the  Marne  was  the  out- 
come of  a  plan  which  he  had  conceived  on  August  25th.  The 
report  of  the  evidence  shows  that  the  President  of  the  Com- 
mission was  not  disposed  to  agree  with  that  statement.  Nor 
does  it  seem  to  accord  with  the  facts  as  known.  It  is  on  record 
that  after  Charleroi,  after  Joffre  had  admitted  the  compulsory 
abandonment  of  his  offensive,  Sir  John  French  tried,  and  tried 
in  vain,  to  find  out  from  him  what  was  his  new  plan.  Joffre's 
enigmatic  reply  at  St.  Quentin,  on  August  26th,  certainly  did 
not  correspond  to  what  French  had  the  right  to  expect.  While 
it  was,  indeed,  French  himself  who  was  the  first  to  propose 
that  a  stand  should  be  made  on  the  Marne.  On  September 
1st  he  submitted  a  memorandum  embodying  this  plan,  which 
Joffre  rejected  on  the  following  day  as  being  impracticable 
under  existing  conditions. 

In  any  event,  the  necessary  precedent  of  the  Marne  was  the 
Battle  of  the  Ourcq,  which  was  engaged  by  Gallieni  and  the 
troops  which  were  defending  Paris. 

It  was  precisely  on  August  25th,  at  n.30  a.m.,  that  Joffre 
received  an  imperative  order  from  the  Minister  of  War  (Mes- 
simy)  that  if  he  was  forced  to  retreat  he  should  detach  three 
corps  for  the  defence  of  Paris.  For  the  Government,  which 
had  been  careful  not  to  interfere  with  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  and  which  had  been  kept  in  complete  ignorance  by  him, 
began  to  be  alarmed  about  the  safety  of  the  capital;  and  all 
the  more  so  because,  when  Gallieni  had  spent  a  day  at  the 
Grand  Quartier  General,  Joffre's  Chief-of-Staff  had  con- 
temptuously intimated  that  the  fate  of  Paris  was  of  little 
account :  25  "Une  ville  comme  toutes  les  autres." 

M.  Maurice  Violette,  the  Chairman  of  the  Commission  sur 
la  Metallurgie,  seemed  to  believe  that  Joffre  had  only  acted 
upon  compulsion  in  allotting  troops  for  the  defence  of  Paris, 
although  the  latter  persisted  in  affirming  that  this  order  had 

26  See  article  by  M.  Messimy  in  the  Revue  de  Paris,  September  15th, 
1921. 


40  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

not  in  any  way  influenced  his  conduct.  That  statement  is  in 
absolute  disaccord  with  the  report  of  General  Hirschauer 
(who  was  sent  at  this  juncture  to  visit  the  General  Staff)  that 
the  order  was  resented :  which  is  confirmed  by  Messimy. 
While  opinion  is  not  unanimous,  there  is  no  general  belief  in 
military  circles,  either  in  France  or  elsewhere,  that  the  retreat 
was  part  of  a  strategic  plan  which  ended  in  the  battle  of  the 
Marne.  Neither  M.  Hanotaux's  somewhat  ecstatic  account, 
nor  the  more  sober  narrative  issued  by  the  General  Staff  some 
months  later,  carries  any  conviction.  The  latter  is  a  glaring 
example  of  a  work  written  with  one  eye  on  posterity.26  An 
unprejudiced  French  authority — Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Thom- 
asson — has  pronounced  it  to  be  interesting  only  subsequent 
to  its  relation  to  the  battle  of  the  Marne,  the  account  of  the 
initial  plan  of  campaign  and  of  the  frontier  battles  being  almost 
unintelligible  and  manifestly  prejudiced. 

In  the  period  between  the  collapse  of  Plan  XVII.  and  the 
battle  of  the  Marne  Joffre's  greatest  value  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  French  Armies  was  clearly  shown.  For  if  his 
primary  errors  and  subsequent  obstinacy  were  responsible  for 
the  disasters  which  delivered  to  the  enemy  nine  of  the  richest 
departments  of  France  and  affected  the  whole  course  of  the 
war,  yet  his  imperturbable  calmness  was  effective  in  preventing 
a  difficult  and  dangerous  retreat  from  developing  into  some- 
thing more  calamitous. 

General  Mangin  has  written  that  in  the  battle  of  the  Marne 
there  is  glory  enough  for  both  Gallieni  and  Joffre. 

Apparently  the  latter  was  of  a  different  opinion.  For  a 
year  later,  in  191 5,  irritated  and  provoked  by  the  fact  that 
many  persisted  in  giving  the  major  credit  to  Gallieni,  he 
endeavoured  to  fix  the  latter's  role  by  giving  him  the  following 
citation : 

"Gallieni,  General,  Gouverneur  Militaire  et  Commandant 
des  Armees  de  Paris  : 

"Commandant  du  Camp  Retranche  et  des  armee  de  Paris, 

26  Quatre    Mois    de    Guerre,    written    by   the    French    General    Staff    in 
December,  1914,  for  the  use  of  the  representatives  of  France  abroad. 


PLAN  XVII.  41 

et  place  le  2  Septembre,  sous  les  ordres  du  Commandant-en- 
Chef ,  a  fait  preuve  des  plus  hautes  qualites  militaires : 

"En  contribuant,  par  les  renseignements  qu'il  avait  recueillis, 
a  determiner  la  direction  de  marche  prise  par  l'aile  droite  alle- 
mande. 

"En  orientant  judicieusement  pour  participer  a  la  bataille  les 
forces  mobiles  a  sa  disposition. 

"En  facilitant  par  tous  les  moyens  en  son  pouvoir  l'accom- 
plissement  de  la  mission  assignee  par  le  Commandant-en-Chef 
a  ces  forces  mobiles." 

It  is  indisputable  that  this  citation  is  ungenerous  in  its 
terms.  But  the  bulk  of  opinion  goes  further.  The  general 
judgment  seems  to  be  that  it  does  not  present  fairly  or  accu- 
rately the  part  taken  by  Gallieni,  and  that  it  was  a  deliberate 
attempt  to  deprecate  what  he  had  actually  done.  The  only 
permanent  result  has  been  an  unpleasant  impression  that  Joffre 
was  unduly  jealous  of  anyone  sharing  the  glory. 

Gallieni  had  a  letter  of  service  which  designated  him  as 
Joffre's  eventual  successor  as  Commander-in-Chief.  But 
Joffre  told  the  Minister  of  War  that  he  did  not  care  to  have 
him  at  the  Grand  Quartier  General;  and  he  was  therefore  left 
in  Paris,  doing  little  or  nothing.  Later  Gallieni  was  entrusted 
with  the  defence  of  Paris;  and  from  a  conversation  he  had 
with  Joffre  by  telephone,  on  August  30th,  he  got  the  idea  that 
the  latter  considered  the  capital  was  doomed. 

It  was  undoubtedly  Gallieni  who  first  saw  the  opportunity 
to  check  the  enemy.  In  1920  M.  Poincare  disclosed  that  on 
September  3rd,  1914,  the  evening  before  he  issued  the  order 
to  Maunoury  to  attack  the  German  flank,  Gallieni  had  tele- 
graphed to  the  Government  at  Bordeaux  stating  that  he 
thought  there  was  a  good  opening.  M.  Poincare  added :  "It 
is  therefore  certain  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Armies  of  Paris  had  spontaneously,  from  the  first  moment,  a 
clear  vision  of  the  battle  to  be  engaged."  21 

On  the  other  hand,  Joffre's  General  Order  No.  48  (which 
arrived  at  Verdun  on  September  4th)  referred  to  a  renewal 
of  the  general  offensive  being  undertaken  "in  some  days." 
27  See  Le  Matin,  September  6th,  1920. 


42  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

This  coincides  with  a  complaint  attributed  to  Joffre,  that  Gal- 
lieni's  action  had  forced  him  to  fight  before  he  was  ready  to 
do  so.  Moreover,  in  rejecting  Sir  John  French's  suggestion 
that  a  stand  should  be  made  on  the  Marne,  Joffre  had  written, 
on  September  2nd,  that  "On  account  of  events  which  have 
taken  place  during  the  last  two  days,  I  do  not  believe  it  possible 
at  present  to  contemplate  a  general  manoeuvre  on  the  Marne 
with  the  totality  of  our  forces."  28 

Undoubtedly  had  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  been  lost  Joffre 
and  the  General  Staff  would  have  been  blamed.  It  is,  there- 
fore, manifestly  unfair  to  seek  to  deprive  them  of  credit  for 
that  victory.  But,  without  Gallieni,  there  would  have  been  no 
Battle  of  the  Ourcq;  and  without  the  Battle  of  the  Ourcq 
there  would  have  been  no  Battle  of  the  Marne.29  The  facts 
justify  Clemenceau,  who,  on  November  nth,  1918,  in 
announcing  the  Armistice  to  the  Chambre  des  Deputes,  said: 
"Without  Gallieni  the  victory  would  have  been  impossible." 

But  the  real  victors  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  were  the 
men,  French  and  English,30  who,  after  suffering  for  weeks 
from  the  direct  effects  of  the  false  strategy,  the  faulty 
preparations,  and  the  imperfect  information  of  the  General 
Staff,  did  all  and  more  than  was  asked  of  them. 

Von  Kliick,  in  explaining  why  he  changed  the  direction  of 
his  Army,  throws  this  salient  fact  into  clearer  relief  than  does 
any  French  writer.31 

Fie  had  followed  the  theory  of  the  younger  von  Moltke 
(which  had,  indeed,  been  emphasised  at  a  Kriegspiel  a  couple 
of  years  earlier)  that  a  fortified  camp  should  not  be  attacked 

28  In  one  publication  the  letter  reads  "Deux  jours";  in  another  "Deux 
heures";  but  "Deux  jours"  appears  to  be  the  correct  version. 

29  If  Joffre  and  the  General  Staff  had  any  definite  plan  to  engage 
a  battle  elsewhere,  which  was  upset  by  Gallieni's  precipitation,  they 
have  never  revealed  it,  although  they  had  an  official  opportunity  to  do 
so  when  they  gave  evidence  before  the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie. 

30  With  some  exceptions,  French  critics  state  fairly  the  part  taken  by 
the  British  Expeditionary  Force  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

31  Neither  von  Kliick  nor  other  German  commanders  seem  to  have 
much  respect  for  the  strategic  abilities  of  any  French  general  except 
Foch.  Regarding  who  was  responsible  for  the  German  retreat  and 
the  necessity  for  it,  see  article  by  Captain  Koeltz  in  the  Revue  de  Paris, 
September  15th,  1921,  where  the  evidence  is  summed  up  in  favour  of 
von  Kliick  as  against  von  Bulow. 


PLAN  XVII.  43 

until  the  armies  in  the  field  had  been  overwhelmed;  while 
undoubtedly  Gallieni  did  not  play  the  game  according  to  the 
German  rule  when  he  himself  ventured  forth  without  having 
been  attacked.  But  while  making  an  allowance  for  that  sur- 
prise von  Kliick  said:  "If  you  want  the  material  reasons  of 
our  check,  look  in  the  newspapers  of  the  day :  they  will  tell 
you  about  lack  of  munitions,  about  a  defective  commissariat : 
all  that  is  exact.  But  there  is  a  reason  which  transcends  all  the 
others;  a  reason  which,  in  my  opinion,  is  entirely  decisive. 
It  is  the  extraordinary  and  peculiar  aptitude  of  the  French 
soldier  to  recover  quickly.  That  is  a  factor  which  it  is  difficult 
to  translate  into  figures,  and  which,  consequently,  upsets  the 
most  precise  and  far-seeing  calculations.  That  men  may 
stand  fast  and  be  killed  is  an  understood  thing  which  is  dis- 
counted in  every  plan  of  battle.  But  that  men  who  have 
retreated  during  ten  days,  that  men  sleeping  on  the  ground 
and  half  dead  with  fatigue,  should  be  able  to  take  up  their 
rifles  and  attack  when  the  bugle  sounds,  is  a  thing  upon  which 
we  never  counted.  It  was  a  possibility  of  which  there  was 
never  any  question  in  our  schools  of  war." 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Fall  of  Joffre 

Shortly  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  the  French  Grand 
Quartier  General  was  established  at  Chantilly.  There  it 
remained  so  long  as  Joffre  was  Commander-in-Chief,  the  first 
of  several  moves  being  made  soon  after  he  was  succeeded  by 
Nivelle. 

Joffre's  supercession  in  December,  191 6,  had  consequences 
which  affected  not  only  the  conduct  of  the  war,  but,  indirectly, 
the  relations  between  the  Allies.  An  examination  of  the  causes 
of  that  change,  and  of  the  incidents  which  led  up  to  it,  is 
therefore  pertinent. 

The  Battle  of  the  Marne  obliterated,  for  the  moment,  all 
recollection  of  the  failure  of  the  strategy  of  the  General  Staff. 
Joffre's  unfortunate  persistence  in  his  mistake  about  the  Ger- 
man plans  was  likewise  forgotten.  To  be  deceived  about  what 
the  enemy  is  going  to  do  is  often  the  most  fatal  of  errors. 
But  in  the  course  of  human  events  it  is  also  the  most  common. 
Any  other  general  might  have  been  equally  deluded.  But 
Joffre  did  what  no  other  French  general  could  have  done 
during  the  long  and  disastrous  retreat.  It  was  said  of  him 
by  one  of  his  officers  that,  "II  distillait  la  confiance  et  la 
tranquillite  comme  d'autres  distillent  l'inquietude  et  l'agi- 
tation."  That  was  the  quality  which,  to  some  extent,  was 
responsible  for  the  unbroken  morale  of  the  soldier  in  the  line, 
which  so  greatly  surprised  von  Kliick. 

But  Joffre's  habit  of  disclosing  nothing  and  of  refusing  to 
discuss  anything  was  even  more  notable  in  time  of  war  than 
it  had  been  in  days  of  peace. 

On  the  morning  of  August  3rd,  1914,  the  generals  who  were 
in  command  of  the  various  French  armies  were  summoned  to 
the  rue  St.  Dominique  to  meet  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
After  the  usual  salutations  General  Dubail,  who  commanded 

44 


THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE  45 

the  First  Army,  got  up  and  pointed  out  that  during  the 
offensive  of  his  army  against  Strasbourg  he  would  need  strong 
forces  to  cover  his  Right  and  Rear  along  the  left  bank  of  the 
Upper  Rhine. 

Joffre  simply  answered :  "This  plan  is  yours ;  it  is  not  mine." 

Dubail,  thinking  that  Joffre  had  not  understood  him,  again 
explained  his  point.  But  Joffre,  according  to  Lanrezac,  "his 
face  beaming  with  his  customary  benevolent  smile,"  replied  in 
exactly  the  same  words.  There  was  general  embarrassment, 
and  the  conference  ended.  "One  of  my  colleagues,  visibly 
moved,"  records  Lanrezac,  "asked  me,  in  confidence,  whether 
I  thought  that  General  Joffre  had  an  idea.  I  replied  'Yes' 
without  hesitation,  but  my  mind  was  clouded  by  a  doubt."  x 

At  Chantilly  Joffre  was  equally  taciturn  and  secretive.  But 
the  disasters  of  the  first  few  weeks  had  had  their  effect.  No 
more  was  heard  of  an  offensive  a  I'outrance.  That  doctrine^ 
was  definitely  abandoned,  nor  were  there  any  further  instruc- 
tions about  artillery  following  the  infantry;  on  the  contrary, 
it  was  now  specifically  laid  down  that  the  artillery  should  pre- 
pare the  way  for  infantry  attacks. 

In  his  general  idea  Joffre  seemed  to  go  from  one  extreme 
to  the  other.  While  at  Chantilly  he  did  not  want  to  take 
any  risk.  His  sole  belief  was  in  the  guerre  d'usure ;  and  val- 
uable time  and  more  valuable  lives  were  wasted  in  many  fruit- 
less and  partial  attacks.  For  Joffre  was  convinced  that  the 
war  was  already  won,  and  that  it  was  only  necessary  to  let 
time  do  its  work  in  order  to  witness  the  collapse  of  Germany.2 
When  a  certain  plan  was  proposed,  involving  the  construction 
of  factories  for  munitions  or  artillery,  Joffre  protested  that, 
as  the  work  would  take  the  better  part  of  a  year,  it  was  useless 
to  begin  it,  since  the  war  would  be  won  before  the  end  of  that 
period. 

That  Joffre  was  not  generous,  and  perhaps  not  even  just, 

1  This  incident  has  been  given  by  Lanrezac,  and  has  also  been 
recounted  in  various  French  works ;  but  I  have  taken  the  English 
version  as  quoted  in  an  article  on  Lanrezac  in  the  National  Review, 
March,  1921. 

a  Sir  John  French  has  confessed  that  he  also  thought  that  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne  was  the  beginning  of  the  end. 


46  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

was  shown  by  his  treatment  of  Gallieni.  He  was  jealous  of 
any  possible  rival,  and  always  careful  lest  he  should  be  sup- 
planted. When  de  Castelnau  was  appointed  Major-General, 
he  insisted  that,  before  he  was  sent  to  Chantilly,  his  powers 
should  be  more  limited  than  the  Government  had  proposed. 
While  when  de  Castelnau  actually  arrived  at  the  Grand  Ouar- 
tier  General  he  was  practically  isolated  and  left  with  little  or 
nothing  to  do.  Joffre  did  not  even  let  the  Government  into 
his  full  confidence,  and  during  the  operations  of  September, 
1914,  he  wrote  to  Gallieni  warning  him  against  communicat- 
ing anything  to  the  Cabinet,  which  was  then  at  Bordeaux. 

On  the  other  hand,  he  arrogated  to  himself  the  right  to 
correspond  with  Allied  Governments  entirely  independently  of 
the  French  Government;  and  upon  one  occasion  at  least  this 
course  nearly  caused  great  trouble  with  Italy.  In  his  pleni- 
tude of  power,  he  dealt  penalties  and  gave  rewards,  and  was 
certainly  not  sparing  of  the  former.  The  number  of  Generals 
whom  he  "limoged"  is  almost  incredible.  It  is  fair  to  add  that 
he  was  quite  impartial,  and  that  only  military  considerations 
and  not  political  persuasions  were  ever  taken  into  account. 

He  himself  was  an  avowed  Republican;  and  a  Freemason 
whom  the  Grant  Orient  had  felicitated  upon  his  promotion  in 
191 1.  A  Frenchman  of  high  standing  irt  the  political  world 
and  a  close  friend  of  Joffre's  who  went  to  see  him  at  Chantilly 
once  sang  to  me  the  praises  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  end- 
ing by  saying:  "et  surtout  il  est  un  bon  republicain." 

But  if  Joffre's  friends  made  that  a  point  in  his  favour,  he 
himself  was  never  influenced  by  it  in  dealing  with  others; 
although  one  of  the  chronicles  of  Chantilly  does  state  that  he 
once  got  angry  because  there  was  no  meat  on  the  table  on 
Good  Friday.  Nor,  like  Sarrail,  did  he  ever  try  to  make  capi- 
tal out  of  his  republicanism. 

But  while  he  never  played  politics,  he  was,  as  Andre  Tardieu 
once  observed,  "a  born  deputy,"  as  those  who  intrigued  against 
him  more  than  once  discovered.  He  knew  how  to  make  and 
how  to  keep  friends  in  the  political  world  for  his  own  pro- 
tection. Perhaps  the  most  potent  and  the  most  active  of  these 
was  M.  Hue,  Director  of  La  Depeche  de  Toulouse,  a  journal 


THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE  47 

which,  on  account  of  its  wide  electoral  influence  in  several 
Departments,  has  always  more  power  upon  the  Government 
of  the  day  than  almost  any  Parisian  newspaper. 

The  members  of  Joffre's  Staff  were  firmly  attached  to  him. 
They  were  indeed  too  ardent,  and  in  the  end  harmed  him.  He 
himself  was  by  no  means  indifferent  to  his  own  renown. 
During  the  months  when  he  was  at  Chantilly  after  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  presents  poured  in  upon  him  from  every  part  of 
the  globe,  while  letters  from  those  calling  him  the  saviour  of 
the  world  to  those  which  only  made  some  trivial  request  came 
by  the  thousands.  M.  de  Pierrefeu  says  that  Joffre  shut 
himself  up  by  the  hour  reading  these  missives — a  statement 
which  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to  accept. 

So  long  as  Millerand  was  Minister  of  War  Joffre  was 
secure.  No  complaint  against  him  got  any  consideration  what- 
ever. But  in  October,  19 15,  Gallieni  succeeded  Millerand  in 
the  Briand  Cabinet.  It  was  only  a  few  weeks  earlier  (on 
September  25th)  that  Joffre  had  issued  the  ungenerous  and 
misleading  citation  in  the  Ordre  de  l'Armee  regarding  Gal- 
lieni's  conduct  in  September,  19 14.  This  citation  was  given  a 
year  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  in  order  to  check  the 
eulogies  of  Gallieni's  foresight  which,  to  Joffre's  annoyance, 
were  still  being  widely  spread. 

But  when  in  office  Gallieni  did  not  once  show  that  he  had 
any  personal  resentment  on  account  of  this  or  other  incidents. 
Upon  ever  occasion  when  he  mentioned  Joffre's  name  in  debate 
it  was  to  defend  or  to  praise  him. 

The  first  difference  of  opinion  between  the  Minister  of  War 
and  the  Commander-in-Chief  arose  in  December,  191 5,  when 
Colonel  Driant  was  at  his  own  request  heard  by  the  Army 
Commission  of  the  Chambre  des  Deputes.  Driant  was  both 
a  soldier  by  profession  and  also  Deputy  for  Nancy.  Inci- 
dentally he  was  the  son-in-law  of  General  Boulanger.  He 
told  the  Commission  that  the  Verdun  district,  where  he  com- 
manded a  sector,  was  entirely  unprepared  to  resist  any  attack. 
The  Commission  communicated  this  startling  statement  to 
Gallieni,  who  was  all  the  more  moved  by  it  because  he  was 
aware  of  Driant's  worth.     On  December   16th  he  wrote  to 


48  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Joffre  saying  that  the  Government  had  received  accounts  to 
the  effect  that  in  certain  regions,  amongst  others  Verdun,  the 
necessary  trench  work  had  not  yet  been  done.  He  asked  for 
an  assurance  that  upon  all  points  of  the  Front  the  organisation 
of  at  least  two  lines  had  been  completed,  and  enforced  by 
barbed  wire  and  other  obstacles. 

On  December  18th  Joffre  replied  that  orders  had  been  given 
on  October  22nd ;  that  their  execution  had  been  constantly 
controlled;  and  that  at  the  places  mentioned  there  were  three 
or  four  successive  positions  of  defence,  either  finished  or  on 
the  way  to  completion.  Having  given  this  assurance,  Joffre 
complained  of  the  Government  attaching  any  credence  to  such 
reports ;  asked  to  be  told  who  had  made  them ;  and  threatened 
to  resign  if  he  was  again  troubled  in  that  manner.  Gallieni 
wrote  a  letter  which  by  its  tone  alone  should  have  given  satis- 
faction to  Joffre,  and  the  incident  seemed  closed. 

But  Driant  was  right  and  Joffre  was  wrong.  In  January, 
191 6,  when  de  Castelnau  returned  from  Salonica,  Joffre  sent 
him  to  inspect  Verdun.  He  found  that  the  defences  were 
entirely  insufficient,  and  gave  orders  that  a  regiment  of 
engineers  should  be  despatched  to  do  the  necessary  work. 
Unfortunately,  the  Germans  did  not  wait,  but  attacked  on 
February  21st,  and  carried  all  before  them.  It  was  in  this 
combat  that  Colonel  Driant  was  killed  while  he  was  trying 
himself  to  safeguard  the  retreat  of  his  men. 

I  am  referring  to  the  Battle  of  Verdun  simply  to  show  to 
what  extent  it  affected  Joffre.  It  is  therefore  only  necessary 
to  recall  that  on  February  24th,  after  Joffre,  following  his 
usual  custom,  had  gone  to  bed  early,  the  news  became  increas- 
ingly grave.  De  Castelnau  wanted  to  see  Joffre,  but  the  officer 
on  duty  did  not  wish  to  awaken  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
But  as  the  news  became  more  serious  de  Castelnau  returned  to 
Joffre's  villa  and  insisted.  When  the  latter  had  read  the 
despatches  he  agreed  that  de  Castelnau  should  go  at  once  to 
Verdun,  and  invested  him  with  full  powers.  The  latter  arrived 
there  the  following  morning,  after  passing  through  scenes 
which  bore  witness  that  growing  disaster  threatened  to  become 


THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE  49 

a  panic ;  and,  after  doing  what  he  could  to  restore  confidence, 
summoned  Petain. 

When  details  came  from  Verdun  the  Government  realised 
that  the  assurance  given  in  Joffre's  letter  of  December  18th 
had  had  no  solid  foundation.  Verdun  was  not  fortified  as 
he  had  said  it  was.  Gallieni  was  especially  affected  by  this 
discovery.  It  confirmed  him  in  the  view  which  he  had  long 
held,  that  there  should  be  some  definite  control  over  the  High 
Command.  On  March  7th  he  read  at  a  Cabinet  meeting  a 
memorandum,  the  gist  of  which  was  that  steps  should  be 
taken  to  limit  Joffre's  power  and  to  prevent  him  from  usurping 
the  functions  of  the  Minister  of  War.  Briand,  who,  for 
national  reasons,  wished  to  retain  Joffre,  would  have  liked 
Gallieni  to  withdraw  this  document.  But  the  latter  persisted 
in  demanding  that  consideration  should  be  given  to  his  recom- 
mendation. When  Gallieni  found  himself  unable  to  obtain 
satisfaction  he  resigned,  being  succeeded  by  General  Roques, 
who  was  known  to  be  friendly  to  Joffre. 

There  had  already  been  numerous  attacks  upon  Joffre  from 
outside,  and  throughout  his  opponents  had  been  pressing  the 
Government  to  limit  his  powers,  if  not  virtually  to  dispossess 
him  of  the  supreme  command.  During  March  and  April, 
191 5,  anonymous  memoranda  had  been  sent  to  various  depu- 
ties and  others.  Presumably  an  effort  was  made  to  sow  the 
seed  upon  fertile  soil.  But  sometimes  the  judgment  of  the 
authors  was  at  fault,  and  their  compilations  fell  into  the  wrong 
hands.  These  accusatory  reports  criticised  Joffre  unfairly, 
both  for  what  he  had  done  and  for  what  he  had  neglected  to 
do.  They  further  complained  that  it  was  improper  that  he 
should  appoint  to  the  high  commands  without  any  control  on 
the  part  of  the  Government;  and  alleged  that  those  to  whom 
he  had  given  armies  were  for  the  greater  part  not  good  Repub- 
licans. The  tendency  of  these  documents  was  to  assert  that 
there  was  only  one  general  to  whom,  both  for  military  and 
political  reasons,  the  Republic  could  safely  entrust  the  conduct 
of  the  war — Sarrail.  The  internal  evidence  makes  it  clear 
that  these  reports  must  have  been  the  work  of  someone  on, 
or  in  close  communication  with,  Sarrail's  staff.     Although,  as 


50  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

M.  Mirmeix  has  justly  remarked,  it  would  be  unfair,  in  the 
absence  of  any  proof,  to  presume  that  they  were  written  or 
distributed  with  the  knowledge  or  assent  of  that  general. 

But  what  some  were  thus  spreading  secretly  others  were 
saying  more  openly.  Finally,  in  a  letter  to  Briand,  dated 
November  18th,  191 5,  M.  Leon  Accambray,  deputy  for  Laon, 
advanced  practically  the  same  charges,  with  the  addition  of  a 
direct  eulogy  of  Sarrail.  Accambray  reiterated  this  when 
speaking  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes.  But  Briand,  who,  as  a 
persuasive  parliamentarian,  has  no  equal  in  France,  was  deter- 
mined to  retain  Joffre.  He  used  his  influence  over  the  Cham- 
bre, while  at  the  same  time  he  gave  some  more  or  less  illusory 
satisfaction  by  making  certain  changes  in  the  composition  not 
of  the  Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre,  but  in  that  of  the  Conseil 
Superieur  de  la  Defense  Nationale. 

In  reality  this  left  Joffre's  position  unchanged,  while,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  his  authority  had  recently  been  extended.  In 
July,  191 5,  Joffre  had  removed  Sarrail  from  the  command  of 
the  Third  Army,  after  the  circulation  of  the  secret  memoranda 
(March- April,  1915),  but  before  Accambray' s  letter  to  Briand. 
Sarrail's  political  friends  (and  he  had  always  been  active  in 
politics)  had  made  every  effort  to  get  him  reinstated,  but 
Joffre  had  held  firm.  The  Government  had,  therefore,  in 
August,  191 5,  given  Sarrail  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Orient,  the  formation  of  which  began  from  that  time.  Joffre 
was  unwilling  to  lessen  his  forces  by  allowing  troops  to  go  to 
Salonica.  In  his  view  it  would  have  been  unwise  to  run  any 
risk  of  weakening  the  Western  Front  by  sending  men  to  rein- 
force such  an  expedition.  Moreover,  Lord  Kitchener,  then 
Minister  of  War,  upon  his  return  from  Greece,  in  November, 
191 5,  had  pronounced  absolutely  against  the  proposed  army. 
The  question  was  to  be  finally  decided  at  a  conference  of  the 
Allies  on  December  4th.  Briand,  to  whom  history  will  give 
full  credit  for  the  Salonica  expedition,  showed  his  habitual 
cleverness.  By  one  and  the  same  stroke  both  secured  the 
active  support  of  Joffre  at  Calais  (which  doubtless  turned  the 
scale,  although  it  did  not  then  convince  Kitchener),  and  satis- 
fied Joffre's  susceptibilities  about  an  independent  army  in  the 


THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE  51 

East;  for  on  the  eve  of  the  conference  Joffre  was  named 
Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  French  Armies,  which  thus 
again  made  Sarrail  his  suhordinate. 

So  long  as  it  was  a  matter  of  political  manoeuvring  against 
the  friends  of  Sarrail  and  against  those  who  thought  that 
Joffre's  powers  were  too  extensive,  and  his  conduct  too  arbi- 
trary, Briand  was  still  able  to  control  the  situation.  Neverthe- 
less, Joffre's  position  was  no  longer  the  same.  Gallieni  had 
been  a  tower  of  strength,  for  his  testimony  in  favour  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  was  that  of  a  soldier  whose  eminent 
services  and  brilliant  talents  were  unquestioned — who  had  no 
political  connections — and  who,  as  was  well  known,  had  little 
reason  to  be  friendly  to  Joffre  or  to  the  Grand  Quartier 
General.  But,  precisely  for  the  same  reason,  the  fact  that  he 
had  finally  demanded  the  curtailment  of  Joffre's  activities,  and 
had  resigned  because  Briand  did  not  support  him  on  that  point, 
had  undermined  Joffre's  position — and  more  so  than  was  at 
first  apparent.  Roques  had  not  the  same  military  reputation; 
while  his  very  friendship  with  Joffre  was  rather  a  source  of 
weakness  in  the  Chambre,  until  his  favourable  report  on  Sar- 
rail (whose  army  he  had  gone  to  inspect  at  the  demand  of  the 
Allies  in  November,  1916)  had  silenced  the  latter's  friends. 

Nevertheless,  Briand  would  probably  have  been  able  to 
maintain  Joffre  had  it  not  been  for  the  Battle  of  the  Somme. 
For  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  the  cumulative  effect  of  Verdun 
and  of  the  Somme  were  (though  for  very  different  reasons) 
responsible  for  the  removal  of  Joffre  on  the  one  side,  and  on 
the  other  of  Falkenhayn,  who  was  succeeded  by  Hindenburg 
and  Ludendorf. 

The  disappointment  in  France  at  the  result  of  the  Battle  of 
the  Somme  solidified  the  feeling  that  the  country  could  not 
continue  to  stand  the  deadly  but  unproductive  warfare  of  which 
Joffre  was  the  admitted  protagonist.  In  some  quarters  he  was 
also  now  blamed  for  the  Roumanian  fiasco.  The  irritation  that 
no  effective  control  should  have  been  exercised  over  the  mili- 
tary adventures  of  a  country  which  the  Allies  had  aided  both 
with  supplies  and  technical  missions  was  natural.  But  there 
were  reasons,  clear,   if  not  at  first  obvious,  why  the   Rou- 


52  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

manians  were  pretty  well  bound  to  have  their  own  way. 
While,  moreover,  they  had  had  a  right  to  count  upon  that 
promised  Russian  assistance  which  had  not  been  forthcoming. 
In  any  event  it  was  unjust  to  hold  Joffre  responsible  for  what 
happened  merely  because  he  commanded  all  the  French  Armies, 
and  had  sent  to  Roumania  General  Berthelot,  who  had  been 
his  right  arm  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 

Briand,  however,  had  no  longer  to  meet  either  secret  or 
flimsy  charges.  He  was  faced  with  facts  and  with  a  current 
of  public  opinion,  supported  by  such  men  as  Paul  Doumer, 
whose  close  connection  with  Gallieni,  during  the  siege  of  Paris, 
did  not  make  him  any  more  favourable  to  Joffre. 

If  Briand  could  have  had  his  own  way  he  would  have 
retained  Joffre  while  restricting  his  powers,  as  he  had  always 
been  willing  to  do  so  far  as  possible.  It  is  doubtful  whether, 
at  this  period,  he  had  any  great  faith  in  Joffre  as  a  military 
genius,  or  in  the  correctness  of  his  mode  of  warfare.  But  he 
realised,  as  he  had  always  done,  that  Joffre  was  an  invaluable 
asset  on  account  of  the  effect  his  name  and  personality  had  on 
the  Allies.  Above  all,  he  thought  that  if  unity  of  command 
were  ever  feasible,  it  would  be  easier  to  get  the  Allies  to 
accept  it  under  Joffre  than  under  any  other  French  General. 
How  well  founded  was  this  belief  was  proved  by  the  fact 
that  when,  eighteen  months  later,  the  question  of  a  unique 
commander  was  being  actively  discussed,  Colonel  House,  who 
represented  President  Wilson,  at  once  suggested  Joffre, 
although  the  latter  had  taken  no  part  in  the  direction  of  the 
war  during  the  previous  campaign.  But  with  his  keen  sense 
of  political  atmosphere  Briand  felt  that  this  time  it  would  be 
impossible  to  cover  Joffre  fully.  Therefore,  before  the  secret 
session  of  November  28th,  1916,  he  did  his  utmost  to  persuade 
the  latter  to  agree  to  relinquish  the  direct  command  of  the 
armies,  while  accepting  some  other  and  less  well-defined  post. 
But  even  to  Briand,  most  seductive  of  statesmen,  Joffre  was 
adamant.  He  wanted  what  he  had  or  nothing  at  all.  He 
refused  to  resign.  Let  Briand  remove  him  if  he  wished  to 
do  so.  These  sterile  interviews  succeeded  each  other  for  days ; 
some  being  held  at  the  Elysee  in  the  presence  of  Poincare.    In 


THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE  53 

the  meantime  the  secret  session  continued,  but  it  was  impossible 
to  make  any  progress  before  Joffre's  future  was  settled. 
Finally,  on  December  3rd,  191 6,  Joffre  yielded.  The  next  day 
Briand  told  the  Chambre  des  Deputes  that  Joffre  was  to  leave 
Chantilly  for  Paris,  that  a  new  Commander  of  the  Armies 
of  the  North  and  North-East  would  be  appointed  (who  would 
have  no  control  over  the  Army  of  the  Orient)  ;  and  that  the 
powers  of  the  Grand  Quartier  General  were  to  be  restricted. 

Upon  this  declaration  the  Chambre  gave  the  Government 
the  vote  of  confidence  which  Briand  needed.  A  Presidential 
Decree  of  December  13th  defined,  but  somewhat  vaguely, 
Joffre's  future  duties :  "Le  General  Joffre,  Commandant-en- 
Chef,  des  Armees  Franchises,  remplit  aupres  du  Gouvernement 
le  role  de  conseiller  technique  en,  ce  qui  concerne  la  direction 
de  la  Guerre." 

It  had  been  intended  that  Joffre  should  still  retain  most  of 
his  staff.  A  large  house  had  been  taken  at  Neuilly  and  was 
being  put  in  order  to  receive  them.  Those  who  were  to  accom- 
pany the  General  had  already  arranged  to  leave  Chantilly  on  a 
fixed  day.  But  although  Briand  had  come  to  terms  with  the 
Chambre  he  had  still  to  get  the  assent  of  the  Senate.  The 
news  of  Joffre's  proposed  installation  with  his  staff,  against 
whom  there  had  been  so  many  complaints,  was  received  unfa- 
vourably by  Paul  Doumer  and  his  friends.  It  was  thought  that 
it  would  simply  mean  Chantilly  in  Neuilly :  that  the  Govern- 
ment would  not  have  that  control,  and  that  Nivelle  (who,  on 
December  13th,  had  been  named  to  succeed  Joffre  in  command 
of  the  Armies  of  the  North  and  North-East)  would  not  have 
that  freedom  of  action  which  Parliament  desired.  The  secret 
sessions  of  the  Senate  were  held  between  December  19th  and 
23rd.  Briand  recognised  the  determination  of  the  majority. 
He  therefore  assured  the  Senate  that  Joffre  would  have  no 
further  independent  power;  and  that  instead  of  going  to 
Neuilly  he  was  to  be  at  the  Hotel  des  Invalides  with  a  small 
secretariat.    Upon  this  statement  he  obtained  the  vote. 

Briand,  whose  political  position  was  already  weakened,  had 
placed  the  resignation  of  his  Ministry  in  the  hands  of  the 
President,  and  had  received  permission  to  form  a  new  Govern- 


54  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

ment.  This  he  had  done  on  December  nth,  having  a  small 
Cabinet,  with  General  Lyautey  as  Minister  of  War.  The 
latter  only  arrived  from  Morocco  some  time  later.  He  at  once 
refused  to  take  possession  of  his  office  on  the  ground  that 
after  his  appointment,  but  before  his  arrival,  certain  steps  had 
been  taken  without  his  knowledge  and  for  which  he  would 
not  accept  responsibility.  Amongst  other  things  he  complained 
of  the  appointment  of  Joffre  as  the  Technical  Adviser  to  the 
Government.  In  his  opinion  that  was  the  natural  function 
of  the  Minister  of  War,  or  of  those  whom  he  might  call  into 
consultation. 

Upon  the  other  hand,  it  would  seem  that  Joffre  was  not 
contented  with  his  anomalous  position,  and  that  indirectly  he 
made  some  overtures  to  secure  the  baton  of  a  marechal  of 
France,  which  had  some  weeks  earlier  been  held  out  as  a  bait 
by  Briand  in  his  attempt  to  secure  his  resignation.  Advantage 
was  taken  of  this  opening,  and  Joffre  was  relieved  of  the 
office  he  had  held  for  less  than  two  weeks  :  about  the  only  thing 
he  had  done  was  to  remove  Foch  from  his  command  upon  the 
plea  that  he  needed  a  rest.  On  December  26th  a  Presidential 
Decree  named  Joffre  Marechal  of  France,  the  first  marechal 
created  by  the  Third  French  Republic. 

From  that  day  Joffre  had  no  further  part  in  the  conduct  of 
the  war. 

Of  the  extent  of  Joffre's  capacity  it  is  difficult  to  judge. 

His  calmness  is  as  legendary  as  his  taciturnity.  He  slept 
soundly  during  the  most  trying  times.  The  late  M.  Etienne, 
once  Minister  of  War,  and  always  friendly  to  Joffre,  acquired 
during  the  Battle  of  Verdun  the  habit  of  telephoning  to  Chan- 
tilly  every  evening  about  eleven  o'clock.  Needless  to  say, 
Joffre  had  then  been  asleep  for  some  hours :  an  invariable 
answer  which  always  satisfied  M.  Etienne.  Equally  well 
known  is  the  story  of  how  one  day  in  August,  1914,  he  was 
lunching  at  British  Headquarters  when  Sir  John  French  (who 
had  been  singularly  unsuccessful  in  trying  to  make  Joffre  talk 
about  his  plans)  was  called  away  suddenly  by  the  news  that 
part  of  his  army  was  in  a  desperate  position:  and  Joffre 
remained  and  calmly  finished  his  own  luncheon. 


THE  FALL  OF  JOFFRE  55 

But  these  qualities  of  silence  and  impassivity  which  were 
at  times  an  undoubted  asset,  were  also  perhaps  at  other 
moments  injurious  to  his  reputation.  Not  only  did  he  say 
little  but  it  seemed  to  be  a  positive  effort  for  him  to  talk.  One 
of  Kitchener's  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet  has  mentioned  that  he 
was  so  silent  that  he  generally  appeared  dense,  if  not  stupid : 
but  that  from  time  to  time,  very  occasionally — he  made  a 
remark  which  was  like  a  brilliant  flash  of  lightning  in  the 
darkness — it  illuminated  everything  for  an  instant.  But 
Joffre's  silence  was  more  complete,  more  consistent,  and  more 
stolid  than  that.  It  is  therefore  difficult  to  say  whether  it 
covered  any  original  creative  ideas.  The  impression  which  he 
gave  to  Lanrezac  and  other  army  commanders  on  August  2nd, 
1914,  was  that  it  probably  did  not.  His  own  evidence  before 
the  Commission  sur  la  Metallurgie,  and  especially  when 
attempts  were  made  to  find  out  how  far  he  was  responsible  for 
the  plan  of  19 14,  and  to  what  extent  he  had  prepared  for  any 
eventualities,  was  lamentable. 

Joffre  certainly  was  a  formidable  personage.  But  he  was 
impressive  partly  because  he  did  not  and  could  not  be  made 
to  talk,  even  when  he  might  reasonably  be  expected  to  do  so. 
His  failure,  or  possibly  his  inability,  to  do  so  upon  these  latter 
occasions  sometimes  appeared  to  his  personal  disadvantage; 
and  raised  the  doubt  as  to  whether  his  silence  originated 
entirely  in  his  love  of  secrecy  or  in  the  fact  that  there  was 
really  nothing  behind  it  which  he  could  produce. 

It  is  curious  to  compare  with  this  the  characteristic  way  in 
which  Foch  converses.  It  was  quite  typical  that  on  the  his- 
toric day  of  the  Doullens  meeting  he  should  have  spoken  as 
follows :  "Heu !  Vous  connaissez  ma  methode.  Heu !  Je 
colle  un  pain  a  cacheter  la,  puis  un  la.  puis  un  autre  la — le 
Boche  n'avance  presque  plus.  J'en  colle  encore  un.  Et  le 
Boche  est  fixe.    On  fixe  toujours  le  Boche."3 

This  difference  between  Joffre's  and  Foch's  style  of  con- 
versation was  entirely  illustrative  of  the  diversity  of  their 

3  Anyone  familiar  with  Sir  Henry  Wilson's  conversation  will  note 
the  remarkable  similarity.  Foch's  words  translated  into  colloquial  English 
would  sound  as  if  they  proceeded  directly  from  Wilson. 


56  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

ideas  about  the  way  in  which  the  war  should  be  prosecuted. 
Foch's  words  picture  graphically  his  mode  of  annoying  the 
enemy,  until  he  could  seize  the  favourable  moment  to  crush 
him.  Joffre,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  in  the  guerre  d'usure. 
He  pinned  his  faith  absolutely  to  wearing  out  the  Germans  on 
the  Western  Front.  In  this  he  resembled  Sir  William  Robert- 
son. But  Robertson  always  thought  that  the  war  would  last 
some  time,  and  was  never  at  any  moment  confident  that  victory 
was  near — if  only  because  there  were  too  many  wicked  poli- 
ticians in  the  world :  whereas  it  was  one  of  Joffre's  fixed  ideas 
that  he  was  always  on  the  point  of  winning  the  war,  and  that 
therefore  it  was  unnecessary  to  provide  for  what  might  happen 
a  year  or  so  ahead. 

In  the  course  of  time  it  was  seen  that  Joffre's  policy  of  war- 
fare was  likely  to  prove  more  fatal  to  his  own  country  than 
to  the  enemy :  and  this  conviction  led  to  the  downfall  of  the 
victor  of  the  Marne. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Nivelle  Offensive 

"En  1915  nous  avons  marche  comme  des  enfants,  en  1916 
comme  des  vieillards:  il  faut  enfin  marcher  comme  des 
hommes." 

That  was  the  current  saying  towards  the  end  of  191 6.  But 
to  do  that — to  get  away  from  the  guerre  d'usure — it  was 
necessary  to  find  a  successor  to  Joffre. 

Many  things  had  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  making 
that  choice,  some  of  them  not  of  a  military  nature.  The 
French  Legislature  has  a  far  closer  control  over  the  Army  in 
time  of  war  than  has  the  British  Parliament.  Both  the  Cham- 
bre  des  Deputes  and  the  Senat  have  Army  commissions  which 
do  active  work,  and  which  few  Governments  can  afford  to 
ignore.  In  1916  these  commissions  were  given  further  powers, 
whereby  some  of  their  members  became  practically  inspectors 
of,  or  delegates  to,  the  Army.  Such  a  system  is  in  direct  accord 
with  the  practice  which  prevailed  during  the  Revolution  and 
later.  It  is  not  for  a  foreigner  to  comment  upon  how  far  this 
is  congruous,  further  than  to  say  that  its  advantages  would 
be  manifest,  even  overwhelming,  if  the  military  and  civil  pow- 
ers were  thus  led  to  agree.  Unfortunately,  that  is  rarely  the 
case.  The  more  usual  result  is  distrust  on  the  part  of  the 
soldier,  and  recrimination  on  the  part  of  the  politician. 

All  Parliamentary  privileges  had,  at  the  outset  of  the  War, 
been  so  overridden  by  Joffre  that  later  there  was  almost  a  revolt 
in  order  to  recover  them.  At  the  moment,  therefore,  the 
Government  found  it  all  the  more  necessary  to  consider  political 
prejudices  when  choosing  a  new  Commander-in-Chief. 

Several  names  were  bruited  abroad  during  the  months  pre- 
ceding Joffre's  resignation. 

De  Castelnau,  having  been  Major-General  since  December, 

57 


58  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

19 1 5,  might  be  said  to  be  in  the  line  of  succession.  It  was  true 
that  he  had  not  been  the  active  coadjutor  of  Joffre,  as  was 
intended  when  he  was  appointed.  But  that  was  entirely  due  to 
the  narrow  jealousy  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  either 
kept  him  idle  at  Chantilly,  or  sent  him  on  missions  of  inspec- 
tion to  Salonica  or  Verdun :  although  his  second  visit  to  Ver- 
dun, when  he  went  to  save  the  situation,  was  of  a  more 
important  nature.  De  Castelnau's  military  reputation  was  of 
the  highest.  He  was  remembered  as  the  defender  of  Nancy, 
and  as  the  victor  of  Grand  Couronne.  He  was  esteemed  in  the 
Army,  and  his  name  had  become  popular  in  the  country.  But 
while  he  had  then  never  taken  part  in  politics  (he  is  to-day  a 
deputy),  he  was  thought  not  to  be  a  very  fervent  Republican. 
He  was  known  to  be  a  practising  Catholic :  and,  referring  to 
some  comments  in  the  press,  he  one  day  laughingly  introduced 
himself  to  Clemenceau  as  "le  Capucin  botte" :  de  Castelnau 
could  afford  to  laugh  at  any  insinuations  that  his  religious 
belief  affected  the  performance  of  his  military  duties.  While 
how  little  he  was  a  fanatic  was  shown  by  the  composition  of 
his  staff  at  Chantilly:  a  chaplain  (Father  Pierre  de  Castelnau, 
his  nephew)  and  three  officers,  one  of  whom  was  a  Protestant, 
while  another  professed  to  be  an  advanced  free-thinker.  But 
to  the  members  of  the  Extreme  Left  (aside,  probably,  from 
Gustav  Herve,  who  had  on  a  similar  occasion  chivalrously 
defended  him)  de  Castelnau's  appointment  would  have  been 
distasteful.  If  they  could  not  have  Sarrail  in  supreme  com- 
mand, at  least  they  did  not  want  to  have  "le  Capucin  botte." 

Sarrail  was  at  all  times  a  possibility.  Pie  was  then  in  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Orient ;  but  his  political  friends 
were  perpetually  urging  that  his  proper  place  was  at  the  head 
of  all  the  Armies  of  the  Republic.  Sarrail  was  a  general  of 
considerable  ability,  and  an  energetic  but  turbulent  personality. 
He  prided  himself  above  all  on  being  a  true  Republican. 
Painleve  said  that  he  was  the  only  really  Republican  general. 
More  intrigues  were  set  in  motion  for  him  than  for  anyone 
else,  and  in  the  end  they  harmed  him. 

His  conduct  at  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  where,  in  order  to 
defend  Verdun,  he  almost  exceeded  the  latitude  of  discretion 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  59 

given  him,  entitles  him  to  great  credit,  and  it  is  too  little 
known.  In  Macedonia  he  was,  upon  the  whole,  not  so  suc- 
cessful in  his  military  operations.  But  he  was  the  last  man 
who  should  have  been  sent  to  command  an  Army  made  up  of 
the  forces  of  various  Allies.  He  managed  to  fight  with  all  of 
them  long  before  he  fought  with  the  enemy.  His  way  of  show- 
ing his  contempt  for  religion,  which,  as  a  free-thinker,  he 
seemed  to  imagine  it  was  incumbent  upon  him  to  do, 
was  distasteful  to  English  officers;  who,  whether  or  not  they 
had  any  deep  religious  feeling,  were  imbued  with  the  instinct 
of  respecting  the  religion  of  others.  Nor  were  they  impressed 
by  the  constant  flaunting  of  their  Republicanism  by  a  General 
and  Staff  whose  primary  duty  was  to  win  battles.  With  the 
Staffs  of  the  Italian  and  Russian  commands  Sarrail  was 
equally  unpopular. 

Moreover,  Sarrail  appeared  to  busy  himself  with  political 
intrigues  more  than  anything  else.  It  is  true  that  he  had  no 
confidence  in  Constantin  or  in  his  word,  and  was  inclined  to 
treat  that  personage  in  the  way  he  richly  deserved.  But  our 
political  manoeuvres  were  out  of  place  in  a  General  command- 
ing an  Allied  Army,  and  excited  all  the  more  apprehension 
because  of  Sarrail's  well-known  violent  character. 

He  was  perpetually  demanding  that  more  troops  should  be 
sent  to  him,  while  he  seemed  to  be  doing  little  with  the  consid- 
erable number  which  were  already  under  his  command.  Thus 
he  gave  rise  to  the  complaints  which  soon  began  to  rain  thick 
and  fast  upon  Paris  from  the  different  Allied  Governments. 
They  were  complaints  which  could  not  be  ignored,  for  England 
and  Italy  flatly  refused  to  reinforce  the  Salonica  Expedition 
until  they  had  been  completely  reassured  about  the  actual  con- 
dition of  the  Army  of  the  Orient,  and  had  had  some  report 
upon  the  doings  of  Sarrail.  It  was  in  these  circumstances 
that  Briand  agreed  with  the  British  and  Italian  Governments 
to  send  Roques,  then  Minister  of  War,  to  Salonica,  to  inquire 
into  the  whole  situation.  Roques's  report  was  favourable. 
While  its  effect  was  strengthened  when  a  few  days  later 
(November  19th,  1916)  Sarrail  took  Monastir.  England  and 
Italy  were,  or  professed  to  be,  content ;  merely  stipulating  that 


60  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

henceforth  Sarrail  should  confine  himself  to  his  military  duties 
and  leave  political  matters  to  those  who  were  charged  to  con- 
duct them. 

Unfortunately  the  fault-finding  did  not  cease  for  long.  The 
idea  was  now  widespread  that  Sarrail,  using  his  Army  for  that 
purpose,  wanted  to  overthrow  the  monarchy  and  set  up  a 
republic  in  Greece.  It  is  probable  that  he  never  had  any 
such  well-defined  intention,  but  both  his  general  bearing  and 
his  manifold  indiscretions  were  such  that  there  was  little  cause 
to  wonder  if  many  believed  this  rumour. 

In  December,  1916,  Lord  Bertie,  who,  in  the  name  of  the 
British  Government,  had  already  remonstrated  about  Sarrail, 
again  impressed  upon  Briand  that  he  must  be  kept  apart  from 
all  political  action :  adding  that,  although  Sarrail  was  a  French 
General,  he  commanded  an  Allied  Army. 

This  time  Briand  determined  to  let  Sarrail  speak  for  him- 
self. The  English,  French,  and  Italian  Prime  Ministers  were 
to  meet  in  Rome  in  January.  Briand  summoned  Sarrail  to 
come  and  explain  his  conduct,  while  on  his  part  he  agreed  that 
his  Government  would  abide  by  the  decision  of  Lloyd  George 
and  Sonnino. 

Sarrail  won  the  day.  His  appearance  and  his  wonderful 
lucidity  of  expression  had  their  effect  upon  Lloyd  George, 
who  pronounced  himself  satisfied.  It  is  curious  that  the  two 
French  Generals  who  most  impressed  Lloyd  George  before 
they  had  actually  succeeded  (for  the  Prime  Minister  is  as 
susceptible  as  anyone  else  to  acquired  success)  were  Sarrail 
and  Nivelle :  both  for  the  same  reason,  their  demeanour  and 
the  clearness  with  which  they  put  their  case  and  answered 
questions. 

Some  months  later  the  same  allegations  were  again  being 
made  against  Sarrail,  and  the  satisfaction  of  Lloyd  George 
had  disappeared.  But  Painleve  was  then  in  power  (first  as 
Minister  of  War  in  the  Ribot  Cabinet,  and  then  as  Prime 
Minister),  and  to  Painleve  Sarrail  was  sacred :  the  only  Repub- 
lican General.  The  situation  had  then  become  critical  in 
Macedonia,  not  only  on  account  of  the  complaints  of  the 
Allies,  but  because  of  mutinies  which  had  broken  out  amongst 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  61 

the  French  troops.  Foch  wished  to  send  a  Questionnaire  to 
Sarrail,  in  an  endeavour  to  find  out  the  exact  position.  But 
such  was  Painleve's  regard  for  the  latter  that  he  refused  to 
allow  even  that  to  be  done,  despite  Foch's  urgent  insistence. 

Painleve  resigned  on  November  13th  and  on  November  16th 
was  succeeded  by  Clemenceau.  The  day  after  the  Inter-Allied 
War  Council  meeting  on  December  4th  (when  the  complaints 
about  Sarrail  had  been  reiterated)  Clemenceau  began  to  exam- 
ine the  documents  relating  to  the  Army  of  the  Orient.  On 
December  7th  Sarrail  was  ordered  to  return  to  France.  To 
the  questions  which  were  put  to  him  in  Parliament  Clemenceau 
answered  bluntly  that  discipline  had  disappeared  to  such  an 
extent  that  the  Army  was  almost  in  a  state  of  dissolution; 
while,  if  unity  of  command  could  not  be  rendered  acceptable 
to  the  Allies  in  the  Orient,  there  would  be  little  chance  of  ever 
getting  them  to  agree  to  it  on  the  Western  Front. 

Sarrail  possesses  military  talent  (although  it  was  not  shown 
to  the  best  advantage  in  Macedonia),  which  is  reinforced  by  a 
vigorous  personality.  There  was  every  reason  to  believe  that 
he  would  be  one  of  the  great  chiefs  at  the  end  of  the  war. 
But  his  inability  to  keep  clear  of  politics,  and  the  intrigues  of 
his  friends  for  him  and  against  his  supposed  rivals,  practically 
ruined  his  career. 

He  did,  however,  have  one  more  chance.  The  incident  is 
curious  and  typical.  In  the  dark  days  of  March,  19 18,  Cle- 
menceau considered  the  possibility  of  appointing  a  Governor 
of  Paris,  who,  by  his  energy,  might  perhaps  inspire  confidence, 
as  Gallieni  had  done  in  1914.  It  was  suggested  to  him  that 
the  only  available  general  with  the  requisite  character  was 
Sarrail.  Clemenceau  hesitated.  But  he  finally  directed  that  the 
offer  should  be  made  to  Sarrail,  who  was  sent  for  and  told  of 
the  proposal. 

"I  would  only  accept  upon  one  condition,"  he  at  once 
answered. 

"What  is  it?" 

"That  Caillaux  should  be  set  at  liberty." 

He  was  reminded  that  he  was  being  asked  to  perform  a  mili- 
tary duty,  and  that  he  could  hardly  make  a  political  act — if  not 


62  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

an  interference  with  the  course  of  justice — a  condition  of 
doing  so.  But  Sarrail  held  firm,  and  when  he  returned  the  next 
day  to  give  his  positive  reply  he  said  that  he  had  nothing  to 
add  to  his  former  statement.  When  that  was  reported  to  Cle- 
menceau  he  asked  how  long  Sarrail  had  to  serve  before  he 
went  on  the  retired  list  in  the  ordinary  course. 

On  April  14th,  191 8,  Sarrail  was  placed  on  the  Cadre  de 
Reserve.     He  was  at  that  date  only  62  years  of  age.1 

But  at  the  time  of  Joffre's  retirement  Sarrail  was  not  an 
absolute  impossibility  as  his  successor.  Nevertheless,  his 
name  got  more  advertisement  than  real  consideration.  His 
quarrel  with  Joffre,  and  the  way  in  which  his  friends  had 
subsequently  forced  the  Government  to  give  him  another  com- 
mand, had  deepened  the  impression  regarding  his  difficult  char- 
acter. Except  amongst  the  Extreme  Left  there  was  general 
relief  when  he  was  at  a  distance  from  Paris. 

Foch  was  naturally  considered  as  a  likely  successor  to  Joffre, 
but,  for  reasons  which  are  obscure,  there  were  at  this  time 
persistent  rumours  that  his  health  was  undermined,  and  that 
he  was  too  fatigued  to  be  entrusted  with  a  high  command.  The 
one  thing  which  seems  clear  is  that  there  was  no  foundation 
for  these  reports.  They  were,  however,  spread  with  such 
persistency  that  they  undoubtedly  injured  his  chances.  His 
opponents  of  the  Extreme  Left  were  thus  relieved  from  the 
necessity  of  combating  his  appointment.  For,  to  some  of 
these  Extremists,  Foch  was  objectionable  because  he,  like 
de  Castelnau,  was  a  practising  Catholic. 

During  the  few  days  in  December  when  Joffre  was  Con- 
seiller  Technique  he  removed  Foch  from  his  command  of  the 
group  of  the  Armees  du  Nord.  However,  that  did  not  affect 
the  question,  as  the  matter  had  already  been  decided.  For 
Joffre  took  this  step  on  the  very  same  day,  December  13th, 
19 1 6,  that  the  name  of  his  own  successor  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  was  announced.  In  reality,  Foch's  health  was  so  little 
impaired  that,  after  reorganising  the  defence  of  the  Swiss 
frontier  in  January,  191 7,  and,  later,  going  on  a  mission  to 

1 1   do  not  cite  my  authority  for  this   incident,  but  it  was   related  to 
me  by  the  politician  who  made  the  offer. 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  63 

Italy,  he  was,  in  May,  1917,  appointed  by  Painleve  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  which  post  he  held  until  he  took  command 
of  the  Allied  Armies. 

The  appointment  of  Petain  was  also  contemplated  as  a 
possibility.  In  August,  19 14,  Petain  was  a  colonel  who  was 
approaching  the  age  when,  holding  that  rank,  he  would  be 
placed  on  the  retired  list.  He  had  been  a  distinguished  pro- 
fessor at  the  War  School,  and  was  known  as  a  soldier  who 
was  devoted  to  his  profession  and  seemed  to  have  few  interests 
outside  of  it. 

His  advancement  had  been  slow  in  time  of  peace,  but  it 
was  strikingly  rapid  once  the  country  entered  on  war.  In 
October,  1914,  he  was  given  command  of  an  Army  Corps. 
His  brilliant  action  at  Vimy  in  June,  19 15  (during  what  the 
French  call  the  second  Battle  of  Artois),  again  attracted  the 
favourable  notice  of  Joffre,  who,  later  in  the  same  month, 
gave  him  the  command  of  the  Second  Army  in  succession  to 
de  Castelnau,  who  was  then  promoted  to  command  a  group  of 
Armies.  He  had  participated  in  the  offensive  of  the  autumn 
of  1915  (the  Battle  of  Champagne),  but  during  the  winter 
his  Army  seems  to  have  been  dispersed :  and  he  was  alone  with 
his  staff  at  Noailles  when  de  Castelnau  summoned  him  to 
Verdun  in  all  haste  in  February,  191 6.  At  Verdun  Petain 
added  to  his  reputation.  On  his  military  record  there  were 
just  grounds  for  considering  his  claims,  together  with  those  of 
Foch  and  de  Castelnau,  in  selecting  a  new  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

Sarrail  (whose  suspicions  about  other  generals  seemed  to 
occupy  a  good  deal  of  his  thoughts)  apparently  had  some 
doubts  about  the  quality  of  Petain's  Republicanism.  He  is 
said  once  to  have  warned  Clemenceau  against  him : 

"He  is  not  one  of  us." 

"Much  I  care  about  that,  provided  he  can  win  a  battle," 
Clemenceau  had  replied. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Petain  was  not  credited  with  holding 
religious  opinions  so  pronounced  or  extreme  as  to  hurt  the 
tender  susceptibilities  of  the  Extreme  Left.  But  he  had 
another  marked  characteristic,  very  different,  but  in  their  eyes 


64  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

equally  objectionable.  He  did  not  care  for  politicians,  and  still 
less  did  he  care  to  have  them  paying  visits  to  his  Army.  When 
they  did  come  he  was  polite,  and  no  more  than  polite.  He  left 
them  in  little  doubt  that  in  his  opinion  they  were  a  nuisance. 
Equally  independent  and  reserved,  he  was  incapable  of  con- 
cealing his  feelings  or  making  any  pretence.  He  made  few 
friends,  but  he  had  a  habit  of  saying  things  which  were  likely 
to  make  enemies.  To  Poincare  he  once  remarked :  "Personne 
n'est  mieux  placee  que  vous,  M.  le  President,  de  savoir  que  la 
France  est  ni  gouvernee  ni  commandee." 

Poincare,  not  unnaturally  annoyed,  replied: 

"Vous  plaisantez,  mon  General." 

"Pas  du  tout,"  responded  Petain. 

It  is  evident  that  a  man  who  was  so  blunt  and  mordant  in 
expressing  his  opinions  would  not  be  much  liked  by  politicians. 
Nevertheless,  it  seemed  probable  that,  in  default  of  anyone  else, 
he  would  have  to  be  chosen :  when  suddenly  a  new  name  began 
to  be  mentioned. 

In  August,  1914,  Nivelle  had,  like  Petain,  been  a  colonel, 
but  a  colonel  of  Artillery.  At  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  where 
he  commanded  the  artillery  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  he  had  dis- 
tinguished himself  by  destroying  six  German  batteries.  Pro- 
moted General  of  Division  (the  highest  rank  in  the  French 
Army,  the  title  of  Marshal  of  France  indicating  a  dignity 
and  not  a  military  grade),  he  later  succeeded  Petain,  first  in 
command  of  the  XXXII.  Corps,  and  later  in  that  of  the 
Second  Army.  It  was  in  the  latter  post  that  his  name  sud- 
denly became  known  to  the  public.  The  Germans  had  taken 
the  fortress  of  Douamont,  and  the  Emperor  had  announced 
this  capture  to  all  the  world  in  one  of  his  customary  pompous 
allocutions.  But  on  November  15th  it  was  recaptured  by  Gen- 
eral Mangin,  who  commanded  under  Nivelle.  The  exploit  was 
brilliant,  and  its  fame  was  increased  by  the  way  in  which 
Wilhelm  had  boasted  when  his  Brandenburgers  had  walked 
into  the  fortress. 

All  this  attracted  attention  to  the  commander  of  the  Second 
Army.  The  senators  and  deputies  who  began  to  visit  him 
found  a  soldier  with  whom  they  could  talk.     He  was  neither 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  65 

silent,  like  Joffre,  nor  biting,  like  Petain.  While  they  were 
chiefly  impressed,  as  everyone  always  was,  by  the  clearness 
with  which  he  explained  everything — a  quality  which  always 
endears  a  soldier  to  civilians.  As  he  was  a  Protestant,  the 
Extreme  Left  had  no  objections  against  him  on  the  score  of 
religion;  while  he  had  always  kept  clear  of  politics.  Parlia- 
mentary opinion  (upon  which  M.  Briand  was  getting  more 
dependent  in  proportion  as  his  Government  grew  weaker) 
gradually  centred  upon  him;  and  finally,  on  December  12th 
or  13th,  191 6,  Nivelle  (whose  mother  was  English  and  whose 
grandfather  had  been  a  British  colonel)  was  appointed  to 
succeed  Joffre.  Some  two  weeks  later  Lyautey's  prompt 
action,  as  Minister  of  War,  removed  Joffre  (as  has  already 
been  related)  from  an  ill-defined  position,  where  he  might 
have  had  some  control  over  operations.  Nivelle  was  then  in 
supreme  command;  not,  indeed,  with  the  same  powers  as 
Joffre  had  once  exercised,  but  responsible  to  no  one  except  the 
Minister  of  War. 

As  Chef  de  Cabinet  Nivelle  brought  with  him  to  Chantilly 
(which  the  G.  Q.  G.  soon  afterwards  left  for  Beauvais)  an 
officer  whose  name  to  this  day  remains  little  known  to  the 
public,  but  who,  behind  the  scenes,  played  a  principal  part  in 
the  events  which  rapidly  followed — Lieut. -Colonel  d'Alenson. 
Noticeable  on  account  of  his  extraordinary  height,  dark  to  the 
verge  of  blackness,  thin  as  a  skeleton — such  was  his  appear- 
ance. In  manner,  taciturn  and  absent-minded.  In  conduct, 
self-willed  to  the  limit  of  obstinacy:  and  enthusiastic  for  his 
own  beliefs  to  the  point  of  being  a  fanatic.  It  was  d'Alenson, 
and  probably  d'Alenson  alone,  who  was  responsible  for  the 
absolute  faith  which  Nivelle  always  expressed  in  the  result  of 
his  operations,  and  in  the  extent  of  their  success :  although 
none  of  his  generals  seem  to  have  shared  his  views  on  the 
latter  point.  D'Alenson  was  a  dying  man,  as  his  appearance 
indicated.  He  was  convinced  that,  following  certain  lines, 
Nivelle  would  win  the  war  in  time  for  him  to  see  the  victory. 
Instead,  he  saw  Nivelle's  failure,  and  only  survived  a  few 
months  thereafter. 

At  Verdun  everything  had  succeeded  with  Nivelle :  it  was 


66  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

therefore  not  remarkable  that  he  counted  upon  those  who  had 
aided  him  there  to  second  him  in  the  greater  task  he  was  now 
undertaking:  especially  upon  Mangin  (one  of  the  greatest  of 
French  fighting  generals,  and  who,  years  before,  had,  with 
Marchand,  faced  Kitchener  at  Fashoda),  to  whom  he  gave 
the  command  of  the  Sixth  Army,  which  numbered  350,000 
men. 

But  although  Nivelle  was  in  supreme  command,  he  inher- 
ited a  plan  of  offensive  which,  in  its  main  outlines,  had  been 
drafted  by  a  meeting  of  Allied  Generals  held  at  Chantilly, 
November  15th  and  16th,  1916.  Acting  upon  this,  Joffre, 
shortly  before  he  retired,  had  prepared  a  plan  whereby  the 
French  were  to  attack  between  the  Somme  and  Lassigny,  and 
the  British  between  Bapaume  and  Vimy.  Nivelle,  however, 
changed  the  plan  by  extending  the  proposed  front  from  Sois- 
sons  to  Rheims :  and  it  was  on  this  extension,  by  an  attack 
on  the  "plateau"  of  Craonne,  that  he  thought  he  would  be 
able  in  some  hours  to  force  the  German  position. 

In  order  to  carry  out  the  whole  plan  Nivelle  attempted  to 
persuade  Haig  to  take  over  the  Front  as  far  as  Roye.  The 
latter  made  various  objections;  and  finally  Nivelle  went  to 
London  to  try  to  wring  from  the  Cabinet  a  decision  which  he 
had  been  unable  to  get  from  Haig. 

In  this  he  was  fully  successful.  Lloyd  George,  as  well  as 
the  other  members  of  the  War  Cabinet,  were  all  impressed  by 
his  appearance,  his  confidence,  and  above  all  by  his  clarity  of 
expression;  while  the  fact  that  he  spoke  English  probably 
counted  not  a  little  (even  if  unconsciously)  with  politicians 
who  were  by  this  time  getting  somewhat  tired  of  being 
dependent  upon  interpreters.  They  cited  Nivelle  as  the  first 
French  general  they  had  met  who  would  tell  them  freely  what 
he  meant  to  do,  and  who  could  also  tell  them  in  a  way  they 
understood.  A  month  later  (on  February  15th,  191 7)  Lloyd 
George,  coming  into  a  room  where  Berthier  de  Sauvigny  (one 
of  the  French  military  attaches)  was  having  a  conversation 
with  Colonel  Hankey,  told  (I  translate  Berthier  de  Sauvigny's 
own  account  of  this  conversation  as  given  in  an  official  pub- 
lication) "how  profound  had  been  the  impression  produced  on 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  67 

the  War  Committee  by  General  Nivelle.  Doubtless,  the  pres- 
tige which  Marshal  Haig  enjoyed  in  the  Army  and  amongst 
the  English  nation  would  not  allow  them  to  subordinate  him 
purely  and  simply  to  the  French  Commander;  but  if  the  War 
Committee  recognised  that  this  measure  was  indispensable,  it 
would  not  hesitate  to  give  Marshal  Haig  secret  injunctions  in 
that  sense." 

On  February  26th  or  27th  an  Allied  Conference  took  place 
at  Calais.  Lloyd  George,  Haig,  Robertson,  Briand,  Lyautey, 
and  Nivelle  were  amongst  those  present.  The  result  of  this 
meeting  was  a  signed  agreement  whereby  in  effect  the  British 
Government  recognised  that  the  direction  of  the  coming  cam- 
paign should  be  in  the  hands  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  French  Army:  and  agreed  that,  with  certain  limitations, 
Haig  should,  but  for  those  operations  only,  be  under  the  orders 
of  Nivelle. 

This  arrangement  was  made  more  difficult  by  the  fact  that 
Haig  was  now  a  Field-Marshal  (which  in  the  British  Army  is 
a  rank  and  not  simply  a  dignity),  while  Nivelle  was  only  a 
General  of  Division,  which  corresponds  to  a  British  Lieutenant- 
General.  But,  nevertheless,  once  it  was  signed,  Nivelle  did 
not  wait  an  instant  to  take  full  advantage  of  it.  For  on 
February  27th  he  sent  (it  is  thought  at  the  instance  of  d'Alen- 
son)  a  letter  of  instructions  couched  in  terms  such  as  would 
only  be  used  by  a  superior  officer  to  his  subordinate.  Apart 
from  the  tone  of  the  communication,  Haig  probably  was  by 
no  means  in  accord  with  some  of  the  things  he  was  directed 
to  do;  for  instance,  that  he  should  increase  the  importance  of 
the  British  Mission  at  French  G.  O.  G. ;  and  that,  upon  his 
return  from  Russia  (where  he  was  then  on  a  mission  with 
de  Castelnau,  Lord  Revelstoke,  and  others),  he  should  place 
Sir  Flenry  Wilson  at  the  head  of  the  Mission. 

Haig  did  not  take  the  trouble  to  discuss  the  contents  of  this 
letter.  He  simply  sent  it  to  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff, 
Sir  William  Robertson,  together  with  a  letter  of  his  own  (of 
which  he  sent  a  copy  to  Nivelle)  in  which  he  re-opened  the 
whole  question  of  his  having  been  put  under  the  orders  of  the 
French  Commander-in-Chief. 


68  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Haig  might  possibly  have  won  his  point  ( for  although  Lloyd 
George  was  entirely  against  him,  he  did  not  care  to  take  the 
risk  of  exasperating  him  to  breaking  point)  had  not  Briand 
intervened.  The  French  Prime  Minister  (who  never  found 
Haig  very  congenial)  sent  the  British  Government  a  message 
of  the  most  vigorous  nature,  insisting  that  Haig  should  be 
made  to  respect  the  Calais  agreement;  and  saying  that  "the 
repeated  tendencies  of  Marshal  Haig  to  evade  the  instructions 
which  are  given  him  .  .  .  render  the  co-operation  of  the 
British  illusory  and  the  exercise  of  a  unique  command  impos- 
sible." 

Briand's  blunt  statements  led  to  another  meeting  in  London, 
on  March  13th,  between  the  British  War  Cabinet,  Ribot,  Haig, 
and  Nivelle.  In  the  result  Haig  signed  a  letter  stating  that  he 
accepted  the  Calais  agreement,  but  specifying  that,  except  for 
the  period  of  the  proposed  operation,  the  British  Army  and  its 
Commander-in-Chief  were  to  be  considered  by  Nivelle  as 
allies  and  not  as  subordinates.  The  terms  of  the  letter  show 
that  Haig  was  acting  more  upon  compulsion  than  in  accordance 
with  his  own  wishes. 

Briand's  telegram,  however,  was,  in  one  respect,  uninten- 
tionally unfair — when  he  suggested  that  Haig  was  in  the  habit 
of  evading  what  he  had  undertaken  to  do.  To  say  that  there 
were  never  any  differences  of  opinion  between  Haig  and  the 
French  High  Command  or  the  French  Government  would  be 
absurd.  There  were  many.  French  statesmen  thought  Haig 
unduly  obstinate,  sometimes  because  he  insisted  upon  follow- 
ing his  own  views  instead  of  adopting  theirs.  One  often  heard 
Haig  criticised.  While  I  see  in  my  diary  for  191 8  the  record 
of  a  conversation  with  a  French  Cabinet  Minister  (needless  to 
say,  not  the  Minister  of  War),  in  which  were  some  forcible 
comments  upon  the  British  Commander-in-Chief.  But  even 
those  who  were  not  amongst  Haig's  admirers  never  then 
impugned  his  loyalty.  Undoubtedly  he  did  not  care  to  be 
under  the  orders  of  Nivelle  any  more  than  he  is  supposed  to 
have  wanted  unity  of  command  until  March,  19 18.  But  it 
may  be  taken  for  granted  that  if  he  objected  to  Nivelle's  letter 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  69 

it  was  because  he  thought  it  was  not  in  accord  with  the  Calais 
agreement. 

This  service,  however,  was  the  last  which  Briand  was 
destined  to  render  Nivelle.  On  March  15th  Lyautey  made  a 
speech  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes  which  led  to  the  downfall 
of  the  Government.  He  first  provoked  the  anger  of  a  number 
of  deputies  by  intimating  that  he  did  not  wish  to  imperil  the 
national  safety  by  disclosing  certain  things :  and  in  the  tumult 
which  followed  this  statement  he  made  other  remarks  which 
still  further  infuriated  the  Extreme  Left.  Unable  to  continue 
his  speech  he  left  the  Chamber  accompanied  by  M.  Briand. 
The  latter  wished  to  arrange  matters  by  some  explanation. 
But  to  that  Lyautey  absolutely  refused  to  be  a  party,  and  gave 
Briand  his  resignation.  Two  days  later  Briand  himself 
resigned. 

The  political  world  was  not  surprised  when  Poincare  asked 
Ribot  to  form  a  Ministry.  Ribot,  in  his  day  one  of  the  greatest 
of  French  parliamentary  orators,  is  of  the  same  generation 
as  Clemenceau.  His  career  had  been  distinguished ;  and  there 
was  no  section  of  the  Chamber  which  did  not  hold  him  in 
respect.  He  was  known  to  have  little  love  for  soldiers.  Indeed, 
it  was  rather  cruelly  said  of  him  that  he  had  even  more 
contempt  for  them  than  he  had  for  the  rest  of  mankind. 

The  new  Minister  of  War  was  Paul  Painleve — whose  tenure 
of  office  is  even  to-day  more  a  subject  of  discussion  than  that 
of  any  other  French  minister  throughout  the  war. 

Painleve,2  who  is  a  member  of  the  Academie  des  Sciences, 
is  the  greatest  mathematician  in  France,  his  only  rival  having 
been  the  late  Henri  Poincare.  But  nobody  has  the  appearance 
of  the  usual  scientist  less  than  Painleve.  Simple  in  his  man- 
ners, unaffected  in  his  conversation,  impulsive,  alert,  ardently 
attached  to  whatever  he  believes,  there  is,  withal,  something 
almost  naive  in  his  composition.  Fie  is  not  only  "tres  honnete 
homme,"  but  he  gives  in  a  marked  degree  the  impression  of 
being  one.  His  first  connection  with  political  life  was  through 
the  Dreyfus  case.     The  prosecution,  hearing  of  some  con- 

2  Apparently  he  is  the  only  person  who  is  ahle  to  give  any  intelligent 
explanation  of  Einstein's  theories. 


70  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

versation  he  was  supposed  to  have  had  with  a  cousin  of 
Dreyfus,  put  in  the  dossier  an  account  of  it  which  was  untrue. 
Painleve  gave  evidence  at  Rennes,  when  there  was  a  dramatic 
confrontation  with  the  author  of  the  fabrication.  It  was 
through  this  incident  that  he  came  to  know  Clemenceau.  For 
many  years  they  were  political  friends.  But  when  Painleve 
was  Prime  Minister,  Clemenceau  assailed  him  so  fiercely  that 
to-day  they  no  longer  speak  to  each  other.  The  war  had 
already  shown  the  difference  between  their  views.  Painleve 
was,  for  instance,  firmly  attached  to  Sarrail,  whom  he  regarded 
as  a  Republican  general.  Clemenceau  was  indifferent  on  this 
point.  It  was,  I  thing,  Painleve  himself  who  once  said 
reproachfully  of  Clemenceau  that  he  did  not  care  whether  he 
won  the  war  with  the  aid  of  God  or  of  the  devil :  which  was 
quite  true. 

But  Painleve  is  of  another  school.  He  would  probably  rank 
Jules  Ferry  as  high  as  Gambetta  among  the  statesmen  of  the 
Third  Republic.  He  has  a  fear  rather  than  any  hatred  of 
the  Church ;  a  fear  lest  it  may  encroach.  Yet  he  has  none  of 
the  bitterness  which  in  France  so  often  characterises  opponents 
of  Roman  Catholicism. 

Painleve  had  been  Minister  of  Public  Instruction  and  of 
Inventions  in  the  Briand  Cabinet  of  October,  19 15.  But  when 
Briand  reconstituted  his  Ministry  in  December,  19 16,  he  had 
refused  to  remain.  For  this  there  were  several  reasons.  Pain- 
leve did  not  approve  of  the  arrangement  about  Joffre  because 
he  though  that  it  still  left  the  latter  in  a  position  where  he 
might  interfere.  But  he  has  himself  written  that  the  certainty 
that  Briand  would  not  name  Petain  (and  presumably  that  he 
would  name  Nivelle)  as  Joffre's  successor  was  also  one  of  his 
reasons  for  refusing  to  continue  in  office. 

This  fact  was  well  known;  and  is  largely  responsible  for 
the  controversy  which  is  still  waged  regarding  Painleve's  con- 
duct in  respect  to  the  Nivelle  offensive.  Briefly,  the  friends  of 
Nivelle  allege  that  Painleve,  by  his  interviews  with  various 
generals,  inspired  a  lack  of  confidence  in  Nivelle;  that  he 
arrested  the  offensive;  that  his  statements  as  to  the  losses 
incurred  were  incorrect;  and  finally,  that  if  Nivelle  had  been 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  71 

allowed  to  continue  he  would  have  had  still  further  and  greater 
success.  His  more  enthusiastic  supporters  go  so  far  as  to  aver 
that  the  war  would  have  been  won  in  191 7  instead  of  1918. 

It  is  undeniable  that  there  are  many  and  obvious  objections 
to  a  Minister  of  War  on  the  eve  of  a  great  offensive  asking 
the  lieutenants  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  criticisms  of 
the  latter's  plan.  But  in  this  instance  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
it  was  not  Painleve  but  Lyautey — Lyautey,  a  soldier  and  not 
a  civilian — who  had  begun  to  ask  the  generals  commanding 
under  Nivelle  for  their  views.  Petain,  when  questioned,  had 
made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  he  could  not  foresee  the  great 
success  which  Nivelle  anticipated  with  such  confidence. 
Lyautey  was  so  impressed  by  this  statement  that  he  com- 
municated it  to  the  War  Committee,  which  summoned  Petain, 
who  simply  repeated  what  he  had  said  to  Lyautey.  Nor  was 
Petain  the  only  one  who  did  not  have  the  same  faith  as 
Nivelle.  Mazel,  who  commanded  the  Fifth  Army,  had  also 
told  Lyautey  (it  is  not  clear  whether  he  did  so  at  his  own 
instance  or  in  answer  to  questions  put  to  him  by  the  Minister) 
that  he  did  not  think  he  would  be  able  to  carry  out  successfully 
the  part  of  the  proposed  operation  which  was  assigned  to  him. 

The  accusation  that  Painleve  divided  the  High  Command 
falls  to  the  ground.  Petain's  criticism  of  the  plan  of  offensive 
was  the  one  which  merited  and  received  the  most  considera- 
tion :  and  that  criticism  had  been  made  before  Painleve  was  in 
office.  When  Painleve  saw  Lyautey  upon  taking  his  succes- 
sion, the  latter  told  him  what  had  occurred,  and,  according  to 
Painleve's  account,  did  not  hide  that  he  himself  was  uneasy. 

Moreover,  two  events  took  place  immediately  before  Pain- 
leve became  Minister  of  War  which  he  may  reasonably  have 
thought  would  possibly  affect  the  plans  of  the  High  Command. 

The  Russian  Revolution  had  led  to  the  collapse  of  the  Rus- 
sian Army,  and  it  was  probable  that  Germany  might  be  able  to 
send  reinforcements  to  the  West  from  that  Front.  Moreover, 
it  had  been  an  essential  part  of  the  original  plan  that  Russia 
should  attack  at  the  same  time  as  Great  Britain  and  France.3 

3 It  has  been  said  (see  Nivelle  et  Painleve,  by  M.  Mermeix,  pp.  67-8), 
and  I  believe   rightly,   that   Painleve's   attention  was   fixed  on  this  point 


72  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

The  other  event  was  the  unhampered  retirement  of  the 
Germans.  On  March  16th  they  had  in  fact  made  their  great 
retreat,  leaving  Roye,  Lassigny  and  Bapaume.  They  had 
taken  with  them  all  their  heavy  artillery  and  other  material, 
and  had  been  allowed  to  do  this  at  their  leisure  without  being 
hurried  by  any  attack.  In  return  they  gave  the  Allies  a  certain 
stretch  of  devastated  territory,  and  rendered  void  in  advance 
a  great  part  of  the  proposed  offensive. 

Three  days  after  Painleve  came  to  the  rue  St.  Dominique — 
on  March  22nd — he  had  a  long  conversation  with  Nivelle. 
According  to  his  own  account  he  told  Nivelle  openly  (what 
Nivelle  of  course  already  knew)  that  his  personal  preference 
had  been  for  Petain  as  the  successor  to  Joffre :  but  that  that 
belonged  to  the  past,  and  that  as  Minister  of  War  he  would 
give  Nivelle  all  possible  support. 

Anyone  who  knows  Painleve  will  readily  believe  that  he 
was  absolutely  frank  in  his  interview  with  Nivelle. 

The  Minister  then  asked  the  Commander-in-Chief  whether 
(in  view  of  the  two  occurrences  to  which  I  have  alluded)  it 
might  not  be  necessary  to  modify  his  plans. 

Nivelle  replied  that  he  had  never  seriously  counted  upon  the 
offensive  being  assisted  by  the  Russians  attacking  on  their 
Front.  While  he  was  not  alarmed  by  the  possibility  of  more 
German  troops  being  freed  in  Russia  for  the  West.  Accord- 
ing to  Painleve,  he  remarked :  "Plus  il  sera  nombreux,  plus  la 
victoire  sera  eclatante." 

Nor  did  Nivelle  show  that  he  attached  any  greater  impor- 
tance to  the  German  withdrawal :  though  the  fact  was  that  he 
had,  as  a  result,  decided,  on  March  15th,  to  extend  his  Front 
for  the  attack  beyond  Rheims  as  far  as  Auberive. 

The  truth  is  that  Nivelle  had  been  warned  of  this  impending 
retirement,  and  had  not  heeded  the  warning.  In  his  report 
on  July  17th,  191 7,  to  the  Army  Commission  of  the  Senat, 

by  a  memorandum  drawn  by  his  Chef  de  Cabinet,  Colonel  Heilbronner. 
M.  Jacques  Heilbronner,  who  is  a  Maitre  des  Requetes  au  Conseil 
d'Etat,  rendered  invaluable  services  throughout  the  war,  especially  as 
an  intermediary  between  those  in  high  authority.  It  may  be  said  that 
while  always  remembering  that  he  was  a  Frenchman  he  did  not  forget 
that  his  grandfather  had  been  a  British  subject. 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  73 

Senator  Henry  Berenger  says :  "The  Commander-in-Chief 
was  in  London — March  13th  and  14th — when  the  first  serious 
indications  of  the  retreat  opposite  Roye-Lassigny  were  sig- 
nalled by  General  Franchet  d'Esperey.  Upon  his  return  to 
Beauvais,  at  four  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  March  16th,  Gen- 
eral Nivelle  sent  for  General  Franchet  d'Esperey,  whom  he 
saw  at  1  p.m.,  when  he  directed  him  to  take  the  offensive  the 
same  evening  in  order  to  regain  on  all  points  close  contact 
with  the  enemy." 

But  Nivelle  had  been  first  warned  of  this  retreat  not,  as  this 
report  would  indicate,  on  March  13th  or  14th,  but  ten  days 
earlier. 

On  March  4th,  and  after  he  had  given  a  prior  verbal  opinion 
to  the  same  effect,  Franchet  d'Esperey  had  written  Nivelle, 
saying:  "The  ensemble  of  information  which  has  been 
obtained  for  some  time  past  shows  that  the  enemy  has  prepared 
a  retreat  towards  a  new  position  situated  at  twenty  kilometres 
from  the  present  Front.  Upon  the  existence  of  this  plan  of 
retreat  there  seems  to  be  no  room  for  any  doubt :  the  con- 
cordant information  given  by  prisoners,  by  the  enemy's  sys- 
tematic course  of  destruction  in  the  zone  which  is  to  be  aban- 
doned, by  the  retirement  which  has  already  been  effected  of  a 
certain  number  of  organisations  (staffs,  aviation  parks,  etc.), 
reveal  clearly  the  intentions  of  our  adversary." 

Franchet  d'Esperey,  in  the  same  letter  of  March  4th,  advised 
Nivelle  that  this  retirement  would  be  on  a  longer  line  than 
he  had  at  first  thought;  suggested  that  it  would  therefore  be 
necessary  to  modify  the  plan  of  the  coming  offensive;  pointed 
out  that  the  sooner  an  attack  was  made  the  more  chance  there 
would  be  of  surprising  the  enemy  in  his  preparations,  and 
especially  of  capturing  his  artillery;  and  finally  added  that  his 
own  armies  (Groupe  des  Armees  du  Nord)  would  be  able  to 
make  the  necessary  attack  upon  six  days'  notice. 

Nivelle  did  not  reply  until  March  7th,  when  he  wrote  that 
he  saw  no  reason  to  modify  the  existing  plan;  and  that  he 
thought  it  was  very  unlikely  that  the  enemy  would  voluntarily 
abandon  the  Roye-Soissons  line. 

The  variation  is  evident.     On  March  7th  Nivelle  did  not 


74  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

contend  that  a  German  retreat  ought  not  to  modify  his  plan — 
he  took  no  issue  on  that  point  with  Franchet  d'Esperey:  he 
simply  said  that  he  did  not  believe  that  there  would  be  such 
a  retreat. 

To  Painleve  he  said  that  it  made  no  difference.  While  it 
has  been  recorded  (although  I  am  in  no  position  to  vouch  for 
this)  that  he  told  a  group  of  officers  that,  if  he  could  have 
given  orders  to  Hindenburg,  they  would  have  been  to  do  that 
very  thing. 

Even  Mangin,  who  is  not  unfavourable  to  Nivelle,  but  is 
hostile  to  Painleve,  says  that  Franchet  d'Esperey  notified 
Nivelle  on  March  4th,  and  adds :  "Sceptical,  General  Nivelle 
at  first  decided  to  change  nothing  in  his  plan  of  operations." 

It  was  not  the  least  of  Nivelle's  mistakes. 

At  his  interview  with  Painleve  on  March  22nd,  and  at 
subsequent  interviews  on  March  26th  and  31st,  Nivelle 
expressed  the  most  complete  confidence  in  his  plan.  Its  object 
was  to  effect  a  rupture  by  attaining  the  third  and  fourth  enemy 
positions.  The  plan  itself,  devoid  of  all  technical  details,  was 
that  the  Sixth  Army  (Mangin)  should  attack  on  the  Aisne, 
and  the  Fifth  Army  (Mazel)  should  take  Brimont.  These 
operations  executed,  the  Sixth  Army  would  press  towards  the 
right,  thus  making  a  space  into  which  would  come  the  Tenth 
Army  (Duchesne),  which  was  to  force  further  the  enemy's 
retreat. 

Throughout  Nivelle  insisted  that  the  rupture  would  be 
obtained  in  twenty-four  or,  at  most,  in  forty-eight  hours.  It 
was  later  suggested  that  the  exact  time  had  simply  been  used 
as  a  phrase,  and  that  Painleve  had  unfairly  tried  to  tie  Nivelle 
down  to  it.  But  leaving  aside  Painleve's  statements  about 
the  various  occasions  upon  which  Nivelle  made  success  within 
that  period,  a  vital  condition  of  the  rupture,  there  is  the  evi- 
dence of  what  he  said  on  that  subject  before  Painleve  was  in 
office. 

On  March  1st,  19 17  (Painleve  became  Minister  on  March 
19th)  Albert  Favre  and  Maurice  Violette,  who  were  mem- 
bers of  the  Army  Commission  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
made  a  report  to  the  Chamber  upon  the  interviews  they  had 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  75 

had  with  Nivelle  and  some  of  his  generals  at  the  Front.  Their 
report  shows  Nivelle  as  saying:  "If  within  the  twenty-four 
hours  of  the  attack  we  are  not  able  to  take  all  the  enemy's  guns, 
including  those  of  large  calibre,  it  will  have  to  be  gone  over 
again,  and  there  will  be  nothing  left  to  do  except  to  stop  the 
battle."  The  reporters  add :  "No  doubt  there  may  be  a  little 
exaggeration  in  this  delay  of  twenty- four  hours ;  the  circum- 
stances may  impose  the  necessity  of  stopping  before  the  third 
position,  as  we  observed  to  General  Nivelle.  A  reasonable 
delay  of  forty-eight  hours,  or,  at  most,  of  three  days,  may 
therefore  be  admitted.  If  the  battle  is  not  won  within  that  time 
one  may  be  sure  it  never  will  be.  Everyone  is  in  agreement  on 
that  point." 

Nivelle  was  equally  confident  that  his  troops  would  reach 
the  third  and  fourth  enemy  positions.  Micheler  was  less  cer- 
tain. On  March  24th  he  wrote  to  Nivelle  expressing  his 
doubts.  Not  receiving  any  answer,  he  took  it  upon  himself 
to  issue  on  March  26,  an  instruction  in  which,  foreseeing 
resistance  on  the  two  last  German  positions,  he  recommended 
certain  measures  of  prudence.  But  this  was  so  little  in  accord 
with  Nivelle's  plans  or  beliefs  that  on  April  1st  he  ordered 
Micheler  to  change  his  instruction,  pointing  out  that  the  suc- 
cess of  the  manoeuvres  to  obtain  a  rupture  depended  upon  the 
surprise  caused  to  the  enemy  by  the  sudden  bursting  of  the 
troops  upon  the  third  and  fourth  positions. 

In  brief,  everything  shows  that  whatever  may  have  been 
Painleve's  errors  of  judgment,  he  never  had  any  cause  (as 
he  probably  never  had  the  desire)  to  press  Nivelle  to  bind  him- 
self to  something  definite.  No  commander  was  ever  more 
ready  than  was  Nivelle  to  say  exactly  what  he  was  certain  he 
would  accomplish,  and  to  fix  the  period  within  which  he 
would  do  it. 

In  the  meantime  Painleve  was  pursuing  his  conversations. 
His  own  impression  was  so  firm  (and  Painleve  is  a  man  whose 
impressions  are  easily  discernible),  his  lack  of  faith  in  Nivelle 
was  so  well  known,  that  it  is  possible  that  this  may  have  had  its 
effect  upon  some  of  those  whom  he  questioned ;  though  it  may 


76  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

be  taken  for  granted  that  it  did  not  in  any  way  change  Petain's 
replies. 

On  March  28th  Painleve  had  a  conversation  with  Micheler, 
whom  he  had  desired  to  come  to  see  him  at  the  rue  St.  Domi- 
nique. According  to  his  own  account,  Painleve  took  this  step 
at  the  repeated  insistence  of  the  late  M.  Antoine  Dubost  (then 
President  of  the  Senate),  who  had  twice  urged  him  to  see 
Micheler,  on  the  ground  that  that  general  could  give  him  in- 
formation of  great  importance.  It  is  therefore  open  to  ques- 
tion whether  or  not  Micheler  took  the  first  step — whether  he 
requested  Dubost  to  get  Painleve  to  send  for  him. 

Micheler  told  Painleve  that  the  situation  was  entirely  dif- 
ferent from  what  it  had  been  in  December,  when  he  had  agreed 
to  carry  out  the  plan :  and  he  gave  the  technical  reasons  for  his 
view.  In  his  opinion  a  rupture  was  out  of  the  question.  If 
everything  went  well  the  troops  might  possibly  be  able  to  reach 
Laon.  But  it  would  be  very  difficult  and  costly.  In  reply  to 
direct  questions  put  to  him  by  Painleve,  Micheler  said  that  he 
thought  it  would  be  dangerous  not  to  make  an  attack,  as  that 
would  offer  the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  take  the  initiative. 

On  April  1st  Painleve  saw  Petain,  whom  he  had  not  met 
since  the  preceding  November.  Petain  gave  a  definite  opinion 
that  the  offensive  would  be  stopped  at  the  second  enemy  posi- 
tion ;  and  that  it  was  illusory  to  imagine  that  it  would  get 
further.  Even  for  that  it  would  be  essential  to  have  good 
weather  conditions,  and  to  concentrate  the  artillery  bombard- 
ment on  the  first  and  second  positions.  It  would  be  an  expen- 
sive operation,  but  it  would  be  worth  while.  He  agreed  with 
Micheler  that  it  would  be  perilous  to  abandon  the  attack  alto- 
gether. Nevertheless,  if  nothing  went  wrong  on  the  Trentino, 
he  would  not  be  afraid  to  put  it  off  until  there  was  better 
weather  and  the  days  were  longer. 

On  April  2nd  Painleve  saw  Franchet  d'Esperey  in  Paris. 
This  general  also  had  his  doubts.  He  was  preoccupied  by 
the  question  of  the  Hindenburg  Line — what  was  its  actual 
strength.  The  G.Q.G.  thought  that  it  was  without  any  depth, 
and  would  crack  like  a  bit  of  paper.  Franchet  d'Esperey 
doubted  the  exactitude  of  this  information. 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  77 

Painleve  had  already,  on  March  24th,  had  a  conversation 
with  Haig.  He  found  that  the  general  desire  of  British  Head- 
quarters was  to  make  an  attack  as  quickly  as  possible. 

As  a  result  of  these  various  interviews  Painleve  called 
Nivelle  to  a  conference  which  was  held  at  the  Ministry  of  War 
on  April  3rd;  the  others  present  being  the  President  du  Con- 
seil,  Ribot,  Painleve  himself,  Admiral  Lacaze,  Albert  Thomas, 
and  the  Minister  of  the  Colonies,  Maginot. 

At  this  meeting  Painleve  told  Nivelle  of  the  objections  raised 
by  his  subordinates.  Nivelle's  confidence  remained  unshaken. 
He  assured  the  Ministers  that  the  two  first  positions  would  be 
taken  without  great  loss — and  that  the  others  would  also  be 
captured.     He  reiterated  that  the  rupture  was  certain. 

It  is  probable  that  Painleve  would  have  been  well  advised, 
both  for  the  sake  of  the  country  as  well  as  for  his  own  record, 
if  he  had  left  the  matter  at  that :  unless,  indeed,  he  was  pre- 
pared to  take  the  responsibility  of  overriding  the  Commander- 
in-Chief — which  would,  of  course,  have  entailed  the  latter's 
resignation. 

He  had  carefully  (perhaps  too  carefully)  collected  the 
opinions  of  Nivelle's  generals.  He  had,  in  the  presence  of  his 
own  colleagues,  placed  these  views  before  Nivelle.  The  latter 
had  held  firm.  Therefore,  unless  Painleve  cared  to  act  him- 
self, there  was  nothing  more  which  could  usefully  be  done. 

Unfortunately,  on  April  5th,  Colonel  (now  General)  Mes- 
simy,  a  deputy,  who  had  been  Minister  of  War  in  August, 
1 91 4,  gave  Ribot  a  memorandum  which,  he  said,  faithfully 
reflected  the  opinion  of  Micheler.  This  note  was  entirely 
against  the  offensive,  claiming  that  while  it  would  entail  heavy 
losses  it  would  give  little  real  result ;  and  that  in  any  event  the 
time  of  year  was  unpropitious  for  such  an  operation. 

The  Prime  Minister  thought  it  proper  to  call  a  Council  of 
War.  This  was  the  famous  Compiegne  Council  held  on  April 
6th,  191 7.  Poincare  himself  was  present,  the  others  there  being 
Nivelle,  Petain,  de  Castelnau,  Micheler,  Franchet  d'Esperey, 
Ribot,  Painleve,  Lacaze,  and  Albert  Thomas.  It  will  be  no- 
ticed that  this  was  a  meeting  of  an  entirely  different  character 
from  the  one  held  three  days  before  when  Painleve  had  sub- 


78  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

mitted  to  Nivelle  the  opinions  of  his  generals.  This  was  a 
Council  of  War,  at  which  the  President  of  the  Republic  pre- 
sided :  and  at  which  Nivelle  and  his  generals  were  brought 
face  to  face. 

Painleve  exposed  the  fears  of  the  Government.  Nivelle 
repeated  his  former  assertions — a  certain  rupture  within 
twenty-four  hours.  De  Castelnau,  who  had  just  returned 
from  Russia,  admitted  that  he  had  had  no  opportunity  to  study 
the  situation  and  therefore  could  pronounce  no  opinion. 
Franchet  d'Esperey  reiterated  his  doubts. 

Micheler's  statement  apparently  led  to  some  dispute  between 
himself  and  Nivelle.  But  in  any  event  Micheler  did  not  go 
so  far  as  had  Messimy's  memorandum :  he  afterwards  told 
Ribot  that  the  latter  had  exaggerated  his  views. 

Petain,  who  probably  was  somewhat  bored  by  so  much 
talking,  said  briefly  that  it  was  an  illusion  to  think  that  they 
could  get  beyond  the  second  enemy  position:  even  that  would 
be  possible  only  if  the  attack  was  well  prepared  and  the  weather 
conditions  were  favourable. 

At  one  stage  Nivelle  offered  to  resign.  The  accounts  of  this 
incident  vary.  Probably  Nivelle  did  not  mean  it  seriously; 
certainly  the  Government  did  not  take  it  seriously. 

The  meeting  ended  without  changing  anything,  except  pos- 
sibly further  weakening  the  confidence  of  some  of  Nivelle's 
generals. 

From  that  time  the  Government  took  no  step  regarding  the 
coming  offensive. 

The  incident  sheds  an  instructive  light  upon  the  relation  of 
a  Government  and  a  Commander-in-Chief  in  time  of  war. 
Undoubtedly  any  Government  (and  perhaps  particularly  that 
of  the  French  Republic)  should  in  advance  know  and  approve 
of  an  operation  so  important  as  the  one  in  question.  But  a 
change  of  Government  after  a  plan  has  been  approved  (even 
admitting  that  external  events  might  be  taken  to  have  altered 
the  position),  but  before  its  execution,  creates  a  delicate  situa- 
tion. Is  the  whole  matter  to  be  reopened?  Or  is  it  a  legacy 
which  the  Government  inherits?  No  one  is  obliged  to  take 
office  if  it  entails  an  unacceptable  legacy.    In  this  instance, 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  79 

although  there  was  no  British  intervention  in  the  matter,  yet 
both  Haig  (whatever  his  primary  view)  and  the  British  Gov- 
ernment would  undoubtedly  have  considered  it  a  breach  of 
faith  had  the  offensive,  agreed  to  in  December,  1916,  been 
abandoned  by  the  Ribot  Ministry  in  March,  191 7. 

It  may  well  be  contended  that  Painleve  would  have  been 
more  logical  if  he  had  not  accepted  the  War  Ministry.  One 
of  the  reasons  why  he  refused  to  remain  in  the  reconstituted 
Briand  Government  in  December  was  (as  already  stated,  and 
as  Painleve  has  admitted)  that  he  did  not  approve  of  the 
appointment  of  Nivelle;  he  thought  that  the  latter's  ability  had 
not  been  sufficiently  tried — and  that  Petain  was  the  man  for 
the  post.  But  if  in  December  he  refused  to  join  a  Cabinet 
because,  in  fact,  he  had  not  sufficient  faith  in  Nivelle,  surely 
he  put  himself — and  others — in  an  awkward  position  when 
he  took  office  as  Minister  of  War  at  a  time  when  that  general 
was  about  to  launch  an  offensive — at  a  time  when  he  himself 
thought  it  could  not  be  arrested :  for  he  subsequently  stated  in 
the  Chambre  des  Deputes  that  it  would  have  been  nearly  as 
impossible  for  him  to  have  done  it  as  to  have  stopped  a  train 
going  at  full  speed. 

It  is  incorrect,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  to  accuse 
Painleve  of  having  begun  the  conversations  with  Nivelle's 
generals.  Petain  and  Mazel  had  already  expressed  their 
doubts  to  Lyautey.  But  Lyautey  told  this  to  Painleve  when 
the  latter  took  office ;  and  Painleve  would  probably  have  been 
wise  to  have  gone  no  further:  for  although  the  duties  of  a 
Minister  of  War  are  the  same  whether  he  be  a  soldier  or  a 
civilian,  it  is  obvious  that  in  carrying  out  these  duties  a 
soldier,  in  dealing  with  other  soldiers,  may,  without  detriment, 
do  things  which  a  civilian  cannot.  In  any  event  Painleve  does 
not  seem  to  have  obtained  much  more  information  than  what 
Lyautey  had  already  given  him. 

But,  if  any  serious  objection  can,  upon  the  whole,  be  taken 
to  Painleve's  conduct,  it  is  that  he  himself  did  not  seem  to 
be  ready  to  assume  any  responsibility. 

Did  he  intend  to  stop  the  offensive  no  matter  what  Nivelle 


80  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

thought  or  what  the  generals  said?  Evidently  not,  or  he 
would  not  have  consulted  one  or  the  other. 

Did  he  mean  to  stop  the  offensive  if  Nivelle's  generals 
thought  it  should  be  stopped?  Impossible  to  say:  for  all  of 
them,  except  perhaps  Micheler  in  the  Messimy  note,  thought 
that  the  attack  should  be  made. 

Petain,  upon  whom  Painleve  placed  most  reliance,  stated 
clearly  that  the  attack,  though  costly,  would  be  worth  while, 
provided  there  was  proper  preparation,  and  that  the  weather 
conditions  were  favourable :  but  that  he  did  not  share  Nivelle's 
sanguine  expectations  as  to  the  extent  of  the  result.  What, 
therefore,  was  there  for  Painleve  to  do  except  to  convey 
those  opinions  to  Nivelle — who,  no  doubt,  was  already  fully 
aware  of  them :  unless  he  meant  to  stop  the  offensive  or  to 
relieve  Nivelle  of  his  command? 

But  anyway,  this  information  was  given  to  Nivelle  for- 
mally at  the  meeting  of  April  3rd.  What  justification  is  there 
for  the  War  Council  of  April  6th,  for  which  Ribot  no  doubt 
is  partly  responsible?  The  only  possible  answer  is  the  Mes- 
simy memorandum.  But  in  the  first  place  it  surely  would 
have  been  a  measure  of  ordinary  prudence,  before  summoning 
such  a  Council,  presided  over  by  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
to  have  sent  for  Micheler  and  to  have  confirmed  this  secondary 
evidence :  all  the  more  so  as  Micheler  had  already  discussed 
the  whole  subject  at  length  with  Painleve  on  March  28th,  and 
had  distinctly  said  that  he  thought  it  would  be  dangerous  to 
abandon  the  offensive.  In  the  result  it  appeared  that  the  Mes- 
simy memorandum  did  not  faithfully  represent  Micheler's 
views.  But  if  it  had,  what  did  Painleve  propose  to  do?  Was 
he  then  going  to  stop  the  offensive?  If  not,  what  was  the 
object  of  the  meeting?  One  can  answer,  to  discuss  the  whole 
matter  again.     But  that  is  exactly  what  was  wrong. 

The  weak  point  in  this  part  of  Painleve's  case  is  that  there 
was  an  offensive  in  which  he  did  not  believe :  and  yet  either 
he  could  not  (as  he  alleges)  stop  it,  or  he  would  not  take  the 
responsibility  of  doing  so.  Nevertheless,  if  Nivelle  had  re- 
nounced his  plan,  would  not  Petain  have  agreed  and  done  the 
best   he   could    to    arrange    with    Haig   and    Lloyd    George? 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  81 

But  Nivelle  would  not  give  it  up;  and  Painleve  wanted  the 
result  without  taking  the  risk. 

It  may  be  going  too  far  to  say  that  he  diminished  confi- 
dence in  Nivelle  (one  may  be  sure  that  Petain,  for  instance, 
was  not  in  any  way  affected),  but  he  certainly  did  nothing 
to  increase  it :  and  that  is  perhaps  one  of  the  duties  of  a 
Minister  of  War. 

It  is  easy  to  criticise  vaguely,  and  more  difficult  to  say 
exactly  what  should  have  been  done,  even  after  the  event. 
I  have  already  suggested  that  Painleve  should  never  have 
taken  office  (though  I  am  well  aware  that  at  that  time  Par- 
liament and  the  country  both  wanted  to  see  him  at  the  War 
Office)  when  an  offensive  was  about  to  begin  under  a  general 
in  whose  capacities  he  had  little  belief. 

Once  in  office,  holding  the  views  he  did,  his  best  course 
was  probably  to  delay  the  offensive  until  there  was  a  certainty 
of  better  weather.  The  fact  that  Petain  considered  that 
course  feasible  should  have  given  Painleve  confidence;  and  it 
also  provided  him  with  someone  to  fall  back  upon  in  the  event 
of  Nivelle's  actually  resigning. 

But  although  Painleve  may  be  open  to  some  criticism  upon 
the  ground  indicated,  there  is  not,  as  I  propose  to  show,  any 
justification  for  the  assertion  that  he  stopped  the  offensive. 
Nivelle  took  the  time  he  said  he  wanted,  and  stopped  it  him- 
self when  he  realised  that  it  was  impossible  to  achieve  a 
rupture.  Still  less,  in  my  opinion,  is  there  any  justification 
for  the  widespread  story  that  through  Nivelle's  not  having 
been  allowed  to  have  his  own  way  the  war  might  have  been 
won  in  191 7.  I  am  inclined  to  regard  that  as  one  of  the 
greatest  fables  of  the  period.  It  is  true  that  Mangin  says  that, 
under  certain  circumstances,  that  result  might  have  been 
attained.  I  gather  (the  passage  is  not  very  clear),  that  he 
means  if  Nivelle's  method  had  been  continued.  It  requires 
some  temerity  for  a  civilian  to  differ  from  that  distinguished 
general ;  and  I  should  not  venture  to  do  so  were  it  not  that 
there  is  equally  eminent  military  opinion  on  the  other  side. 

It  remains  to  record  one  curious  and  amusing  result  of  this 
conflict  between  civilian  and  soldier.     Mr.  Lloyd  George  was 


82  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

so  taken  back  by  all  the  discussion  it  had  aroused,  and  by  the 
bungle  which  seemed  to  have  resulted,  that  at  a  meeting  on 
May  4th  in  Paris,  he  practically  lectured  the  members  of  the 
French  Government  upon  the  necessity  of  soldiers  keeping 
their  plans  to  themselves,  and  not  running  the  risk  involved 
in  disclosing  them  to  politicians.  That  surely  must  have 
caused  Haig,  who  was  present,  to  ask  himself  grimly,  "Is  Saul 
also  among  the  prophets?" 

The  English  offensive  had  begun  on  April  gth.  The  French 
attack  upon  which  Nivelle  had  based  such  high  hopes  com- 
menced (after  having  first  been  fixed  for  April  14th)  at  six 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  April  16th.  The  weather  was 
cloudy,  and  partly  on  that  account  there  had  not  been  the 
proper  artillery  preparation.  In  brief,  neither  of  the  conditions 
precedent  which  had  been  stated  by  Petain  to  be  essential  to 
even  the  qualified  success  which  he  considered  possible  were 
fulfilled.  But  what  had  perhaps  not  been  foreseen  by  anyone 
(and  certainly  not  by  Nivelle),  and  what  above  all  else  stopped 
the  advance,  were  the  enemy's  machine  guns  used  in  a  quantity 
which  caused  amazement,  and  taking  full  advantage  of  the 
nature  of  the  ground  which  the  French  had  to  cross. 

Nivelle's  own  account  of  this  first  day  says  that  at  noon 
it  was  evident  that  there  was  a  "lutte  acharnee"  at  the  first 
enemy  position :  and  he  admits  that  it  was  only  partially  on 
the  Fifth  Army  front  that  the  second  position  was  reached. 
He  adds :  "We  are  meeting  everywhere  with  an  obstinate 
resistance.  The  enemy,  in  order  to  replace  his  fixed  machine 
guns  which  have  generally  been  destroyed,  is  taking  into  action 
numerous  light  machine  guns  which  the  German  Army  have 
only  used  recently,  and  which  the  infantry  are  bringing  out  of 
the  shelters." 

In  brief,  Nivelle's  report  of  what  did  happen  differs  ma- 
terially from  what  he  was  confident  would  happen. 

Mangin  himself  admits  that  it  was  difficult  for  his  army  to 
advance.  After  going  forward  from  500  to  2,000  metres  his 
troops  were  stopped.  They  began  again,  only  to  be  checked. 
Mangin  remarks  that  the  battle  had  not  taken  the  turn  which 
was  anticipated. 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  83 

On  the  morning  of  April  17th  Nivelle  stopped  the  advance 
of  the  Sixth  Army  (Mangin's).  He  had  realised  that  there 
was  now  no  question  of  breaking  the  enemy's  lines. 

The  result  of  these  two  days,  as  summed  up  by  the  report 
of  Senator  Berenger  (who  is  considered  as  being  friendly  to 
Nivelle),  is  as  follows:  "It  appears  from  this  perusal" 
(i.e.,  of  all  the  orders  given  during  this  period),  "with  a 
monotony  which  is  truly  tragic,  that  the  abrupt  halt  (arret)  of 
the  regiments  which  attacked  was  everywhere  due  to  the 
enemy's  use  of  machine  guns." 

M.  Abel  Ferry's  report  said:  "We  did  not,  alas,  get  to 
Laon,  as  the  High  Command  had  cherished  the  illusion  that 
we  should.  We  did  not  capture  the  first  position  at  all  points, 
we  rarely  took  the  second,  and  nowhere  did  we  take  the 
third.  ...  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  clan  of  the  infantry 
was  as  in  the  first  days  of  the  war:  and  also  that  the  destruc- 
tion wrought  was  equally  as  incomplete  as  during  those  early 
days.  Our  men  were  no  longer  thrown  upon  intact  barbed 
wire,  but  they  were  thrown  against  intact  machine  guns." 

The  plan  of  operations  was  changed  on  April  22nd.  But 
I  propose  to  refer  only  to  two  incidents  which  illustrate  the 
continuous  conflict  between  Painleve  and  Nivelle. 

Nivelle  projected  an  attack  upon  Briamont.  Painleve, 
through  a  conversation  with  Mazel,  obtained  an  idea  (and 
possibly  an  incorrect  one)  of  the  probable  losses.  According 
to  Nivelle's  friends,  Painleve  stopped  the  operation.  The  only 
proof  in  support  of  that  statement  (but  one  to  which  some 
weight  must  be  given)  is  a  letter  from  Nivelle  to  Painleve, 
dated  April  30th,  which  reads  as  follows: 

"You  informed  me  yesterday,  April  29th,  at  7  o'clock,  by 
telephone,  that  the  Cabinet,  at  a  meeting  held  the  same  after- 
noon, had  decided  to  suspend  the  operation  of  the  Fifth  Army. 
Not  having  received,  according  to  regulations,  a  written  con- 
firmation of  this  decision,  which  is  important,  both  in 
principal  and  as  a  fact,  I  have  the  honour  to  ask  you  to  be 
good  enough  to  give  the  liaison  officer  who  takes  this  letter 
such  confirmation  by  letter." 

On  the  other  hand,  Painleve  denies  absolutely  that  he  ever 


84  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

gave  such  an  order.  He  states  specifically  that  in  the  telephone 
conversation  which  he  had  with  Nivelle  on  the  evening  of 
April  29th,  the  only  reference  to  the  Briamont  attack  was  that 
he  impressed  upon  Nivelle  that  he  must  first  be  in  accord  with 
Petain,  who  had  that  day  been  appointed  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  with  extended  powers ;  and  who,  so  far  as  Painleve  knew, 
thought  that  Briamont  would  only  be  captured  to  be  lost 
immediately.  It  is  regrettable  that  Painleve  has  not  published 
the  reply  which  he  sent  to  this  letter  of  Nivelle's.  It  is  in- 
conceivable that  he  should  have  been  so  imprudent  as  to  leave 
such  a  communication  (which  he  admits  was  delivered  to 
him)  without  an  answer.  If  there  is  no  reply  in  existence 
he  must  fully  realise  this  fact  to-day;  for  he  complains  that  it 
is  Nivelle's  letter  which  has  allowed  the  circulation  of  a  report 
that  the  Government  had  telephoned  prohibiting  the  proposed 
operation. 

Some  days  earlier,  on  April  22nd,  M.  Ybarnegary,  a  deputy 
who  was  serving  at  the  Front,  was  received  at  the  Elysee,  on 
his  own  demand,  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  to  whom 
he  declared  that  he  spoke  on  behalf  of  his  chief,  General 
Hirschauer,  and  likewise  interpreted  the  sentiments  of  the 
officers  and  men  of  his  corps;  that  they  were  about  to  be 
ordered  again  to  begin  the  Craonne  attack  which  had  been  so 
fruitless  and  costly  on  April  16th;  and  that  they  were  all 
firmly  of  the  opinion  that,  on  account  of  insufficient  artillery 
preparation,  as  well  as  for  other  reasons,  the  only  result  would 
be  a  great  loss  of  life  to  no  good  purpose. 

M.  Poincare  was  alarmed  by  a  statement  made  with  such 
precision  and  upon  such  authority.  It  happened  that  Painleve 
was  that  day  absent  from  Paris.  Poincare  therefore  took  it 
upon  himself  to  have  a  telephone  message  sent  to  Nivelle,  to 
the  effect  that  he  had  been  warned  by  those  who  would  be 
charged  with  the  execution  of  the  proposed  operation  that  they 
considered  it  premature  and  doomed  to  failure. 

Painleve  subsequently  confirmed  the  action  which  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  had  thus  taken. 

Nivelle,  naturally  irritated  by  this  communication,  replied 
that  as  a  matter  of  fact  no  date  had  yet  been  fixed  for  the 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  85 

attack.  He  asked  to  be  told  which  of  his  subordinates  had 
acted  in  this  way  behind  his  back;  and,  at  the  same  time, 
instituted  on  his  own  account  an  inquiry  which  proved  futile. 

Whether  or  not  Hirschauer  or  Ybarnegary  had  any  good 
ground  for  believing  that  the  attempt  was  on  the  point  of 
being  made  again  has  been  disputed.  But  in  any  event  these 
two  incidents  prove  clearly  that  Nivelle's  usefulness  was 
hampered  by  interference,  and  that  his  authority  had  been 
diminished.  The  Government  had  shown  before  the  offensive 
that  he  did  not  possess  its  full  confidence.  In  the  offensive  he 
had  not  achieved  that  success  which  he  had  almost  guaranteed 
in  advance.  After  the  offensive  the  Government  let  it  be  seen 
still  more  openly  that  it  placed  no  reliance  upon  him.  In  these 
circumstances  it  was  as  proper  as  it  was  inevitable  that  Nivelle 
should  make  way  for  someone  else.  On  April  29th  Petain 
was  appointed  Chief  of  the  General  Staff.  Under  the  arrange- 
ment thus  made  Nivelle  was  unable  to  take  any  initiative 
except  in  accord  with  Petain,  who  had  had  no  enthusiasm 
whatever  for  the  plan  of  the  offensive.  For  two  weeks  Nivelle 
remained  in  nominal  command  but  without  any  actual  author- 
ity. Finally,  on  May  15th,  he  was  relieved.  Petain  was 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Armies  of  the  North- 
East,  and  Foch  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 

In  the  disappointment  which  was  universally  felt 
throughout  France  at  the  result  of  Nivelle's  offensive,  a  great 
part  of  the  hostile  criticism  was  directed  against  Mangin. 
Many  stories  were  current  about  the  manner  in  which  he  was 
said  to  have  uselessly  sacrificed  his  troops.  The  fact  was  (as 
Painleve  admitted)  that  the  losses  of  the  Sixth  Army 
(Mangin)  were  proportionately  less  than  those  of  the  Fifth 
Army  (Mazel).  Nevertheless,  a  popular  outcry  seemed  to 
indicate  Mangin  as  a  victim. 

One  of  the  allegations  made  by  Nivelle's  friends  against 
Painleve  is  that  he  was  responsible  for  Mangin's  removal 
from  the  command  of  his  army.  All  the  evidence  is  against 
this  contention.  It  appears  that  Nivelle  himself  broached  the 
subject  to  Painleve  on  April  25th;  and  on  the  same  day 
asked  the  Minister  of  the  Colonies  (M.  Maginot)  to  appoint 


86  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Mangin  Governor  of  West  Africa.  This  request  he  repeated 
to  Ribot  at  a  meeting  held  at  the  Foreign  Office  on  April  28th. 
On  both  occasions  he  was  told  that  it  was  out  of  the  question 
that  the  somewhat  turbulent  Mangin  should  be  sent  to  West 
Africa,  where  there  had  already  been  some  trouble;  and  that 
in  any  event  Mangin  would  never  accept.  When  this  demand 
was  rejected  a  second  time  Nivelle  proposed  that  Mangin 
should  be  replaced,  saying  that,  while  he  had  not  committed 
any  error,  yet,  rightly  or  wrongly,  he  had  lost  the  confidence 
of  his  subordinates.  The  Government  consented  to  take  the 
action  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  stated  was  necessary. 
It  was  agreed  that  Nivelle  should  himself  inform  Mangin  of 
the  decision  the  next  morning,  April  29th ;  and  that  the  ar- 
rangement thus  made  should  be  formally  ratified  by  the  War 
Committee  on  the  same  day. 

Painleve  did  his  part.  The  War  Committee  of  the  Cabinet 
approved  of  the  decision  which  had  been  taken.  Early  in  the 
evening  of  April  29th  Painleve  telephoned  this  to  Nivelle; 
the  latter  replied  that  he  had  informed  Mangin  that  he  was 
removed  for  the  reasons  already  stated;  and  also  that  Mangin 
was  then  on  his  way  to  Paris  to  place  himself  at  the  disposition 
of  the  Minister  of  War. 

Later  in  the  evening  Mangin  appeared  at  the  rue  St. 
Dominique;  but  he  then  told  Painleve  a  different  tale,  namely 
that  Nivelle  now  admitted  he  could  reproach  him  with  nothing, 
and  no  longer  insisted  that  he  should  be  relieved  of  his 
command. 

Painleve  replied  that  it  was  then  too  late.  But  the  surprise 
which  this  incident  caused  him  was  increased  when,  on  May 
2nd,  he  received  from  Nivelle  the  usual  letter  confirming  his 
request  that  Mangin  should  be  removed,  but  giving  another 
pretext.  Instead  of  repeating  that  Mangin  had  lost  the  confi- 
dence of  his  subordinates  (the  ground  upon  which  the  Cabinet 
actually  had  acted).  Nivelle  wrote  asking  that  he  should  be 
given  leave  in  order  that  he  might  rest,  and  added :  "In  the 
course  of  the  recent  offensive  General  Mangin,  yielding  to  the 
ardour  of  a  military  temperament,  did  not  bring  to  his  cal- 
culations for  the  preparation  of  the  attack  the  method  and  the 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  87 

precision  which  are  necessary  in  commanding  an  army.  I 
express  the  opinion  that  General  Mangin,  by  his  great  qualities 
as  a  leader,  by  his  character,  and  by  the  prestige  which  arises 
from  his  splendid  military  career,  deserves  to  receive,  when 
his  holiday  is  finished,  a  new  command  at  the  Front." 

Painleve  drew  Nivelle's  attention  to  the  very  vital  difference 
between  the  reasons  for  which  he  had  asked  the  Government 
to  remove  Mangin  and  those  given  in  his  formal  letter  making 
that  request.  Presumably  there  was  no  reply.  But  the  reason 
of  the  sudden  change  is  not  far  to  seek.  Mangin's  ability  to 
express  his  views  with  vigour  and  emphasis  is  well  known. 
He  told  Nivelle  forcibly  what  he  thought  of  the  way  in  which 
it  was  proposed  to  treat  him.  In  the  face  of  this  determined 
man  Nivelle  ceded,  and  allowed  him  to  go  to  Painleve  saying 
that  there  was  now  no  reason  why  he  should  be  displaced. 
While  when  Nivelle  finally  was  obliged  to  sign  a  letter  asking 
for  his  removal  he  thought  it  better,  on  account  of  his  inter- 
view with  Mangin,  to  alter  his  reasons. 

No  doubt  Painleve  himself  thought  that  Mangin  should 
lose  his  command.  But  clearly  Nivelle  took  the  initiative, 
possibly  thinking  that  that  sacrifice  would  calm  the  storm 
which  had  arisen  on  account  of  the  comparative  failure  of  the 
offensive. 

It  remains  to  consider  whether  the  offensive  could  be  called 
a  success,  even  if  it  did  not  realise  all  Nivelle's  sanguine 
anticipations. 

Nivelle  himself  told  Painleve  on  April  19th,  and  repeated  it 
to  Poincare  at  the  Elysee  on  April  28th,  that  the  battle  was 
won.  He  admitted  that  it  was  less  brilliant  in  its  result  than 
he  had  anticipated,  and  that  the  enemy  lines  had  not  been 
broken ;  but  said  that  his  initiative  had  been  paralysed. 
Mangin  also  held  the  view  that  the  operations  were  a  success ; 
and  contends  to-day  that  they  should  not  have  been  abandoned. 
That  was  not  the  general  impression  in  the  army.  Petain,  for 
instance,  did  not  agree  with  this  conclusion. 

Amongst  politicians  M.  Doumer's  judgment  may  be  taken 
as  sound  and  without  prejudice,  while  his  position  as  Chair- 
man   of    the    Senate    Army    Commission    gave    him    every 


88  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

opportunity  of  getting  from  day  to  day  the  information  nec- 
essary to  form  a  fair  opinion.  He  stated  that,  making  all 
allowances,  it  could  not  be  denied  that  there  had  been  a  check. 
That  view  coincided  with  popular  opinion. 

It  has  been  asserted  by  Nivelle  and  Mangin  that  the  Govern- 
ment  magnified  the  losses,  and  that  there  were  only  from 
15,000  to  16,000  killed  in  the  period  between  April  16th  and 
26th,  and  not  25,000. 

Nivelle,  in  a  note  dated  May  13th,  which  was  subsequently 
used  by  Berenger  in  his  report,  places  the  number  of  killed 
at  15,589.  But  the  value  of  this  summary  disappears  when 
it  states  that  the  figure  only  includes  those  whose  death  has 
been  certified  by  two  witnesses.4  Moreover,  if  the  number  of 
prisoners  was  deducted  from  Nivelle's  number  of  missing,  the 
number  of  killed  would  be  very  much  higher  on  his  own 
showing.  Mangin  himself  puts  the  number  who  disappeared 
at  20,500,  and  there  were  only  4,000  prisoners. 

G.Q.G.  at  first  gave  the  figures  for  the  period  between 
April  16th  to  24th  as  25,000  killed;  96,000  wounded;  and 
4,000  prisoners.  And  the  Government,  so  far  from  increasing 
these  calculations,  reduced  them  somewhat  in  its  statement  to 
the  Army,  putting  the  killed  at  20,000.  But  G.Q.G.  sub- 
sequently changed  its  figures  several  times,  and  on  one  occasion 
put  the  wounded  as  low  as  58,000:  explaining  the  difference 
from  the  original  96,000  on  the  ground  of  double  counting. 

Painleve  puts  the  total  at  117,000,  made  up  as  follows: 
28,000  to  29,000  killed;  85,000  wounded,  of  whom  5,000  died 
in  the  hospitals  at  the  Front;  and  4,000  prisoners. 

Of  all  the  conflicting  statistics  those  of  M.  Abel  Ferry  seem 
to  be  entitled  to  the  most  consideration.  He  accepted  as  a 
basis  a  total  of  102,000 — 17,000  killed;  65,000  wounded;  and 
20,000  disappeared.  While  as  there  were  only  4,000  prisoners, 
this  would  increase  the  number  of  killed  to  about  28,000, 
after  making  a  fair  allowance  for  deserters  and  those  who 
strayed  away,  and  also  taking  into  consideration  the  deduction 
of  ten  per  cent.,  which  Ferry  said  should  be  made  on  all  his 

4  It  is  only  fair  to  add  that  that  is  the  French  system,  and  was  not 
invented  by  Nivelle. 


THE  NIVELLE  OFFENSIVE  89 

figures.  On  the  other  hand,  5,000  of  the  wounded  who  died 
in  the  ambulances  at  the  Front  between  April  16th  and  25th 
may  properly  be  added  to  the  number  of  those  killed,  thus 
making  a  total  of  33,000.    This  supports  Painleve's  estimate. 

The  large  number  of  missing  and  the  small  proportionate 
number  of  prisoners  is  attributed  to  the  fact  that  the  Germans 
killed  many  wounded  who  were  lying  on  the  battlefield.  In 
the  result,  the  proportion  of  killed  to  wounded  was  high. 

The  certain  gains  to  be  put  against  these  losses  are  20,000 
prisoners  taken  (the  English  took  another  20,000),  and  a  not 
very  great  advance.  It  was  impossible  to  calculate  the  number 
of  Germans  killed.  Ferry  seemed  to  think  that  they  may 
have  about  equalled  those  of  the  French.  I  understand,  how- 
ever, that  the  German  official  figures,  which  have  not  yet  been 
published,  will  show  that  between  April  1st  and  30th  the 
Seventh  Army,  the  First  Army,  and  the  Right  Flank  Division 
of  the  Third  Army,  lost  50,866  in  killed  and  wounded,  and 
22,219  m  missing;  making  a  total  of  73,485.  As  these  sta- 
tistics do  not  correspond  exactly,  either  in  the  period  they 
cover  or  otherwise  to  the  French  ones  cited,  it  is  impossible 
to  deduce  from  them  any  absolute  comparison.  But  it  would 
seem  clear  that  the  German  losses  were  certainly  less  than  those 
sustained  by  the  armies  under  Nivelle's  command. 

But  the  effect  of  a  great  but  not  decisive  battle  upon  the 
morale  of  the  troops  engaged  is  also  a  factor  to  be  taken  into 
account  when  deciding  whether  it  was  a  success. 

That  Nivelle  himself  may  have  suffered  a  bitter  disappoint- 
ment in  not  seeing  his  hopes  realised  was  one  thing.  But  it 
was  another  and  graver  thing  that  the  hopes  he  had  incited 
in  the  armies  should  have  come  to  nothing.  Before  the 
offensive  he  expressly  encouraged  the  idea  that  it  was  the  last 
great  effort.  Officers  had  been  instructed  to  arouse  the  en- 
thusiasm of  their  men;  and  for  that  purpose  part  of  the  plan 
of  operation  was  communicated  to  them.  The  various  meas- 
ures taken  in  this  direction  were  eminently  successful.  Before 
the  offensive  there  was  a  general  spirit  of  optimism.  M.  Abel 
Ferry  recounted  how  the  poilu  was  convinced  that  it  was  "le 
dernier  coup." 


90  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

To  raise  to  this  point  the  expectations  of  men  of  whom 
many  had  been  fighting  for  twenty  months  on  their  own  soil 
was  a  dangerous  move.  The  certainty  of  reaction  in  the  event 
of  failure  to  realise  these  great  hopes  must  have  been  evi- 
dent. Nivelle  himself  must  have  been  well  aware  of  the  risk 
he  was  taking;  and  all  the  more  so  because  on  February  28th 
he  had  written  to  the  Minister  of  War  exposing  at  length  the 
"defaitiste"  propaganda  which  was  then  being  carried  on  in 
the  army. 

When  these  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  saw  all  these 
promises  of  a  speedy  end  of  the  war  vanish,  when  they  saw 
that  it  all  remained  to  be  done,  and  that  there  were  yet  many 
weary  months  of  righting  ahead  of  them,  there  ensued  a 
demoralisation  such  as  the  French  Army  has  probably  never 
seen.  Battalions,  regiments,  even  a  whole  division,  mutinied, 
and,  refusing  to  obey  their  officers,  attempted  to  march  on 
Paris. 

It  was  Petain's  first  work  to  restore  discipline  and  to  revive 
the  morale  of  the  armies — and  probably  only  Petain's  patient 
work  could  have  done  it.5  But  the  result  was  that  for  many 
months  he  was  obliged  to  be  on  the  defensive.  Haig  had 
thought  the  offensive  should  continue ;  and  on  May  4th  Lloyd 
George  had  solemnly  engaged  the  French  Government  to  go 
on.  But  the  Government  promised  what  it  could  not  do.  Some 
important  positions  at  Verdun  were  retaken  between  August 
and  December;  and  on  October  23rd  the  Battle  of  Malmaison 
was  won.  But  for  the  greater  part  of  this  time,  while  Haig 
was  continuing  his  vigorous  operations,  the  French  Armies 
were  recuperating  from  the  after  effects  of  the  Nivelle 
offensive.6 

BIn  a  recent  interview  (published  in  Le  Matin,  September  21st,  1921) 
Ludendorf  said :— "What  General  Petain  did  in  1917  was  a  magnificent 
work — more  difficult  and  more  important  than  winning  a  battle — the 
moral  reconstruction  of  an  army  in  which  Bolshevist  propaganda  was 
making  its  ravages." 

a  Since  the  above  was  written  I  have  read  M.  Painleve's  recent 
articles  in  La  Revue  de  Paris,  and  Mangin's  still  more  recent  retort 
(Revue  de  Paris,  March  1st,  1922).  Apart  from  some  details,  this  new 
phase  of  the  controversy  leaves  my  view  unchanged. 


CHAPTER  V 
Unique   Command 

Long  before  1918  it  was  apparent  that  the  vital  defect  in 
the  instructions  which  Kitchener  had  given  to  Field-Marshal 
French  in  August,  1914,  was  the  strict  injunction  to  remem- 
ber that  his  army  was  independent,  and  that  he  was  never  to 
be  under  the  orders  of  any  other  Allied  general. 

The  subordination  of  Haig  to  Nivelle  had  ended  when  the 
latter  was  relieved  of  his  command  in  May.  The  British 
Government  saw  no  reason  to  place  their  armies  under  the 
orders  of  his  successor,  Petain :  and  all  the  less  so  because 
the  morale  of  the  French  troops  was  seriously  affected,  and 
Petain  was  employed  more  in  restoring  that  than  in  under- 
taking any  serious  operations.  There  was  also  another  reason 
to  which  at  the  time  the  French  did  not  give  due  weight.  The 
British  Ministers  had  not  been  greatly  edified  by  the  conflict 
between  Painleve  and  Nivelle.  While  not  pronouncing  upon 
the  merits  of  that  dispute  (nor  were  they  unanimous  in  their 
views),  the  members  of  the  War  Cabinet  could  not  understand 
how  it  was  possible  to  expect  success  with  such  friction  and 
interference.  Lloyd  George,  who  had  never  been  much  on 
the  side  of  the  soldier,  was  impressed  by  this  example  of  what 
happened  when  politicians  wanted  to  be  generals,  or,  at  least, 
wanted  to  control  generals  too  strictly.  So  much  so,  that,  as 
already  related,  he  took  it  upon  himself  to  read  the  French 
Government  a  lesson  (which  was  very  badly  taken  in  some 
quarters)  on  the  need  of  letting  those  in  command  keep  their 
own  counsel. 

It  was  obvious  that,  fighting  in  France,  it  was  only  a 
French  general  who  could  be  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Allied  Forces.  Lloyd  George,  at  one  period,  said  that  public 
opinion  in  England  would  never  allow  the  British  Army  to 

91 


92  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

be  under  the  orders  of  an  Allied  general,  except  possibly  for 
the  execution  of  a  particular  movement.  But  as  time  showed 
the  weakness  of  a  dispersed  command  the  Prime  Minister 
realised  that  public  opinion  would  be  obliged  to  bow  to 
necessity. 

At  the  end  of  October,  191 7,  Painleve,  Franklin-Bouillon, 
and  Loucheur  came  to  London.  Whatever  the  exact  object 
of  the  visit,  the  conversation  I  had  with  the  two  former  gave 
me  the  impression  that  they  were  not  sorry  to  be  away  for  a 
few  days  from  questions  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes.  It 
was,  in  fact,  then  evident  to  all  that  the  Painleve  Government 
was  tottering. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  during  this  visit  that  Lloyd  George 
gave  Painleve  a  letter  which  was  the  basis  of  a  great  change. 
This  communication,  which  was  dated  October  30th,  was  in 
itself  remarkable.  At  the  outset  it  stated  that  the  brutal  fact 
which  had  to  be  recognised  was  that,  after  three  years  of  war, 
and  after  the  greatest  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  Ger- 
many remained  the  victor.  After  an  examination  of  the 
circumstances  it  concluded  that  the  fundamental  weakness  of 
the  Allies  lay  entirely  in  the  lack  of  real  unity  in  the  conduct 
of  military  operations.  It  therefore  proposed  the  creation  of 
a  Committee,  "A  kind  of  Inter-Allied  General  Staff,"  which 
would  prepare  plans  of  warfare  and  keep  constant  watch  upon 
what  was  taking  place.  It  was  practically  what  had  been  sug- 
gested by  a  French  Deputy,  M.  Jean  Hennessy,  in  December, 

1 91 6.  This  plan  was  formally  adopted  on  November  9th, 

1 91 7,  at  Rapallo,  the  Caporetto  having  made  it  necessary  that 
the  meeting  of  the  Allies  should  be  held  in  Italy. 

It  was  arranged  that  the  Supreme  War  Council  should  meet 
every  month  at  Versailles.  The  only  permanent  members  were 
the  Prime  Ministers.  But  there  was  also  a  staff  of  military 
advisers  attached  to  the  Council  in  order  to  co-ordinate  the 
efforts  of  the  Allies;  and  they  made  their  headquarters  at 
Versailles.  The  military  representatives  first  appointed  were 
Foch,  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  and  Cadorna,  General  Bliss  being 
added  later  to  represent  the  United  States.  But  Lloyd  George 
was   insistent   that  no   Chief-of-Staff  of   any  of   the  Allied 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  93 

armies  should  be  eligible,  his  primary  object  being  to  exclude 
Robertson.  Therefore,  on  December  4th,  191 7,  it  was  decided 
that  Foch  should  remain  Chief  of  the  Staff,  and  General 
Weygand  was  appointed  in  his  place  as  the  French  Military 
Representative.  In  effect  this  made  no  difference.  For,  unlike 
Robertson  and  Henry  Wilson,  Foch  and  Weygand  were  as 
one;  the  latter,  in  fact,  having  been  Foch's  Chief-of-Staff  up 
to  this  time. 

While  the  formation  of  the  Supreme  War  Council  was 
undoubtedly  a  move  in  the  right  direction,  yet  the  whole 
scheme  was  not  without  a  certain  ambiguity.  Lloyd  George's 
letter  had  pointed  out  that  of  course  the  Council  could  not 
substitute  itself  for  the  various  Governments,  that  it  could 
only  advise.  In  brief,  it  had  no  real  executive  power.  It  is 
probable  that  the  Prime  Minister  always  meant  this  as  a  first 
step  towards  unity  of  command,  and  that  he  considered  that 
public  opinion  in  England  might  be  prepared  in  this  manner. 
But  it  is  regrettable  that  Painleve  did  not  take  advantage  of 
the  opening  thus  given  to  press  for  an  immediate  change. 
Lloyd  George  could  not  himself  make  such  a  proposal,  but  he 
might  have  yielded  to  it.  Painleve  must  have  realised  a  few 
days  later  the  strength  of  the  feeling  which  existed  on  this 
subject. 

On  November  13th  Millerand,  who  had  not  spoken  in  the 
Chambre  des  Deputes  since  191 5,  made  it  a  direct  question 
upon  which  he  challenged  the  Government.  The  former  Min- 
ister of  War  insisted  that  it  was  not  sufficient  to  promise  unity 
of  action.  The  enemy  had  actual  unity  of  command.  Every- 
one knew  the  name  of  their  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the  only 
way  that  the  Allies  could  have  equally  effective  unity  was  by 
choosing  without  delay  one  supreme  commander. 

The  Government  was  sustained  on  this  question,  but  a  few 
hours  later  it  was  defeated  upon  another  vote.  Painleve  re- 
signed, and  was  succeeded  by  Clemenceau. 

In  certain  quarters  in  England  the  institution  of  the  Ver- 
sailles Council  was  not  regarded  with  any  favour.  The  fact 
that  the  British  representative  was  Sir  Henry  Wilson  did  not 
lessen  this  resentment.     Wilson,  who,  in  the  South  African 


94 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


War,  had  been  a  protege  of  Lord  Roberts,  was  afterwards  the 
head  of  the  Staff  College.  He  had  always  urged  that  prepara- 
tions should  be  made  for  sending  an  expeditionary  force  to 
the  Continent  in  the  event  of  war.  But  he  thought  that  the 
plan,  as  finally  drafted,  was  defective,  both  in  respect  to  the 
number  of  troops  and  otherwise.  A  legend  (for  which  it  is 
impossible  to  vouch)  has  it  that,  when  lecturing  one  day  at  the 
Staff  College,  he  pointed  to  a  town  on  the  map  and  said : 
"There,  or  just  about  there,  gentlemen,  is  where  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  will  run  a  great  risk  of  being  defeated  or 
surrounded."  The  place  indicated  was  Mons.  When  the  war 
broke  out  he  was  Director  of  Military  Operations.  In  the 
ordinary  course  he  would  presumably  have  become  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  Staff  when  that  post  was  given  to  Sir  William 
Robertson.  But  he  forfeited  this,  ostensibly  on  account  of 
the  part  he  had  taken  in  the  Curragh  trouble. 

No  doubt  Wilson's  attitude  at  the  War  Office  during  that 
crisis  had  something  to  do  with  Asquith's  decision;  but  cer- 
tainly the  Prime  Minister  was  not  sorry  to  find  a  reason  that 
allowed  him  to  pass  over  Henry  Wilson.  He  had  not  for- 
gotten how,  some  time  before  the  war,  Wilson,  despite  his 
objections,  had  insisted  upon  reading  at  a  meeting  of,  I  think, 
the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  a  memorandum  setting 
forth  the  unprepared  condition  of  the  country  and  of  the  army 
in  the  event  of  any  conflict. 

In  the  last  days  of  July,  or  the  early  days  of  August,  1914, 
Lord  Haldane,  during  his  fugitive  re-passage  at  the  War 
Office,  sent  Wilson  to  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Paul 
Cambon,  to  make  a  proposal  that  Great  Britain  should  give 
only  certain  limited  and  indirect  support  to  France.  The  exact 
facts  regarding  this  incident  are  still  obscure,  but  it  has  already 
been  stated  in  print  that  it  occurred,  and  Lord  Haldane  did 
not  take  that  opportunity  to  make  any  denial.  While,  in  an 
account  published  some  time  ago  in  the  National  Review, 
Mr.  Leo  Maxse  related  how  he  was  in  constant  communication 
with  Wilson  during  those  days;  that  at  one  stage  the  latter 
told  him  that  the  outlook  had  darkened  regarding  the  participa- 
tion of   England  side  by  side   with   France;  and  that  this, 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  95 

through  Mr.  George  Lloyd,  M.  P.  (now  Sir  George  Lloyd 
and  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Bombay),  led  to  the  leaders  of 
the  Opposition,  Lord  Lansdowne  and  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  writing 
a  letter  promising  support,  which  forced  the  hand  of  the 
Government.  But  what  Mr.  Maxse  does  not  tell  (and  possibly 
did  not  know)  is  that  Wilson  was  entirely  pessimistic  that 
day,  precisely  on  account  of  the  mission  with  which  he  had 
been  charged  by  Lord  Haldane. 

In  any  event,  the  offer  was  considered  unsatisfactory,  and 
was  rejected  by  M.  Cambon.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  Wilson 
must  greatly  have  disliked  being  the  bearer  of  such  a  communi- 
cation, for  he  had  long  been  a  firm  friend  of  France  and  of 
the  French.  Convinced  that  there  would  be  war  with  Ger- 
many, he  had  been  in  the  habit  of  spending  some  weeks  in 
France  every  year,  generally  using  a  bicycle,  exploring  the 
country  and  learning  the  roads  which  it  might  be  useful  to 
know  in  the  event  of  an  invasion — knowledge  which  was  of 
practical  service  during  the  retreat  in  August,  1914.  More- 
over, Wilson  was,  before  the  war,  on  friendly  terms  with 
many  French  officers,  and  notably  with  Foch. 

He  was  with  Sir  John  French  during  the  retreat  after  Mons, 
and  it  was  his  tact  which  prevented  a  disagreement  between 
Gallieni  and  French  just  before  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  The 
former  seems  to  have  suspected,  without  being  sure,  that  it 
was  Wilson  who  had  thus  eased  a  strained  situation.  The 
French  always  remembered  this  incident,  and  (as  has  been 
mentioned),  when  Nivelle  sent  his  famous  letter  to  Haig,  on 
March  4th,  191 7,  after  the  Calais  Conference  had  given  him 
supreme  command,  one  of  the  points  on  which  he  insisted  was 
that  Wilson  should  be  attached  to  French  Headquarters  as 
soon  as  he  returned  from  Russia. 

Haig  and  Robertson  were  both  strongly  opposed  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Supreme  War  Council,  told  their  objec- 
tions to  Lloyd  George,  and  repeated  them  to  everyone  else. 
It  is  probable  that  Lord  Derby,  who  was  then  Secretary  of 
State  for  War,  and  Robertson's  firm  supporter,  did  not,  at 
first,  look  upon  it  with  any  great  favour.  Wilson  had  great 
difficulty   in   getting  the   staff  he   required   for  his  work  at 


96  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Versailles.  I  recollect  his  saying  one  day,  before  he  returned 
there  soon  after  his  appointment,  that  if  "Eddie  Derby" — as 
he  called  Lord  Derby — did  not  soon  give  him  what  he  wanted, 
he  would  resign.  Then,  cheering  up,  he  added  that,  anyway 
"X"  (naming  a  certain  general)  would  always  do  his  best  for 
him  at  the  War  Office  while  he  himself  was  absent. 

I  did  not  add  fuel  to  the  flame  by  telling  Wilson  that,  the 
evening  before,  I  had  happened  to  meet  "X"  at  dinner  and 
that,  in  discussing  the  situation  afterwards,  he  had  said  to  me 
that  Wilson  was  not  the  man  who  should  have  been  sent  to 
Versailles,  and  that  the  appointment  was  a  bad  one.  I  have 
always  found  that,  although  soldiers  complain  about  politicians 
intriguing,  they  can  do  their  fair  share  in  that  way. 

Nevertheless,  the  Versailles  Council  did  finally  get  under 
way,  but  at  no  time  did  it  possess  the  sympathy  of  either  the 
Commander-in-Chief  or  the  then  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff. 
Haig  disliked  it  instinctively.  Robertson  felt  that  it  might  be 
the  first  step  towards  unity  of  command,  which  he  had  always 
pronounced  to  be  "radical,  untimely,  and  dangerous."  In  fact, 
Robertson's  one  plan  seems  to  have  been  that  of  wearing  down 
the  Germans :  killing  on  both  sides,  finally  leaving  the  Allies 
with  something  over.  It  was  exactly  the  "guerre  d'usine" 
which  had  been  the  fixed  idea  of  Joffre,  and  which  led  to  his 
downfall  when  it  was  realised  that  that  meant  the  maximum 
sacrifice  of  human  life  and  the  minimum  exercise  of  human 
intelligence. 

The  immediate  result  of  the  friction  caused  by  the  creation 
of  the  Supreme  War  Council  was  a  constant  stream  of 
rumours  of  resignations  and  dismissals.  On  Saturday,  De- 
cember 29th,  1 91 7,  a  well-known  Frenchman  came  to  see  me 
in  Paris,  and  told  me  that  Lloyd  George  had  unofficially 
informed  those  in  high  authority  in  France  that  he  intended 
to  replace  Haig  by  Robertson,  and  Robertson  by  Wilson.  I 
got  permission  to  communicate  this  to  Wilson,  who  was  then 
at  Versailles;  but,  despite  its  source,  it  seemed  to  me  a  wild 
rumour,  or,  at  best,  a  statement  which  had  become  twisted 
in  the  telling.  For,  although  it  was  quite  possible  that  Robert- 
son might  some  day  be  replaced  by  Wilson,  it  seemed  highly 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  97 

improbable  that  Robertson  would  ever  succeed  Haig.  It  was, 
therefore,  with  some  interest  that  I  subsequently  read  in 
Colonel  Repington's  "Diaries"  that  on  January  ioth,  1918, 
he  was  told  in  Paris  by  an  unnamed  Frenchman  that  it  was 
being  said  again  that  Haig  would  be  replaced  by  Robertson 
and  the  latter  by  Wilson. 

In  the  meantime  Foch  and  Wilson  had  proposed  the  forma- 
tion of  an  Executive  War  Committee.  Its  primary  object  was 
to  form  a  reserve  by  withdrawing  from  each  Allied  Army  such 
number  of  divisions  as  the  representatives  of  the  Allies  on 
this  military  committee  might  decide.  Obviously,  such  a 
body  infringed  upon  the  full  powers  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  But  its  necessity  was  equally  obvious,  for  the  basis 
of  the  Foch  plan  of  campaign  for  1918  was  a  Reserve  Army 
which  could  strike  when  and  where  occasion  might  demand. 
Such  a  force  could  never  be  formed  by  commanders  in  the 
field.  Nor  was  it  meant  that  it  should  be  under  their  orders 
until,  possibly,  after  it  was  thrown  into  action. 

Robertson  seemed  to  think  that  the  appointment  of  this 
Committee  might  diminish  what  he  considered  the  evils  of 
the  Supreme  War  Council.  The  belief  that  he  might  be  named 
to  represent  Great  Britain  may  have  had  its  effect  upon  his 
judgment.  It  has  been  said  that  Henry  Wilson  suggested 
that  Robertson  should  be  the  British  Member  of  the  Board. 
I  am  unaware  whether  this  is  a  fact.  But  when  the  composi- 
tion of  the  Committee  was  settled  at  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme 
War  Council  towards  the  end  of  January,  1918,  someone 
mentioned  Robertson,  and  Lloyd  George  then  renewed  his 
objection  to  any  country  being  represented  on  such  committees 
by  its  Chief-of-Staff",  and  proceeded  to  name  Wilson.1 

That  was  the  beginning  of  the  end.  Early  in  February 
came  the  long-expected  break  between  the  Prime  Minister  and 
Robertson.  The  immediate  cause  was  an  acrimonious  dispute 
between  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff  and  the  War  Cabinet 
about  the  Versailles  Council. 

1  Painleve  has  related  how  insistent  Lloyd  George  had  previously- 
been  upon  this  condition,  which  he  had  made  a  sine  qua  non  in  respect 
to  the  military  advisers  of  the  Supreme  War  Council.  Its  primary 
object  was  to  make  Robertson  ineligible. 


98  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

There  was  never  any  question  about  the  services  which  Sir 
William  Robertson  rendered  to  his  country,  or  about  his 
absolute  devotion  to  duty.  But  he  was  sincerely  imbued  with 
the  idea  that  the  function  of  the  Government  was  to  raise  men, 
more  men,  and  still  more  men,  and  to  allow  him  to  have  these 
men  killed  off  without  any  comment  or  control.  He  apparently 
believed  that  all  the  political  people  were  incompetent,  when 
they  were  not  something  worse.  The  war  was  finally  won  by 
the  very  principles  which  Robertson  had  rejected  as  dangerous, 
which  he  did  his  utmost  to  obstruct,  and  for  the  tardy  adoption 
of  which  he  is  to  some  extent  responsible. 

The  publication  of  Colonel  Repington's  "Diaries"  showed 
Robertson's  belief  in  himself,  distrust  of  others,  narrowness 
of  vision,  and  absolute  lack  of  any  plan  except  that  of  the 
"guerre  d'usure." 

As  between  Lloyd  George  and  Robertson,  it  was  a  clash  of 
two  natures  which  were  absolutely  incompatible.  Probably 
neither  gave  the  other  credit  for  all  the  qualities  he  possessed. 
In  any  event,  Lloyd  George  disliked  Robertson,  and  Robertson 
had  no  confidence  in  Lloyd  George.  It  was  inevitable  that 
they  could  not  continue  to  work  together,  and  equally 
inevitable  that  Robertson  should  be  the  one  to  go.  It  was, 
however,  unfortunate  for  Robertson  that  his  too  ardent  friends 
would  insist  upon  contending  that  no  one  else  could  do  his 
work,  and  that,  if  he  went,  it  was  a  political  job.  The  truth 
is  that,  for  reasons  which  might,  perhaps,  be  described  as 
temperamental,  Robertson  never  fully  appreciated  our  French 
Allies,  and,  possibly,  was  never  fully  appreciated  by  them.  He 
was,  no  doubt,  a  very  good  watch-dog  to  see  that  the  French 
did  not  get  the  better  of  us  in  any  way.  But  that  attitude 
was  not  one  which  contributed  towards  the  Allies  getting  the 
utmost  possible  out  of  their  mutual  co-operation. 

An  incident  which  occurred  at  this  time  showed  how  wide- 
spread was  the  sentiment  which  had  been  manufactured  about 
Robertson,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  following  extract  from  a 
diary  I  kept  at  the  time : 

"Henry  Wilson's  appointment  to  succeed  Robertson  was 
known  on  Saturday,  February  16th,  and  was  in  the  Sunday 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  99 

papers.  I  spent  an  hour  with  Wilson  Sunday  morning  at 
Eaton  Place,  and  he  reminded  me  of  what  I  told  him  in  Paris. 
I  asked  Wilson  about  the  general  situation,  and  he  said  that 
there  were  various  places  where  the  Germans  could  break 
through  'as  if  it  were  paper.'  He  felt  quite  certain  that  the 
big  German  offensive  would  be  on  the  Western  Front. 

"I  was  struck  by  the  way  in  which  he  spoke  about  Haig. 
I  reminded  him  of  when,  through  Haig,  he  had  had  no  billet 
the  summer  before;  how,  upon  his  return  from  Ireland,  he  had 
spent  an  afternoon  with  me  in  my  empty  house  (everyone  being 
in  the  country),  and  had  expressed  the  fear  that  he  might  not 
be  employed  again  during  the  war,  and  of  what  had  led  to  his 
being  given  Eastern  Command  soon  afterwards. 

"Wilson  took  absolutely  the  proper  tone  about  Haig,  and 
showed  none  of  that  bitter  hostility  which  the  friends  of  Haig 
and  Robertson  always  show  about  Wilson.  He  said  he  had 
no  illusion  about  Haig  being  a  military  genius ;  that  if  there 
was  to  be  a  great  offensive  on  our  part,  Haig  would  certainly 
not  be  the  man  for  the  place :  but  that  what  we  had  first  to  look 
forward  to  was  to  being  on  the  defensive;  and  that  no  one 
could  do  that  better  than  Haig ;  that  he  would  be  very  sorry  to 
see  him  go ;  and  that  he  meant  to  support  him  by  every  means 
in  his  power.  He  added  that  when  we  came  to  having  an 
offensive  there  would  probably  be  a  Generalissimo,  and  he 
hoped  it  would  be  Foch. 

"We  discussed  Lord  Derby's  position,  and  I  expressed  the 
view  that,  within  the  last  ten  days  or  so,  Lloyd  George  had 
detached  him  from  Robertson,  and  that  Lord  Derby  would  not 
resign.  Wilson  said  it  was  impossible.  He  had  committed 
himself  too  far. 

"When  I  returned  home  the  latter  part  of  the  afternoon  I 

found  that  Lord  Beresford  2  had  twice  telephoned  to  me.     I 

2  Few  men  of  his  generation  got  such  insufficient  credit  for  their 
attainments  and  foresight  as  did  "Lord  Charles."  His  popularity  entirely 
overshadowed  his  abilities.  The  current  saying  that  sailors  thought  he 
was  a  politician,  while  politicians  could  only  see  in  him  a  sailor,  gave  a 
grossly  unfair  impression.  He  was  a  man  of  strong  personal  likes  and 
dislikes,  the  former  often  based  on  instinct,  the  latter  always  founded 
on  fact.  But  his  judgments  were  sober,  sound,  and  full  of  common 
sense,  although  his  manner  of  expressing  them  was  often  breezy. 
Long  before  the  majority  of  his  fellow-countrymen  he  saw  much  that 
was  to  happen,  and  gave  warnings  which  were  neglected.  His  other 
qualities,  especially  the  strength  of  his  friendship,  and  the  sincere  affection 
he  was  able  to  inspire,  rest  in  the  recollection  of  those  who  knew 
him. 


100  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

therefore  telephoned  to  Great  Cumberland  Place,  and  he  told 
me  that  there  had  been  a  meeting  there  that  afternoon,  Lord 
Salisbury  and  a  number  of  others ;  that  they  were  all  indignant 
about  Robertson's  dismissal,  and  that  they  meant  to  bring  the 
matter  up  in  the  Lords.  Lord  Beresford  also  assured  me  that 
it  was  a  fact  that  Lord  Derby  was  going  to  stay  at  the  War 
Office,  and  gave  me  the  authority  for  the  statement.  I  tele- 
phoned this  to  Henry  Wilson,  whose  surprised  ejaculation  was 
forcible. 

"I  went  to  see  Lord  Beresford  early  on  Monday  morning, 
and  pointed  out  the  embarrassment  that  might  be  caused  by  a 
debate  of  the  kind  which  he  and  his  friends  contemplated.  He 
admitted  that,  but  said  they  thought  it  was  their  duty;  that 
Lloyd  George  was  getting  rid  of  Robertson  because  the  latter 
would  not  stand  any  of  Lloyd  George's  trickery,  and  that  any- 
way Robertson  was  a  great  soldier. 

"I  took  that  opening:  I  said  that  nobody  could  possibly  be 
more  ignorant  of  military  matters  than  I  was;  and  that  for 
anything  I  knew  to  the  contrary  Robertson  might  be  ten  times 
a  greater  soldier  than  Wilson.  But  that  what  I  did  know  was 
that  Robertson  did  not  get  on  with  the  French;  that,  despite 
any  strength  of  character  he  might  have,  it  was  a  fact  that  he 
was  a  Waterloo  Englishman — one  who  thought  that  any  Eng- 
lishman was  worth  three  Frenchmen,  and  one  who  was  quite 
unable  to  prevent  the  French  from  seeing  that  he  thought  so. 
I  said  that  it  did  not  require  any  knowledge  of  military  matters 
to  know  that  it  was  of  the  highest  importance  that  if  we  were 
going  to  have  Allies,  we  should  work  hand  in  hand  with  them 
— that  I  did  know  something  about  the  situation  in  France: 
and  I  also  supported  my  statement  by  showing  Lord  Beresford 
two  or  three  letters. 

"I  also  referred  to  the  fact  that  Henry  Wilson  was  persona 
gratissima  with  the  French,  and  especially  with  Foch. 

"To  my  great  satisfaction,  Lord  Beresford  came  round  to 
the  view  that  working  together  was  more  important  than  any- 
thing else.  He  promised  to  see  that  nothing  was  done  (at  his 
request  I  sent  him  a  memorandum),  and  that  ended  the  matter. 

"During  his  conversation  it  appeared  that  (although  they 
were  both  Irishmen)  Lord  Beresford  and  Henry  Wilson  had 
never  met.  When  I  was  lunching  with  the  Beres fords  a 
couple  of  days  later  they  asked  me  to  ask  Henry  Wilson  if  he 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  101 

would  come  to  dine,  and  to  fix  a  date  with  him,  and  that  Lady 
Beresford  would  then  write  to  him.  This  I  did.  Wilson  was 
much  interested  by  what  had  happened,  and  chose  Thursday, 
March  21st.  He  called  for  me  that  evening,  and  told  me  he 
had  just  left  the  King,  who  was  very  much  agitated,  as  the 
expected  Offensive  had  begun. 

"When  we  got  to  Great  Cumberland  Place  there  was  a  mes- 
sage that  the  Prime  Minister  wanted  to  speak  by  telephone 
with  Sir  Henry  Wilson.  In  Great  Cumberland  Place  the  tele- 
phone is  somewhere  in  the  subterranean  regions,  and  Wilson 
therefore  had  to  be  conducted  to  the  cellar.  The  same  thing 
happened  while  we  were  at  soup,  and  twice  again  during  the 
dinner.  I  heard  afterwards  that  Lloyd  George  had  quite  lost 
his  head.  There  were  sixteen  at  dinner:  the  Beresfords, 
Henry  Wilson,  Lord  and  Lady  Salisbury,  Lord  Hardinge,  Lady 
Lytton,  Sir  Edward  and  Lady  Carson,  Sir  Frank  Swettenham, 
Sir  John  Cowans,  and  Theresa,  Lady  Londonderry.  I  can't 
remember  who  were  the  others. 

"Towards  the  end  of  dinner  we  got  the  intercepted  German 
wireless,  according  to  which  we  had  lost  more  than  15,000 
prisoners.  They  put  it  to  Wilson,  who  said  it  was  about  what 
he  had  expected  the  first  day. 

"It  was  an  interesting  dinner,  partly  because  some  of  those 
present  thus  met  Wilson  for  the  first  time  on  what  must  have 
been  one  of  the  most  critical  days  of  his  career.  His  calmness, 
his  confidence  in  the  ultimate  result,  while  at  the  same  time  not 
making  any  predictions  other  than  to  say  that  we  might  yet 
have  worse  days  before  we  saw  better,  made  the  effect  which 
they  deserved  to  make." 

The  great  effect  of  Wilson's  appointment  was  that  there  was 
now  a  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff  who  was  strongly  in  favour 
of  unity  of  command ;  whereas  his  predecessor,  Robertson, 
had  always  been  bitterly  opposed  to  that  idea. 

The  attacks  upon  Henry  Wilson  continued  for  some  time. 
They  were  inspired  by  indiscreet  and  irresponsible  friends  of 
Robertson's,  and  were  supported  mainly  by  Colonel  Repington, 
who,  to  a  belief  in  Robertson,  added  an  avowed  enmity  to 
Wilson.    The  origins  of  that  personal  feeling  are  well  known. 


102  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

If  Repington  sincerely  thought  that  the  appointment  of  Wilson 
was  wrong  and  that  Robertson's  services  as  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  Staff  were  essential  to  winning  the  war,  he  would 
have  been  well-advised  had  he  even  gone  out  of  his  way  to 
show  that  his  own  dislike  of  Wilson  counted  for  nothing  when 
considering  matters  of  national  importance.  Unfortunately, 
he  was  at  no  pains  to  hide  his  manifest  prejudice.  His  articles 
at  first  caused  some  amazement  in  France.  But  once  the 
nature  of  his  relations  with  Wilson  was  understood  (I  was 
obliged  to  refer  to  them  myself  in  the  course  of  an  interview, 
and  I  believe  that  others  did  likewise),  the  value  of  his  com- 
ments upon  this  particular  subject  was  discounted  by  the 
French  Press. 

The  result  proved  Repington  to  be  entirely  wrong.  He 
was  adverse  to  unity  of  command,  and  he  wrote  that  the  war 
would  never  be  won  unless  Robertson  was  brought  back.  In 
the  end  the  unique  command  opened  the  way  to  a  victory  which 
rested  upon  principles  entirely  opposed  to  those  advocated  by 
Robertson.  Moreover,  at  a  time  when  in  France  he  was 
making  some  parade  of  his  friendship  for  our  Ally,  Repington 
wrote  (as  is  stated  in  his  own  Diary)  a  memorandum  for  the 
Dominion  Prime  Ministers,  in  which  he  accused  the  French 
of  wanting  to  force  unity  of  command  simply  in  order  that 
they  might  be  able  to  make  use  of  British  troops  for  their 
own  purposes.  Such  a  proceeding  is  hardly  creditable,  either 
to  Repington's  sagacity  or  to  his  good  faith. 

Henry  Wilson  always  took  these  attacks  in  good  part, 
although,  I  think,  he  had  some  contempt  for  Repington's  folly 
in  letting  the  world  see  how  he  was  influenced  by  personal 
animosity. 

He  realised  long  before  he  succeeded  Robertson  (and  had 
often  stated)  that  his  opinion  about  the  way  the  war  should 
be  conducted  differed  radically  from  that  held  by  the  latter. 
But  he  regarded  that  simply  as  a  divergence  of  professional 
opinion.  Nevertheless,  as  the  attacks  proceeded,  he  thought 
that  Robertson's  friends  were  doing  him  an  ill-service.  He 
wrote  me  about  this  matter  as  follows : 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  103 

"26,  Eaton  Place,  S.  W.  i. 

"24,  iv,  18. 

"Dear  X., 

"Many  thanks  for  your  cutting,  which  is,  I  think,  true. 
Someone  ought  to  defend  Robertson  against  the  disgraceful 
attacks  in  the  M.  P.  and  Globe.  In  effect,  these  attacks  consist 
of  saying  that  Robertson  categorically  warned  Govt,  that  they 
were  steering  straight  for  disaster;  that  the  Govt,  flouted  his 
advice,  and  then  that  Robertson  continued  to  draw  his  full  pay 
and  live  rent  free  in  York  House,  knowing  we  were  doomed. 
"I  can't  believe  it,  and  someone  ought  to  save  him  from  such 
disgraceful  attacks. 

"Yours, 

"H.  W." 

At  the  outset  of  the  1918  campaign  the  Allied  troops 
actually  at  the  Front  were  somewhat  inferior  in  numbers  to 
the  enemy,  although,  probably,  better  supplied  with  materials 
of  war.  The  Allied  forces  in  France  (which  phrase  does  not 
include  the  American  troops)  reached  their  height  in  the 
spring  and  summer  of  1917;  but  thereafter  it  was  necessary 
to  allow  large  numbers  of  men  to  return  to  carry  on  the  life 
of  the  country :  to  work  on  the  land  as  well  as  in  the  factories. 

The  question  of  effectives  was,  therefore,  a  source  of  con- 
stant pre-occupation,  and  also  a  cause  of  continuous  irritation 
between  London  and  Paris.  Nothing  excited  Clemenceau  so 
much.  Whenever  his  mood  was  not  of  the  best,  he  seemed 
to  turn  to  this  subject.  He  had  more  than  one  clash  with 
Lloyd  George,  and  the  latter  finally  told  him  that  he  was  at 
liberty  to  send  to  England  and  have  a  report  made  upon  what 
had  been  done  with  the  men  raised,  and  whether  it  was  possible 
to  get  any  mope  from  the  country.  For  Clemenceau  was  in 
the  habit  of  protesting  that,  if  the  figures  supplied  by  the 
British  Government  were  correct,  he  could  not  imagine  what 
had  become  of  all  the  men  who  had  been  called  to  the  colours. 

It  happened  that  there  was  a  French  expert  on  Man  Power, 
Colonel  Roure,  who  had  had  great  success  in  his  own  country. 
Clemenceau  took  advantage  of  Lloyd  George's  offer  and  sent 


104  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Roure  to  England;  but  his  mode  of  conducting  his  investiga- 
tion (and  probably  other  things)  simply  led  to  further  friction. 

However,  the  predominant  importance  of  the  Man-Power 
question  was  clearly  realised  by  the  Versailles  War  Commit- 
tee. This  body,  of  which  Foch  had  been  made  Chairman, 
immediately  began  to  try  to  organise  the  reserves  necessary 
for  the  1 918  campaign.  The  plan  had  the  evident  complica- 
tion that  Foch  was  to  get  armies  which  were  presumably  to 
be  under  his  command,  by  detaching  troops  from  the  armies 
of  Petain  and  Haig,  as  well  as  some  to  be  sent  by  Italy. 
Nevertheless,  in  pursuance  of  this  scheme,  the  French  Third 
Army  was  withdrawn  from  the  Front,  where  it  was  replaced 
by  Gough's  unfortunate  Fifth  Army.  The  French  First 
Army  and  some  other  divisions  were  also  added  to  these  re- 
serves for  the  Army  of  Manoeuvres,  as  it  was  called. 

Foch  was  anxious  to  constitute  this  Army  as  speedily  as 
possible.  He  thought  that  the  Germans  would  attack  either 
near  Cambrai  or  near  Rheims,  and  the  plan  was  to  keep  his 
forces  near  Paris,  ready  to  strike  whichever  way  the  attack 
was  made. 

But  a  difficulty  arose  about  the  contribution  which  was  to 
be  made  by  Haig.  It  was  on  February  6th,  191 8,  that  the 
Inter-Allied  War  Committee  wrote  to  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief  stating  the  number  of  troops  each  was  expected  to  send 
for  the  Reserve  Army.  The  French  and  Italian  replies  were 
received  within  two  weeks.  But  it  was  only  on  March  2nd 
that  Haig  wrote  refusing  to  contribute  any  divisions  to  the 
General  Reserve  except  the  British  Divisions  then  in  Italy, 
and  which,  in  any  event,  were  not  under  his  command. 

The  result  of  this  was  that  the  Italians  withdrew  their 
promise  to  send  troops,  and  the  contemplated  "Army  of 
Manoeuvres"  practically  ceased  to  exist  except  on  paper.  That 
was,  in  fact,  the  last  of  Haig's  various  refusals  to  abide  by 
the  promises  and  arrangements  made  by  his  Government.  It 
was  also  the  most  costly. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  any  legitimate  reason  for  Haig 
having  thus  withheld  his  reply  until  the  very  eve  of  hostilities. 
Moreover,  he  had  been  present  at  Versailles  when  the  Supreme 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  105 

War  Council  adopted  the  plan  of  campaign  for  191 8.  He 
must,  therefore,  have  known  that  a  Reserve  Army,  to  strike 
as  Foch  might  direct,  was  the  very  essence  of  that  plan. 

The  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Supreme  War  Council, 
Captain  P.  E.  Wright,  has  written :  "It  may  quite  well  be 
that  he  did  not  understand  what  was  being  done.  My  own 
impression  of  him  during  the  discussion  was  that  he  entirely 
failed  to  follow  what  was  being  discussed."  The  tone  of 
Captain  Wright's  comments  upon  Haig  seem  to  show  a  cer- 
tain prejudice.  "A  man  both  obtuse  and  extraordinarily  slow. 
.    .    .   On  a  very  low  plane  of  human  intelligence." 

Yet  it  must  be  admitted  that  French  military  leaders  and 
statesmen  who  throughout  the  war  (and  since)  showed  in 
private  conversation  their  admiration  of  the  diverse  qualities 
of  various  English  generals — Wilson  or  Allenby,  Plumer, 
Home,  or  Byng — were  never  able  to  perceive  in  Haig  the 
slightest  power  of  conception  or  the  faintest  tinge  of  imagina- 
tion :  nothing  beneath  his  charming  manner  but  an  obstinacy 
which  was  shown  chiefly  by  his  tenacity  in  insisting  upon  his 
own  prerogatives.  Even  to  his  troops  he  was  little  known. 
No  stories  or  anecdotes  are  evoked  by  his  name.  Unlike  any 
other  commander,  he  went  through  the  war  leaving  no  record 
of  any  mark  made  in  council,  or  of  any  great  deed  achieved 
on  the  field  for  which  he  was  primarily  responsible. 

It  has  also  been  stated  by  Captain  Wright  that  Haig  re- 
fused to  detach  any  troops  for  the  Reserve  Army  because 
he  and  Petain  had  met  towards  the  end  of  February,  and,  un- 
known to  Foch,  had  made  a  plan  which  was  inconsistent  with 
the  one  already  adopted.  It  is  true  that  at  one  period  there 
were  rumours  in  well-informed  circles  that  Haig  and  Petain 
had  arrived  at  some  arrangement  which  would  render  abortive 
the  idea  of  Foch's  striking  Army.  But  rumours  were  then 
rife,  and,  in  the  absence  of  some  proof,  it  is  preferable  to 
think  that  it  was  only  a  rumour.  Confirmation,  however,  of 
the  feeling  which  prevailed  about  Foch's  plan  is  to  be  found 
in  an  account  which  Colonel  Repington  gives  of  a  conversa- 
tion he  had  with  Foch  at  Compiegne  on  February  6th.  Petain 
then  said  that  he  did  not  mean  to  allow  Foch  to  interfere  with 


106  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

his  reserves,  and  that  he  would  resign  if  necessary.  He  added 
that  he  was  sure  that  he  and  Haig  would  agree,  and  that  they 
could  "carry  on." 

If  by  chance  that  lying  jade,  Rumour,  was  for  once  right 
— if  Haig  and  Petain  did  concoct  a  plan — then  they  at  the 
same  time  prepared  a  calamity.  When  it  was  apparent  to 
Foch  that  he  was  not  going  to  have  any  Reserve  Army  it 
was  equally  apparent  to  him  that  Gough's  Army  would  be 
destroyed  if  the  enemy  attacked  at  that  point,  and  that  any- 
way there  would  be  disaster  somewhere.  On  March  14th, 
1 9 1 8,  there  was  a  meeting  in  London.  Foch  has  himself 
recently  recounted  what  happened. 

By  this  time  his  relations  with  Clemenceau  had  changed. 
Some  months  earlier  there  had  been  general  amazement  in 
Paris  at  the  influence  which  Foch  seemed  to  have  acquired 
over  the  President  du  Conseil.  That  influence  probably  ex- 
aggerated, although  undoubtedly  they  were  then  on  the  best 
of  terms.  But  in  March,  1918,  and  thereafter,  Clemenceau, 
while  using  Foch,  missed  few  opportunities  to  be  unpleasant 
to  him.  As  Foch  himself  says :  "Je  ne  sais  pas  s'il  m'aimait, 
mais  il  ne  me  le  temoignait  guere."  It  is  difficult  to  say 
exactly  who  or  what  was  responsible  for  this  change  (one 
which  was  later  destined  to  prove  fatal  to  Clemenceau's  can- 
didature for  the  Presidency),  but  perhaps  Mandel  (Clemen- 
ceau's Chef  du  Cabinet,  and  now  a  deputy)  was  not  foreign 
to  it. 

Foch  says :  "I  had  been  appointed  to  command  the  'Army 
of  Manoeuvre,'  which  did  not  exist  to  any  great  extent.  At 
this  meeting  I  asked  the  English  to  contribute  effectives  for 
this  Army.  Marshal  Haig  declared  in  the  name  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, which  was  represented  particularly  by  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  that  it  was  impossible.  I  began  to  reply  with  some 
vivacity.  'Keep  quiet,'  M.  Clemenceau  said  to  me  forcibly; 
T  am  the  person  to  speak  in  the  name  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment, and  I  accept  Marshal  Haig's  reply.'  I  said  to  my- 
self:  'Wait  until  to-morrow,  and  I  will  say  something.'  The 
next  day,  when  the  Council  was  on  the  point  of  breaking  up, 
I  spoke,  and  this  time  I  was  not  stopped.     I  declared  that  a 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  107 

formidable  offensive  was  being  prepared.  I  added :  'I  know 
what  the  battles  of  the  Allied  armies  are  like.  I  have  taken 
part  in  them  on  the  Marne  and  in  Italy.  Here  is  what  is  neces- 
sary in  the  way  of  liaisons.  Here  is  how  we  should  under- 
stand each  other.  Here  are  the  precautions  we  ought  to  take, 
etc.,  etc.  But  I  warn  you  that  nothing  is  ready  to  repel  the 
offensive,  and  that  there  may  well  be  a  disaster.'  It  had  its 
effect  on  them.  And  some  days  later,  at  Compiegne,  and  then 
at  Doullens,  they  remembered  what  I  had  said."  3 

The  result  of  the  German  attack  was  (as  Foch  had  pre- 
dicted) the  complete  defeat  of  Gough's  Fifth  Army,  as  there 
were  not  sufficient  reserves  which  could  be  brought  up  in  time. 
Foch's  plan  had  simply  been  that,  as  the  Germans  might  at- 
tack either  the  British  or  French  line,  there  should  be  a  re- 
serve army  within  striking  distance :  for  it  was  obvious  that, 
in  an  attack,  the  Germans  could  throw  in  forces  which  would 
put  either  the  British  or  French  Army  alone  at  a  marked 
numerical  disadvantage.  Haig  had  frustrated  this  plan.  He 
thus  found  himself  (as  Foch  had  foreseen,  but  as  Haig  was 
incapable  of  realising  until  it  was  too  late)  fighting  the  major 
part  of  the  German  Army  with  his  own  weaker  and  unsus- 
tained  force.  It  required  the  greatest  defeat  which  the  Brit- 
ish Army  has  ever  known  (for  so  the  Battle  of  St.  Quentin 
has  been  justly  described)  to  make  him  comprehend  the  situa- 
tion. 

On  March  26th  the  capture  of  Amiens  seemed  immi- 
nent, and  Haig  ran  every  risk  of  being  driven  back 
to  the  coast.  He  at  last  saw  his  error,  and  also  that  he 
had  created  a  situation  which  was  beyond  his  power  to  con- 
trol. He  therefore  telephoned  that  morning  to  London  ana 
asked  Lloyd  George  to  come  over,  stating  that  in  his  opinion 
it  was  now  essential  to  have  unity  of  command.  Lloyd  George, 
being  unable  to  leave  London,  sent  Lord  Milner.  The  meet- 
ing took  place  at  Doullens,  on  March  23rd,  1918.  Foch  has 
given  the  following  account  of  it :  "At  Doullens  there  were 
Lord  Milner,  Marshal  Haig,  M.  Poincare,  M.  Clemenceau, 
*  Interview  with   Marechal   Foch   in  Le  Matin,   November  6th,    1920. 


108  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

M.  Loucheur,  and  General  Petain.4  For  my  own  part,  I 
was  not  content.  According  to  all  I  had  learned,  General  Petain 
was  preparing  to  retire  on  Paris,  and  Marshal  Haig  towards 
the  sea.  It  was  the  open  door  to  the  Germans.  It  spelled 
defeat.  'We  might,'  said  M.  Clemenceau,  'give  Marechal 
Foch  the  command  of  the  Armies  which  are  operating  around 
Amiens.'  It  was  Marshal  Haig  who  opposed  this  suggestion, 
stating  that  there  was  only  one  reasonable  solution,  and  that 
was  to  give  me  command  of  the  Allied  Armies  on  the  Western 
Front.    M.  Clemenceau  agreed,  and  so  it  was  decided." 

This  account  differs  somewhat  in  its  details  from  other 
reports  of  this  historic  meeting  at  Doullens,  It  omits  all 
reference  to  the  part  taken  by  Lord  Milner,  for  it  was  the 
latter  who,  when  he  saw  that  matters  were  proceeding  slowly, 
and  that  Foch's  dissatisfaction  was  increasing  every  minute, 
took  M.  Clemenceau  aside,  suggested  to  him  that  the  supreme 
command  should  be  given  forthwith  to  Foch,  and  then  spoke 
about  it  to  Haig,  upon  whom  he  had  earlier  in  the  day  urged 
the  desirability  of  that  course.  Foch's  own  account  shows 
that  Haig,  then  comprehending  the  danger,  was  against  any 
half  measures,  and  preferred  to  see  Foch  in  supreme  com- 
mand.   It  was  none  too  soon. 

It  was  thus  given  to  Foch,  who  at  one  time  during  the  war 
had  been  left  practically  idle,  to  finish  the  struggle. 

Gallieni,  to  whom  history  will  always  give  the  credit  for 
the  Battle  of  Ourcq,  was  "l'intelligence  meme."  The  same 
phrase  was  used  by  two  French  statesmen  in  depicting  to  me 
his  qualities. 

Joffre,  although  his  plans  were  wrong,  his  preparations 
lacking,  and  his  operations  faulty,  was  able  to  inspire  a  con- 
fidence which  was  not  always  justified  by  the  circumstances. 
But  it  played  its  part  in  warding  off  danger. 

Petain's  character  perhaps  entitles  him,  more  than  any  other 
French  general,  to  be  called  a  great  man.  As  a  soldier  he 
failed  in  little  or  nothing  he  undertook.     No  one  else  could 

*  Sir  Henry  Wilson  was  also  present.  Lord  Milner,  in  the  account 
he  has  given  of  the  Doullens  meeting,  tells  how  he  motored  to  it  with 
Wilson,  who  urged  upon  him  the  necessity  of  Foch  being  given  supreme 
command. 


UNIQUE  COMMAND  109 

have  restored  the  morale  of  the  troops  as  he  did  in  the  weeks 
following  Nivelle's  offensive.  But  Petain's  failing  (as  failing 
it  is  from  a  military  point  of  view)  is  that  he  was  too  care- 
ful. He  was  never  quite  ready  for  the  big  offensive:  either 
there  were  not  enough  troops  in  the  line;  or  artillery  was 
lacking;  or  reserves  were  not  sufficiently  strong.  He  aimed 
at  a  degree  of  preparation  and  perfection  which  it  is  difficult 
to  achieve  in  practice.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  war  would  have 
been  finished  in  1918  had  he  been  in  supreme  command. 

Foch  is  sometimes  reproached  with  thinking  that  France 
is  made  for  the  Army,  instead  of  the  Army  for  France.  The 
truth  within  that  exaggerated  statement  is  that  he  is  a  sol- 
dier through  and  through.  He  is  also  the  greatest  strategist 
the  war  produced.  It  has  been  said  that  he  had  the  advan- 
tage of  taking  supreme  command  after  four  years  of  war- 
fare, when  he  could  profit  by  the  lessons  and  by  the  mistakes 
of  others.  In  a  measure  that  may  be  correct,  but  it  is  more 
to  the  point  to  consider  the  position  which  existed  when  Foch 
was  actually  given  a  free  hand.  On  March  14th  he  predicted 
what  would  happen  because  he  had  not  been  allowed  to  con- 
stitute a  proper  Reserve  Army.  His  prophecy  was  fulfilled 
to  the  letter.  When  the  meeting  took  place  at  Doullens  the 
British  Army  had  sustained  the  most  stupendous  defeat  in 
its  history.  The  whole  situation  was  gravely  compromised, 
and  the  peril  of  irremediable  disaster  was  more  impending 
than  at  any  time  since  September,  1914.  As  Foch  himself 
remarked  to  Clemenceau  in  a  moment  of  impatience  at  Doul- 
lens :  "You  give  me  a  battle  which  is  already  lost,  and  you 
ask  me  to  re-establish  it.  I  accept,  and  you  think  you  are 
making  me  a  present.  It  needs  all  my  candeur  to  accept  under 
such  conditions." 


CHAPTER  VI 
The  Asquith  Debacle 

The  dramatic  fall  from  power  of  Mr.  Asquith,  in  Decem- 
ber, 1 916,  vitally  affected  the  whole  course  of  the  war. 

Asquith  had  first  made  his  name  by  a  brilliant  career  at 
Oxford,  where  Jowett  had  predicted  his  success  in  the  world. 
Coming  to  London,  he  was  called  to  the  Bar,  eventually 
achieved  a  certain  practice,  and  in  due  course  went  into  Par- 
liament. Although  without  family  influence  or  private  means 
he  was  from  the  outset  marked  for  political  office.  His  name 
became  better  known  in  the  country  through  his  success  as 
Sir  Charles  Russell's  junior  in  the  Times  Parnell  proceedings 
before  the  Royal  Commission,  although  it  should  be  added  that 
he  never  obtained  any  commanding  position  as  a  lawyer. 

His  second  marriage  both  broadened  and  changed  his  life 
and  affected  his  whole  career.  He  was  at  that  time  Home 
Secretary.  Soon  afterwards  his  party  went  into  Opposition; 
and  he  himself  broke  an  unwritten  rule  that  a  former  Cabinet 
Minister  should  not  return  to  practice  at  the  Bar.  He  came 
back  to  office  with  Campbell-Bannerman,  whom,  a  few  years 
later,  he  succeeded. 

Possibly  the  country  was  fortunate  in  having  Asquith  at 
the  head  of  what  was  then  the  extreme  party  in  the  State. 
There  was  at  least  the  assurance  that  nothing  would  be  done 
too  hastily.  A  man  of  great  intellect,  but  with  none  of  the 
makings  of  a  great  man;  with  no  high  ideals,  but  with  no 
petty  characteristics,  he  rarely  imitated,  and  habitually  he 
temporised  as  long  as  possible  before  arriving  at  a  decision 
upon  the  proposals  of  others.  Although  very  unfair  use  was 
made  of  his  favourite  saying,  "Wait  and  see"  (a  phrase  which 
was    equally    unfortunate    as    President    Wilson's    quotation 

110 


THE  ASQUITH  DEBACLE  111 

"Too  proud  to  fight"),  it  is  undeniable  that  it  truly  expressed 
his  mentality  in  the  latter  days  of  his  political  power. 

All  that  he  asked  was  to  remain  at  10,  Downing  Street 
and  to  guide  the  affairs  of  the  country  with  as  much  dignity 
and  as  little  trouble  as  might  be  possible.  In  the  ordinary 
course  he  doubtless  would  have  been  Prime  Minister  for  a 
number  of  years.  But  sooner  or  later  there  probably  would 
have  come  a  conflict  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  The  latter 
was  in  every  respect  the  antithesis  of  his  chief :  a  man  of  no 
intellectual  accomplishments  and  of  little  knowledge,  who  felt 
at  home  only  in  the  company  of  those  whose  attainments  in 
that  respect  were  at  least  not  superior  to  his  own.  Dominated 
sometimes  by  high  ideals  and  sometimes  actuated  by  mean 
motives,  he  had  withal  many  of  the  parts  of  a  great  man; 
and  still  more  of  the  qualities  of  a  great  national  leader.  But 
it  was  not  so  much  the  difference  in  character  which  rendered 
inevitable  the  clash  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  overweening  ambi- 
tion to  be  in  supreme  power.  Nevertheless,  any  contest  be- 
tween Asquith  and  Lloyd  George  might  not  have  terminated 
to  the  advantage  of  the  latter  in  normal  times.  The  war  gave 
him  his  opportunity. 

Soon  after  August,  1914,  it  was  apparent  that  the  truth 
of  Macaulay's  dictum  that  a  successful  peace  Prime  Minister 
might  be  a  failure  in  time  of  war  was  illustrated  in  the  per- 
son of  Mr.  Asquith.  He  was  neither  resolute  in  council  nor 
did  he  possess  any  personal  power  to  arouse  the  country. 
When  he  had  been  on  the  verge  of  defeat  he  had  accepted 
the  proposal  to  form  a  coalition,  which  he  had  previously 
spurned.  But  any  live  leadership  was  still  lacking.  When 
Parliament  prorogued  in  the  summer  of  19 16  it  was  after  a 
session  in  which  the  vacillations  of  the  Government  had  first 
amazed  and  had  finally  alarmed  and  exasperated  the  nation. 

Nevertheless  the  Cabinet  started  the  Autumn  Session  with 
better  prospects  than  it  had  earned  any  right  to  expect.  But 
within  a  few  weeks  its  inherent  weakness  again  began  to  be 
apparent.  By  the  month  of  November  the  country  was  dis- 
gusted. While  at  the  same  period  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  say- 
ing openly  to  his  intimate  friends  that  the  war  would  be  lost 


112  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

if  Asquith  continued  in  office.  He  sincerely  believed  (and 
with  reason)  that  he  was  the  man  destined  to  show  the  way 
to  victory. 

But  it  was  difficult  to  see  how  matters  could  be  brought 
to  a  crisis  except  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  himself  taking  a 
personal  political  risk ;  and  that  he  was  always  indisposed 
to  do.  He  wanted  a  "palace  insurrection,"  a  rebellion  from 
within,  which  would  oust  Mr.  Asquith  and  carry  him  to  Down- 
ing Street.  He  was,  therefore,  obviously  obliged  to  depend 
upon  the  adhesion  of  the  leaders  of  the  Unionist  party.  The 
most  essential  point  was  to  obtain  the  support  of  Mr.  Bonar 
Law.  Although  perhaps  even  that  might  not  have  sufficed 
to  carry  the  day  had  not  Mr.  Balfour  also  deserted  Mr. 
Asquith. 

In  many  respects  the  details  of  the  intrigue  are  still  un- 
known or  obscure.  The  person  who  had  the  greatest  part 
in  carrying  it  to  a  conclusion  was  Lord  Beaverbrook,  who 
then,  as  Sir  Max  Aitken,  sat  in  the  House  of  Commons  as 
member  for  Ashton-under-Lyne.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
Aitken  conceived  the  original  idea.  The  probability  seems 
to  be  that  it  originated  with  others ;  and  that  it  was  in  casting 
around  for  someone  to  influence  Mr.  Bonar  Law  that  they 
disclosed  the  project  to  Aitken. 

The  latter  was  already  credited  with  being  mainly  respon- 
sible for  the  choice  of  Mr.  Bonar  Law  as  leader  of  the  Union- 
ist party  upon  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Balfour.  At  that  time 
the  logical  selection  was  either  Mr.  Walter  Long  or  Mr. 
Austen  Chamberlain.  The  party  was  divided  in  its  views; 
and  neither  Mr.  Long  nor  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  anxious  to 
force  a  vote  on  such  a  question.  Aitken  saw  the  opportunity 
and  took  steps  to  ensure  the  election  of  Mr.  Bonar  Law. 

His  success  upon  that  occasion  was  the  more  remarkable 
because  he  had  then  been  in  England  for  only  two  or  three 
years,  and  was  largely  unknown.  Beaverbrook  is  by  birth 
a  Canadian,  like  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  to  whom  he  is  distantly 
related.  As  a  result  of  various  financial  operations,  he  had 
made  a  considerable  fortune  before  he  was  thirty  years  of 
age.     No  reasonable  explanation  has  ever  been  given  in  Eng- 


THE  ASQUITH  DEBACLE  113 

land  for  the  antipathy  to  Aitken  which  was  then  so  wide- 
spread in  Canada.  Possibly  it  must  be  regarded  as  an  ex- 
emplification of  the  saying  that  a  prophet  has  no  honour  in 
his  own  country.  For  no  specific  allegation  has  ever  been  made 
against  him ;  while  the  companies  which  he  promoted  not 
only  made  money  for  their  promoter  but  for  those  who  in- 
vested in  them.1  Colonel  Repington  mentions  in  his  Diary 
that  a  Canadian  lady  told  him  why  Aitken  was  so  disliked  in 
Canada.  It  is  regrettable  that  he  did  not  share  that,  as  he 
did  so  much  other  private  information,  with  anyone  ready 
to  pay  two  guineas. 

Later  (and  after  the  events  to  which  I  am  now  referring) 
Beaverbrook  did  his  utmost  to  obtain  a  favourable  press  in 
Canada.  When  he  became  Minister  of  Information  (and 
no  one  who  was  at  the  meeting  of  the  Unionist  War  Commit- 
tee will  ever  forget  the  strange  reasons  which  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  adduced  for  having  given  him  that  post)  he  succeeded 
to  some  extent. 

A  small  body  of  recognised  experts  on  foreign  affairs,  who 
had  done  that  part  of  the  work  before  the  Ministry  was  in- 
stituted, refused  to  serve  under  Lord  Beaverbrook.  They 
emigrated  to  the  Foreign  Office,  where  their  services  were 
accepted  and  retained  by  Lord  Hardinge,  whom  Beaverbrook's 
protests  left  coldly  indifferent.  The  latter  reorganised  his 
department  by  bringing  in  a  number  of  men  distinguished 
in  the  literary  world,  and  others  well  known  in  the  City.  But 
a  large  percentage  of  the  rank  and  file  were  Canadians,  whose 
experience  of  foreign  affairs  and  whose  knowledge  of  for- 
eign languages  was  as  limited  as  that  possessed  by  Beaver- 
brook himself.  The  result  was  that  the  work  of  the  Ministry, 
aside  from  the  cinematograph  and  amusement  part  (which 
was  excellently  done),  was  greatly  below  the  required  level. 
It  was  a  constant  source  of  polite  amusement  to  the  Maison 
de  la  Presse,  of  which  the   founder  and  guiding  spirit  was 

1 1  am  aware  that  a  director  of  the  Canadian  and  Pacific  Railway- 
Company,  the  late  Sir  Stamford  Fleming,  did  attack  Aitken  in  the 
Press  regarding  certain  private  transactions  they  had  had  together; 
but  the  matter  never  proceeded  further  than  Fleming  stating  his  own 
view  of  the  disagreement. 


114  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

the  astute  and  accomplished  Philippe  Berthelot,  who  knows 
all  the  things  of  which  Beaverbrook  is  so  essentially  ignorant, 
but  who,  on  the  other  hand,  could  never  have  amassed  the 
money  which  Beaverbrook  made  in  the  promotion  of  com- 
panies. 

However,  the  Ministry  of  Information  spent  lavishly,  as 
the  accounts  show;  and  part  of  the  expenditure  went  in  pay- 
ing the  expenses  of  Canadian  (as  well  as  other  overseas) 
journalists  who  were  brought  to  England.  All  this  had  some 
effect  in  dissipating  the  strange  unpopularity  which  Beaver- 
brook had  incurred  in  his  native  country.  Although  as  late 
as  December,  1918,  such  a  well-known  newspaper  as  the 
Ottawa  Citizen  stated  bluntly  that  he  could  never  be  elected 
to  any  office  in  Canada. 

But  in  the  autumn  of  191 6  Lord  Beaverbrook  (as  he 
shortly  afterwards  became)  took  a  leading  part  in  bringing 
together  the  elements  which  overcame  Mr.  Asquith.  It  is 
known  that  he  himself  kept  a  diary,  in  which  he  recorded 
minutely  what  took  place  during  those  momentous  weeks. 
Probably  all  the  facts  will  never  be  known  unless  that  journal 
is  one  day  made  public.  Even  then  it  will  have  to  be  accepted 
with  reserve.  Sir  Edward  (now  Lord)  Carson  told  me  that 
the  part  of  it  which  he  had  seen  attributed  to  him  a  role  he 
had  never  played.  The  truth  is  that  Carson  was  then,  as 
always,  aloof  from  all  intrigue. 

Aitken  used  his  influence  over  Bonar  Law  to  good  effect. 
It  was  understood  that  as  a  reward  he  was  to  become  Presi- 
dent of  the  Board  of  Trade  in  the  new  Government.  But 
strong  objection  to  that  appointment  came  from  various  quar- 
ters. To  his  annoyance  the  office  he  coveted  was  allotted 
to  Sir  Albert  Stanley;  and  he  himself  was  consoled  by  a 
peerage. 

After  all  that  has  occurred  during  the  last  five  years  it  is 
to-day  difficult  to  realise  what  a  step  it  then  was  for  Tories 
deliberately  to  oust  the  Liberal  Asquith  in  order  to  place  in 
office  and  to  serve  under  their  own  bete  noir,  the  Radical 
Lloyd  George.  The  primary  instinct  against  such  a  course 
must  have  been  specially  strong  in  the  breast  of  Mr.  Walter 


THE  ASQUITH  DEBACLE  115 

Long,  who  had  himself  served  under  Lord  Salisbury,  and 
who  was  the  last  of  the  country  squires  to  make  a  mark  in 
the  House  of  Commons. 

I  saw  Mr.  Long  upon  various  occasions  during  these  weeks. 
Upon  my  return  to  England  in  October,  191 6,  after  a  month 
spent  abroad,  I  found  a  letter  from  him  requesting  me  to 
call  at  the  Local  Government  Board.  At  that  interview  he 
asked  me  to  find  out  what  I  could  regarding  the  prevalent 
feeling  about  the  Government,  and  to  let  him  know  in  the 
course  of  the  following  week. 

Quoting  from  my  diary :  "When  I  saw  Mr.  Long  sub- 
sequently I  mentioned  that  the  feeling  towards  the  Coalition 
seemed  very  much  better  than  it  had  been  in  August;  that 
the  Government  was  not  only  stronger  in  the  country  than 
it  had  been  at  the  end  of  last  session,  but  that  it  was  stronger 
than  it  had  any  right  to  expect;  that  many  people  who  had 
opposed  the  Coalition  were  now  only  too  anxious  to  accept 
and  support  it  on  the  ground  that  men  who  had  for  two  years 
conducted  such  a  novel  business  as  a  great  war  must  necessarily 
know  more  about  it  than  any  others,  even  if  they  had  not  been 
the  best  men  in  the  beginning.  I  added  that  Mr.  Asquith's 
speech  had  made  a  wonderful  impression,  and  that  if  he  only 
kept  the  promises  made  in  it  the  Government  should  be  safe; 
but  that  if,  on  the  other  hand,  he  did  the  same  thing  as  last 
session,  introduced  bills  and  withdrew'  them,  and  showed 
one  way  and  another  that  he  did  not  know  his  own  mind, 
the  situation  would  be  worse  than  ever,  as  people's  hopes 
had  now  been  raised.  Mr.  Long  disagreed  with  me  as  re- 
gards the  Government  running  any  chance  of  being  defeated. 

"Two  or  three  days  later  I  got  a  telephone  message  from 
Mr.  Long,  and  when  I  went  to  see  him  he  asked  me  to 
write  a  letter  embodying  what  I  had  said,  as  he  wished  to 
show  it  to  Mr.  Asquith.  I  was  leaving  for  Paris  at  five 
o'clock  that  afternoon,  and  therefore  wrote  very  hurriedly 
and  rather  badly  a  letter  to  that  effect  in  the  intervening  couple 
of  hours." 

Quoting  further  from  my  diary  towards  the  end  of  Novem- 
ber, 1916:     "I  saw  Mr.  Long  last  Thursday,  spending  more 


116  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

than  two  hours  with  him.  He  knew  that  I  had  already  seen 
X.  I  suggested  that  exactly  what  I  pointed  out  in  my  letter 
had  happened;  that  the  Government  had  made  the  same  mis- 
takes as  last  session,  and  that  as  a  result  they  were  worse  off 
than  ever.  He  said  that  that  was  true,  and  also  admitted  that 
things  could  not  go  on  as  they  were.  I  then  pointed  out  that 
the  only  possible  successor  to  Mr.  Asquith  was  Lloyd  George ; 
that  it  might  be  disappointing  that  no  Conservative  or  at  least 
no  one  of  a  different  political  tradition  from  Lloyd  George 
could  be  found  who  was  capable  of  being  Prime  Minister,  but 
the  fact  was  that  no  such  person  existed. 

"Also  that  Lloyd  George  was  surrounded  by  a  band  of  flat- 
terers who  were  urging  him  to  make  the  attempt ;  and  that 
if  he  ever  screwed  up  his  courage  to  doing  it  without  the  as- 
sistance of  the  Unionist  leaders,  and  was  successful,  he  would 
be  cock  o'  the  walk.  Mr.  Long  seemed  rather  taken  aback  by 
this,  and  kept  on  repeating  'Cock  o'  the  walk.'  He  then,  how- 
ever, made  a  point  that  even  if  Lloyd  George  made  the  attempt 
he  would  be  defeated  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The  sug- 
gestion was  curious  as  showing  how  a  man  who  has  lived 
the  greater  part  of  his  life  in  the  House  may  be  absolutely  out 
of  touch  with  public  feeling  once  that  feeling  gets  out  of  its  or- 
dinary channel.  I  told  Mr.  Long  (and  I  believe  it  to  be  true) 
that  nothing  would  help  Lloyd  George  more  than  an  open  state- 
ment that  he  did  not  agree  with  the  way  the  war  was  being  con- 
ducted, followed  first  by  his  resignation,  and  subsequently  by 
his  defeat  in  the  House  because  the  Party  Whips  were  against 
him ;  that  in  that  event  he  would  soon  force  a  General  Election, 
and  would  undoubtedly  come  back  triumphant,  the  country  be- 
ing heartily  sick  of  the  House  of  Commons  and  its  ways.  More- 
over, that,  although  resignation  was  a  risk  which  was  often 
fatal  in  English  political  life,  yet  that  the  times  were  extraor- 
dinary, and  that  there  was  no  possible  parallel  to  be  drawn 
between  the  resignation  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill  and  that 
of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  whom  the  country,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
wanted  to  see  Prime  Minister.  I  added  that  the  only  thing 
which  would  prevent  the  matter  going  through  would  be 
whether  or  not  Lloyd  George  had  the  pluck  to  make  the  plunge 


THE  ASQUITH  DEBACLE  117 

unless  he  had  what  he  considered  sufficient  Unionist  support 
first  promised  him.  On  this  point  I  admitted  I  was  in  some 
doubt. 

"Mr.  Long  first  referred  to  the  possibility  of  a  General  Elec- 
tion, and  mentioned — what  I  knew — that  dissolution  was  the 
prerogative  of  the  Prime  Minister.  But  he  added  what  I  did 
not  know,  namely,  that  on  one  or  two  occasions  Prime  Minis- 
ters had  exercised  that  prerogative  without  giving  their  col- 
leagues any  warning.  I  think  he  said  that  Mr.  Balfour's  dis- 
solution was  one  of  those  occasions. 

"He  then  proceeded  to  recall  how  when  Mr.  Joseph  Cham- 
berlain had  differed  from  the  other  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment he  had  come  to  a  Cabinet  Meeting,  had  told  them  so 
frankly,  and  had  then  resigned.  And  he  said  that  if  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  would  only  adopt  that  plan  instead  of  working  outside 
the  Cabinet  he  would  probably  get  more  support  than  otherwise, 
and  in  quarters  where  he  did  not  expect  it. 

"However,  Mr.  Long  was  mainly  insistent  that  a  deputation 
should  see  Mr.  Asquith  to  get  him  to  change  his  ways.  I  ven- 
tured to  argue  that  all  the  deputations  in  the  world  were  hardly 
likely  to  change  the  character  of  a  man  of  sixty-five ;  that,  as 
Mr.  Long  himself  had  been  impressing  on  me,  there  probably 
was  no  specific  thing  which  the  present  Government  was  not 
doing  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  could  say  he  would  do,  but 
that  he  would  do  things  more  quickly,  which  in  time  of  war 
was  almost  as  important  as  a  question  of  policy;  and  that  the 
procrastination  which  was  the  Prime  Minister's  fatal  defect 
was  not  likely  to  be  changed  by  any  deputation.  However,  I 
asked  Mr.  Long  whom  he  suggested  should  be  on  this  deputa- 
tion. He  mentioned  the  names  of  Lord  Cromer,  Lord  Milner, 
Sir  Starr  Jamieson,  and  one  of  the  Rothschilds.  In  casting 
about  for  a  fifth  he  mentioned  J.  P.  Morgan.  I  pointed  out 
that  Morgan  was  an  American.  Mr.  Long  would  hardly  be- 
lieve this,  and  at  first  insisted  that  Morgan  had  become  a  nat- 
uralised British  subject. 

"At  Mr.  Long's  request  I  said  that  I  would  see  X  and  would 
then  write  in  the  course  of  the  next  two  days.  He  asked  me  to 
see  Mr.  Bonar  Law  and  discuss  the  matter  with  him  also.     I 


118  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

told  him  that  I  did  not  think  any  good  purpose  would  be  an- 
swered by  my  seeing  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  whom  I  knew  very 
slightly. 

"At  the  end  of  this  conversation  Mr.  Long,  whose  political 
connection  probably  goes  back  farther  than  anyone  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  bar  five  or  six,  told  me  several  interest- 
ing things  about  the  past.  He  related  how  he  had  made  up 
the  quarrel  caused  by  Randolph  Churchill  opening  a  letter 
which  was  not  addressed  to  him.  He  mentioned  that  he  him- 
self had  been  put  on  political  committees  by  Disraeli ;  and  said 
that  he  remembered  Disraeli  even  further  back  than  that ;  that 
Disraeli  had  stayed  at  Rood  Ashton  when  he  (Mr.  Long)  was 
eight  years  old,  and  that  he  remembered  him  patting  him  on  the 
head,  saying  that  he  hoped  he  would  go  to  Parliament,  like 
his  father  and  grandfather,  and  then,  admiring  the  steel  on  his 
velvet  suit,  and  making  them  the  vehicle  of  a  rather  fulsome 
compliment  to  Mr.  Long's  mother  upon  her  taste  in  having 
chosen  them. 

"The  following  day  I  wrote  to  Mr.  Long  saying  that  it  ap- 
peared to  be  too  late  for  a  deputation,  even  admitting  that  it 
might  have  been  useful  at  any  time,  and  adding  that  the  main 
point  now  was  that  the  matter  should  not  go  further  without 
the  support  of  Unionist  leaders  other  than  those  who  preferred 
to  cleave  to  Mr.  Asquith." 

The  Thursday  following:  "Mr.  Long  telephoned  yester- 
day morning  asking  me  to  meet  him  at  two  o'clock,  an  easy 
hour  for  him,  as  he  never  takes  any  luncheon.  I  walked  with 
him  from  the  Local  Government  Board  Office  to  Lansdowne 
House,  and  waited  for  him  while  he  saw  Lord  Lansdowne.  On 
the  way  through  the  park  he  amused  me  by  pointing  out  how 
well  Lord  Crewe,  whom  we  happened  to  meet,  had  done  for 
himself  in  life,  considering  that  he  had  no  great  abilities,  al- 
though a  charming  manner.  A  barony  turned  into  a  marqui- 
sate,  the  Garter,  and  the  leadership  of  the  House  of  Lords,  al- 
though he  is  able  to  speak  so  little  that  even  in  the  Lords  it  is 
more  mumbling  than  speaking.  But  Mr.  Long  added  that 
Lord  Crewe's  speeches  were  as  pleasant  to  read  as  they  were 


THE  ASQUITH  DEBACLE  119 

otherwise  to  listen  to.  He  also  said  that  Lord  Crewe  wrote 
very  good  verses,  evidently  an  inherited  talent. 

"Mr.  Long  was  rather  put  out  by  a  leader  in  yesterday's 
Times  advocating  a  dictatorship  of  three.  I  told  him  that  no- 
body considered  that  that  was  practicable.  He  said  he  real- 
ised now  that  the  view  I  had  taken  last  week  was  right,  that 
the  matter  had  gone  too  far,  and  that  Asquith  would  probably 
go.  He  added  that  he  expected  that  Lord  Lansdowne  himself 
would  go  likewise.  I  said  that  from  what  I  had  been  told  by 
X.  I  had  no  reason  to  think  that  Lloyd  George  would  ask 
Lord  Lansdowne  to  stay;  but  I  did  understand  that  it  was 
agreed  that  he  (Long)  should  be  asked  to  remain. 

"I  do  not  know  what  Lord  Lansdowne  told  him,  but  he 
seemed  decidedly  more  cheerful  afterwards. ,? 

Wednesday  following.  "Asquith  has  definitely  gone.  When 
there  was  very  little  risk  Lloyd  George  finally  got  wTorked  up 
to  making  his  ultimatum.  It  really  amounted  to  a  demand 
that  the  whole  responsibility  of  the  war  should  be  given  to  a 
small  committee,  in  which  Asquith  should  practically  not  have 
any  vote.  Asquith  saw  the  King  on  Saturday  and  then  went 
to  Walmer.  This  was  the  cue  for  Lloyd  George,  who  sent  a 
message  that  the  matter  could  not  wait,  and  must  be  decided 
immediately,  or  otherwise  his  resignation  must  take  effect. 
Asquith  came  back  on  Sunday;  and  that  afternoon  the  Union- 
ist members  of  the  Government  wrote  him  that  they  resigned 
if  Lloyd  George  did.  In  fact,  they  did  send  in  their  resigna- 
tions, but  withdrew  them  when  Asquith  replied  that  the  matter 
raised  by  Lloyd  George  was  not  settled.  Asquith  then  ac- 
cepted Lloyd  George's  terms.  But  on  Monday,  urged  by  some 
of  his  political  friends  (and  chiefly,  I  understand,  by  Mc- 
Kenna),  he  withdrew  his  acceptance.  He  then  saw  that  he 
would  be  deserted  and  was  forced  to  resign.  The  King  sent 
for  Bonar  Law,  who  said  that  he  would  try  to  form  a  Govern- 
ment, but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  did  not  make  any  attempt 
to  do  so.  Before  the  King  gave  the  task  to  Lloyd  George 
there  was  a  conference  at  the  Palace  between  Lloyd  George, 
Asquith,  and  Bonar  Law.  I  believe  that  Asquith  would  then 
have  been  willing  to  accept  the  terms  imposed  by  Lloyd  George ; 


120  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

but  the  latter  was  only  too  glad  to  have  him  out  of  the  way, 
and  would  only  consider  the  proposal  formerly  made  as  being 
definitely  rejected.  In  the  result  Lloyd  George  undertook  to 
form  a  Government,  and  is  now  doing  so." 

Saturday  following :  "Mr.  Long  sent  me  a  message  asking 
me  to  come  to  the  Local  Government  Board  and  go  with  him 
to  Paddington,  as  he  was  leaving  for  Rood  Ashton  for  the 
week-end.  He  is,  I  think,  rather  glad  to  be  Colonial  Secre- 
tary. But  he  was  very  much  annoyed  by  an  attack  in  the  Times 
this  morning  saying  that  he  and  Mr.  Balfour  ought  to  have  been 
left  out  of  the  Government.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Lord  North- 
cliffe  is  very  prejudiced  against  Mr.  Long.  About  two  weeks 
ago,  when  this  affair  was  coming  on,  X.  spoke  to  me  about  a 
dinner  he  thought  of  arranging  to  bring  them  together;  but 
later  he  said  he  had  decided  not  to  do  so,  as  Northcliffe  might 
quite  possibly  be  rude  to  Long." 

Briand,  like  Asquith,  resigned  in  December,  1916.  But 
the  effect  of  these  two  changes  of  Government  was  vastly  dif- 
ferent. Briand  reorganised  his  Cabinet,  pending  his  retire- 
ment three  months  later,  when  he  made  way  for  a  successor 
who,  for  the  time  being,  more  fully  enjoyed  the  confidence  of 
Parliament.  But  the  disappearance  of  Mr.  Asquith  in  Eng- 
land signalled  a  revolution  in  the  mode  of  conducting  the  strug- 
gle. Thereafter  the  country  was  inspired  to  make  efforts  and 
to  submit  to  sacrifices  of  which  neither  its  Allies  nor  its  ene- 
mies had  thought  it  capable.  The  winning  of  the  war  was 
placed  before  and  above  all  else.  The  accumulations  of  the  past 
and  the  prospects  of  the  future  were  alike  used  towards  that 
end  without  any  count  being  taken.  The  statesman  who  was 
thus  able  to  call  forth  the  utmost  vitality  and  resolution  in 
his  own  country  soon  took  the  leading  part  in  the  councils  of 
the  Allies. 

Macaulay  once  wrote  that  "Of  almost  every  man  who  has 
been  distinguished  in  the  political  world  it  may  be  said  that 
the  course  which  he  pursued,  and  the  effect  which  he  produced, 
depended  less  upon  his  personal  qualities  than  on  the  circum- 
stances in  which  he  was  placed."    It  is  not  decrying  Mr.  Lloyd 


THE  ASQUITH  DEBACLE  121 

George's  merits  to  say  that  he  and  the  occasion  were  made  for 
each  other. 

The  passage  of  Mr.  Asquith  meant  something  else,  which, 
while  less  important,  was  nevertheless  far  reaching.  It  sounded 
the  knell  of  Gladstonian  Liberalism ;  and,  by  a  curious  chance, 
enabled  the  Conservative  party  to  ward  off  its  own  dissolution, 
and  possibly  to  get  a  new  lease  of  life,  by  adopting  a  great 
Radical  leader. 


CHAPTER  VII 
The  French  Political  World 

The  present  period  in  French  political  history  dates  from 
the  day  when  it  became  apparent  that  M.  Clemenceau  would 
not  be  elected  President  of  the  Republic.  Although  Cle- 
menceau had  at  first  waved  aside  the  suggestion  that  he  should 
go  to  the  Elysee,  he  finally  admitted  that  he  was  being  "car- 
ried" there  by  the  force  of  public  opinion.  It  was  only  three 
days  before  the  election  that  the  carefully  prepared  intrigue  saw 
the  light  of  day.  Marechal  Foch  was  in  no  small  degree  re- 
sponsible for  its  success,  although  not  for  its  inception — a  fact 
which  would  not  have  been  generally  known  had  it  not  been 
for  the  indiscretion  of  l'Abbe  Wetterlee. 

Many  months  before  Clemenceau  had  decided  that  if  he 
could  arrange  it,  M.  Millerand  should  be  his  successor  as 
President  du  Conseil.  Millerand  had  been  Minister  of  War 
in  191 5.  His  administration  of  that  office  has  been  greatly 
criticised.  It  is  difficult  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  the  justice 
of  the  allegations  made  against  him.  In  brief,  they  amount 
to  an  accusation  that  his  policy  was  such  as  to  waste  the  lives 
of  many  tens  of  thousands  to  no  good  purpose.  The  feeling 
about  this  is  still  so  bitter  that  within  the  last  eighteen  months 
the  Rapporteur  General  of  an  important  Parliamentary  Com- 
mittee, who  has  been  a  member  of  more  than  one  Cabinet,  men- 
tioned to  me  that  he  never  went  to  see  Millerand  (who  was  then 
Prime  Minister)  about  the  reports  to  be  made,  as  he  wished  to 
avoid  any  contact  with  him ;  but  that,  of  course,  he  was 
obliged  to  receive  le  President  du  Conseil  when  the  latter  re- 
versed the  usual  procedure  and  called  upon  him. 

Clemenceau  had  not  been  upon  good  terms  with  Millerand 
for  some  years.  The  difference  originated  before  the  war. 
There  is  a  certain  piquancy  in  recalling  that  when  the  Govern- 

122 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  123 

ment  left  Paris  to  go  to  Bordeaux,  in  1914,  Millerand's  last 
warning  to  the  Military  Governor  who  was  left  in  charge — 
Gallieni — was  to  beware  of  what  Clemenceau  might  attempt 
to  do.  Nevertheless,  when  some  four  years  later  Clemenceau 
wanted  a  Haut  Commissaire  for  Alsace-Lorraine  he  turned  to 
Millerand,  disregarded  the  past,  and  persuaded  him  to  accept 
the  post.  Later  he  decided  that  Millerand  was  the  man  upon 
whom  he  could  best  rely  to  ensure  the  execution  of  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles.  I  see  by  my  diary  that  as  early  as  April,  1919, 
a  person  well  known  in  the  French  political  world  brought 
me  that  news. 

Millerand  had  taken  certain  steps  towards  the  constitution 
of  a  Cabinet  with  the  idea  that  Clemenceau  would  be  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic.  When  in  the  middle  of  the  week  it  was 
evident  that  M.  Deschanel's  *  friends  (or  M.  Clemenceau's 
enemies)  had  gained  the  day,  it  was  probably  necessary  to  make 
a  few  changes. 

The  election  at  Versailles  was  devoid  of  interest.  The  re- 
sult was  a  foregone  conclusion.  It  was  very  different  from 
the  day  seven  years  previously  when  Clemenceau  and  M.  Ca- 
mille  Pelletan  had  done  their  bitter  utmost  to  defeat  Poincare 
and  to  send  M.  Pams  to  the  Elysee.  It  was  also  a  dull  day  in 
Paris.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  not,  despite  the  statement  in 
the  newspapers,  at  Versailles,  as  in  other  circumstances  he 
doubtless  would  have  been,  to  honour  M.  Clemenceau.  In- 
stead, he  lunched  somewhat  gloomily  at  Claridge's  Hotel,  and 
had  much  to  say  about  the  ingratitude  of  nations. 

Woodrow  Wilson  repudiated ! 

Clemenceau  rejected! 

Was  anyone  safe? 

Apart  from  supervising  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  it  was 
thought  that  any  Government  would  have  to  consider  the  re- 
vision of  the  Constitution.  In  England  the  power  of  the  Cabi- 
net has  steadily  increased  at  the  expense  of  Parliament,  which 
to-day  is  much  less  potent  than  it  was  a  quarter  of  a  century 

1  To  a  foreigner  it  is  curious  to  notice  that  one  of  the  most  striking 
things  in  M.  Deschanel's  appearance  is  the  scar  of  a  wound  which  he 
received  in  a  duel  with  M.  Clemenceau  many  years  ago. 


124  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

ago.  One  of  the  results  of  five  years  of  warfare  has  been  to 
lessen  the  direct  responsibility  of  Ministers  of  the  Crown  to 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  to  place  the  Prime  Minister  al- 
most in  the  position  of  a  president  of  a  republic. 

But  in  France  Parliament  has  increased  its  influence  out 
of  all  due  proportion.  It  has  absorbed  the  greater  share  of 
the  power,  leaving,  on  one  side,  a  President  who  is  to  a  large 
extent  a  figure-head,  and  upon  the  other  an  underpaid  judiciary 
which  is  dependent  upon  its  will.  It  was  thought  that  this 
might  be  rectified,  and  that  the  whole  balance  might  be  read- 
justed, by  augmenting  the  powers  of  the  President,  which 
would  add  to  the  security  of  the  Government  of  the  day.  The 
project  secured  all  the  more  adherents  because  the  men  of  the 
Republic  have  never  forgotten  that  the  Constitution  of  1875 
was  drafted  by  a  Royalist  majority :  while  there  was  a  general 
impression  that  a  mistake  had  been  made  in  adopting  the  Eng- 
lish in  preference  to  the  American  system. 

It  was,  I  think,  Sir  Henry  Maine  who  wrote  that  the  King 
of  England  reigned  without  governing,  that  the  President 
of  the  United  States  governed  without  reigning,  but  that  it 
had  remained  for  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  neither 
to  govern  nor  to  reign.  The  accuracy  of  this  statement  is 
questionable.  The  French  constitution  gives  the  President  very 
considerable  power;  although  it  is  true  that  every  presidential 
decree  must  be  countersigned  by  a  minister  as  well  as  signed 
by  the  President.  But  no  President  has  ever  cared  to  take  any 
initiative  or  to  exercise  his  full  powers  since  the  misfortune 
which  befell  Marechal  MacMahon  on  the  Seize  Mai.  While 
the  fact  that  the  office  conferred  little  real  power  was  accen- 
tuated in  recent  years  by  the  coincidence  that  neither  M. 
Loubet  nor  M.  Fallieres,  though  both  worthy  men,  were  of  a 
calibre  which  enabled  them  to  be  anything  but  respectable 
nonentities. 

M.  Poincare,  with  his  great  intellectual  attainments,  and  be- 
hind him  his  career  as  a  leader  of  the  Paris  Bar,  would  in 
normal  times  doubtless  have  made  some  effort  to  break  away 
from  what  had  become  a  tradition ;  for  although  "un  homme 
timide" — of  which  one  of  the  results  is  his  apparent  coldness 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  125 

— M.  Poincare  is  a  man  of  considerable  resolution.  But  the 
advent  of  the  war  forbade  any  experiments  of  that  kind :  and 
even  M.  Poincare's  personal  letter  to  King  George  in  the  days 
preceding  the  declaration  of  hostilities  had  to  be  assented  to 
by  his  ministers. 

But  M.  Poincare  himself,  although  he  recently  wrote  that  the 
inaction  imposed  on  a  President  of  the  Republic  was  galling, 
strongly  urged  in  the  same  article  that  no  attempt  should  be 
made  to  revise  a  constitution  which,  upon  the  whole,  had  well 
served  its  purpose  for  half  a  century. 

Apparently  M.  Millerand  concurred  in  the  view  that  the 
powers  are  in  the  constitution  if  the  President  wants  to  ex- 
ercise them.  For  although  some  days  before  his  election  in 
September,  1920,  he  issued  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  if  he 
became  President  he  would  take  an  active  part  in  directing 
the  policy  of  the  country,  he  did  not  intimate  that  he  thought 
that  involved  any  constitutional  change. 

On  the  other  hand,  M.  Briand  was  one  of  the  many  who 
some  years  ago  were  credited  with  holding  the  opinion  that 
some  revision  was  essential  in  order  to  increase  the  independ- 
ence of  the  executive  and  to  lessen  the  overwhelming  influence 
of  Parliament.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  he  was  well  con- 
tent not  to  raise  the  question.  For  within  the  past  two  years 
there  has  been  a  very  general  revulsion  of  feeling,  and  for  a 
curious  reason.  An  eminent  statesman,  who  was  a  member 
of  M.  Briand's  Cabinet,  told  me  on  several  occasions  during 
the  war  that  one  of  the  first  duties  of  Parliament  after  peace 
was  obtained  would  be  to  extend  the  presidential  powers.  Since 
then  he  and  many  of  his  political  friends  have  changed  their 
mind.  The  lesson  they  saw  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Wilson  was  that 
it  is  better  to  have  a  President  whose  powers  are  too  limited 
than  one  whose  powers  are  too  wide. 

The  political  position  of  France  differs  from  that  of  Eng- 
land in  that  there  are  at  least  half  a  dozen  men  who  might  be 
called  to  be  Prime  Minister  to-morrow  without  evoking  any 
surprise  in  the  country.  There  are  almost  innumerable  for- 
mer Prime  Ministers.  The  list  is  not  exhausted  by  citing 
MM.    de    Freycinet,    Ribot,    Clemenceau,    Caillaux,    Barthou, 


126  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Viviani,  Millerand,  Doumergue,  Painleve,  Leygues,  Briand, 
Meline,  and  Monis.2 

Some  of  these  can  never  again  be  in  office  on  account  of 
their  advanced  age.  Others  are  unlikely  to  be  so  for  various 
reasons.  But  there  remain  a  number  who  are  quite  "Minis- 
trable"  :  while  it  would  be  difficult  to  give  a  full  list  of  those 
who  have  held  some  Cabinet  rank  and  who  are  possibilities  as 
Prime  Ministers. 

Aristide  Briand,  who  was  recently  President  du  Conseil 
for  the  sixth  time,  is  59  years  of  age.  He  is  an  avocat  who 
has  not  practised  for  many  years.  M.  Briand  is  supposed 
to  be  indolent,  but  upon  occasion  no  one  can  show  more  firm- 
ness and  energy.  He  made  his  reputation  as  reporter  of  the 
law  separating  Church  and  State.  But  the  feat  which  clings 
most  to  his  name  is  the  quashing  of  a  widespread  railway 
strike,  by  calling  the  employes  to  the  colours,  and  thus  placing 
them  under  martial  law. 

Although  he  began  his  career  with  socialistic  tendencies 
Briand  has  long  been  practically  an  independent.  For  some 
years  his  name  was  not  inscribed  upon  the  list  of  any  group, 
but  lately  he  has  been  classed  as  a  Socialist  Republican.  He 
is  the  greatest  of  French  parliamentarians ;  so  far  ahead  of 
everyone  else  that  he  is  often  inclined  to  trust  somewhat  too 
much  to  his  power  to  win  the  day  from  the  tribune.  If  he  is 
not  the  greatest  of  orators  amongst  the  deputies,  he  is  second 
only  to  Viviani,  whose  speaking  is  of  quite  a  different  order. 

M.  Briand  is  probably  the  only  French  politician,  except 
M.  Poincare,  who  can  hold  his  own  against  Mr.  Lloyd  George ; 
although  he  is  thought  to  have  been  too  yielding  at  Cannes. 
This  is  partly  because  he  is  somewhat  of  the  same  type.  M. 
Millerand  is  perhaps  a  strong,  and  is  certainly  an  obstinate 
man.  He  always  knows  his  case  thoroughly  as  befits  a  lawyer. 
But,  as  was  patent  when  he  was  Prime  Minister,  he  cannot 
"manceuvrer  sur  place,"  a  defect  vital  to  anyone  dealing  with 
Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

Briand  also  had  the  advantage  of  the  guidance,  and  of  trust- 

2  Since   writing  the   above   another    former   Prime    Minister   has    died: 
M.  Combes. 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  127 

ing  to  the  guidance  of,  M.  Philippe  Berthelot.  The  latter  is 
the  most  remarkable  member  of  a  remarkable  family.  His 
father,  a  celebrated  scientist  who  was  almost  equally  well  known 
as  a  free-thinker  in  a  former  generation,  made  a  brief  appari- 
tion at  the  Quai  d'Orsay  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  One 
of  his  brothers  is  M.  Andre  Berthelot,  who  is  both  a  senator 
and  a  figure  in  the  world  of  high  finance. 

Philippe  Berthelot  is  one  of  the  ablest  and  perhaps  the 
most  "seduisant"  man  in  France.  His  literary  and  artistic 
interests  and  talents,  coupled  with  his  delight  in  the  intercourse 
of  others,  have  made  him  a  notable  figure  in  all  classes  of 
Parisian  society.  His  work  as  a  diplomatist  has  always  borne 
witness  to  his  strong  personality.  He  has  created  many  attach- 
ments, has  aroused  some  enmities,  and  excited  more  jealousies  : 
but  generally  he  has  been  able  to  dispel  prejudices  which  were 
acquired  before  their  holders  had  met  him. 

M.  Berthelot's  ill-wishers  thought  that  the  troubles  of  a 
bank  of  which  his  brother  was  the  chairman  afforded  an  open- 
ing for  checking  a  career  which  was  too  brilliant  to  please 
many  of  them.  They  made  the  most  of  the  opportunity; 
whilst  on  the  other  hand  some  of  those  who  had  reason  to  be 
grateful  to  him  did  not  rally  to  his  support  until  they  saw 
which  way  the  wind  blew.  But  the  incident  served  to  show 
berthelot's  courage  and  imperturbation.3 

8  Since  the  proof  of  this  chapter  was  corrected,  M.  Berthelot,  at  the 
instance  of  M.  Poincare,  appeared  hefore  a  Disciplinary  Council 
charged  with  having  sent  on  his  own  authority,  but  signed  in  the  name 
of  successive  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  (M.  Leygues  and  M.  Briand), 
certain  telegrams  designed  to  strengthen  the  position  of  La  Banque 
Industrielle  de  Chine,  of  which  his  brother  was  chairman.  As  a  result 
of  the  finding  of  this  body  M.  Poincare  decided  that  he  should  be  sus- 
pended from  the  Diplomatic  service  for  ten  (10)  years.  As  Philippe 
Berthelot  is  now  56,  this  practically  ends  his  career  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay. 
He  has  thus  paid  dearly  for  whatever  error  he  may  have  committed. 
But  his  country  is  also  a  loser,  for  France  does  not  at  present  possess 
many  diplomatists  of  Berthelot's  calibre.  It  is  worth  recalling  that  in 
1920  a  determined  effort  was  made  by  Berthelot's  friends,  both  in 
France  and  in  England,  to  secure  for  him  the  succession  to  M.  Paul 
Cambon.  The  fact  that,  at  this  juncture,  M.  and  Mme.  Berthelot  had 
the  honour  of  lunching  alone  with  the  King  and  Queen  was  advanced 
as  showing  the  welcome  which  he  might  expect  as  Ambassador.  But 
it  is  to  my  personal  knowledge  that  Berthelot's  partisans  were  unable 
to  get  any  encouragement  from  M.  Millerand,  who  was  then  Prime 
Minister.  M.  Painleve  would  also,  at  this  time,  have  liked  to  follow 
M.  Cambon  at  Albert  Gate. 


128 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


At  the  Quai  d'Orsay  he  has  nearly  always  rendered  himself 
indispensable  to  the  Minister  of  the  day.  It  is  true  that  M. 
Ribot  never  entirely  overcame  a  fear  that  Berthelot  might  ab- 
sorb some  of  his  own  jealously  guarded  power,  or  might  become 
too  influential.  But  M.  Clemenceau,  who  arrived  at  the  For- 
eign Office  holding  Berthelot  in  detestation,  within  a  few 
months  placed  the  greatest  reliance  upon  him  and  had  the 
greatest  confidence  in  him. 

When  Lord  Derby  came  to  Paris  as  Ambassador,  Lord 
Bertie  told  him  to  beware  of  one  man  among  all  others — Ber- 
thelot. For  the  latter  had  never  been  able  to  advance  in  Lord 
Bertie's  good  graces  any  more  than  he  has  in  those  of  M. 
Poincare.  This  warning,  coming  from  one  who  had  repre- 
sented his  country  for  so  many  years  in  Paris,  was  not  a  good 
recommendation.  But  within  eighteen  months  the  new  Am- 
bassador had  formed  his  own  opinion.  I  recollect  Lord  Derby 
recounting  to  me  this  injunction  of  his  predecessor,  and  his 
own  impression  that  while  Philippe  Berthelot  was  supremely 
nationalist,  he  was  a  sincere  friend  of  Great  Britain,  and  a 
firm  supporter  of  the  Entente. 

But  with  Briand  M.  Berthelot  has  always  been  on  the  closest 
terms.  It  was  indeed  the  idea  that  Berthelot  was  essentially 
Briand's  man  which  had  primarily  indisposed  M.  Clemen- 
ceau towards  him.  With  the  return  of  Briand  to  the  Quai 
d'Orsay  Berthelot's  position  was  assured,  while  it  was  further 
fortified  by  the  retirement  of  M.  Paleologue,  who  is  generally 
held  responsible  for  the  ill-advised  recognition  of  Wrangel 
by  M.  Millerand's  Government. 

In  the  autumn  of  1920,  when  the  Leygues  Ministry  was 
only  a  stop-gap,  it  was  felt  that  only  a  Briand  Cabinet  (or 
possibly  a  Poincare-Briand  combination)  would  be  strong 
enough  either  to  induce  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  take  steps  to 
enforce  the  execution  of  the  Treaty,  or  to  act  alone  if  Great 
Britain  declined  to  move.  From  the  day  he  formed  his  Gov- 
ernment M.  Briand  showed  that  he  was  impressed  by  the  fact 
that  France  has  counted  upon  and  must  get  from  Germany 
the  reparation  contemplated  by  the  Treaty:  while  as  a  practi- 
cal politician  with  a  keen  sense  of  atmosphere  he  realised  that 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  129 

the  temper  both  of  the  country  and  of  Parliament  was  such 
that  any  Government  which  did  not  make  headway  in  that  di- 
rection would  not  last  long.  But  although  M.  Briand  is  both 
by  nature  and  by  experience  better  fitted  than  any  other 
French  statesman  to  hold  his  own  against  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
and  while  he  is  not  excelled  by  the  British  Prime  Minister 
either  in  resourcefulness  or  in  force  of  character,  he  was  al- 
ways at  a  certain  disadvantage  in  his  negotiations  with  Down- 
ing Street. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  starts  with  a  certain  preponderant  au- 
thority by  reason  of  the  fact  that  he  is  the  sole  survivor  of  the 
makers  of  the  Treaty.  But  Briand's  European  reputation  in 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  was  a  sufficient  set-off  to  a 
claim  the  value  of  which  is  daily  becoming  more  doubtful: 
it  is  not  a  proud  boast  to  have  manufactured  a  machine  which 
one  cannot  or  will  not  make  operative. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  secure  in  his  majority.  Relatively 
he  is  a  permanency.  When  he  deals  with  any  French  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  he  knows  that  at  the  next  conference  he 
may  be  faced  by  another — one  more  or  one  less  tractable. 
He  knows  that  the  result  of  the  negotiations  of  the  day,  and 
even  his  own  conduct,  may  have  its  repercussion  in  the  French 
Parliament,  and  may  result  in  the  downfall  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Many  Ministers  have  passed  in  and  out  of  the  Quai 
d'Orsay  while  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  remained  firmly  in  power. 
Even  if  there  be  any  basis  for  the  accusation  that  he  some- 
times subordinates  his  foreign  policy  to  his  political  pros- 
pects, he  is  only  bound  to  do  so  in  view  of  the  next  General 
Election,  in  view  of  what  the  country  may  say  at  the  polls  at 
some  more  or  less  distant  date.  His  fate  is  not  always  in  the 
balance  from  day  to  day. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  in  office  by  virtue  of  a  Unionist  ma- 
jority. At  times  his  Government  has  done  things  of  which 
that  majority  did  not  sincerely  approve.  More  than  once, 
alike  after  the  Armistice  and  since  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was 
signed,  the  Unionist  War  Committee  or  its  successor  sent  pro- 
testing deputations  to  the  then  leader,  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  to  state 
emphatically  that  the  party  was  not  in  accord  with  the  pro- 


130  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

posals  of  the  Government.  More  than  once  Mr.  Bonar  Law 
intimated  in  his  quiet  and  precise  manner  that  the  alternative 
might  be  a  General  Election ;  and  the  members  of  the  deputa- 
tion returned  to  whence  they  came  with  their  tails  between 
their  legs. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George,  however,  has  no  rival  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  He  certainly  would  have  had  nothing  to  fear  had 
Mr.  Bonar  Law  not  retired. 

But  the  situation  of  M.  Briand  or  of  any  French  Prime 
Minister,  is  manifestly  different.  A  Government  which  wishes 
to  enforce  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  is  confronted  by  the 
united  opposition  of  all  the  socialist  deputies;  while  it  must 
also  count  upon  a  certain  number  of  adverse  votes  from 
nearly  all  the  other  groups — some  on  the  ground  that  it  has 
been  too  exacting,  and  others,  for  the  reason  that  it  has  been 
too  feeble,  either  in  its  demands  upon  Germany  or  in  its  con- 
versations with  the  British  Cabinet. 

In  the  vote  taken  on  May  26,  1921,  when  M.  Briand  asked 
the  Chambre  des  Deputes  to  approve  what  he  had  done  in 
London,  the  Government  was  sustained  by  a  majority  of  234, 
the  figures  being  391  as  against  157. 

But  this  minority  of  157  was  made  up  as  follows : 

14  members  of  the  Republican  and  Socialist  Entente; 

2.J  members  of  the  Republican  Democratic  Entente; 

12  members  of  the  Republican  and  Democratic  Left; 

16  Independents; 
7  Radicals  and  Radical  Socialists ; 

48  Socialists ; 

14  representatives  of  the  Left; 

12  Socialist  Communists; 
7  Deputies  belonging  to  no  group. 

Of  the  forty-seven  deputies  who  abstained  from  voting,  for- 
ty-five belonged  to  one  or  other  of  the  groups  above  men- 
tioned, but  the  remaining  two  were  members  of  the  Republi- 
can and  Social  Action ;  while  of  the  eighteen  deputies  who  had 
leave  of  absence,  one  belonged  to  a  group  not  yet  named,  the 
Socialist  Republican. 

It  is  obvious  that  a  legislature  divided  into  so  many  diverse 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  131 

fractions  is  at  all  times  a  mine  which  may  explode  and  shat- 
ter the  Cabinet  of  the  day.  Any  one  of  a  dozen  combinations 
may  cause  the  outburst.  The  Prime  Minister  is  therefore 
obliged  to  walk  circumspectly.  If  members  of  the  House  of 
Commons  do  not  approve  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  policy  he  can 
send  them  back  to  their  constituencies — to  expensive  uncer- 
tainty. But  if  the  deputies  do  not  approve  of  the  President 
du  Conseil  they  can  cast  him  out  of  office  without  themselves 
running  any  risk  of  having  immediately  to  answer  to  their 
electors.  Of  the  science  of  managing  the  French  Parliament 
M.  Briand  is  the  greatest  living  exponent. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  M.  Barthou  was  in  the  Briand  Cabi- 
net, and  is  in  the  Poincare.  For  it  is  Barthou  who  in  May, 
1920,  made  in  the  Chambre  a  bitter  attack  upon  Lloyd  George's 
treatment  of  France  and  his  disregard  of  French  rights  under 
the  Treaty.  Barthou  had  been  incited  by  Briand  to  speak  in 
this  sense;  although  I  believe  that  Briand  thought  he  went 
too  far,  and  congratulated  him  less  when  he  descended  from 
the  tribune  than  he  had  encouraged  him  before.  It  is  a  curious 
coincidence  that  the  very  same  afternoon  Lloyd  George  spoke 
in  the  House  of  Commons  and  made  certain  references  to 
the  position  of  France  which  for  the  moment  went  far  to  re- 
move the  dissatisfaction  then  felt  in  that  country.  But  the  in- 
clusion of  Barthou  in  recent  Ministries  is  a  forewarning  that 
the  French  claims  were  at  last  to  be  forcibly  maintained  and 
vigorously  pressed.  M.  Barthou  is  one  of  those  who  may 
possibly  again  be  Prime  Minister.  He  was  responsible  for  the 
Three  Years'  Military  Service  Law,  passed  shortly  before  the 
war :  a  courageous  act  which  earned  him  the  undying  hatred 
of  the  Socialists.  He  is  equally  well  known  for  his  literary 
and  historical  works,  and  is  as  proud  of  being  a  member  of 
the  Academie  Franchise  as  of  his  political  distinction. 

The  two  men  who  were  Clemenceau's  most  trusted  colleagues 
at  the  Peace  Conference  are  still  in  the  Chambre — M.  Lou- 
cheur  and  Andre  Tardieu.  The  former  is  a  contractor,  who 
before  the  war  had  amassed  a  fortune  which  the  subsequent 
course  of  events  is  said  greatly  to  have  increased.  He  has 
all  the  characteristics  of  an  energetic  and  practical  man  of 


132 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


business,  added  to  an  exceptional  power  of  lucid  expression 
when  dealing  with  figures.4 

In  several  conversations  which  I  had  with  Loucheur  in 
1920,  before  he  again  took  office,  I  gathered  that  he  thought 
that  Lloyd  George  was  not  giving  France  proper  support  in 
enforcing  the  execution  of  the  Treaty.  He  made  no  secret 
of  the  fact  that  if  he  was  in  power  he  would  protect  French 
interests  by  independent  action.  This  statement  he  subse- 
quently made  good  by  conducting  direct  negotiations  with 
Ratenau  for  the  reparation  by  Germany  of  the  devastated 
districts. 

Loucheur  is  politically  ambitious.  That  led  him  to  aid  Bri- 
and  in  forming  his  Government  and  thus  to  break  with  the 
more  devoted  followers  of  M.  Clemenceau.  Of  the  latter  the 
most  conspicuous  is  Andre  Tardieu.  In  19 14  he  was  one 
of  the  editors  of  Le  Temps,  and  was  also  known  as  the  author 
of  several  books  on  foreign  affairs.  After  passing  some  time 
at  the  Front  he  made  his  reputation  as  French  High  Commis- 
sioner in  the  United  States.  Upon  his  return  Clemenceau  took 
him  into  his  Cabinet.  Tardieu  is  undoubtedly  the  ablest  man 
of  his  generation  (he  is  to-day  46  years  of  age)  in  political 
life.  Flis  manner,  however,  makes  him  more  enemies  than 
friends.  At  present  he  spends  his  time,  both  in  the  Chambre 
and  outside,  in  defending  the  Treaty  and  denouncing  those 
who  do  not  see  to  its  execution ;  apparently  forgetting  that  he 
himself  is  one  of  those  mainly  responsible  for  neglecting  to 
include  proper  automatic  penalties  for  its  non-fulfilment. 

Loucheur  and  Tardieu  were  the  only  two  members  of  Cle- 
menceau's  Cabinet  who  could  speak  openly  to  and  hold  their 
own  against  him.  After  Clemenceau  resigned  they  were  politi- 
cal allies  until  they  differed  about  Loucheur  entering  the  Briand 
Ministry. 

In  the  Senate  one  of  the  outstanding  figures  is  Paul  Doumer, 
who  was  recently  Minister  of  Finance.5 

4  The  five  French  representatives  were  Clemenceau,  Pichon,  Klotz, 
Tardieu,  and  Jules  Cambon.  Loucheur  was  not  a  plenipotentiary,  but 
he  shared  with  Tardieu  the  burden  of  the  heavy  work. 

6  Doumer's  quasi-agreement  in  August,  1921,  with  the  representatives 
of  Great  Britain  and  Belgium  about  the  division  of  the  money  then  paid 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  133 

Millerand,  Briand,  and  others  were  at  one  time  Socialists, 
although  to-day  none  are  stronger  champions  of  established 
authority.  But  Doumer  has  always  been  a  Republican  of  the 
early  type,  making  his  own  way  in  the  world  by  his  own  ef- 
forts; simple  in  his  mode  of  life;  and  impeccably  honest. 
About  fifteen  years  ago  he  was  nearly  elected  President  of  the 
Republic ;  the  margin  by  which  Fallieres  defeated  him  was 
not  very  great.  Later  he  was  Governor-General  of  Indo- 
Chine.  When  the  war  broke  out  he  stayed  in  Paris  when  the 
Government  (of  which  he  was  not  then  a  member)  and  others 
went  to  Bordeaux.  On  September  4  he  wrote  to  Gallieni 
the   following  letter : 

"MON  CHER  GENERAL, 

"Je  viens  vous  faire  un  amical  et  pressant  appel. 

"Puisque  les  choses  de  la  politique  ont  tourne  de  telle  sorte 
que  je  n'ai  pu  participer  au  pouvoir,  a  l'heure  seule  ou  le  pou- 
voir  est  tentant,  donnez-moi,  je  vous  prie,  la  possibility  d'agir 
de  travailler  a  la  chose  publique. 

"Appelez-moi  pres  de  vous  a  un  titre  quelconque. 

"Par  exemple,  creez  a  votre  Cabinet  un  service  ou  un  secre- 
tariat des  affaires  civiles,  et  appelez-moi  a  le  diriger. 

"Je  vous  debarrasserai  des  broutilles,  dans  le  mesure  ou  vous 
deciderez,  et  je  vous  preparerai  les  elements  de  solution  des 
affaires  importantes. 

"Je  sais  commander;  je  saurai  done  obeir. 

"Et  puis,  ce  que  me  fait  vous  demander  cela  avec  insistence, 
e'est  que  la  defense  de  Paris  peut  devenir  difficile,  que  les 
heures  tragiques  peuvent  arriver  et  que  je  voudrais  pouvoir 
tomber,  en  service,  a  cote  de  vous,  et  non  comme  un  badaud 
qui  va  voir  ou  pleuvent  les  coups. 

"Si  vous  prenez  tout  de  suite  une  decision  favorable, 
envoyez-moi  simplement  un  ordre.  Sinon,  donnez-moi  l'occa- 
sion  de  vous  voir. 

"Votre  tout  devoue, 

"(Signe)   Paul  Doumer. 

by  Germany  met  with  the  disapproval  of  his  colleagues,  and  nearly 
led  to  his  resignation.  Doumer  and  Loucheur,  two  men  of  a  different 
generation,  different  training,  and  a  different  experience  of  life,  are 
known  to  be  antipathetic;  and  it  is  no  secret  that  Loucheur  coveted 
Doumer's  post. 


134  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

"II  va  sans  dire  que  si  je  suis  appele  au  Gouvernement  mili- 
taire  j'y  consacrerai  tous  mes  instants  et  ne  m'occuperai  plus 
de  rien  autre." 

Gallieni  telegraphed  to  the  Government  to  ask  if  he  might 
accept  Doumer's  offer,  and  received  a  reply  telling  him  that 
he  might  use  his  own  discretion.  Later  another  message  came 
saying  that  the  Cabinet  had  decided  that  it  could  not  authorise 
him  to  do  as  Doumer  had  suggested.  But  Gallieni  had  al- 
ready acted,  and  Doumer,  who  had  begun  at  ten  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  had  completed  his  organisation  before  noon. 

Later,  Doumer,  as  President  of  the  Army  Commission  of 
the  Senate,  was  one  of  those  active  in  insisting  that  the  powers 
of  Joffre  should  be  curtailed. 

When  Briand  made  him  his  Finance  Minister  he  was  Presi- 
dent of  the  Senate  Finance  Committee. 

Few  men  in  France  were  more  sorely  tried  than  M.  Doumer 
during  the  war,  his  three  eldest  sons  all  being  killed. 

M.  Viviani  is  the  greatest  orator  in  France.  He  has  been, 
and  in  all  probability  will  again  be  Prime  Minister ;  but  at  the 
present  time  he  shows  no  desire  for  any  immediate  return  to 
office.  M.  Painleve  (whose  career  has  been  recounted  at 
some  length  in  a  previous  chapter)  is  also  not  at  the  end  of 
his  political  career,  but  he  is  obviously  out  of  touch  with  the 
present  Chambre  des  Deputes. 

There  remains  M.  Poincare,  the  strongest  and  most  uncom- 
promising protagonist  of  the  integral  execution  of  the  Treaty : 
although  in  his  opinion  the  Treaty  does  not  go  far  enough; 
as  was  shown  when  he  was  the  sole  supporter  of  Foch's  pro- 
tests against  the  abandonment  of  the  French  demand  for  Al- 
lied occupation  of  the  Rhine  country. 

As  President  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the  Sen- 
ate he  was  a  power  with  which  the  Government  of  the  day 
had  to  reckon.  Moreover,  his  influence  was  increased  by  his 
political  articles  in  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  Le  Temps, 
and  other  publications.  It  was  no  secret  that  he  refused  to 
join  M.  Briand's  Government  in  December,  1920,  because 
he  hoped  one  day  to  be  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  while  probably 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  135 

being  at  the  same  time  President  du  Conseil.  This  aspira- 
tion has  since  been  realised. 

M.  Poincare  is  likely  to  have  more  affirmative  success  in 
negotiations  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George  than  is  any  other  French 
statesman.  Unlike  Briand  he  will  keep  the  British  Prime  Min- 
ister at  arm's  length.  Doubtless  he  will  achieve  more  by  that 
method;  for  few  politicians  can  gain  anything  by  coming  to 
close  quarters  with  Lloyd  George.  But  Poincare  will  treat  in 
that  fashion  as  much  by  necessity  as  from  premeditated  de- 
sign. It  is  impossible  for  him  to  unbend.  He  is  not  genial 
as  was  always  M.  Briand.  He  will  not  lose  his  temper  as  did 
sometimes  M.  Clemenceau.  But  unceasingly  he  will  be  re- 
served, and  almost  stern.  He  will  be  quite  unaffected  by  the 
Prime  Minister's  moods.  The  expansive  and  irritable  mo- 
ments will  leave  him  equally  indifferent.  The  one  will  not 
amuse  him;  the  other  will  not  abash  him.  The  Welsh  charm 
will  not  fascinate  the  inexorable  "homme  de  Lorraine."  Poin- 
care will  be  tenacious  for  what  he  considers  the  rights  of  his 
country;  and  it  will  be  beyond  even  the  Prime  Minister's  well- 
known  powers  to  divert  him  from  the  object  he  is  pursuing. 
Moreover,  he  will  be  on  his  guard.  For  when  he  read  the  Gov- 
ernment report  of  the  San  Remo  conversations  he  was  im- 
pressed by  the  fact  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  spoken  in  no 
friendly  way  of  the  French  claims. 

Poincare's  lucid  intelligence  and  orderly  mind  recoil  from 
the  new  system  of  successive  conferences,  which  settle  little, 
and  which  leave  nothing  settled  for  long.  He  has  already  ex- 
pressed his  abhorrence  of  what  he  calls  "cinema  diplomacy." 
His  own  position  is  clear.  Time  and  again  during  the  last  two 
years  he  has  put  on  record  his  view  that  France  must  get 
what  the  Treaty  gives  her.  So  long  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George  ad- 
mits in  the  main  M.  Poincare's  contentions  on  that  subject,  so 
long  (but  so  long  only)  will  they  agree.  Their  conversation  at 
Boulogne  was  satisfactory  precisely  because  Poincare  got  his 
way  upon  all  the  essential  points. 

Poincare  also  has  the  country,  and  probably  Parliament, 
more  solidly  behind  him  than  had  any  of  his  predecessors 
since  Clemenceau;  and  it  is  Mr.  Lloyd  George  who  has  put 


136  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

them  there.  He  is  the  first  President  of  the  Republic  who  has 
ever  held  office  after  leaving  the  Elysee,  although  there  is  to- 
day another  in  the  Senate — M.  Deschanel. 

The  General  Election  of  19 19  produced  some  surprises  in 
the  way  of  unexpected  defeats,  but  two  years  have  not  brought 
forward  many  new  men  of  outstanding  promise. 

One  of  the  most  marked  figures  in  the  new  Chambre  is 
General  de  Castelnau.  When  the  election  of  Millerand  to  suc- 
ceed Deschanel  as  President  of  the  Republic  brought  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Senate  and  the  Chambre  together  I  noticed  that  de 
Castelnau  was  almost  the  only  one  for  whom  there  was  any 
spontaneous  applause  when  he  ascended  the  tribune  to  cast 
his  ballot.  Undoubtedly  that  was  largely  a  personal  tribute: 
but  de  Castelnau  is  a  possible  Minister  of  War. 

In  the  Chambre  a  young  deputy,  M.  Forgeot,  has  given 
proofs  of  an  eloquence  which  is  impressive  at  the  moment,  but 
which  is  as  yet  devoid  of  a  sense  of  parliamentary  atmopshere. 
In  the  Senate  M.  de  Jouvenel  (who  is  one  of  the  editors  of 
Le  Matin)  quickly  made  a  name  by  a  few  speeches  which  were 
equally  interesting  and  thoughtful.  But  upon  the  whole  it 
does  not  seem  to  be  a  Parliament  of  new  talents. 

It  is  a  current  saying  that  the  new  Chambre  does  not  repre- 
sent the  country;  that  it  leans  too  much  towards  the  Right, 
and  that  it  is  reactionary.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  that 
estimate  is  inaccurate.  The  Chambre  reflects  the  feeling  of 
France  that  Germany  must  be  made  to  pay;  and  the  fear  of 
France  that  the  extreme  Left  would  not  see  that  that  was  done. 
Moreover,  the  Socialists,  the  Communists,  and  all  the  groups 
which  in  France  correspond  to  the  most  advanced  wing  of  the 
Labour  Party,  are  at  present  hopelessly  divided,  and  engaged 
in  active  warfare  among  themselves.  This  arises  partly  from 
the  fact  that  many  of  them,  being  small  proprietors,  are  op- 
posed to  Bolshevism.  But  the  courage  shown  by  Clemenceau 
and  his  immediate  predecessors  during  the  war  in  not  adopting 
Lloyd  George's  policy  of  yielding  to  all  demands,  leaving  the 
future  to  right  matters,  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  in  France 
there  have  been  fewer  labour  troubles  than  in  England,  and 
no  unconstitutional  menace  to  the  State. 


THE  FRENCH  POLITICAL  WORLD  137 

There  were  many  predictions  that  the  senatorial  elections 
in  January  would  show  that  the  Left  was  gaining;  but  in 
the  actual  result  there  was  practically  no  alteration.  The  three 
elections  which  took  place  in  July,  1921,  were,  considered  to- 
gether, a  reverse  which  may  possibly  indicate  that  the  Bloc 
National  has  passed  its  high-water  mark  of  power.  But  their 
importance  should  not  be  exaggerated  as  local  influences  played 
an  important  part. 

The  change  will  probably  not  come  until  the  country  feels 
more  assured  than  it  does  to-day  that  Germany  will  meet  her 
obligations. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


Caillaux 


No  study  of  political  possibilities  in  France  would  be  com- 
plete if  it  ignored  M.  Caillaux.  It  is  quite  possible  that  he 
will  never  return  to  power.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  not  beyond 
the  bounds  of  possibility  that  he  may  once  again  be  President 
du  Conseil.  I  consider  that  contingency  more  unlikely  than 
otherwise;  but,  in  view  of  what  may  develop  in  regard  to  the 
execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  not  entirely  out  of  the 
question. 

Joseph  Caillaux  is  now  59  years  of  age ;  practically  the  same 
age  as  M.  Briand,  who  was  born  a  few  months  earlier. 

I  have  neither  any  sympathy  for,  nor  faith  in,  the  policy 
which  throughout  his  political  career  M.  Caillaux  has  con- 
stantly advocated.  I  believe  that  it  would  have  been  as  fatal 
to  his  own  country  as  it  was  in  some  respects  inimical  to  Eng- 
land. But  it  is  impossible  to  accuse  Caillaux  of  being  an  op- 
portunist— much  less  a  political  adventurer.  Upon  this  latter 
point  there  is  in  England  a  very  general  misconception — quite 
in  keeping  with  our  prevalent  ignorance  about  the  political 
personages  of  other  countries.  I  was  once  asked  by  a  mem- 
ber of  the  then  Government  how  Caillaux  managed  to  get  a 
foothold  in  public  life — whether  he  had  not  begun  as  a  dema- 
gogue. The  fact  is  that  no  one  is  less  of  a  political  filibuster 
than  Caillaux.  Many  French  hommes  d'etat  of  the  present 
day  have  by  their  own  praiseworthy  efforts  raised  themselves 
to  power  and  eminence  from  origins  which  were  quite  obscure. 
Others  owe  their  prominence  to  intrigues  which  are  less  laud- 
able. But  Caillaux  was  born  in  the  political  purple.  He  is,  I 
think,  the  only  Cabinet  or  ex-Cabinet  Minister  alive  in  France 
to-day  who  is  also  the  son  of  a  Cabinet  Minister. 

138 


CAILLAUX  139 

Caillaux's  father  was  a  member  of  the  Due  de  Broglie's 
Government  at  the  time  of  the  Seize  Mai  episode. 

This  political  connection,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  he  sprang 
from  perhaps  rather  better  stock  than  the  majority  of  French 
politicians,  has  been  partly  responsible  for  a  certain  arrogance 
which  sat  oddly  upon  the  leader  of  a  Radical  party.  M.  Jo- 
seph Reinach  once  said  to  me :  "Caillaux  was  brought  up  on 
the  laps  of  duchesses";  referring  to  the  world  into  which  he 
was  brought  in  contact  through  his  father's  friendship  with 
the  Due  de  Broglie  and  others  of  the  Faubourg  St.  Germain. 
While  he  recounted  how  he  was  equally  annoyed  and  shocked 
(for  M.  Reinach,  as  became  the  disciple  of  Gambetta,  was 
first  and  last  a  Republican)  when,  in  the  lobby  of  the  Chambre 
des  Deputes,  Caillaux  said  with  some  contempt  of  one  of  their 
colleagues  who  had  interrupted  their  conversation :  "il  n'est 
pas  de  notre  monde." 

Joseph  Caillaux  inherits  from  his  father  (who  was  at  one 
time  president  of  the  P.L.M.  Railway)  a  moderate  fortune. 
For  some  years  he  was  in  the  Government  service  and  rose 
to  be  an  Inspector  of  Finance.  In  1898  he  was  elected  as 
one  of  the  deputies  for  the  Department  of  the  Sarthe.  Within 
a  year  he  became,  through  a  succession  of  accidents,  Minister 
of  Finance  in  the  Waldeck-Rousseau  Government. 

Caillaux's  policy  before  the  war  may  fairly  be  summed  up 
by  saying  that  he  wanted  to  see  a  general  settlement  of  all  out- 
standing differences  with  Germany — believing  that  the  safety 
of  his  own  country  and  the  peace  of  Europe  would  in  that  way 
be  better  preserved  than  by  a  close  alliance  with  Great  Britain. 
He  was  not  opposed  to  an  Entente ;  still  less  was  he  hostile  to 
England.  But  he  was  firmly  convinced — as  were  many  French- 
men before  him,  and  as  are  many  to-day — that,  if  there  was  any 
partnership,  England  would  get  the  lion's  share,  and  would 
simply  make  use  of  France  to  serve  her  own  ends.  "Desin- 
teresser  l'Empire  Germanique,  comme  fut  desinteressee  la 
Grande  Bretagne,  par  des  concessions  raisonables,  e'est  la 
vrai  politique.     II  ne  me  faudra  recourir  a  une  autre  que  si 


140 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


l'Allemagne  se  montre  trop  exigeante."  Such  is  Caillaux's  own 
statement  of  his  foreign  policy.1 

I  believe  that  Caillaux  was  profoundly  wrong  in  his  view 
that  France  would  be  the  loser  by  an  alliance  with  Great  Britain : 
though  circumstances  force  me  to  admit  that  those  in  power 
in  England  to-day  are  doing  their  utmost  to  prove  to  France 
that  he  was  right.  But  whatever  his  error  of  judgment,  it 
was  an  opinion  which,  as  a  Frenchman,  he  had  every  right 
(if  not  much  reason)  to  hold. 

But,  going  one  step  further,  Caillaux  has  been  accused  of 
making  a  bad  bargain  for,  or  of  betraying  (the  stories  vary 
between  these  two  degrees),  his  own  country  in  the  Agadir  ne- 
gotiations. 

Laying  aside  rumours,  and  basing  one's  judgment  only  upon 
admitted  facts  and  documents,  the  truth  seems  to  be  as  follows : 
when  M.  Caillaux  became  President  du  Conseil  in  191 1  he 
asked  M.  Leon  Bourgeois  to  become  Minister  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. M.  Bourgeois,  following  his  almost  invariable  custom 
(it  is  no  secret  that  he  has  refused  nearly  every  office  in  the 
State  more  than  once),  declined.  M.  Caillaux  then  offered  the 
post  to  M.  Poincare,  who  likewise  rejected  the  proposal.  In 
his  embarrassment  he  then  turned  to  M.  de  Selves.  M.  Cail- 
laux himself  has  written  that  he  was  encouraged  to  take  this 
course  by  M.  Clemenceau,  who,  when  Prime  Minister,  had 
himself  thought  of  sending  M.  de  Selves  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  this  apparently  innocent  appointment  was 
destined  to  be  the  cause  of  lasting  trouble  for  M.  Caillaux. 
No  one  who  knows  the  former  Prefet  of  the  Seine  will  question 
the  statement  that  he  is  one  of  the  most  amiable  of  men — per- 
haps too  amiable.  It  is  only  a  few  months  ago  that  he  was 
ousted  from  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Senate  Committee  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  order  to  make  way  for  M.  Poincare — the 
contention  of  his  opponents  being  that,  in  his  desire  to  please,  he 
constantly  yielded  to  the  wishes  of  the  Government  of  the  day. 
In  brief,  M.  de  Selves'  predominant  characteristic  has  always 
been  tact  rather  than  strength  of  character.  This  agreeable 
personage  was  ill-fitted  either  to  keep  in  check  that  restless 

1  Agadir,  p.   132. 


CAILLAUX  141 

activity  which  always  led  Caillaux  to  dabble  in  something 
closely  resembling  intrigue;  or  to  hold  his  own  against  the 
somewhat  brutal,  but  very  competent  M.  Kiderlen-Waechter 
in  the  crisis  which  was  fast  approaching.  For  it  was  only  some 
days  after  M.  Caillaux  took  office  that  Germany  sent  the  gun- 
boat Panther  to  Agadir. 

Who  was  responsible  for  and  what  was  the  object  of  that 
action  are  still  open  questions.  It  has  been  suggested  that  it 
was  simply  one  of  those  impulsive  movements  of  the  Kaiser 
which  so  often  embarrassed  his  advisers.  I  see  little  to  support 
that  hypothesis,  and  much  to  lead  one  to  believe  that  it  was  a  de- 
liberate action  of  the  German  Government  at  the  instigation  of 
the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter. 
What  is  more  doubtful  is  the  motive.  My  own  view  is  that 
the  primary  purpose  was  to  test  the  strength  of  the  understand- 
ing between  England  and  France.  The  astute  Kiderlen-Waech- 
ter was  somewhat  at  a  loss  to  know  to  what  extent  the  Entente 
was  solid — what  strain  it  would  really  bear  if  words  had  to 
make  way  for  deeds.  But  what  he  clearly  understood  was  that 
some  knowledge  upon  this  point  was  essential  for  the  direction 
of  German  foreign  policy.  He  realised  that  the  result  of  this 
despatch  of  the  Panther  would  indicate  whether  France  could 
still  be  bullied,  or  whether  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  new  period 
when  bluster  alone  would  no  longer  serve  any  useful  end. 

The  premature  death  of  M.  de  Kiderlen-Waechter  was  un- 
doubtedly a  loss,  the  full  effect  of  which  Germany  only  felt 
during  the  war.  He  was  somewhat  coarse  both  in  his  percep- 
tions and  in  his  ways.  His  mode  of  life  undermined  his  con- 
stitution and  shortened  his  days.  While  he  was  in  frequent 
friction  with  his  subordinates  in  the  diplomatic  services  be- 
cause their  wives  did  not  always  care  to  receive  a  certain  lady 
with  whom  his  relations  were  a  subject  for  much  comment. 
It  was  typical  of  him  that  he  saw  nothing  extraordinary  in 
choosing  a  period  when  the  situation  between  the  two  coun- 
tries was  very  critical  to  make  an  excursion  across  the  fron- 
tier with  the  Baronne  de  Y.  Although  they  were  travelling  in- 
cognito there  was  always  a  possibility  that  the  German  Secre- 
tary of  Foreign  Affairs  might  be  recognised;  which,  in  the 


142 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


exasperated  state  of  public  feeling,  might  have  led  to  an  un- 
pleasant incident.  The  Quai  d'Orsay  was  alarmed.  Caillaux, 
therefore,  instructed  the  Prefet  of  the  Department  in  ques- 
tion to  welcome  the  German  statesman  officially,  and  even 
went  to  the  length  of  having  a  photograph  taken  of  him  and 
his  companion.  Kiderlen-Waechter  was  greatly  annoyed  at 
this  interruption  of  his  holidays ;  but  he  was  obliged  to  beat  a 
precipitate  retreat  to  Germany.  However,  what  he  lacked  in 
finesse  he  made  up  for  in  the  directness  of  his  actions  and 
the  clarity  of  his  vision.  He  was  under  no  delusion  about 
the  dangerous  incompetency  of  the  Kaiser  or  the  mediocrity 
of  the  Chancellor,  Bethmann-Hollweg.  His  letters  to  his 
friend,  the  Baronne  de  Y.  (of  which  only  a  part  have  been 
published),  makes  this  delightfully  clear.  In  his  correspon- 
dence the  Kaiser  is  known  as  "la  fourrure,"  and  the  Chancellor 
of  the  Empire  as  "la  petite  bete."  Kiderlen-Waechter  through- 
out shows  his  contempt  for  a  pair  whom  he  calls  "les  deux 
vieilles  femmes."  In  July,  191 1,  the  British  and  German 
fleets  were  to  meet  in  Norwegian  waters,  where  they  were 
both  manoeuvring.  Unfortunately  the  date  was  one  day  be- 
fore the  Kaiser's  visit  to  Norway  came  to  an  end.  Kiderlen- 
Waechter  took  alarm.  "Avec  son  temperament,  en  vue  de 
deux  grandes  flots,  il  perdra  tout  equilibre,  depassera  les 
bornes,  et  fera  Dieu  sait  quelles  betises,"  he  writes  to  the 
Baronne  de  Y.  The  Foreign  Secretary,  therefore,  discloses 
his  fears  to  our  Ambassador,  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  and  gets 
him  to  arrange  that  the  date  should  be  changed.  Telling  the 
Baronne  de  Y.  what  he  has  done,  and  referring  again  to  the 
Kaiser,  he  writes :  "Dans  son  exuberance  il  dirait  et  ferait 
des  choses  qui  rendraient  les  Anglais  mefiants,  parce  que — 
ne  connaissant  pas  son  etourderie — ils  croiraient  qu'il  veut  les 
compromettre  aux  yeux  de  leurs  amis.  .  .  .  Et  avec  tout  cela, 
nous  n'aurions,  en  realite,  aucun  but  politique,  rien  que  l'amuse- 
ment  de  la  fourrure." 

In  the  negotiations  which  ensued  Berlin  was  the  centre. 
France  was  ably  represented  by  M.  Jules  Cambon.  But  from 
the  outset  that  eminent  diplomat  seemed  to  feel  that  the  support 
of  the  Quai  d'Orsay  was  not  sufficient,  and  that  in  order  to 


CAILLAUX  143 

ensure  a  successful  conclusion  it  was  desirable  that  M.  Caillaux 
himself  should  take  an  active  and  personal  part.  As  early  as 
July  ioth,  191 1,  M.  Canibon  wrote  a  confidential  letter  to  M. 
Caillaux:  "C'est  M.  de  Kiderlen  qui  conduira  la  negociation 
au  point  de  vue  allemand,  mais  il  est  bon  qu'il  sente  qu'au 
point  de  vue  francais  vous  y  avez  la  main." 

It  is  clear,  both  from  this  and  from  subsequent  letters  of  M. 
Cambon's,  that  Caillaux's  intervention  was  at  the  suggestion  of 
the  French  Ambassador  himself — who  considered  that  it  would 
be  in  the  best  interests  of  France.  Caillaux  promptly  sup- 
ported the  Ambassador.  Whether  in  so  doing  he  usurped  the 
functions  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  is  another  and  a 
more  trivial  question.  Undoubtedly  Caillaux  offended  M.  de 
Selves  and  his  friends — and  in  the  end  paid  dearly  for  do- 
ing so. 

I  have  no  intention  of  entering  into  the  details  of  that  con- 
flict. But  Caillaux's  greater  and  higher  responsibility — his 
duty  towards  his  country — is  covered  by  the  fact  that  it  was 
in  answer  to  the  Ambassador's  own  appeal  that  he  came  to  his 
assistance;  and  that  in  the  result  the  successful  issue  of  the 
negotiations  was  largely  due  to  Caillaux  himself.  Such  at 
least  was  the  opinion  of  M.  Cambon — whose  judgment  is  not 
to  be  lightly  disputed.  Writing  to  Caillaux  on  October  23rd, 
191 1,  from  Berlin,  he  expresses  the  hope  that  he  may  be  in- 
troduced to  Madame  Caillaux  when  he  next  goes  to  Paris,  and 
adds :  "Et  je  serais  heureux  que  ce  voyage  put  etre  prochain, 
car  ce  serait  la  preuve  que  la  negociation  a  laquelle  vous 
avez  preside  et  qui  fera  tant  d'honneur  a  votre  prevoyance 
d'homme  d'Etat  est  heureusement  terminee."  While  on  No- 
vember 3rd  the  Ambassador  writes  again :  "Je  crois  que  je 
puis  enfin  vous  feliciter  d'avoir  mene  a  bien  par  votre  perse- 
verance et  votre  volonte,  personelle  l'ceuvre  de  notre  accord 
marocain." 

There  remains  the  more  grave  accusation  that  M.  Caillaux 
had  negotiations  with  the  German  Embassy  in  Paris,  through 
a  private  channel  unknown  either  to  M.  Cambon  or  to  M.  de 
Selves.  The  facts  are  that  between  July  25th  and  28th  a  cer- 
tain M.   Fondere,  who  was  of  French  nationality,  acted  as 


144  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

intermediary  between  M.  de  Lancken,  Counsellor  of  the  Ger- 
man Embassy,  and  M.  Caillaux — the  intrigue  having  been  set 
in  motion  by  M.  de  Lancken.  On  July  28th  M.  de  Selves 
communicated  to  M.  Caillaux  two  telegrams  which  have  since 
become  famous  under  the  name  of  "les  depeches  vertes."  These 
were  two  despatches  from  the  German  Ambassador,  M.  Schoen, 
to  the  German  Foreign  Office.  For  some  unknown  reason  the 
German  Embassy  sent  these  telegrams  in  an  old  cipher  which 
had  not  been  used  for  some  time,  and  of  which  the  French 
Foreign  Office  had  the  key.  The  messages  were  therefore  de- 
ciphered by  M.  de  Selves'  subordinates;  and  as  is  customary 
in  such  cases,  the  translations  were  written  upon  green  paper. 
The  telegrams  contain  an  account  of  the  Fondere-Lancken  con- 
versations which  is  more  or  less  (although  not  exactly)  in 
accord  with  that  given  by  M.  Caillaux  himself.  The  really 
important  part  is  the  last  sentence  of  the  second  telegram,  dated 
9.35  p.m.,  July  27th:  "Caillaux  demande  instamment  qu'on 
ne  fasse  rien  connaitre  a  Cambon  de  ses  overtures." 

On  the  morning  of  July  28th  M.  de  Selves  communicated 
these  intercepted  telegrams  to  M.  Caillaux.  According  to  the 
latter's  report  of  this  interview,  M.  de  Selves  made  no  com- 
plaint about  M.  Caillaux  having  had  negotiations  which  had 
been  kept  secret  from  him,  but  did  draw  Caillaux's  attention 
to  the  statement  which  exacted  that  the  Wilhelmstrasse  should 
say  nothing  about  them  to  M.  Cambon.  Caillaux  denied  that 
he  had  ever  made  such  a  request;  and  said  that,  on  the  con- 
trary, he  was  simply  getting  information  which  might  assist 
M.  Cambon  in  his  conversations  with  Kiderlen-Waechter.  In- 
deed, on  July  29th  Caillaux  did  actually  send  M.  Pietri  to 
Berlin  to  tell  M.  Cambon  of  the  Fondere-Lancken  conversa- 
tions. Would  he  have  done  so  had  it  not  been  for  the  dis- 
covery of  the  telegrams  by  the  Quai  d'Orsay?  Was  Kiderlen- 
Waechter  right  when,  in  writing  to  the  Baronne  de  Y.  on 
July  29th,  after  saying  that  Lancken  had  come  from  Paris 
to  discuss  the  Fondere  conversations,  he  comments  on  Cail- 
laux's desire  of  secrecy,  adding  that  he  had  known  for  some 
time  that  there  was  a  certain  rivalry  between  Cambon  and 


CAILLAUX  145 

Caillaux  as  to  which  should  have  the  credit  of  making  a  sat- 
isfactory arrangement  with  Germany? 

My  own  belief  is  that  Caillaux  probably  was  responsible 
for  the  injunction  contained  in  the  telegram.  But  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that  the  whole  affair  arose  not  from  any  desire 
either  to  impede  or  to  forestall  M.  Cambon,  but  simply  from 
the  tendency  to  intrigue  which  has  its  birth  in  Caillaux' s  inces- 
sant activity — in  that  inability  ever  to  wait  and  let  things  take 
their  course,  which  has  perhaps  been  more  fatal  to  him  than 
has  anything  else. 

But  in  all  that  it  is  impossible  to  see  anything  except  a  cer- 
tain lack  of  correction,  and  a  procedure  which  might  have 
been  dangerous.  In  the  result  no  harm  was  done.  At  the 
conclusion  of  the  negotiations  M.  Cambon  was  able  to  felicitate 
M.  Caillaux  upon  what  he  had  accomplished  in  terms  which 
were  not  merely  those  of  perfunctory  politeness.  More  than 
that,  when  Caillaux  was  on  trial  after  the  war  the  matter  of 
his  conduct  at  this  period  was  referred  to  by  the  prosecution. 
M.  Jules  Cambon  was  called  as  a  witness.  He  had  nothing  to 
say  or  allege  against  M.  Caillaux. 

So  much  for  Agadir. 

In  191 3  came  the  tragedy  which  interrupted  M.  Caillaux's 
political  career ;  and  it  was  only  a  few  days  after  Madame 
Caillaux's  acquittal  in  191 4  that  Germany  declared  war. 

To  understand  Caillaux's  conduct  during  that  period  it  is 
necessary  to  consider  his  character  and  temperament. 

Joseph  Caillaux  is  a  man  of  marked  capacity,  untiring  en- 
ergy, and  great  resolution.  He  is  self-reliant  and  overbearing, 
intellectually  and  otherwise.  Against  that  it  must  be  put  that 
he  possesses  both  physical  and  moral  courage  in  a  degree 
somewhat  above  the  average.  He  is  in  no  sense  what  the 
French  call  "sympathique."  Although  not  an  orator  of  the 
calibre  of  Briand  or  Viviani,  he  may  be  called  almost  a  great 
speaker.  But  even  then  his  voice,  with  its  metallic  tinge,  his 
bearing,  which  suggests  the  arrogance  of  his  nature,  and  his 
somewhat  awkward,  though  always  vigorous,  gestures  are  all 
against  him:  the  first  impression  is  unfavourable,  and  one  is 
only  won  over  by  a  certain  lucidity  of  expression  and  a  com- 


146  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

pactness  in  argument  which  are  none  too  common  amongst 
French  politicians.  He  is  often  described  as  "fastueux,"  but 
as  a  matter  of  fact  he  lives  very  simply  at  Mamers;  and  it  is 
fair  to  add  that  he  is  greatly  beloved  in  the  little  town  where 
he  has  passed  all  his  life.  He  is  reputed  for  his  financial 
knowledge  and  ability.  But  he  is  not,  like  the  late  M.  Rouvier, 
a  financier  who  became  a  politician,  but  a  politician  who,  to 
some  extent,  has  devoted  himself  to  finance.  I  am  aware  that 
he  spent  a  number  of  years  in  the  Administration  des  Finances. 
But  he  gave  up  that  career  while  still  young,  and  it  was  only 
after  being  Minister  of  Finance  that  he  became  a  director  of 
various  banks  and  companies.  Flis  general  knowledge  is 
wider  in  its  basis  than  that  of  most  of  his  political  contem- 
poraries. But  it  is  not  a  knowledge  which  has  grown  sufficiently 
to  influence  his  ideas.  Indeed,  his  weak  point  intellectually 
is  the  absolute  fixity  of  his  views,  which  are  unchanging.  In 
that  respect  Briand  and  Caillaux  are  the  two  extremes.  The 
one  idle  by  nature,  though  rousing  himself  to  bursts  of  en- 
ergy; open  to  all  ideas,  and  subtle  to  the  last  degree.  The 
other  hard  working  and  industrious,  but  unaffected  by  any- 
thing outside  except  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  used  in  support 
of  his  acquired  opinions.  Caillaux  lacks  judgment — and  per- 
haps the  politician  who  said  that  he  lacked  "bon  sens"  was 
right.  He  has  the  unfortunate  faculty  either  of  surrounding 
himself  with  or  allowing  himself  to  be  made  the  centre  of  people 
who  range  from  plain  undesirables  to  dangerous  adventurers. 
This  arises  partly  from  his  restlessness,  and  partly  from  the 
fact  that  he  is  a  man  of  few  friendships ;  for  Caillaux,  any 
tool  is  better  than  no  tool,  and  his  choice  of  tools  is  never 
very  great. 

He  is  ambitious,  and  has  an  absolutely  sincere  belief  in  his 
own  capacities.  His  greatest  defect — or,  at  least,  the  defect 
which  has  proved  most  fatal  to  him — is  his  absolute  incapac- 
ity at  any  given  moment  to  bide  his  time,  to  let  things  take 
their  course.  This  curse  leads  him  into  unnecessary  intrigue 
when  things  are  going  well ;  and  into  useless  and  futile  strug- 
gles when  the  tide  is  against  him.  He  is  neither  a  great  man, 
nor  has  he  many  of  the  elements  which  go  to  make  a  great 


CAILLAUX  147 

man;  but  one  who,  within  certain  limits,  has  abilities  of  a 
high  order,  which  he  can  drive  with  a  vigour  which  is 
quite  extraordinary. 

One  of  his  fixed  ideas  is  his  conception  about  England  and 
the  British  Empire.  To  some  extent  he  belongs  to  the  school 
of  Rouvier.  The  latter,  when,  as  President  du  Conseil  in 
1905,  he  forced  M.  Delcasse  to  leave  the  Quai  d'Orsay  at  the  be- 
hest of  Germany,  said :  "Une  alliance  Franco- Anglaise  serait 
la  guerre  et  la  defaite.  Ma  main  secherait  plutot  que  de  signer 
pareille  alliance."  Caillaux's  opinions  about  the  exact  value  of  a 
close  alliance  with  England  are  not  the  outcome  of  any  hos- 
tile feeling.  On  the  contrary,  he  has  a  certain  respect  and  re- 
gard for  British  institutions.  But  he  held  (and  still  holds) 
the  view  that  the  Greater  Britain  has  passed  the  apex  of  its 
greatest  power  and  prosperity ;  that  Ireland  is  a  problem  which 
will  never  be  solved ;  and  that  India  will  lead  the  way  towards 
a  general  dissolution  of  the  Empire. 

If  Caillaux  had  been  well-advised  he  would  from  the  out- 
set of  the  war  have  either  stayed  at  the  Front  or  remained 
quietly  at  Mamers.  Had  he  followed  that  course,  had  he  dis- 
creetly held  himself  apart  from  any  participation  in  political 
life,  and  also  sedulously  avoided  all  incidents  which  would 
turn  public  attention  in  his  direction,  it  is  more  than  likely  that 
he  would  have  at  least  formed  part  of  some  Cabinet.  But  to 
expect  that  he  would  or  could  have  adopted  such  an  attitude 
is  to  misconceive  his  very  nature.  He  could  not  bear  to  see 
great  events  taking  place  in  the  world  in  which  he  had  for 
years  been  one  of  the  masters,  and  where  he  was  now  relegated 
to  what  almost  amounted  to  exile.  He  could  bear  it  all  the  less 
because  he  thought  that  those  in  power  were  doing  ill  what 
he  could  do  well.  For  instance,  in  a  private  conversation  in 
December,  19 14,  he  remarked  that  he  could  not  understand 
why  the  Government  was  not  then  issuing  a  great  National 
Loan ;  that  with  France  to  some  extent  delivered  by  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  there  was  a  chance  to  do  that  successfully  which 
might  not  occur  again  if  the  war  was  prolonged ;  and  that  the 
money  thus  obtained  would  be  cheaper  than  what  the  Govern- 
ment would  be  obliged  to  get  abroad  in  the  event  of  the  war 


148 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


lasting  two  or  three  years  longer.  His  feverish  restlessness 
would  not  permit  of  inaction.  His  audacity  led  him  into  indis- 
cretions of  which  his  lack  of  judgment  did  not  allow  him  to 
realise  the  full  enormity. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  Caillaux  became  a  Paymaster 
with  the  Army.  While  at  the  Front  he  is  said  (rightly  or 
wrongly)  to  have  come  into  violent  collision  with  several  of- 
ficers, some  of  whom  were  English.  Probably  the  Govern- 
ment was  only  too  glad  to  send  him  far  away  on  a  commer- 
cial mission  to  Brazil  and  the  Argentine.  There  he  met  by 
chance  a  young  man,  Minotto,  employed  by  the  Guaranty  Trust 
Company  of  New  York,  but  who  apparently  was  of  German 
extraction.  Caillaux  seems  to  have  talked  with  some  freedom 
to  Minotto,  who  reported  the  conversations  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Buenos  Ayres.  After  his  return  to  France 
he  was  approached  upon  several  occasions  by  people  who  were 
acting  at  the  instigation  of  Germany.  It  is  clear  that  Cail- 
laux would  have  nothing  to  do  with  them — and  that  he  told 
them  plainly  to  leave  him  alone.  It  is  not  clear  that  he  told 
the  Government  of  these  overtures.  Caillaux  affirmed  that  he 
had  communicated  the  facts  to  M.  Briand,  which  the  latter 
denied. 

Later,  in  December,  191 6,  he  went  to  Italy  to  join  Madame 
Caillaux.  The  evidence  shows  that  in  the  ordinary  course  he 
had  conversations  in  Rome  with  various  Italians  (and  there- 
fore subjects  of  an  Allied  country)  ;  and  notably  that  in  talking 
to  Signor  Martini  he  expressed  doubts  whether  France  could 
win  the  war  if  the  next  offensive  failed;  and  said  that  it  would 
then  be  necessary  to  make  peace,  even  if  only  part  of  Lorraine 
was  obtained ;  although  she  would  not  be  expected  to  give  back 
the  German  colonies. 

I  must  confess  that,  out  of  sympathy  as  I  am  and  always 
have  been  with  Caillaux's  policy,  I  yet  cannot  see  anything 
unpatriotic  in  such  conduct.  If  he  had  made  any  propaganda 
it  would  appear  in  a  very  different  light.  But  these  views  were 
communicated  to  a  politician  with  whom  he  was  exchanging 
views  in  the  course  of  a  private  conversation.     I  can  only 


CAILLAUX  149 

compare  it  to  a  remark  made  to  me  at  about  the  same  time 
by  a  member  of  the  British  Government.  We  had  been  dis- 
cussing the  same  question — the  sole  question  of  those  days — 
the  war :  and  in  answer  to  something  I  said  this  personage 
replied :  "That  is  all  very  well,  but  you  see  only  the  French 
side.  I  hope  I  may  be  wrong,  but  I  don't  think  we  will  be  able 
to  wrest  Alsace-Lorraine  from  Germany,  and  we  can't,  as  you 
suggest,  be  expected  to  go  on  fighting  for  the  impossible 
only  to  please  France." 

That  was  the  perfectly  sincere  opinion  of  a  patriotic  man — 
expressed  in  a  conversation  after  luncheon  with  one  whom  he 
knew  to  be  strongly  in  favour  of  the  French  claims.  I  find 
it  difficult  to  draw  a  distinction  between  that  and  Caillaux's 
words  to  Signor  Martini. 

But  if  there  is  any  doubt  about  Caillaux's  wrong-headed 
policy  being  inspired  by  what  he  firmly  believed  was  for  the 
good  of  his  country  it  would,  I  think,  be  dispelled  by  a  con- 
sideration of  what  was  found  in  the  safe  at  Florence — that 
famous  safe  which  disappointed  so  many  expectations.  This 
document  gave  the  outline  of  what  Caillaux  proposed  to  do  if 
and  when  he  came  into  power.  It  presaged  the  making  of  peace 
after  the  Government  was  formed :  that  is,  a  Caillaux  Gov- 
ernment would  come  into  being  because  the  country  wanted  a 
Caillaux  policy ;  while  the  following  passage  is  significant : 
"Dans  quelques  conditions  qui  se  fasse  la  paix — apres  victoire 
obtenue  par  le  nouveau  Gouvernement,  ou  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment  soit  forme  pour  la  conclure — ne  rien  faire,  ne  rien  con- 
clure,  sans  un  mandat  special  du  pays." 

A  man  who  drafts  a  plan  in  the  expectation  of  being  called 
to  office,  and  who  lays  stress  on  his  intention  not  to  conclude 
any  peace  or  to  take  any  definite  step  without  a  special 
mandate  can  hardly  be  called  a  potential  dictator;  still  less  a 
traitor. 

Equally  indicative  are  the  names  of  those  whom  the  memo- 
randum mentions  as  possible  collaborators — a  curious  medley, 
of  whom  I  cite  only  a  few:  Jean  Dupuy;  Pichon  (the  faithful 
shadow  of  Clemenceau)  ;  Charles  Humbert;  Longuet,  the  So- 


150  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

cialist ;  Malvy,2  after  whose  name  Caillaux  himself  added  an 
interrogation  point;  and  Franklin-Bouillon. 

While  as  ambassadors  Caillaux  thought  of  Briand;  Bar- 
thou ;  Painleve ;  Leygues,  whom  he  intended  to  send  to  Italy ; 
and  Doumergue. 

There  is  in  fact  nothing  extraordinary  about  the  whole  docu- 
ment. Caillaux  thought  that  by  the  course  of  events  he  would 
probably  be  brought  into  office  (the  memorandum  itself  men- 
tions M.  Caillaux  as  President  du  Conseil,  thus  fixing  his 
role)  and  he  considered  in  advance  what  he  would  do  when 
that  day  came. 

This  is  absolutely  in  keeping  with  Caillaux's  conversation 
with  Signor  Martini  when  he  said  that  he  did  not  expect  the 
Briand  Ministry  to  last  long;  and  that  afterwards  it  would 
be  a  question  whether  he  or  Clemenceau  would  form  a  Cabi- 
net (M.  Barthou  being  out  of  the  running  on  account  of  his 
supposed  clericalism).  Caillaux  added  that  there  might  pos- 
sibly be  a  Painleve  Government  in  between ;  but  that  the  Presi- 
dent du  Conseil  who  followed,  whether  it  was  Clemenceau  or 
himself,  would  stay  in  office  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

In  some  respects  it  was  impossible  to  foresee  events  more 
clearly.  Ribot  succeeded  Briand;  and  Painleve  followed  Ribot. 
Indeed,  when  the  latter  resigned,  he  tried  to  reorganise  his 
Cabinet,  but  failed  because  Painleve  refused  to  remain,  stating 
that  he  did  not  believe  that  a  stable  Government  could  be  con- 
stituted without  the  aid  of  the  Socialists.  But  when  Ribot 
thereupon  abandoned  the  attempt  Painleve  himself  formed  a 
Ministry  in  which  there  were  no  Socialists.  Painleve's  subse- 
quent explanation  of  this  apparent  contradiction  was  that 
otherwise  Poincare  would  have  sent  for  Clemenceau :  which 
perhaps  may  not  seem  to  everyone  a  sufficient  reason  for  the 
inconsistency.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Poincare  had  warned 
Painleve  that  if  he  refused  the  task  he  would  be  obliged  to  en- 
trust it  either  to  Clemenceau  or  to  Caillaux;  and  that  he  did 
not  intend  to  send  for  Caillaux  except  as  a  last  resort. 

2  It  was  M.  Poincare  himself  who  insisted  or  anyway  desired  that 
Malvy  should  be  retained  in  various  War  Cabinets  as  Minister  of  the 
Interior.  This  fact  was  communicated  to  me  by  one  of  Malvy's  colleagues 
in  the  Cabinet. 


CAILLAUX  151 

Clemenceau  did  follow  Painleve  and  did  remain  in  office  un- 
til the  conclusion  of  the  war. 

Despite  this  account  of  Poincare's  conversation  with  Pain- 
leve (which  has  already  been  published,  and  so  far  as  I  am 
aware  has  not  been  denied)  I  doubt  if  he  would  have  called 
Caillaux  to  the  Elysee  had  both  Painleve  and  Clemenceau  re- 
fused or  been  unable  to  form  a  Government. 

But  I  admit  that  the  President  of  the  Republic  might  have 
been  obliged  to  summon  Caillaux  if  it  appeared  that  the  war 
was  lost :  and  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  the  war  would 
have  been  won  without  the  assistance  of  the  United  States, 
upon  which  neither  Caillaux  nor  anyone  else  could  rely  at  the 
date  of  his  conversation. 

But  it  would  have  been  more  interesting  had  Caillaux  gone 
one  step  further  in  disclosing  his  vision  of  the  future,  if  he 
had  told  Signor  Martini  how  he  thought  Clemenceau  would 
treat  him  if  he  should  become  Prime  Minister,  and  how  he 
proposed  to  act  towards  Clemenceau  should  he  come  into  of- 
fice himself.  Caillaux  was  as  well  aware  as  anyone,  and  bet- 
ter than  most  people,  that  Clemenceau  never  played  gently.  He 
must  have  known  what  to  expect.  I  stated  publicly  myself 
that  I  thought  it  probable  that  Clemenceau  would  order  Cail- 
laux's  arrest,  and  I  was  only  stating  what  many  thought. 

The  fact  is  that  it  had  come  down  to  a  clash,  not  between 
two  men,  but  between  two  policies ;  and  it  being  war  time  one 
or  the  other  had  to  be  suppressed.  Had  Caillaux  been  called 
to  power  it  would  have  been  his  duty  to  stop  the  publication  of 
L'Homme  Libre,  or  L'Homme  Enchaine,  as  I  think  it  was 
called  at  this  period,  and  to  have  silenced  Clemenceau.  I  do 
not  doubt  that  he  would  have  done  so. 

Possibly  the  methods  adopted  by  Clemenceau  were  somewhat 
rough,  but  I  am  unable  to  imagine  why  anyone  should  have 
expected  him  to  act  otherwise.  Moreover,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  what  else  could  have  been  done  with  Caillaux — an  auda- 
cious and  turbulent  man  of  great  ability,  who  had  some  fol- 
lowing in  the  country.  An  eminent  French  statesman  who 
might  very  possibly  have  had  to  deal  with  the  situation  told 
me  that  he  had  had  a  solution  ready — he  had  meant  to  send 


152 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


Caillaux  to  Madeira.  But  my  imagination  does  not  allow  me 
to  see  Caillaux — without  a  trial  and  condemnation — going 
into  exile. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  have  been  both  wiser  and  more 
courageous  simply  to  have  suppressed  Caillaux  for  the  period 
of  the  war  without  sowing  far  and  wide  the  statement  that  he 
was  a  traitor — a  statement  which,  when  the  time  came,  it  was 
impossible  to  prove.  I  will  finish  this  part  of  the  story  briefly. 
The  accusation  formulated  against  Caillaux  at  his  trial  was 
based  upon  Articles  78  and  79  of  the  Penal  Code,  which  relate 
to  the  crimes  of  relations  with  the  enemy  and  attempts  against 
the  security  of  the  State.  Upon  these  he  was  acquitted  by  a 
majority  of  the  High  Court  (in  other  words,  the  Senate  sit- 
ting as  a  special  tribunal).  But  the  Court  then  decided  to  ap- 
ply to  his  case  Article  yy,  which  refers  to  "correspondence 
with  the  subjects  of  an  enemy  without  having  the  object  of 
establishing  relations  with  the  enemy  or  of  assailing  the  se- 
curity of  the  State." 

Upon  this  count  Caillaux  was  convicted  and  sentenced,  the 
"correspondence"  being  his  conversations  with  Minotto  in 
South  America,  though  it  is  fair  to  add  that  apparently  Cail- 
laux had  no  reason  to  think  that  Minotto  was  in  any  way 
German. 

I  have  set  forth  at  length  the  gist  of  Caillaux's  trial  solely 
for  one  reason — to  make  it  clear  that  he  was  not  convicted  of 
any  crime  which  makes  his  return  to  power  an  absolute  im- 
possibility. It  is  true  that  his  interdiction  does  not  expire 
until  after  the  expiration  of  the  present  Parliament.  There- 
fore, barring  a  pardon  or  remission  by  the  President,  he  will 
be  unable  to  be  a  candidate  at  the  next  General  Election.  «Upon 
the  whole  I  think  the  chances  are  against  his  again  being 
Prime  Minister,  and  none  the  less  so  because  Briand's  enmity 
stands  in  the  way.  Only  a  few  months  ago  (December  23rd, 
1920)  Briand  wrote  to  the  Figaro  protesting  against  his  name 
having  been  coupled  with  that  of  M.  Caillaux,  adding:  "It 
is,  I  repeat,  a  gross  calumny,  the  stupidity  of  which  must  be 
immediately  apparent  to  all  those  who  have  been  in  political 
life  for  the  last  fifteen  years,  and  who  cannot  be  ignorant  of 


CAILLAUX  153 

the  fact  that  M.  Caillaux  and  myself  have  always  been  irrecon- 
cilable opponents." 

But  if  France  goes  from  bad  to  worse  financially  the  country 
might  turn  to  Caillaux.  Even  his  enemies  admit  or  exaggerate 
his  financial  genius.  Still  more  so  might  he  seem  the  saviour 
if  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  proved  to  be  a  broken  reed — if  no 
money  was  obtained  from  Germany — if  Caillaux's  warning 
that  England  would  protect  herself  and  leave  France  in  the 
lurch  should  turn  out  to  be  true.  In  that  event  Caillaux  might 
again  be  President  du  Conseil;  for  which  he  would  have  to 
render  some  thanks  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  in  whose  hands  his 
future  now  possibly  rests. 


CHAPTER  IX 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Party  Politics 

Even  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  opponents  will  admit  that  his  por- 
trait, as  recently  drawn  by  the  unknown  "Gentleman  with  a 
Duster,"  does  not  err  on  the  side  of  generosity.  The  Prime 
Minister's  anonymous  critic  names  many  defects,  the  existence 
of  some  of  which  is  sufficiently  patent  to  all,  and  of  others  is 
questionable.  But  where  the  picture  is  false  is  in  its  lack  of 
lights  and  shades.  It  is  "tout  d'une  piece."  No  mention  is 
made  of  the  qualities  which  enabled  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  more 
than  any  other  politician,  to  save  his  country  from  the  threat- 
ened domination  of  Germany.  The  author  of  "The  Mirrors 
of  Downing  Street"  is  not  alone  in  regretting  that  the  man  who 
was  able  to  do  that  was  not  one  to  delight  in  the  company  of 
Mr.  Edmund  Gosse  rather  than  in  that  of  Lord  Riddell :  that 
he  has  neither  the  historic  name  of  Lord  Lansdowne  nor  the 
scholarship  of  Lord  Morley :  that  he  lacks  the  suavity  of  Mr. 
Balfour  and  the  dignity  of  Mr.  Asquith.  The  regret  is  com- 
prehensible. But  what  is  less  clear  is  the  omission  to  bring 
out  that  it  was  this  man  of  another  type  and  of  a  different 
fibre  who  alone  was  capable  of  rousing  the  mass  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen  to  make  the  requisite  effort  at  the  most  critical 
moments.1 

For  it  was  only  Mr.  Lloyd  George  amongst  English  poli- 
ticians who  could  inspire  or  excite  any  enthusiasm. 

1  Captain  P.  E.  Wright,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Supreme  War 
Council,  in  citing  Mr.  Lloyd  George  as  the  only  man  who  could  have 
won  the  war,  and  in  taking  issue  with  attacks  upon  the  Prime  Minister, 
qualifies  his  praise  as  follows :— "In  spite  of  his  oblique  and  subterranean 
methods;  his  inveterate  taste  for  low  and  unscrupulous  men;  of  the 
distrust  felt  for  him  by  his  favourites,  even  at  the  height  of  their 
power;  of  his  superficial,  slipshod,  and  hasty  mind,  this  determination 
of  character  made  him,  without  any  assumption  on  his  part,  the  leader 
of  the  Alliance." 

154 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  155 

Moreover,  he  was  (with  one  exception)  the  only  English 
parliamentarian  who  made  any  marked  impression  upon  the 
political  leaders  of  Allied  countries.  That  did  not  arise  from 
the  fact  that  he  was  Prime  Minister.  It  was  a  judgment  formed 
in  the  earlier  days  of  the  war.  In  the  summer  of  1916  I  hap- 
pened to  be  having  a  conversation  with  a  French  statesman 
when  a  news  agency  despatch  was  brought  to  him  repeating  a 
London  rumour  that  Mr.  Asquith  contemplated  resigning  on 
account  of  the  trouble  which  had  grown  out  of  the  Easter 
rebellion  in  Ireland.  The  discussion  which  ensued  as  to  the 
likelihood  of  this  being  a  fact  was  ended  by  my  French  friend 
shrugging  his  shoulders  and  remarking:  "(Ta  ne  fait  rien, 
pourvu  que  M.  Lloyd  George  y  reste."  French  lack  of  appre- 
ciation of  Mr.  Asquitlrs  qualities  was  always  remarkable. 

Not  only  were  Lloyd  George's  abilities  appreciated  by  the 
French,  but  upon  the  whole  his  chameleon-like  traits  tended 
towards  useful  co-operation.  He  was  able  to  impress  his  per- 
sonality upon  the  various  French  politicians  who  were  Presi- 
dents du  Conseil  in  the  course  of  the  war;  and  to  establish 
workable  relations  with  all  of  them — differing  in  character 
and  in  temperament  as  they  did  the  one  from  the  other. 

Briand  is  to  some  extent  a  man  of  his  own  type,  with  the 
saving  grace  of  being  more  detached  in  his  personal  interests 
and  fairer  in  his  judgment.  Briand  rated  Lloyd  George's 
qualities  and  defects  at  their  proper  value.  He  did  not  exag- 
gerate either  the  one  or  the  other ;  nor  did  he  take  his  outbursts 
too  seriously.  Ribot  is  by  nature  cold  and  suspicious.  From 
the  outset  he  distrusted  Lloyd  George.  It  must  be  admitted 
that  eventually  the  facts  bore  out  his  instinct.  Painleve  was 
probably  on  closer  personal  terms  than  were  any  of  his  pred- 
ecessors with  the  British  Prime  Minister.  The  latter  admired 
the  limpid  honesty  of  Painleve's  nature ;  and  was  not  oblivious 
to  the  fact  that  he  himself  was  the  stronger  character. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  two  men  less  appreciative  of 
each  other's  good  points  than  were  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd 
George.  At  least  each  was  more  prone  to  think  of  the  other's 
defects  than  of  his  qualities.  Clemenceau  is  essentially  what 
the  French  call  a  mauvais  coucheur.     He  is  hard,  often  rough, 


156 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


satirical  to  the  point  of  being  cruel,  and  few  men  can  work 
with  him  unless  they  entirely  accept  his  ascendency — as  did 
the  faithful  Pichon.  But  there  is  nothing  small  about  him. 
His  courage,  moral  as  well  as  physical,  is  perhaps  his  outstand- 
ing characteristic.  He  is  absolutely  veracious,  not  only  be- 
cause he  would  think  it  cowardly  to  be  otherwise,  but  also  be- 
cause his  pleasure  is  to  get  his  own  way  by  pluck  and  audacity. 
He  holds  sentimentalism  in  horror.  But  he  himself  is  by  no 
means  devoid  of  true  sentiment.  Those  who  can  remember 
the  way  he  used  to  look  at  the  poilus  at  the  Front  will  know 
that.  But  any  feelings  of  Clemenceau's  which  come  to  the 
surface  are  sincere  and  abiding. 

Unfortunately  he  recoiled  from  the  fact  that  Lloyd  George's 
cleverness  was  based  upon  a  certain  mental  agility  rather  than 
upon  a  foundation  of  conviction.  He  sometimes  doubted  his 
word.  He  always  distrusted  his  courage.2  While  the  Welsh- 
man's vanity,  as  shown  by  his  sensitiveness  to  criticism,  was 
a  source  of  much  mocking  comment. 

Upon  the  other  hand  Lloyd  George  chafed  under  Clemen- 
ceau's varying  attitude,  which,  according  to  his  mood,  ranged 
from  pleasantness  to  raillery.  He  professed  to  make  allow- 
ance for  him  on  account  of  his  age.  I  recollect  his  telling  me 
that  Clemenceau  objected  to  his  seeing,  when  in  Paris,  any 
of  the  other  French  politicians  with  whom  he  had  formerly 
acted  during  the  war ;  and  that,  in  order  not  to  irritate  an  old 
man,  he  had  agreed  not  to  do  so ;  making,  however,  an  excep- 
tion of  Albert  Thomas. 

For  Thomas  was  the  one  of  all  others  with  whom  Lloyd 
George  was  most  at  his  ease.  I  think  it  was  the  fact  that 
Thomas  took  Claridge's  Hotel  in  Paris  (which  had  just  been 
finished  in  1914),  as  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  which  led 
Lloyd  George  to  begin  his  commandeering  of  London  hotels. 
In  any  event  when  Thomas  was  a  member  of  the  Ribot  Cabi- 
net, and  in  Russia  on  a  mission,  it  was  said  that  he  maintained 
a  correspondence  or  private  communications  with  Lloyd 
George;  and  that  his  advice  was  not  always  in  keeping  with 

'  It  is  sometimes  stated  in  France  that  during  the  dark  days  of  March, 
1918,  Clemenceau  showed  to  better  advantage  than  did  Lloyd  George. 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  157 

Ribot's  views  or  policy.  The  intermediary  was  reputed  to  be 
M.  Mantoux,  a  Frenchman  who  before  1914  was  a  professor 
at  London  University ;  and  who  later  rendered  valuable  services 
as  an  interpreter  (he  was  one  of  rare  excellence)  at  the  Allies' 
meetings  and  subsequently  at  the  Peace  Conference.  His  re- 
ward, like  that  of  Albert  Thomas,  was  a  post  in  the  League  of 
Nations  organisation.3  Mantoux  was  originally  not  an  ad- 
herent of  Clemenceau's.  The  only  time  I  ever  heard  him  dis- 
cuss the  situation  was  soon  after  the  latter  became  Prime  Min- 
ister; when  he  predicted  to  me  that  Clemenceau  would  not  be 
in  office  for  three  months.  I  imagine  that  the  latter  knew 
Mantoux's  views  and  took  an  opportunity  to  warn  him  to  re- 
serve his  political  conversation  to  interpreting  the  words  of 
others.  For  when  some  time  afterwards  I  related  this  conver- 
sation to  Henry  Wilson  he  remarked  that  that  gave  him  the 
clue  to  a  certain  incident :  that  at  one  English-French  meeting 
Clemenceau  absolutely  refused  to  have  Mantoux  as  interpreter; 
but  had  allowed  him  to  act  at  the  next  one,  apparently  thinking 
that  one  lesson  had  sufficed. 

During  the  war,  and  in  their  considered  reflections  since, 
French  hommes  d'etat  have,  for  the  greater  part,  been  unani- 
mous in  thinking  that  the  only  two  first-rate  statesmen  we  had 
(first-rate  in  very  different  ways)  were  Lloyd  George  and 
Lord  Milner.  Winston  Churchill  often  excited  interest  and 
sometimes  a  fugitive  admiration :  but  he  was  not  a  possession 
which  they  envied  us.  Sir  Edward  Carson  aroused  curiosity. 
But  he  was  and  always  remained  a  mystery.  During  the 
Peace  Conference  Lord  Robert  Cecil  earned  great  respect, 
though  he  was  generally  thought  to  be  a  dangerous  fanatic 
on  some  subjects.  Mr.  Balfour  was  accepted  as  a  personality 
— more  than  that — as  a  charmeur ;  but  a  diplomat  who  had 
known  his  uncle  and  knew  his  cousin  once  said  to  me :  "Un- 
derneath the  surface  Mr.  Balfour  is  mainly  negative :  and  I  can 

8  M.  Albert  Thomas,  as  Director  of  the  International  Labour  Bureau, 
receives  a  salary  equivalent  to  more  than  350,000  francs  at  the  present 
rate  of  exchange.  Like  all  salaries  of  the  League  of  Nations  it  is  paid 
in  pounds  sterling  and  is  not  subject  to  any  income-tax  or  super-tax. 
Thomas  is  doubtless  the  most  highly-paid  Socialist  politician  in  the 
world. 


158  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

give  you  a  negative  comparison  of  him.  He  is  a  Cecil — with 
all  the  cynicism  of  Lord  Salisbury,  and  with  all  his  contempt 
of  what  is  not  of  his  world,  but  entirely  without  Lord  Salis- 
bury's firm  determination  to  fight  a  losing  battle  to  the  end; 
while  on  the  other  hand  he  has  none  of  the  generous  but  mis- 
placed enthusiasm  of  Lord  Robert." 

At  the  Peace  Conference  Mr.  Lloyd  George  again  did  good 
work  for  his  country.  This  required  high  efficiency  in  the 
exercise  of  a  certain  talent,  political  juggling:  a  talent  which 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  possesses  in  an  exceptional  degree.  The 
rights  or  the  wrongs  of  the  Treaty  do  not  enter  into  this  ac- 
count. All  conferences  of  the  conquerors  in  a  great  war  show 
the  more  despicable  side  of  human  nature.  Those  who  have 
been  sworn  allies  in  the  face  of  a  common  foe  invariably 
have  disagreements  more  or  less  deep  when  the  work  of  the  sol- 
dier is  finished  and  the  politicians  begin  to  apportion  the  spoil. 
More  often  than  not  the  extent  of  the  discord  is  limited  only 
to  the  need  which  the  victors  think  they  will  have  of  each  other's 
support  and  assistance  in  the  future. 

The  Congress  of  Vienna  has  long  been  the  classic  instance. 
In  history  its  place  will  now  doubtless  be  taken  by  the  Paris 
Conference — with  all  its  intrigues,  and  its  manifold  signs  of 
meanness ;  its  hypocrisies :  the  promise  that  there  should  no 
longer  be  any  secret  diplomacy — when  nothing  was  ever  more 
secret;  the  pretence  that  small  nations  would  get  the  same 
hearing  as  great  nations,  when  sometimes  they  were  not  really 
heard  at  all,  and  more  often  they  were  given  to  understand 
that  their  interests  could  not  be  considered.  But  throughout 
this  proof  that  human  nature  had  not  changed  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  did  his  duty  in  seeing  that  this  country  obtained  what 
she  needed  or  wanted. 

While  no  one  can  add  much  to  the  delightful  third  chapter 
of  Mr.  Keynes's  regrettable  book,  it  is  perhaps  permissible 
to  draw  this  distinction :  Mr.  Lloyd  George  often  got  the 
better  of  Mr.  Wilson  and  sometimes  of  M.  Clemenceau.  But 
in  the  former  instance  Wilson  either  did  not  realise  it  or  awoke 
to  the  fact  too  late;  while  Clemenceau  always  knew  it,  and 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  159 

when  he  had  to  bow  to  it,  did  so,  sardonically,  as  part  of 
the  game. 

It  is  undeniable  that  Lloyd  George  never  consistently  took  a 
firm  stand  upon  any  higher  ground  than  the  interests  of  his 
own  country.  While  sometimes  he  did  not  convince  his  col- 
leagues that  he  was  even  drawing  a  definite  dividing  line  be- 
tween those  national  interests  and  his  desire  to  assure  his  own 
political  future.  In  matters  which  did  not  directly  affect  Great 
Britain  he  generally  took  little  or  no  interest.  But  such  sub- 
jects as  the  punishment  of  German  war  criminals,  and,  above 
all,  of  the  former  Kaiser,  always  elicited  from  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter a  support  which  he  was  far  from  giving  to  the  claims  of  the 
smaller  nations.  He  was  at  no  pains  to  conceal  that  he  was  thus 
forging  electoral  weapons.  Nevertheless,  one  of  the  few  amus- 
ing consequences  of  the  Peace  Conference  is  the  unending  as- 
tonishment of  French  statesmen  about  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
conduct  on  this  subject.  For  their  own  part  they  then  cared 
comparatively  little  about  the  question  of  punishment.  At 
best  it  was  to  them  a  secondary  matter.  What  they  naturally 
wanted  was  some  security  for  the  future  and  some  reparation, 
in  money,  for  the  past.  But  in  order  to  conciliate  Lloyd 
George  on  these  points  they  seconded  his  every  effort  on  what 
he  seemed  to  have  so  much  at  heart — and  even  made  the  de- 
mand their  own.  His  subsequent  indifference  at  first  amazed 
and  then  amused  his  former  French  colleagues. 

But  it  ill  behoves  any  Englishman  to  complain  that  Lloyd 
George  thought  too  much  of  the  interests  of  his  country. 

Still  less  is  the  Prime  Minister  open  to  any  serious  reproach 
upon  the  ground  that  he  did  not  attempt  to  regenerate  the 
human  race.  Lie  had  the  great  good  sense  to  limit  his  efforts 
to  achieving  what  was  feasible.  The  short  space  of  two  years 
has  shown  that  the  one  of  the  Four  wno  had  ideas  of  another 
nature  is  the  person  responsible  for  the  state  of  Europe  to-day. 
M.  Alfred  Capus  has  written  (and  with  reason)  that  Wilson's 
greatest  fault  consisted  in  imagining  that  the  war  which  had  de- 
stroyed ten  million  men  had,  at  the  same  time,  made  the  human 
race  perfect,  whereas  in  fact  it  had  only  diminished  its  num- 
bers.   While  he  justly  blames  the  American  President  for  hav- 


160  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

ing  sacrificed  the  present  generation  to  his  own  personal  satis- 
faction, with  having,  in  his  exaltation,  forgotten  that  there 
still  existed  Americans,  English,  Germans,  and  French,  and 
that  the  differences  and  antagonisms  of  races  could  not  be 
made  to  disappear  by  a  flourish  of  his  magic  wand.  "Des 
en f ants  de  Japet,  tou jours  une  moitie  fournira  des  armes  a 
l'autre." 

After  the  General  Election  of  191 8  some  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  friends  launched  the  genial  idea  that,  for  his  own 
sake,  he  ought  to  retire,  and  thus  be  free  to  come  back  as  a 
saviour  when  others  had  bungled  and  had  disappeared.  It 
was,  I  think,  the  newspaper  of  which  Lord  Astor  is  the  prin- 
cipal proprietor  and  Mr  J.  L.  Garvin  the  oracle  which  directed 
public  attention  to  this  odd  notion.  Certainly  the  task  with 
which  Lloyd  George  was  faced  was  not  a  grateful  one.  While 
in  some  respects  it  did  not  suit  his  genius  as  well  as  manoeuvr- 
ing in  Paris.  But  apart  from  the  fact  that  there  was  no  one 
else  able  to  assume  the  burden,  and  that  it  would  have  been 
cowardly  to  refuse  it,  what  would  Mr.  Lloyd  George  have 
done  had  he  voluntarily  left  10,  Downing  Street  and  abandoned 
politics?  I  always  wondered  what  kind  of  a  life  Lord  Astor 
and  Mr.  Garvin  had  planned  for  him.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  is 
hardly  like  Sulla,  who,  having  exterminated  his  enemies  be- 
cause he  had  to  do  so  in  order  to  avoid  being  exterminated 
himself,  was  delighted  to  turn  aside  from  the  political  world, 
and  to  give  himself  up  to  the  pleasures  which  very  soon  killed 
him.  Nor  could  the  last  experiment  of  the  kind  in  England 
be  taken  as  an  encouraging  example.  That  was  when  Mr. 
Gladstone,  after  the  defeat  of  his  party,  decided  in  1884  that, 
at  the  age  of  sixty-five,  he  could  fitly  retire  from  public  life. 
Apart  from  the  weight  of  his  years,  Mr.  Gladstone  at  least  had 
the  semblance  of  other  pursuits  to  which  he  could  devote  him- 
self— the  writing  of  theological  tracts,  the  translation  of  the 
classics.  In  that  he  had  the  advantage  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
whom  one  can  only  imagine  perpetually  playing  golf  on  Wal- 
ton Heath  and  discussing  the  mistakes  of  his  successors.  But 
even  Mr.  Gladstone  could  not  stand  aside  when  power  was 
within  his  grasp;  and  although  after  the  next  election  the 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  161 

Queen  sent  for  Lord  Hartington,  Mr.  Gladstone  promptly 
bundled  him  out  of  the  way,  and  again  took  control. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George's  friends  went  a  step  further  since  they 
announced  openly  that  the  plan  was  to  resurrect  him  at  an  op- 
portune moment.  The  Prime  Minister  would  certainly  have 
found  it  somewhat  difficult  to  get  a  locum  tenens  in  the  lead- 
ership of  a  party.  Doubtless  he  himself  never  gave  any  heed 
to  this  mad  scheme. 

Mr.  Asquith's  idea  was  simple,  if  nothing  else.  He  pro- 
tested with  vehemence,  and  even  with  bitterness,  that  the  game 
was  not  being  played  fairly :  that  it  had  always  been  under- 
stood that  the  Coalition  should  be  for  the  duration  of  the  war 
only:  that  therefore  it  should  cease  automatically  upon  the 
conclusion  of  peace,  and  all  politicians  should  return  to  their 
pre-war  allegiance.  The  argument  is  curiously  like  that  of 
Von  Kliick,  who  has  written  complaining  that  had  his  op- 
ponent only  observed  the  rules  Germany  would  have  won  the 
war  in  19 14.  According  to  the  German  general  it  was  an 
accepted  military  tradition  that  the  garrison  of  an  armed  camp 
should  not  leave  it  except  to  repel  an  attack,  which  Gallieni 
had  unfairly  ignored  in  assailing  his  flank  while  he  was  skirt- 
ing around  Paris.     Hinc  illce  lachrymce. 

Mr.  Asquith  apparently  thought  that  parties  were  immut- 
able, and  that  party  ties  were  as  sacred  as  a  priest's  vow  of 
celibacy.  There  were  many  who  had  likened  Asquith  to  the 
younger  Pitt  as  described  in  a  notable  passage  of  Macaulay — 
a  great  Prime  Minister  in  time  of  peace,  but  incompetent  as 
a  War  Minister;  and  had  looked  for  his  triumphant  return  to 
office  soon  after  the  struggle.  But  this  pronouncement  con- 
vinced the  country  at  large  that  Mr.  Asquith  was  hopelessly 
out  of  touch  with  the  changing  times.  Bourbon-like,  he  had 
learned  nothing  and  had  forgotten  nothing.  The  end  of  the 
war  found  him  with  exactly  the  same  mental  vision  as  he  had 
in  1 914.  The  interlude  had  only  meant  his  exile  from  Down- 
ing Street.  But  now  he  seriously  proposed  that  everyone 
should  put  themselves  back  to  19 14  and  should  resume  the 
old  fight  side  by  side  with  those  who  had  opposed  them  for 
more  than  four  years,  as  if  nothing  had  happened  in  the  in- 


162  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

terval.  He  was  unable  to  realise  that  opponents  who  had  found 
a  common  ground  which  permitted  them  to  work  together 
during  the  war  might  in  good  faith  find  a  common  ground 
which  would  enable  them  to  continue  to  work  together  in  times 
to  which  the  years  before  19 14  afforded  no  analogy.  He  may 
have  thought  it  extraordinary  that  Lloyd  George  and  Mr. 
Walter  Long  could  continue  to  sit  together  on  the  same  Front 
Bench.  But  he  forgot  that  after  all  that  had  happened  it  would, 
for  instance,  have  been  even  more  extraordinary  and  much 
more  inconsistent  to  find  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Pringle 
in  the  same  party.  Mr.  Asquith  on  this  occasion  went  out 
of  his  way  to  prove  that  his  political  claims  rested  entirely 
upon  his  ability  as  a  parliamentarian. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  may  have  been  amused  by  Mr.  Asquith's 
proposal,  but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  it  appealed  to  him  even 
less  than  the  idea  that  he  himself  should  play  the  part  of  the 
Master  of  Ballantrae  with  Lord  Astor  as  Secundra. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  began  by  having  a  General  Election.  It 
was  the  proper  course  to  take.  Had  he  not  done  so,  had  he  al- 
lowed Parliament  in  time  of  peace  to  continue  to  give  itself 
new  leases  of  life  in  defiance  of  the  law,  he  would  have  weak- 
ened his  own  authority  and  Great  Britain's  position  at  the 
Conference.  It  might  even  have  been  held — it  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  alleged — that  he  did  not  represent  the  opinion 
of  his  country — while  he  might  later  have  been  obliged  to  fight 
a  General  Election  with  the  Treaty  of  Peace  in  suspense — and 
might  possibly  have  been  repudiated  as  was  Woodrow  Wilson ; 
thus  bringing  to  naught  the  work  of  months.  In  the  actual 
result  Mr.  Lloyd  George  got  a  mandate  which  he  executed. 
The  Treaty  of  Versailles  may  not  contain  all  that  he  promised 
during  his  campaign,  but  in  the  main  it  embodies  what  was 
guaranteed  to  the  electors. 

Undoubtedly  it  accorded  with  Lloyd  George's  personal 
interest  to  have  an  election  in  December,  19 18.  But  the  sug- 
gestion that  he  should  have  waited  until  an  unfavourable  mo- 
ment— until  a  moment  that  suited  his  opponents — sounds  rather 
strange  on  the  lips  of  Mr.  Asquith  and  his  supporters. 

The  General  Election  sent  to  Westminster  a  House  of  Com- 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  163 

mons  whom  Mr.  Keynes  has  described  as  "a  set  of  hard  faced 
men  who  looked  as  if  they  had  done  very  well  out  of  the  war." 
From  that  one  would  be  inclined  to  imagine  that  they  were 
disciples  of  the  Daily  News,  which,  on  the  very  eve  of  the  war, 
urged,  with  all  the  vigour  which  Mr.  A.  G.  Gardiner  could 
command,  that  the  proper  course  was  for  Great  Britain  to 
stand  aside  and  to  make  money  out  of  those  who  would  be 
bleeding  to  death.  But,  in  fact,  the  views  of  Mr.  Gardiner, 
either  those  he  held  in  19 14  or  those  he  holds  to-day,  find  little 
echo  in  the  present  Parliament.  It  is  said  that  it  is  a  House 
of  Commons  which  does  not  represent  the  country.  The  truth 
is  that,  just  as  it  would  have  been  an  unrepresentative  House 
in  1914,  so  it  is  a  House  which  would  doubtless  be  unrepre- 
sentative in  1925.  But,  like  the  French  Chambre  des  Deputes, 
it  is  quite  representative  of  its  period — of  the  transitional 
stage  through  which  we  are  passing. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  thus  gained  time  to  consider  the  situation 
and  to  see  what  bargain  he  could  make. 

To  the  credit  of  his  account  he  could  put  the  fact  that  the 
political  party  which  was  most  united  (though  it  certainly 
was  not  united  on  any  fixed  principles),  which  had  most  mem- 
bers in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  the  best  organisation  in 
the  country,  was  to  all  intents  and  purposes  in  search  of  a 
leader;  while  he  was  undoubtedly  the  one  leader  whom,  as  a 
matter  of  practical  politics,  any  party  would  most  covet.  It 
was  evident  that,  although  Mr.  Bonar  Law  might  be  a  bril- 
liant second  and  a  great  leader  of  the  House  of  Commons,  he 
had  neither  the  temperament  nor  the  ambition  to  go  further. 
Mr.  Bonar  Law  has  a  nature  which  inclines  him  to  attach 
himself  to  some  stronger  personality:  and  his  loyalty  is  so 
sure  and  impeccable  that  that  attachment  is  a  precious  and 
invaluable  support  to  any  Prime  Minister.  At  one  time  his 
devotion  seemed  to  be  turned  in  the  direction  of  Mr.  Asquith, 
who,  however,  made  nothing  of  it.  Lloyd  George,  on  the 
contrary,  has,  since  December,  1916,  nurtured  it;  so  that  when 
Bonar  Law  retired  he  was  fairly  counted  as  Lloyd  George's 
man. 

Not  only  has  the  Prime  Minister  few  competitors  as  a  party 


164  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

leader,  but  there  are  only  two  people  of  whose  opposition  he 
has  any  great  fear. 

For  Mr.  Winston  Churchill's  power  to  be  unpleasantly 
pugnacious  he  has  a  wholesome  respect.  Churchill  has  all  the 
moral  courage  which  Lloyd  George  lacks ;  but  none  of  his  tact 
in  negotiation,  none  of  his  caution  in  acting.  In  the  excitement 
of  speaking  Mr.  Lloyd  George  sometimes  says  things  which 
he  has  reason  to  regret.  But  he  rarely  moves  precipitately. 
No  one  is  more  careful  not  to  do  anything  which  is  unpopular; 
and  presumably  to  follow  public  opinion  is  good  politics  al- 
though it  may  not  be  high  principles.  But  Winston  Churchill, 
to  whom  public  applause  is  not  the  breath  of  life  (luckily  for 
him,  since  throughout  his  career  he  has  been  a  target  for  at- 
tacks), is  restrained  by  no  such  consideration.  He  acts  im- 
petuously, and  in  the  face  of  opposition  maintains  his  posi- 
tion, often  with  more  pluck  than  circumspection. 

He  holds  (and  has  held  for  many  years  past)  one  record 
of  which  the  late  Lady  Randolph  Churchill  was  wont  to 
boast  with  justifiable  maternal  pride.  He  has  been  in  office 
for  more  years  than  any  man  of  his  age  in  our  political  his- 
tory, always  barring  the  younger  Pitt. 

It  is  curious  to  reflect  that  small  events  may  change  the 
whole  political  history  of  a  country.  In  1902  both  Bonar  Law 
and  Winston  Churchill  were  possibilities  for  the  post  of  Par- 
liamentary Secretary  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  Churchill  wanted 
it  and  thought  that  it  was  his  due.  Mr.  Balfour  gave  it  to 
Bonar  Law.  It  was  that,  more  than  anything  else,  which  led 
Churchill  to  cross  the  floor  of  the  House.  It  convinced  him 
that  he  would  find  no  future  in  the  Conservative  fold.  Party 
ties  mean  little  to  Churchill.  He  sincerely  believes  that  the 
country  has  need  of  his  services,  and  does  not  intend  that  it 
shall  be  deprived  of  them.  He  is  first  and  foremost  a  great 
Winstonian.  Other  things  being  equal,  his  authoritative  tem- 
perament inclines  him  naturally  to  Toryism;  just  as,  on  the 
other  hand,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  were  the  choice  open  to  him, 
would  rather  be  in  power  supported  by  the  party  which  makes 
the  most  direct  appeal  to  popular  feeling. 

During  Churchill's  temporary  political  eclipse  he  served  for 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  165 

some  time  with  his  regiment  in  France.  But  on  his  return 
he  allowed  Lloyd  George  to  see  both,  I  believe,  by  the  line  he 
took  at  a  secret  session  of  the  House,  as  well  as  otherwise,  that 
the  choice  was  between  a  friendly  colleague  and  a  parliamen- 
tary opponent  of  a  very  different  metal  from  Asquith.  The 
Prime  Minister  capitulated,  and  Churchill  came  back  to  office. 
He  will  never  be  in  opposition  to  Lloyd  George  if  the  latter 
is  able  to  prevent  it.  Probably  the  only  contingency  is  the  re- 
mote prospect  that  Churchill  may  one  day  lead  a  party. 

The  other  person  upon  whom,  for  very  different  reasons, 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  keeps  a  watchful  eye  is  Lord  Derby.  The 
latter  has  neither  the  pugnacity  nor  the  force  of  Churchill, 
who  once  upon  a  time  was  his  own  bete  noir.  But  he  has  ex- 
actly what  the  other  lacks,  a  following  in  the  country.  His 
work  in  recruiting  during  the  war  will  always  stand  to  his 
credit.  It  was  not  his  fault  if  those  who  came  in  under  the 
Derby  scheme  later  possibly  had  some  well-founded  grievances. 
At  the  War  Office  he  was  known  as  a  firm  supporter  of  Gen- 
eral Robertson  in  the  conflict  of  which  that  distinguished  sol- 
dier was  the  centre.  When  Robertson  was  succeeded  by  Henry 
Wilson  it  was  thought  that  Lord  Derby  would  at  once  re- 
sign. But  it  was  only  some  time  later  that  left  Whitehall  to 
succeed  the  late  Lord  Bertie  in  Paris. 

The  appointment  was  one  which  caused  widespread  surprise 
and  interest.  Obviously,  if  there  was  no  diplomat  suitable  and 
available  for  the  post  (and  Sir  Rennel  Rodd,  who  had  some 
claim  to  it,  could  not  be  spared  from  Rome),  it  ought  to  have 
been  given  to  a  great  peer.  Lord  Derby,  of  course,  had  that 
qualification  in  an  eminent  degree:  and  his  acceptance  was  a 
deathblow  to  intrigues  which  might  possibly  have  led  to  one 
or  other  of  several  unworthy  nominations.  But  he  was  so  little 
known  in  connection  with  foreign  affairs  that  in  some  quarters 
there  was  doubt  as  to  the  result. 

I  recollect  asking  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Paul  Cambon, 
at  luncheon  a  few  days  after  the  appointment  was  announced 
if  he  knew  whether  Lord  Derby  spoke  French,  the  current 
rumour  being  that  he  did  not.  "Oui,"  replied  the  Ambassador, 
with  a  characteristic  movement,  "Oui,  il  parle  francais  comme 


166  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

je  parle  anglais."  As  nobody,  to  my  knowledge,  has  ever  heard 
M.  Cambon  speak  English,  the  certificate  was,  and  was  doubt- 
less meant  to  be,  rather  enigmatic. 

But  if  opinions  were  divided  before  Lord  Derby  went,  there 
was  perfect  unanimity  long  before  he  returned.  His  success 
was  immediate  and  complete.  The  French  confidence  in  him 
was  unlimited;  and  even  during  the  unpleasant  and  critical 
days  which  followed  the  Frankfort  incident  that  confidence  was 
unbroken  and  his  popularity  amongst  all  classes  remained  un- 
diminished. Lord  Bertie  was  a  man  of  great  attainments  who 
jealously  guarded  the  interests  of  his  country.  He  was  re- 
spected and  feared :  but  he  neither  was,  nor  apparently  did  he 
want  to  be,  liked.  Lord  Derby  awakened  very  different  feel- 
ings. In  Paris  his  name  is  and  long  will  be  linked  with  those 
of  the  only  two  other  English  ambassadors  who  left  behind 
them  any  abiding  memory — Lord  Lytton  and,  to  a  somewhat 
less  extent,  Lord  Dufferin. 

To  be  a  peer  is  to-day  a  handicap  in  the  political  world. 
Some  thirty  odd  years  ago  three  comparatively  young  men 
— George  Curzon,  St.  John  Brodrick,  and  the  then  Lord 
Wolmer — realised  that  fact  and  cast  about  for  a  way  in  which 
they  might  avoid  the  soporific  House  of  Lords.  They  were 
advised  (by  Lord  James  of  Hereford,  I  think)  to  consult  a 
lawyer  who  could  help  them  if  anyone  could — H.  H.  Asquith. 
However,  even  Mr.  Asquith's  ingenuity  was  not  equal  to  that 
task.  It  is  apparently  destined  to  be  Mr.  Lloyd  George  who 
will  afford  some  relief  to  unwilling  peers. 

But  if  Lord  Derby  has  that  handicap,  it  is,  in  his  case,  not 
without  some  compensating  advantage.  He  is  a  peer  with 
territorial  influence;  one  of  the  last  of  them,  and  probably 
possessed  of  more  influence  of  that  kind  than  any  two  other 
peers  in  England.  In  Lancashire  he  is  a  power :  and  Lan- 
cashire is  a  power  in  England. 

Of  still  greater  importance  is  the  almost  universal  belief, 
at  home  as  well  as  abroad,  that  Lord  Derby  typifies  in  a  su- 
preme degree  the  English  character,  with  its  great  qualities 
and  its  traditional  limitations.  The  country  may  admire  Mr. 
Lloyd  George's  extreme  cleverness,  but  it  does  not  altogether 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  167 

trust  it.  To  the  ordinary  English  mind  he  seems  just  a  little 
too  clever.  In  brief,  his  ability  is  useful  to  him  for  what  it 
enables  him  to  achieve  more  than  for  the  confidence  it  inspires : 
for  in  a  referendum  on  the  latter  point  he  would  fall  far  be- 
hind Lord  Derby. 

It  was  a  foregone  conclusion  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  would 
offer  Lord  Derby  a  place  in  the  Cabinet  when  he  returned 
to  England.  What  was  not  so  certain  was  the  course  which 
Lord  Derby  himself  would  take.  He  chose  the  middle,  and, 
in  the  circumstances,  the  sensible  one.  He  declined  the  Prime 
Minister's  overtures.  But  at  the  same  time  he  gave  no  en- 
couragement to  those  who,  partly  for  their  own  purpose, 
tried  to  force  him  into  leading  some  movement  against  the 
Government. 

He  admits  himself  that  he  is  credited  with  once  having 
had  two  ambitions — to  be  Prime  Minister  and  to  win  the 
Derby:  and  adds  that  only  one  of  the  two  remains  with  him 
to-day.  Lord  Derby  is  still  racing;  and  I  trust  that  he  may 
yet  be  successful.  It  is  less  likely  that  he  will  ever  be  Prime 
Minister.  But  he  will  always  be  a  certain  power,  he  can  hold 
high  office  whenever  he  likes:  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  dis- 
playing his  habitual  cautious  wisdom  in  not  neglecting  him. 

On  the  Conservative  side  there  is  hardly  anyone  else  to 
whom  the  Prime  Minister  need  pay  much  attention.  Lord 
Robert  Cecil  may  become  a  nuisance.  He  is  much  less  likely 
ever  to  be  a  rival.  He  is  in  one  respect  the  Mr.  Dick  of  poli- 
tics:  the  Church,  like  King  Charles's  head,  may  be  brought 
into  any  question.  Such  a  weakness  puts  him  at  a  marked 
disadvantage  as  an  opponent  of  opportunists. 

As  Lord  Chancellor  Lord  Birkenhead  has  had  a  success, 
both  on  the  Woolsack  and  in  the  debates  in  the  Lords,  which 
has  entirely  delighted  and  somewhat  surprised  the  whole  po- 
litical world.  It  is  well  known  that  he  has  no  intention  of 
being  restrained  by  any  traditions  as  to  what  former  Lord 
Chancellors  should  or  should  not  do.  In  this  respect  his  ideas 
correspond  with  those  held  by  Brougham,4  whom  he  equals 

*  The    only    reason    why    Brougham    never    held    any    office    after    his 
Chancellorship   was  that   after  that  experience  no  one   wanted   to  work 


168  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

in  brilliancy  (although  not  so  versatile)  and  excels  in  sanity. 
Lord  Birkenhead  will  doubtless  yet  fill  various  offices.  But  it 
is  not  impossible  that  the  former  hope  of  the  Tory  party  may 
one  day  lead  it  or  its  successor. 

Austen  Chamberlain's  present  position  does  not  seem  to 
be  quite  clear.  He  leads  in  the  House  of  Commons,  but  can 
hardly  be  considered  the  actual  or  definite  leader  of  the  party 
in  the  country.  The  fact  that  Lord  Derby  is  pointing  to 
Lloyd  George  as  the  logical  leader  of  the  Conservative  party 
is  indicative  of  the  situation  in  which  Chamberlain  is  placed. 

Amongst  the  new  men  there  is  only  one  of  pronounced 
promise.  Sir  Robert  Home  has  achieved  a  great  position 
in  a  short  time.  He  is  certainly  more  of  a  Tory  than  was 
ever  Mr.  Bonar  Law :  whether  that  is  an  advantage  or  other- 
wise is  another  question.  That  he  will  go  far  is  likely:  but 
at  the  present  day  he  is  not  a  possible  leader. 

In  any  event  the  Conservative  party  is  in  a  condition  of 
flux,  if  not  actually  in  process  of  dissolution.  The  word 
"Unionist"  has  now  ceased  to  have  any  application.  The 
word  "Conservative"  has  little  more,  except  in  so  far  as  it 
may  indicate  the  less  extreme  party  in  the  State. 

Disraeli  seems  to  have  seen  plainly  enough  what  was  com- 
ing, and  to  have  found  the  only  way  for  his  party  to  keep 
even  with  the  times  without  being  submerged.  The  Tory 
Democracy  of  Lord  Randolph  Churchill,  though  somewhat 
crude,  was  entirely  in  keeping  with  Disraelism.  But  Lord 
Salisbury  took  a  different  stand.  M.  Paul  Cambon  once  told 
me  that  Lord  Salisbury  always  gave  him  the  impression  of  a 
man  who  went  on  knowing  that  he  was  fighting  a  losing  fight, 
but  with  no  intention  of  yielding  to  the  trend  of  the  period. 
That  was  not  Disraelism.  But  it  is  reminiscent  of  Bismarck's 
reputed  comment  at  the  Berlin  Conference :  "Lord  Salisbury 
is  a  lath  painted  to  look  like  iron,  but  the  old  Jew  means  busi- 
ness." 

To  Lord  Salisbury  succeeded  Mr.  Balfour,  who  completed 
the  ruin  of  his  party.     He  made  no  effort  either  to  keep  the 

with  him.    At  one  moment  he  had  a  fleeting  idea  of  becoming  a  naturalised 
Frenchman  so  that  he  might  be  elected  a  Deputy. 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  169 

votes  of  one  class  or  to  get  those  of  the  other.  He  went  back 
to  country-house  Toryism — a  pleasant  enough  life,  but  not 
one  calculated  to  win  seats  in  Parliament.  Had  the  Con- 
servative party  had  another  leader  the  progress  of  the  Labour 
party  would  have  been  less  rapid.  But  Mr.  Balfour  lost  what 
used  to  be  called  the  working-class  vote  (the  basis  of  Tory 
strength  once  the  franchise  was  extended)  without  doing 
anything  to  get  the  middle-class  support  which  Gladstone  had 
firmly  riveted  to  the  Liberal  cause.  Finally,  he  was  guilty  of 
the  tactical  error  of  refusing  to  go  to  the  country  when  it  was 
evident  that  his  Government  was  discredited. 

By  common  consent  Mr.  Balfour  has  great  charm  of  man- 
ner. But  his  detachment  is  something  hardly  human.  I  have 
heard  him,  at  a  critical  period  of  the  war,  and  while  he  was 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  discuss  after  dinner 
the  prospects,  the  chances  of  our  ultimately  winning  or  los- 
ing, with  the  interest  of  a  person  observing  a  great  phe- 
nomenon which  in  no  way  affected  him  personally :  the  interest 
one  might  have  expected  to  be  displayed  by  a  week-end  visitor 
from  Mars. 

At  the  time  Lord  Queenborough  went  to  the  House  of 
Lords  someone  who  was  staying  at  a  country  house  where 
Mr.  Balfour  was  also  of  the  party  mentioned  the  coming  by- 
election  in  Cambridge,  and  Mr.  Balfour  asked  how  there  was 
a  vacancy.  "What  has  become  of  Almeric?"  he  queried.  And, 
when  told,  said  that  he  was  unaware  that  Mr.  Paget  had 
gone  to  the  Upper  House. 

I  repeated  this  to  the  late  Lady  X.,  who  to  her  last  day 
maintained  her  lifelong  interest  both  in  politics  and  in  racing. 
She  said  that  she  had  never  been  able  to  determine  how  much 
of  Mr.  Balfour's  attitude  about  not  knowing  what  was  tak- 
ing place  in  the  world  was  pose,  and  how  much  simply  a 
natural  aversion  to  be  bothered  with  such  matters :  and  cited 
another  instance;  how,  at  a  time  when  he  was  leader,  he 
expressed  his  ignorance  about  a  coming  by-election  (Peter- 
borough, I  think)  of  some  importance.  Lady  X.'s  own  im- 
pression was  that  what  had  originally  been  a  pose  had  long 
since  become  a  habit. 


170  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

I  was  therefore  not  surprised  when  a  well-known  French- 
woman told  me  recently  that  on  the  first  day  that  Mr.  Balfour 
attended  the  Peace  Conference  (it  was,  I  think,  the  first  day 
of  the  Conference)  she  lunched  with  Mr.  Balfour,  Lord 
Robert  Cecil,  and  others.  When  Mr.  Balfour  was  obliged  to 
leave  in  order  to  go  to  the  Conference  she  made  a  little  dis- 
cours  de  circonstance:  "An  interesting  and  memorable  his- 
toric occasion,"  etc.  "Yes,"  agreed  Mr.  Balfour,  with  some- 
thing between  a  sigh  and  a  yawn,  "but  what  a  bore!" 

When  Mr.  Balfour  became  impossible  as  leader  of  his 
party  the  choice  fell  (in  circumstances  to  which  I  have  al- 
ready adverted)  upon  a  man  for  whom  the  general  respect 
has  increased  year  by  year;  but  who  was  not  really  a  Tory, 
and  had  not  in  him  the  making  of  a  great  leader  except  on 
the  benches  of  the  House  of  Commons. 

Upon  this  showing  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  prospects  of  strik- 
ing a  bargain  more  or  less  on  his  own  terms  might  appear 
favourable.  But  against  that  must  be  put  the  cold  fact  that 
he  has  no  party  organisation,  and  not  a  great  many  followers 
who  have  moderately  safe  seats.  A  party  in  search  of  a 
leader  is  in  a  bad  way.  But  a  leader  in  search  of  a  party 
is  in  a  still  worse  position.  Nobody  knows  the  force  of  that 
argument  better  than  Sir  George  Younger,  who  doubtless 
has  more  than  once  used  it  in  discussions  with  the  Prime 
Minister.  The  end  will  probably  be  that  Lloyd  George  will 
go  somewhat  further  than  he  would  like  to  proceed  along 
the  path  to  which  Younger  points.  But  needs  must.  The  war 
and  the  ensuing  coalitions  only  hastened  an  end  which  was 
inevitable.  Neither  the  remnants  of  the  party  nor  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  will  lose  by  the  bargain.  What  is  more  important, 
the  country  will  gain;  for  it  is  never  in  the  public  interest 
that  either  of  the  principal  political  parties  in  the  State  should 
be  derelict. 

Such  was  the  position  until  a  few  months  ago.  But  since 
the  above  was  written  there  has  been  a  change  of  atmosphere. 
Shortly  before  the  Cannes  Conference  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
and  those  close  to  him  had  practically  decided  to  have  an 
early  general  election.     Sir  George  Younger  stoutly  opposed 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  171 

this  decision.  But  apparently  Mr.  Lloyd  George  thought  that 
he  held  the  stronger  cards;  and  that,  if  it  came  to  an  issue, 
the  Unionist  party  would  cede  rather  than  forfeit  his  leader- 
ship. He  therefore  held  firm.  If  there  had  been  a  party 
meeting  (always  an  unsatisfactory  affair)  he  might  possibly 
have  carried  the  day.  But  Younger  kept  the  matter  in  his 
own  hands;  and,  to  the  surprise  and  chagrin  of  Lloyd  George, 
he  accepted  what  almost  amounted  to  a  challenge,  came  into 
the  open,  and  told  the  world  that  Unionists  were  entirely  op- 
posed to  a  needless  general  election.  Probably  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  never  regretted  so  keenly  that  the  only  following  which 
he  could  absolutely  call  his  own  was  in  the  minority.  In  the 
circumstances  he  was  forced  to  retreat;  and  he  therefore 
did  his  utmost  to  make  out  that  he  had  never  had  any  such 
idea.  The  doughty  and  debonair  Sir  George  was  for  the 
moment  left  in  the  possession  of  the  field,  smilingly  asking 
"Who  said  General  Election?" 

Indeed,  Younger  went  further.  For  in  a  subsequent  speech 
he  defined  more  clearly  than  had  Mr.  Chamberlain  the  inde- 
pendent position  which,  according  to  his  conception,  the  Union- 
ists occupy  in  the  Coalition.  This  led  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to 
serve  notice  upon  Mr.  Chamberlain  that  he  would  resign  un- 
less his  Unionist  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet  could  keep  their 
followers  in  order.  His  letter  was  almost  tantamount  to  de- 
manding that  Younger  should  be  ousted  from  his  post  as  head 
of  the  party  organisation.  At  first  sight  it  might  seem  that 
the  Prime  Minister  was  merely  making  a  stand  for  a  reason- 
able measure  of  party  discipline.  But  it  is  necessary  to  go 
a  little  further  back  in  order  to  get  a  true  light  upon  the  sub- 
ject. What  originated  this  trouble,  and  caused  Sir  George 
Younger  to  speak  so  openly?  Simply  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
temporary  insistence  upon  a  general  election  against  the 
wishes  of  the  Unionists;  that  is,  in  opposition  to  the  views  of 
those  who  are  not  of  his  own  party,  but  who  give  him  a  ma- 
jority in  the  House  of  Commons. 

In  reality,  therefore,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  going  far  beyond 
an  appeal  for  party  discipline.  He  is  setting  up  the  pretension 
that  in  the  future  he  shall  be  an  unquestioned  dictator — as  he 


172  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

has  sometimes  been  in  the  past.    Or  at  least  he  is  making  that 
the  condition  of  his  continuance  in  office. 

At  the  time  I  am  writing  the  outcome  of  this  crisis  rests 
in  doubt.  But  it  is  probable  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  no 
sincere  desire  to  retire;  and  that  it  was  a  threat  which  he 
would  fulfil  with  regret.  Nevertheless,  if  he  did  so  upon  the 
ground  that  he  would  not  submit  to  be  ruined  by  the  Unionists, 
he  would  have  every  chance  of  leading  another — and  a  more 
Radical — party  within  a  short  time.  To  be  at  the  head  of 
such  a  party  is  what  he  would  most  prefer;  if  only  it  could  be 
accomplished  without  that  unpleasant  and  uncertain  interval 
which  would  follow  his  departure  from  Downing  Street ! 

If  Mr.  Lloyd  George  remains  as  Prime  Minister  (which  is 
likely)  it  will  be  a  question  of  terms  between  himself  and 
the  Unionist  party.  Should  the  latter  yield  entirely  it  will 
simply  mean  that  it  has  gone  into  voluntary  liquidation 
and  has  had  a  sale.  Truth  to  tell  there  would  not  then  be 
much  left  to  sell.  It  has  no  great  leaders.  Even  the  Morn- 
ing Post  can  only  suggest  that  Mr.  Balfour,  now  seventy- 
four  years  of  age  and  in  many  respects  out  of  touch  with 
the  present  generation,  should  take  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  suc- 
cession. Its  principles  the  Unionist  party  long  ago  threw 
overboard.  In  brief  its  chief  asset  is  the  number  of  seats 
it  holds  in  the  present  House  of  Commons. 

Even  if  Mr.  Lloyd  George  does  not  obtain  the  full  assur- 
ances which  he  wants  he  will  at  least  have  divided  the  Union- 
ist in  the  same  way  as  he  has  already  divided  the  Liberal 
party,  although  not  to  the  same  extent.  He  will  have  in- 
creased his  own  independence,  and  his  own  political  value, 
while  correspondingly  diminishing  that  of  a  great  party.  It 
is  personal  politics  upon  a  high  scale. 

Whatever  the  ultimate  result,  this  crisis  has  hastened  the 
end  of  the  Coalition;  and  has  exposed  the  weakness  of  Mr. 
Chamberlain. 

But  if  the  Conservative  party  is  in  a  state  of  dissolution 
the  former  Liberal  party  is  dead  and  all  but  buried.  With 
the  rise  of  the  Labour  party  it  was  obvious  that  one  of  the 
pre-existing  parties  would  sooner  or  later  disappear.      Par- 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  173 

liamentary  government  originated  in  England;  and  its  basis, 
its  very  essence,  is  that  there  should  be  two  parties  in  the 
State  holding  contradictory  opinions  upon  the  vital  issues  of 
the  day.  More  than  two  parties  there  have  never  been  ex- 
cept when  there  has  been  a  split  in  one  of  the  two  and  the 
minority  wing  has  not  yet  gone  over  or  been  reabsorbed — 
for  instance,  the  Peelites — or  when  there  has  been  a  party  for 
a  single  particular  purpose,  as  was  the  Irish  Nationalist  party. 
The  main  reason  why  parliamentary  government  has  not  had 
the  same  success  in  Latin  countries  is  attributable  to  an  ap- 
parent inability  to  form  and  maintain  parties,  as  distinguished 
from  groups.  It  was,  I  think,  Mr.  Bodley  who  once  aptly 
wrote  that  while  the  British  constitution  was  a  very  excellent 
thing,  yet,  like  the  Blessed  Sacrament,  it  was  not  to  be  carried 
around  and  worshipped.  If  either  the  Conservative  or  Radi- 
cal Party  had  to  give  away  to  the  new  Labour  element  it  was 
clear  that  it  was  the  Radicals  who  would  be  crowded  out ;  for 
there  was  nothing  which  they  proposed  to  do  which  the  Labour 
leaders  did  not  promise  to  do  more  thoroughly.  The  elec- 
tion of  1918,  coming  as  it  did  immediately  after  the  end  of 
hostilities,  hastened  the  downfall  of  Gladstonian  Liberalism. 
But  the  result  would  have  been  the  same  in  any  event,  though 
the  final  issue  might  otherwise  have  been  delayed.  It  is  sig- 
nificant that  since  then  there  has  been  a  sneaking  desire  on 
the  part  of  Radicals  to  come  to  terms  with  Labour.  But 
the  old  Liberal  party  has  little  to  offer  except  a  money  chest 
— a  very  useful  and  even  a  necessary  adjunct  for  any  cam- 
paign, but  not  in  itself  all-sufficient.  The  party  holds  few 
seats.  It  has  no  leaders  who  can  arouse  any  interest  or  excite 
any  enthusiasm.  Mr.  Asquith  is  out  of  touch,  not  only  with 
the  country,  but  with  a  House  of  Commons  which  he  does  not 
understand.  Lord  Grey's  renewed  activity  will  raise  the  tone 
of  public  life.  But  any  chance  he  ever  had  of  becoming  a 
great  leader  ceased  the  day  he  rather  unwillingly  went  to  the 
House  of  Lords.  Sir  Donald  MacLean  is  held  in  sympathetic 
esteem  even  by  his  opponents,  but  he  will  never  be  dangerous. 
Mr.  McKenna,  a  man  who  couples  real  ability  with  the  knack 
of  making  himself  disliked  for  no  deep  reasons,  is  not  very 


174  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

likely  to  leave  a  certainty  in  the  world  of  high  finance  for  an 
uncertainty  in  that  of  politics.  Mr.  Masterman  still  dreams 
of  an  alliance  between  Liberalism  and  Labour.  But  his  is 
a  voice  crying  in  the  wilderness.  Sir  Herbert  Samuel  (at 
present  occupied  in  governing  Palestine)  is  ambitious.  But 
his  brain  does  not  work  so  quickly  as  that  of  his  cousin,  Mon- 
tagu; nor,  to  do  him  justice,  do  his  party  and  personal  alle- 
giances weigh  upon  him  so  lightly.  For  of  all  desertions  to 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  that  of  Montagu  was  the  least  excusable. 
He  did  not,  like  others  of  his  then  colleagues,  go  over  in 
December,  191 6,  when  they  took  the  risk  of  challenging 
Asquith's  power.  He  stayed  with  Asquith  then,  and  only 
left  him  later,  when  it  was  no  longer  a  question  of  men  group- 
ing together  in  the  interest  of  their  country  to  turn  out  an 
incompetent  Prime  Minister,  but  solely  a  question  of  Montagu 
getting  into  office.  But  the  worst  part  of  the  transaction  is 
that  Montagu  was  Asquith's  particular  protege.  It  was  the 
Liberal  Prime  Minister  who  opened  to  him  the  road  to  po- 
litical success,  and  who  made  him  his  youngest  colleague. 
Truly  Mr.  Asquith,  the  most  loyal  of  men,  has  not  been  over 
fortunate  in  the  devotion  of  his  followers. 

The  fact  that  Liberalism  has  little  to  offer  Labour  is  one 
to  which  the  leaders  of  the  latter  movement  are  fully  alive. 
Any  amalgamation  is  unlikely  unless  it  is  one  whereby  Labour 
swallows  the  remnants  of  the  Liberal  party.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Labour  party  has  not  had  during  the  present  Par- 
liament the  success  which  it  anticipated.  It  has  not  produced 
many  men  of  first-rate  ability;  but  that  is  hardly  the  cause 
of  its  failure,  since  no  other  party  has  much  to  boast  of  in 
that  respect.  Winston  Churchill's  gibe  that  Labour  is  unfit  to 
govern — unfit  in  the  sense  that  it  has  not  the  administrative 
capacity — is  absurd.  A  Cabinet  of  which  no  member  had 
ever  been  in  office  before  would  certainly  encounter  many 
preliminary  difficulties.  But  there  are  several  Labour  leaders 
who  held  Government  office  during  the  war.  While  as  re- 
gards actual  ability,  what  is  to  be  said  about  the  present  Front 
Bench?  Eliminate  Lloyd  George,  Bonar  Law,  Winston 
Churchill  himself,  Sir  Robert  Home  (who  was  a  real  find), 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  175 

and  how  are  the  others  to  be  ranked?  Something  can  be  said 
for,  but  also  a  great  deal  against,  the  administrative  capacity 
of  Mr.  Chamberlain.  Sir  Worthington  Evans  as  a  solicitor 
was  shrewd  and  capable,  and  will  show  the  same  qualities 
in  any  office.  But  Labour  can  produce  as  good  as  that.  While 
if  one  takes  the  whole  Front  Bench,  beginning  with  Home 
as  the  highest  type  of  efficiency,  and  finishing  with  the  un- 
fortunate and  incompetent  Dr.  Addison  at  the  other  end,5 
it  will  be  found  that  the  middle  is  certainly  not  above  the  aver- 
age that  any  party  might  reasonably  hope  to  possess. 

The  present  trouble  with  the  Labour  party  arises  from  the 
transitional  stage  through  which  all  parties  are  now  passing, 
and  also  from  the  fact  that  it  increased  the  number  of  seats 
it  held  too  quickly  for  its  own  good.  It  is  unlikely  that  there 
will  ever  be  any  retrogression ;  on  the  contrary,  there  will 
almost  certainly  be  a  progressive  increase  for  some  time  to 
come.  But  the  lack  of  power  of  assimilation,  the  lack  of 
party  discipline  (discipline  in  the  proper  sense),  the  lack 
of  even  a  minor  George  Younger,  at  present  deprives  the  party 
of  the  influence  it  otherwise  might  have.  A  party  of  which 
the  leaders  preach  their  loyalty  to  the  constitution,  and  their 
faith  in  constitutional  methods,  while  one  of  its  whips  makes 
a  fool  of  himself  by  trying  to  insult  the  sovereign,  struggles 
under  a  certain  disadvantage. 

But  these  are  minor  defects  which  will  doubtless  disappear 
as  this  new  party  settles  down  to  prepare  itself  to  take  its 
turn  of  governing  the  country.  The  vital  difficulty  lies  else- 
where. It  is  essential  that  the  Labour  party  should  appeal 
to  the  country  at  large.  A  party  which  merely  represents 
trade  unions  will  never  come  into  power  in  England,  for  which 
one  may  be  duly  thankful,  as  that  would  be  class  government 
of  the  most  pronounced  kind.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
no  possibility  of  increasing  the  number  of  trade  unionists  to 
anything  like  the  requisite  figure. 

There  are  at  present  about  8,000,000  members  of  Trade 
Unions  in  Great  Britain.  That  is  not  sufficient  to  ensure 
a  majority  in  the  House  of  Commons.  A  great  deal  of  the 
6  Written   before    Dr.    Addison's    severance   from   his    salary. 


176  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

talk  about  the  absolute  power  of  Labour  is  therefore  nonsense. 
The  power  of  Labour  to  cause  inconvenience,  to  lose  money 
for  workers  and  employers  alike,  temporarily  to  interrupt 
the  course  of  ordinary  life,  and  to  do  harm  to  the  country,  is 
almost  incalculable.  But  that  is  not  enough,  especially  in 
England.  For  some  time  the  superior  organisation  of  the 
Trade  Unions  enabled  the  Labour  party  to  show  a  front  which 
gave  an  exaggerated  idea  of  its  real  influence  if  it  was  put  to 
a  decisive  test.  But  as  the  origin  of  this  strength  was  realised 
other  interests  in  the  State  also  began  to  organise.  While  the 
railway  strike  of  1919,  and  the  more  recent  coal  strike  have 
demonstrated  clearly  that  so  long  as  there  is  parliamentary 
government  the  country  will  not  allow  a  minority  to  impose 
its  will  upon  a  majority.  Direct  action  on  a  large  scale  would 
probably  solve  the  question  quickly — to  the  discomfiture  of 
Labour;  and  the  Labour  leaders,  who  know  that  quite  as 
well  as  anyone  else,  have,  for  the  greater  part,  ho  stomach  for 
a  policy  to  which  many  of  them  are  sincerely  opposed,  and  of 
which  many  more  doubt  the  sagacity.  They  realise  that  the 
country  will  not  be  bullied,  and  that  any  party  in  England 
which  to-day  openly  says  that  a  minority  is  to  govern  is 
simply  slamming  in  its  own  face  the  door  to  office.  The 
extremists  will  never  admit  that.  But  the  recent  strikes — 
and  failures — have  had  their  effect  in  convincing  the  rank 
and  file  that  success  does  not  lie  that  way.  The  only  remain- 
ing course  is  to  rest  on  the  field  of  constitutional  government 
and  to  augment  their  forces.  To  achieve  the  latter  end  they 
will  be  obliged  to  do  what  every  other  fresh  party  has  done 
before  it  came  into  power — to  compromise.  If  they  do  so 
now,  before  it  is  too  late,  while  the  country  is  not  satisfied 
with  a  one  party  power,  and  before  anything  else  arises  on 
the  ashes  of  the  Liberal  pyre,  they  have  every  chance  of  form- 
ing the  basis  of  one  of  the  two  great  parties. 

The  Labour  leaders  are  therefore  confronted  with  the 
problem  of  some  way  securing  a  large  proportion  of  that 
middle-class  vote  which  Gladstone  always  had  behind  him, 
and  which  stuck  to  the  Liberal  party  until  the  War.  That 
can  only  be  done  by  having  a  policy  as  free  as  possible  from 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  177 

any  suspicion  of  class  domination.  It  was  the  fixed  idea 
that  the  landed  classes  were  getting  too  much  and  giving  too 
little  to  the  State — that  they  were  trampling  on  the  others — 
which  solidified  the  middle  classes  against  Toryism.  Un- 
fortunately for  the  Labour  party  the  middle  classes  now  have 
the  idea  that  the  Trade  Unionists  want  to  impose  their  su- 
premacy. Many  things — such  as  ill-considered  and  arbitrary 
strikes — have  fostered  this  conviction.  While  the  way  in 
which  the  rates  have  gone  up  in  many  municipalities  where 
Labour  rules  seems  to  indicate  that  a  Labour  Government 
would  be  without  a  rival  in  lavish  expenditure  of  the  tax- 
payers' money. 

All  these  facts,  and  many  more,  are  being  brought  to  the 
attention  of  the  middle  classes  by  non-party  organisations 
which  hope  to  prevent  that  vote  going  to  Labour.  But  if 
the  Labour  party  has  any  sincere  idea  of  a  national  role  it 
will  realise  in  time  that  it  cannot,  in  these  days,  expect  to  carry 
the  country  in  support  of  its  class  legislation  merely  because, 
in  days  gone  by,  others  were  so  ill-advised  as  to  enforce  legis- 
lation in  favour  of  another  class.  In  order  to  broaden  its 
policy  it  will  have  to  rid  itself  of  its  extreme  element.  In  re- 
turn it  will  probably  get  that  much  coveted  middle  class  vote 
which  will  one  day  carry  it  to  power.  In  the  meantime  it 
might  advantageously  adopt  the  suggestion  of  the  Manchester 
Guardian  that  it  should  not  oppose  selected  candidates,  be- 
longing to  other  parties,  who  stand  for  progress. 

That  the  country  will  ever  be  converted  to  nationalism  is 
doubtful.  The  great  difficulty  which  Labour  leaders  meet  in 
preaching  that  doctrine  is  that  they  are  unable  to  point  to 
any  country  where  it  has  really  been  a  success.  It  has  been 
tried  in  many — but  has  always  been  found  wanting,  and  some- 
times been  practically  abandoned.  The  State  railways  in 
France  do  not  compare  with  those  controlled  by  private  owner- 
ship— except  in  the  size  of  their  annual  deficits.  The  postal 
and  telegraph  services  are  lamentable.  In  the  United  States 
the  period  of  Government  ownership  during  the  war  brought 
confusion  to  every  service  it  took  in  hand.  For  an  essential 
point  about  national  ownership  and  operation  is  not  only  that 


178  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

it  costs  more,  but  that  it  gives  less;  the  lack  of  efficiency  is 
always  marked.  One  would  naturally  have  expected  the  much- 
governed  Germany  to  have  afforded  a  useful  example.  But  the 
German  railways  have  never  been  up  to  the  first-class  standard 
as  regards  either  comfort  or  speed. 

An  opportunity  to  see  how  far  the  English  character  was 
in  keeping  with  national  ownership  was  given  during  the 
war.  The  result,  once  again,  was  to  prove  that  Government 
control  means  extravagance  and  mismanagement.6  This  could 
only  be  minimised  by  restrictions  which  the  public  would 
find  galling  in  the  extreme;  while  it  is  curious  to  reflect  that 
during  the  war  no  section  of  the  community  objected  so 
strongly  to  such  restrictions  as  there  were  as  did  Labour. 

Again,  the  Labour  party  has  yet  to  establish  that  it  has 
some  idea  of  economical  administration,  all  the  more  so  be- 
cause some  of  the  extremists  have  made  it  rather  too  clear 
that  they  look  forward  to  spending  other  people's  money. 

Finally,  another  bar  to  success  at  the  polls  is  the  attitude 
of  the  party  about  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  The  day 
will  not  soon  come  in  England  when  a  majority  of  the  country 
will  consent  to  foreign  policy  being  controlled  by  any  hybrid 
internationalism — by  a  congress  at  Berne  or  Amsterdam,  any 
more  than  by  dictates  coming  from  Moscow.  That  is  a  taint 
of  which  the  Labour  party  will  have  to  purge  itself  before  it 
achieves  office. 

Neither  in  England  nor  in  France  will  the  last  active  in- 
tervention of  Labour  in  international  affairs  be  soon  forgotten. 
That  was  a  few  days  before  the  war,  when  German  Labour 
leaders  went  out  of  their  way  to  convince  Jaures  and  their 
other  French  friends  that  there  would  probably  be  no  dec- 
laration of  war;  but  that  if  there  was,  the  German  Labour 
and  Socialist  members  of  the  Reichstag  would  refuse  to  vote 
the  necessary  credits.     For  the  greater  part  they  voted  like 

"The  last  Blue  Book  giving  information  on  this  subject  (June,  1921) 
shows  that  the  Government's  experiments  as  a  merchant  were  also 
disastrous,  the  losses  upon  various  exploitations  running  into  millions 
of  pounds. 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  179 

lambs  and  fought  or  worked  like  tigers.7  The  national  feeling 
which  that  indicated  is  not  (in  my  opinion)  to  their  discredit. 
But  it  is  not  consistent  with  any  pretence  of  internationalism. 

Everything  the  German  Government  did  during  the  war 
was  in  the  interest  of  their  own  capital  and  labour  (for  it 
was  understood  that  they  necessarily  went  hand  in  hand), 
and  for  the  post-war  extinction  and  oppression  of  the  capital 
and  labour  of  its  enemies.  The  French  Socialist  party  has 
lost  all  political  influence  precisely  because  of  the  horror 
which  the  country  has  of  any  tinge  of  internationalism  under 
German  auspices.  No  doubt  English  Labour  leaders  have 
already  found  instructive  reading  in  The  Industries  of  Occu- 
pied France.  This  was  a  book  of  482  pages  (containing 
many  tables  and  plans),  the  work  of  200  German  officers 
serving  in  France,  chosen  on  account  of  their  technical  knowl- 
edge of  the  various  industries,  which  was  published  in  Febru- 
ary, 1 916.  It  was  sent  to  all  the  German  Chambers  of  Com- 
merce and  other  financial  and  commercial  associations  through- 
out the  country.  A  copy  of  this  confidential  publication  was 
given  to  the  Supreme  Council  in  February,  1919.  Its  ob- 
ject was  to  show  how  German  capital  and  German  labour 
might  profit  by  the  destruction  which  had  been  wrought  in 
France;  either  that  caused  in  the  course  of  warfare  or  that 
which  was  systematic  and  deliberate.  It  abounds  in  state- 
ments such  as  the  following :  "Bleaching  and  dyeing.  Every- 
thing in  copper  and  all  the  driving  belts  have  been  taken  down 
and  sent  to  Germany.  And  an  important  outlet  is  thus  opened 
for  machines  of  German  manufacture."  "Wool  spinning- 
mills.  In  the  factories  almost  all  the  copper  parts  of  the 
boilers  and  the  leather  belts  have  been  taken  away.  .  .  .  Ger- 
many ought  to  be  in  a  position  to  recommence  her  full  produc- 
tion at  least  two  years  before  France." 

If  the  Labour  party  limits  itself  to  a  determination  to  main- 

7  At  the  outset  of  the  war  even  Licblcnecht  (who  repented  later) 
approved  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory.  While  _  in  those  early 
days,  when  a  speedy  victory  seemed  in  sight,  no  political  group  was 
more  pan-Germanist  than  was  the  Socialist  party.  It  was  only  when 
the  result  became  uncertain,  and  they  realised  that  they  might  have  to 
bear  the  penalties  instead  of  sharing  the  spoils,  that  they  again  began 
to  prate  about  the  blessings  of  internationalism. 


180  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

tain  peace  and  to  frown  upon  designs  of  territorial  expansion 
on  the  part  of  any  country,  it  will  rest  on  firm  ground.  But 
if  it  makes  any  brand  of  internationalisation  a  component  part 
of  its  creed  it  is  unlikely  to  be  in  power  for  years  to  come. 

The  probability  is  that  the  Labour  party  will  undergo  great 
changes  between  a  comparatively  brief  period.  In  its  inner 
mechanism  there  is  more  to  be  admired  than  is  generally 
known.  Labour  members  represent  their  constituents  more 
truly  and  more  independently  than  do  many  on  the  other  side 
of  the  House.  Most  of  them  are  men  of  no  private  means 
and  of  small  incomes  who  could,  in  these  days,  make  much 
more  if  they  were  not  in  political  life.  During  a  recent  in- 
quiry regarding  members'  salaries,  a  Labour  member  told 
how  his  parliamentary  allowance  was  spent — in  eking  out  an 
existence — and  said  that  he  gave  in  all  £5  a  year  as  subscrip- 
tions to  charitable  and  other  organisations  in  his  constituency. 
For  the  people  who  send  these  men  into  Parliament  pay  the 
expenses  of  their  own  political  associations  without  looking 
for  assistance.  They  elect  whom  they  want  and  owe  nothing, 
and  are  under  no  obligation  to  their  member.  Yet  how  many 
who  are  to-day  sitting  on  the  right  of  the  Speaker  give  part 
(or  all)  of  their  parliamentary  allowance  to  support  the  party 
association  in  their  own  constituency,  entirely  aside  from  their 
manifold  donations  to  charitable,  religious,  sporting,  and  other 
organisations.  The  men  who  form  these  Conservative  or  Co- 
alition associations  are,  upon  the  whole,  much  better  off  than 
those  who  send  Labour  members  to  Westminster.  But  they 
are  also  much  less  independent.  They  place  so  little  value 
upon  the  franchise  that  they  will  not  even  pay  their  own  way. 
The  Lord  Chancellor  (in  speaking  of  the  divorce  laws)  told 
the  Upper  House  that  the  Law  was  ingenious  enough  to  cope 
with  any  conditions.  Possibly  a  broad  inquiry  will  one  day 
furnish  evidence  which  will  lead  to  much  needed  legislation 
on  this  subject. 

While  there  are  not  many  Labour  members  who  have  made 
any  great  mark  in  the  House  of  Commons,  there  are  some 
who  can  well  hold  their  own  with  all  comers.  I  will  refer 
to  two  only.     To  Mr.  Clynes,  with  his  quiet  manner  and  his 


LLOYD    GEORGE— PARTY    POLITICS  181 

lucid  statements,  the  House  always  listens  attentively.  Per- 
haps more  than  anyone  else  in  his  party  he  would  command 
confidence  as  a  Minister  of  the  Crown  in  a  Labour  Govern- 
ment. Mr.  J.  H.  Thomas  is  forcible  or  persuasive  at  will, 
and  generally  throws  a  new  light  on  every  subject.  That  he 
has  great  moral  courage  he  has  proved  time  and  again  out- 
side of  Parliament,  when  he  has  told  Labour  meetings,  in 
plain  language,  what  would  be  the  outcome  of  unjustifiable 
strikes.  As  a  negotiator  in  a  difficult  crisis  he  has  more  than 
once  rendered  great  service  to  his  country.  But  it  is  regret- 
table that  Mr.  Thomas,  who  is  by  no  means  so  convincing 
when  he  writes  as  when  he  talks,  was  recently  so  indiscreet 
as  to  become  an  author.  He  drew  a  picture  of  the  future — 
when  Labour  rules — which  was  undoubtedly  distasteful  to  the 
great  majority  of  his  fellow  countrymen.  Whilst  his  fallacies 
and  contradictions  left  him  an  easy  prey  to  anyone  who  cared 
to  analyse  his  rather  shallow  production.  Unfortunately  for 
the  Labour  leader,  the  Duke  of  Northumberland  seems  to 
have  been  sighing,  "O  that  mine  enemy  should  write  a  book!" 
He  turned  his  attention  to  Mr.  Thomas's  and  completely  de- 
molished it,  even  in  the  opinion  of  many  who  would  have 
preferred  to  have  been  able  'to  agree  with  Mr.  Thomas  rather 
than  with  the  Duke.  It  was  not  that  the  latter  wrote  anything 
very  forcible,  but  Mr.  Thomas's  work  was  at  once  feeble  and 
elementary. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  Mr.  Thomas,  who  is  a  national  asset, 
will  take  the  lesson  to  heart;  that  he  will  remember  that  the 
cobbler  should  stick  to  his  last.  He  excels  in  talking  and  per- 
suading, not  in  writing  and  pondering.  Moreover,  a  leader 
of  a  progressive  party  stultifies  himself  when  he  attempts  to 
write  the  last  word  of  a  political  or  social  creed.  The  Duke 
of  Northumberland  had  a  right  to  do  that  because  he  holds 
opinions  which  neither  time  nor  events  will  change.  But  Mr. 
Thomas  has  only  created  for  himself  a  source  of  future  em- 
barrassment. 

Undoubtedly  the  day  will  come  when  Mr.  Thomas  and 
Mr.  Clynes,  Mr.  Hodges,  Mr.  Jack  Jones,  and  others,  will 
spend  their  week-ends  at  Chequers  Court,  waited  on  by  the 


182  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

footmen  or  other  staff  for  whose  payment  Lord  and  Lady 
Lee  have  provided  in  making  their  generous  gift.  Money 
amassed  in  America  has  been  spent  in  many  strange  ways 
little  contemplated  by  its  maker.  But  it  is  difficult  to  imagine 
anything  more  fantastic  than  a  fortune  made  in  Stock  Ex- 
change or  banking  transactions  with  and  for  capitalistic  trusts 
being  used  to  provide  a  country  home  for  those  who  are  the 
avowed  enemies  of  such  combinations. 

When  all  is  said,  it  would  seem  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
should  still  be  able  to  sleep  tranquilly  at  10  Downing  Street. 
In  the  political  world  there  is  no  one  outside  his  net  who  can 
do  him  much  present  harm.  His  tenure  of  office  would  appear 
to  be  secure. 

Unfortunately  for  the  Prime  Minister's  peace  of  mind,  he 
has  an  enemy  more  powerful  by  far  than  any  parliamentary 
opponent  hitherto  named,  and  whose  voice  reaches  further 
than  that  of  the  loudest  mouth  orator.  Lord  Northcliffe 
and  his  numerous  satellites  are  constantly  on  the  alert;  they 
neither  give  nor  take  any  rest. 


CHAPTER  X 

Lord  Northcliffe  and  his  Press 

It  is  almost  a  tragedy  that  the  man  who  of  all  others  is 
most  sensitive  to  newspaper  criticism  should  have  made  an 
enemy  of  the  man  who  controls  the  most  powerful  and  the 
most  unsparingly  outspoken  newspapers  in  England. 

Lloyd  George's  weakness  in  this  respect  has  long  been  a 
source  of  amusement  to  European  statesmen.  They  are  un- 
able to  understand  how  anyone  who  has  been  in  public  life 
for  so  many  years  can  worry  unduly  about  comments  or  at- 
tacks in  the  Press.  M.  Painleve  once  mentioned  to  me  this 
characteristic  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  who,  he  said,  particularly 
disliked  the  articles  of  a  certain  French  journalist,  whom 
Painleve  cited  by  the  pseudonym  under  which  he  writes.  I 
mentioned  his  real  name,  whereupon  Painleve  remarked  that 
the  fact  that  he  had  never  before  known  who  it  was  indicated 
the  degree  of  importance  which  French  politicians  were  wont 
to  attach  to  such  articles. 

The  only  practical  result  of  the  Prime  Minister's  hyper- 
sensitiveness  to  newspaper  criticism  is  that  he  has  exposed 
his  weak  point  as  a  target  for  those  who  are  inimical  to  him, 
and  has  alienated  others  who  were  not  disposed  to  be  un- 
friendly. The  French  Press  mocks  (and  not  without  reason) 
at  the  way  Lloyd  George  winces  under  the  comments  of 
"Pertinax"  in  I'Echo  de  Paris  and  of  M.  Jules  Sauerwein 
in  Le  Matin.  He  has  from  time  to  time  tried  to  placate  the 
former.  While  his  aversion  to  the  plain  statements  of  the 
latter  is  so  well  known  that  at  the  time  of  the  Conference  of 
London  in  192 1  one  Paris  journal1  reported  that  he  had 
thought  of  having  Sauerwein  deported;  although  anyone  con- 

1  Aux  Ecoutes,  July  24th,  1921. 

183 


184  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

versant  with  English  methods  must  know  that  whatever  might 
have  been  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  irritation  there  could  be  no 
solid  foundation  for  that  statement. 

It  is  not  the  differences  between  the  British  and  French 
Governments  which  are  primarily  responsible  for  the  dis- 
favour with  which  the  French  Press  regards  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  but  simply  his  system  of  sacrificing  anything  or  any- 
body in  order  to  safeguard  his  own  susceptibilities. 

A  few  months  ago  Mr.  Frank  Simmonds,  who  is  perhaps 
better  known  in  England  and  France  than  any  other  American 
journalist,  wrote  that  if  the  British  Prime  Minister  attended 
the  Washington  Conference  he  would  find  himself  an  "object 
of  suspicion."  The  reasons  given  were  such  incidents  as 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  attempt  to  stop  the  publication  in  the 
New  York  World  of  an  article  which  he  regarded  as  politically 
embarrassing,  as  well  as  his  conduct  at  the  Peace  Conference, 
where  "his  quarrels  with  the  Paris  Press  are  sufficiently  no- 
torious to  need  no  recalling." 

Mr.  Simmonds  said  plainly  that  "if  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
should  come  to  the  United  States  surrounded  by  the  group 
of  newspaper  friends  and  Press  agents  who  served  his  interests 
at  Paris,  and  should  employ  the  same  methods — that  is,  should 
seek  the  suppression  of  news — almost  incalculable  harm 
would  be  done  to  the  whole  cause  of  Anglo-American 
friendship." 

Undoubtedly  Lord  Riddell  is  answerable  for  much.  That 
excessively  able  man  may  have  talents  which  qualify  him  to 
be  an  excellent  Press  agent.  But  he  was  grotesquely  out  of 
place  in  dealing  with  the  foreign  Press.  He  was  lacking  in 
both  knowledge  and  experience.  No  doubt  he  sometimes 
prevented  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  sensibilities  from  being  ruffled. 
But  his  methods  did  not  make  for  good  feelings  amongst  the 
Allies.  For,  despite  much  dining  together,  the  truth  is  that 
when  Lord  Riddell  did  not  amuse  he  exasperated  those  for 
whom  it  was  his  duty  to  act  as  intermediary. 

The  whole  question  may  be  summed  up  by  saying  that  the 
French  and  American  Press  are  at  one  in  their  fixed  objections 
to  being  either  bullied  or  bamboozled.     Apparently  the  Press 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS  185 

is  moderately  indifferent  to  either  the  praise  or  the  blame  of 
Mr.  Lloyd  George,  but  is  determined  to  report  his  doings  as 
it  sees  them. 

But  the  fact  remains  that  the  Prime  Minister  will  never 
realise  that  newspaper  comment  is  fairly  the  lot  of  the 
politician.  He  both  fears  and  resents  it.  Sometimes  he 
blusters  in  reply.  Sometimes  he  tries  to  cajole  his  critics  or 
to  stifle  their  criticism. 

When  the  Daily  Chronicle,  once  his  faithful  supporter, 
began  to  annoy  him  by  its  attacks,  his  friends  bought  it  and 
placed  the  control  in  safe  hands.  In  brief,  he  will  adopt  any 
feasible  method  to  avoid  having  a  hostile  Press.  The  one 
thing  he  is  temperamentally  incapable  of  doing  is  to  accept 
any  reproof  gracefully. 

This  was  illustrated  years  ago  in  the  unfortunate  Marconi 
case.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  (as  well 
as  Lord  Reading,  then  Sir  Rufus  Isaacs)  made  very  humble 
speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons,  admitting  their  grave 
error  of  judgment,  but  denying  any  conscious  wrong-doing; 
and  then,  according  to  precedent,  withdrew  while  the  House 
decided  their  fate.  In  the  result  both  the  Prime  Minister  and 
the  future  Lord  Chief  Justice  and  Viceroy  were  saved  from 
what  was  very  nearly  the  consequence  of  their  Marconi  specu- 
lations— the  closing  of  their  political  careers.  But  a  few  days 
later  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  being  then  out  of  the  woods,  delivered 
a  speech  at  the  National  Liberal  Club  which  can  only  be  de- 
scribed as  defiant  in  tone,  and  which  doubtless  would  have 
turned  the  majority  against  him  had  he  made  it  in  the  House 
of  Commons  instead  of  the  more  penitent  discourse  with  which 
he  wisely  sought  to  conciliate  that  assembly. 

The  Prime  Minister's  susceptibility  to  newspaper  attacks 
arises  partly  from  the  fact  that  popularity  is  essential  to  his 
well-being  (at  which  Clemenceau  used  to  gibe  behind  his  back, 
and  of  which  he  sometimes  took  advantage  in  his  negotia- 
tions), and  partly  from  his  sense  of  the  injustice  of  one  who 
wants  at  any  cost  to  please  and  to  be  applauded  by  the  majority 
of  his  fellow-countrymen  being  assailed  by  them. 

Lloyd  George  is  not  naturally  a  maker  of  public  sentiment. 


186  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Upon  one  occasion — and  the  most  critical  of  all — he  did  give 
a  lead;  and  the  memory  of  that  will  always  be  his  greatest 
claim  to  renown.  But  leaving  aside  that  notable  instance  an 
examination  of  his  career  will  show  that,  while  he  has  some- 
times excited  the  passions  of  a  class,  he  has  seldom  formed 
the  judgment  of  the  country.  He  prefers  to  find  out  what  is 
public  opinion  (and  no  one  is  more  clever  in  the  art  of 
divining  it  early  in  the  day),  and  to  adopt  it  as  his  own.  He 
is  positively  grieved  when  the  force  of  circumstances  obliges 
him  to  take  a  line  which  he  knows  will  not  be  popular;  and, 
unfortunately  for  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  conditions  after  a 
great  war  are  such  that  any  Government  must  do  many  things 
which  tend  to  make  it  disliked. 

These  characteristics  of  the  Prime  Minister  have  led  him 
into  a  habit  of  reviling  the  Press  whenever  it  disagrees  with 
him  or  with  his  policy.  No  names  are  then  too  bad  for  it; 
no  good  motive  is  then  imputed  to  it.  The  British  Press  is  so 
free  and  incorruptible  that  it  probably  never  takes  such  out- 
bursts seriously;  and  all  the  less  so  because  it  is  common 
knowledge  that  no  politician  in  our  history  has  made  such  use 
of  newspapers  as  has  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  But  nevertheless  it 
is  an  unhealthy  state  of  affairs  that  any  statesman,  through 
an  incapacity  to  bear  blame,  should  impute  unworthy  ends  to 
newspapers  which  may  sincerely  think  that  he  is  at  fault.  This 
situation  has  become  at  once  graver  and  more  ludicrous 
through  other  Ministers  of  the  Crown  copying  the  example 
of  their  Chief.  After  all,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  with  his  great 
qualities,  with  his  weaknesses,  and,  above  all,  with  his  record 
of  services  to  the  country,  is  in  a  sense  a  person  apart;  and 
much  allowance  must  be  made  for  his  foibles.  But  it  becomes 
another  matter  when  his  colleagues  feel  bound  to  imitate  him ; 
when,  for  instance,  Sir  Worthington  Evans  begins  to  lecture 
the  Press,  as  he  did  last  session  in  the  House  of  Commons. 

Mr.  Bonar  Law,  with  his  infallible  good  sense,  has  a  much 
keener  sense  of  proportion.    Speaking  in  191 5,  he  said : 

"It  is  the  right,  not  only  of  every  member  of  the  House,  but 
of  every  newspaper  in  this  country,  on  every  platform,  if  he 
honestly  believes  that  a  member  of  the  Government  is  incom- 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS  187 

petent  or  is  not  properly  doing  his  work,  to  try  to  get  rid  of 
that  member,  even  if  his  trying  to  do  so  does  create  a  want  of 
confidence  in  the  Government." 

For  the  last  few  years  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  standing  quarrel 
has  been  with  Lord  Northcliffe.  During  the  War  their  rela- 
tions varied.  Sometimes  they  were  at  one.  Sometimes  the 
Northcliffe  Press  attacked  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  Sometimes  the 
latter  went  out  of  his  way  to  be  conciliating.  Lord 
Northcliffe  was  sent  on  several  missions  by  the  Government. 
He  was,  it  is  understood,  offered  the  Air  Ministry.  The 
country  was  never  apprised  of  this  by  any  official  or  semi- 
official announcement — nor,  curiously,  was  Lord  Cowdray, 
who  then  held  the  office.  But  Lord  Northcliffe  published  a 
letter  he  had  written  declining  the  post,  and  in  which  he  had 
also  embodied  a  little  sermon  upon  the  Cabinet's  shortcomings. 
Later,  he  was  at  the  head  of  the  department  in  charge  of 
propaganda  work  in  enemy  countries.  But  it  was  after  the 
Armistice  that  relations  became  strained,  until  finally  they 
reached  the  breaking  point.  It  is  said  that  Northcliffe  wished 
to  be  one  of  the  British  representatives  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence, and  that  the  Prime  Minister  refused  to  consider  the 
suggestion.  No  direct  proof  has  ever  been  advanced  that  any 
such  overtures  were  made  by  Lord  Northcliffe  or  on  his 
behalf,  though  it  is  true  that  before  the  end  of  the  War,  in 
1 91 7,  he  was  generally  credited  with  cherishing  that  ambition. 
But  it  is  significant  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  speaking  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  April  16th,  1919,  intimated  clearly 
that  Lord  Northcliffe  (whom  he  did  not  mention  by  name) 
had  asked  for  something  which  he  had  not  seen  fit  to  give 
him;  and  that  that  was  the  cause  of  the  bitter  hostility  of  the 
Northcliffe  Press  towards  his  Government. 

The  offensive  nature  of  the  comments  about  Lord  North- 
cliffe was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that,  when  referring  to  him, 
Lloyd  George  touched  his  forehead,  as  if  to  indicate  mental 
derangement. 

Such  remarks,  made  in  such  a  place  and  in  such  a  way, 
would  render  any  reconciliation  difficult  even  between  men 


188  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

with  tough  skins.  Undoubtedly  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had 
provocation  for  his  assault.  But  the  general  impression 
amongst  those  who  heard  the  speech,  amongst  moderate  men 
who  were  political  supporters  of  the  Government  and  by  no 
means  admirers  of  Lord  Northcliffe,  was  that  he  had  gone 
too  far.  It  was  thought  regrettable  that  a  Prime  Minister 
should,  on  such  an  occasion,  have  used  such  language,  or 
should  have  descended  to  reply  to  what  he  evidently  considered 
were  personal  attacks.  That,  I  believe,  will  also  be  the  judg- 
ment when  the  incident  has  passed  into  history. 

Still  more  doubtful  was  the  wisdom  of  the  onslaught.  The 
Northcliffe  newspapers  may  not  be  able  to  do  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  all  the  harm  which  many  people  seem  to  imagine  (the 
degree  of  influence  which  newspapers  have  on  the  electorate 
is  generally  exaggerated),  but  it  is  quite  possible  that  his 
continued  depreciation  by  a  powerful  press  with  many  rami- 
fications will  have  some  adverse  effect.  Certainly  it  is  not 
helpful.  Moreover,  the  contest  is  unequal.  For  while 
Northcliffe  may  injure  Lloyd  George,  the  latter  cannot  in  any 
possible  way  hurt  Northcliffe.  The  basis  of  the  prosperity 
and  potency  of  newspapers  is  their  circulation.  The  com- 
plaints of  the  Prime  Minister  and  his  colleagues  about  the 
alleged  unfairness  of  the  Northcliffe  Press  may  find  some 
echo  in  the  political  world  and  in  a  limited  circle  outside.  But 
probably  the  principal  and  the  most  direct  result  of  each  of 
these  protests  is  to  increase  the  sale  of  the  Northcliffe  news- 
papers. Quite  unconsciously  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has 
constituted  himself  one  of  Lord  Northcliffe's  most  effective 
circulation  agents. 

Of  course,  Northcliffe's  immunity  is  dependent  upon  his 
keeping  behind  the  barrier  of  his  own  press.  He  is  like  a 
man  in  a  fortress.  Lloyd  George  is  outside,  and  from  time 
to  time  is  compelled  to  pass  within  range  of  his  enemy's  guns. 
He  can  do  little  in  the  way  of  counter-attack.  For  instance, 
the  banning  of  Northcliffe  by  our  Washington  Embassy  was 
simply  a  further  advertisement  of  his  power.  But  the  situa- 
tion changes  if  Northcliffe  steps  into  the  open.  Lloyd  George 
is  not  the  man  to  miss  any  such  chances.     Certainly  he  made 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS  189 

the  most  of  an  opportunity  which  Northcliffe's  imprudence 
recently  gave  him.  It  will  suffice  to  recall  the  facts  briefly. 
On  Friday,  July  29th,  1921,  the  Prime  Minister  communi- 
cated to  a  somewhat  astonished  House  of  Commons  a  message 
from  the  King,  denying  the  truth  of  certain  statements  at- 
tributed to  him  in  an  interview  given  in  America  by  Lord 
Northcliffe,  and  published  by  the  New  York  Times,  and  by 
one  or  more  of  Northcliffe's  own  newspapers  in  England  or 
Ireland. 

Lord  Northcliffe,  on  his  side,  thereupon  cabled  to  the  King's 
secretary  denying  that  he  had  ever  used  the  words  quoted  by 
the  Prime  Minister,  and  adding,  "I  gave  no  such  interview." 

Possibly  he  would  have  been  well  advised  to  show  a  little 
more  candour.  For  it  appeared  later  that  while  he  had  not 
given  the  interview,  yet  that  the  person  directly  responsible 
was  Mr.  Wickham  Steed,  the  editor  of  the  Times  and  Lord 
Northcliffe's  travelling  companion,  who  had  made  the  state- 
ments in  question  on  the  previous  Monday.  How  it  was 
attributed  to  Lord  Northcliffe  in  his  own  newspapers  is  a 
matter  which  by  this  time  has  doubtless  been  settled  between 
his  henchmen  and  himself.  But  what  the  public  would  like 
to  know  is  why  his  cable  to  the  King's  secretary  did  not  tell 
the  whole  story;  why  it  did  not  admit  frankly  that  the  state- 
ments in  question  had  been  made  by  Northcliffe's  editor;  and 
why,  although  the  interview  was  published  on  Monday  in 
New  York  (where  Northcliffe  then  was),  he  never  made  the 
faintest  protest  until  the  House  of  Commons  was  informed 
that  the  King  had  denounced  the  statements  as  untrue. 

The  New  York  Times  had  rightly  attributed  the  interview 
to  Mr.  Wickham  Steed.  But  it  maintained  the  accuracy  of 
its  report  of  what  the  latter  had  said.  Mr.  Wickham  Steed 
promised  to  give  explanations.  The  only  one  he  gave  publicly 
was  a  rather  lame  excuse  to  the  effect  that  he  had  mentioned 
things  which  he  had  not  thought  would  be  published,  thus 
leaving  intact  the  fact  that  those  statements,  on  the  authority 
of  the  King,  were  false.  After  that  Lord  Northcliffe  and  Mr. 
Wickham  Steed  promptly  left  New  York.  The  former  crossed 
the  Continent  as  quickly  as  possible ;  and  even  his  own  diligent 


190  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

press  could  find  no  sayings  of  his  to  record  until  he  had  put 
the  comfortable  distance  of  three  thousand  miles  between 
himself  and  this  unfortunate  incident. 

A  Frenchman  who,  on  account  of  his  political  connections, 
as  well  as  for  other  reasons,  has  long  been  a  figure  in  interna- 
tional politics,  and  who  was  on  friendly  personal  terms  with 
both  Lloyd  George  and  NorthclifTe,  told  me  that  some  time 
ago  he  was  instigated  to  try  and  heal  the  breach.  He  men- 
tioned the  suggestion  to  Lloyd  George,  saying  that  he  would 
also  approach  NorthclifTe  if  the  Prime  Minister  consented. 
But  the  latter  replied  that  he  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that, 
if  he  had  to  have  an  enemy,  he  would  rather  it  should  be 
NorthclifTe  than  anyone  else. 

There  may  well  have  been  many  excellent  reasons  why  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  did  not  want  any  overtures  to  be  made  to  Lord 
NorthclifTe,  but  I  doubt  if  that  was  the  real  one. 

Even  those  who  have  no  special  reason  to  like  Lord  North- 
clifTe (amongst  whom  I  count  myself)  must  admit  that  he  is 
always  a  great  national  character,  and  at  times  a  great  national 
asset.  A  book  by  the  late  Mr.  Kennedy  Jones  recently  gave 
rise  to  some  discussion  as  to  whether  he  made  Lord 
NorthclifTe,  or  vice  versa.  One  reviewer  said  that,  from  Mr. 
Kennedy  Jones's  story,  one  would  imagine  that  it  was  a  very 
lucky  day  for  NorthclifTe  when  they  met,  but  that  Fleet  Street 
thought  the  fortunate  one  was  Kennedy  Jones.  The  truth 
probably  lies  in  another  direction.  Doubtless  Kennedy  Jones 
excelled  Lord  NorthclifTe  in  the  management  of  a  daily  news- 
paper (he  had,  it  is  alleged,  a  peculiar  talent  for  brutally 
eliminating  all  incompetents),  and  would  have  made  a  fortune 
even  if  he  had  never  brought  the  Evening  News  proposal  to 
Mr.  Alfred  Harmsworth;  while  probably  Lord  Rothermere 
is  a  shrewder  man  of  affairs  than  Lord  NorthclifTe.  But 
NorthclifTe  has  a  touch  of  genius  or  greatness  which  neither 
of  the  other  two  possesses,  and  which  he  certainly  did  not  get 
through  having  Kennedy  Jones  as  a  partner  or  Lord  Rother- 
mere as  a  brother. 

In  France  the  political  world  was  never  in  any  doubt  about 
NorthclifTe.      In   the   conversation   to  which   I   have   already 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS  191 

alluded,  when  indifference  was  expressed  about  Asquith  re- 
signing, provided  Lloyd  George  remained  in  office,  the 
statesman  who  held  this  view  added :  "You  have  only  two 
really  great  men  in  England — Lloyd  George  and  Northcliffe." 
If,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  Northcliffe  did  not  rank  so  highly  as 
Lloyd  George  in  French  public  opinion,  it  was  chiefly  on 
account  of  the  official  position  occupied  by  the  latter. 

For  my  own  part  I  think  that  Northcliffe  as  a  personality 
is  greater,  infinitely  greater,  than  his  press,  and  that  the  way 
in  which  his  newspapers  constantly  refer  to  him  tends  both  to 
diminish  his  position  and  to  lessen  their  influence.  Nothing 
which  he  does  is  left  unadvertised.  No  word  of  his  is  per- 
mitted to  fall  to  the  ground.  The  state  of  his  health  is 
recorded  with  meticulous  care.  But  the  only  result  of  this 
misplaced  zeal  on  the  part  of  his  satellites  is  to  create  a  certain 
mild  amusement  both  in  England  and  on  the  Continent. 

Two  instances  of  what  I  mean  will  suffice.  One  day  not 
long  ago  one  could  read  in  the  Times  the  following  items  of 
information: 

"The  Earl  of  Lathom  has  returned  to  London. 

"The  Earl  and  Countess  of  Scarborough  return  to  London 
to-day  after  a  short  visit  to  the  Earl  and  Countess  of  Midleton 
at  Peper-Harrow,  Godalming. 

"Viscount  Northcliffe  has  arrived  at  Cap  Martin  in  good 
health. 

"Lord  Glentanar  has  left  London  for  Scotland. 

"Lord  Colum  Crichton-Stuart  has  gone  abroad  for  a  few 
months.  Lord  Queenborough  has  returned  to  39,  Berkeley 
Square  from  Nostell  Priory,  Wakefield." 

(The  italics  are  mine.) 

The  nuance  is  slight  but  typical. 

This  solicitude  to  keep  before  the  public  the  name  of  the 
principal  proprietor  must  make  Delane  and  all  the  Walters 
turn  in  their  graves.  Nor  has  it  even  the  excuse  of  being  in 
deference  to  the  custom  of  the  day.  One  will  search  the  files 
of  the  Daily  Telegraph  in  vain  to  find  any  such  complete  and 
minute    accounts    of    the    doings    of    Lord    Burnham.      The 


192  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Morning  Post  rarely  refers  to  Lady  Bathurst.  Lord  Beaver- 
brook  occupies  no  undue  amount  of  space  in  the  columns  of 
the  Daily  Express. 

The  same  publicity  is  given  to  the  doings  of  all  members 
of  the  Harmsworth  family  who  find  favour  in  the  eyes  of 
Lord  Northcliffe.  In  fact,  it  goes  so  far  that  the  reports  of 
the  Northcliffe  Press  are  not  always  easily  reconcilable  with 
those  of  other  newspapers. 

On  June  23rd,  1921,  there  was  a  debate  in  the  House  of 
Commons  regarding  Dr.  Addison's  salary.  An  interesting 
comparison,  in  which  political  predilections  can  play  no  part, 
may  be  made  by  putting  side  by  side  the  accounts  given  in  the 
Morning  Post  and  the  Northcliffe  newspapers — both  equally 
opposed  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  this  question.  From  the 
latter  one  would  imagine  that  a  successful  attack  on  the  Gov- 
ernment had  been  led  by  Mr.  Esmond  Harmsworth.  From 
the  former  (as  well  as  according  to  other  newspapers)  it 
would  appear  that  the  movement  had  been  unsuccessful;  while 
the  name  of  Mr.  Esmond  Harmsworth  is  not  even  amongst 
those  mentioned  in  the  many  columns  given  to  a  report  of  the 
debate. 

The  only  result  was  to  bring  into  ridicule  one  of  the  ablest 
and  most  promising  of  the  younger  members  of  the  House 
of  Commons;  and  to  lend  point  to  a  comment  by  a  French 
politician  that  the  title  of  the  Paris  Daily  Mail  should  be 
changed  to  the  Family  Herald. 

Some  months  ago  the  publication  of  a  book  entitled  "The 
Mirrors  of  Downing  Street"  gave  rise  to  much  comment, 
which  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  name  of  the  author 
was  not  disclosed.  A  small  volume  of  174  pages,  it  contained 
character-sketches  of  various  personages,  including,  amongst 
others,  Lloyd  George,  Winston  Churchill,  Lord  Fisher,  Lord 
Kitchener,  Mr.  Asquith,  Lord  Haldane,  and  Mr.  Arthur  Bal- 
four. Of  the  fourteen  chapters  one  of  less  than  nine  pages 
was  devoted  to  Lord  Northcliffe.  The  book  was  reviewed  in 
the  Times  of  the  15th  October,  1920.  The  Times  reviewer 
is  at  pains  to  bring  forward  everything  good  said  about  his 
proprietor,  while  being  content  to  leave  in  the  background  the 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS  193 

more  unpleasant  comments.  In  brief,  it  is  questionable 
whether  the  review  conveys  a  fair  or  a  misleading  account  of 
what  the  author  actually  said  about  Northcliffe.  It  is  impos- 
sible to  quote  in  full  the  article  from  "The  Mirrors  of 
Downing  Street,"  but  no  violence  is  being  done  to  its  text  in 
citing  the  following  sentences :  "I  should  say  he  has  no  moral 
scruples  in  a  fight,  none  at  all ;  I  doubt  very  much  whether  he 
ever  asks  himself  if  anything  is  right  or  wrong.  I  should 
say  that  he  has  only  one  question  to  ask  of  fate  before  he  strips 
for  a  fight,  Is  this  going  to  be  Success  or  Failure?  .  .  .  But 
it  is  already  apparent  that,  for  want  of  balance  and  moral 
continuity  in  his  direction  of  policy,  Lord  Northcliffe  has  done 
nothing  to  elevate  the  public  mind  and  much  to  degrade  it. 
He  has  jumped  from  sensation  to  sensation.  He  has  never 
seen  in  the  great  body  of  public  opinion  a  spirit  to  be  patiently 
and  orderly  educated  towards  noble  ideals,  but  rather  a  herd 
to  be  stampeded  of  a  sudden  in  the  direction  which  he  himself 
has  suddenly  conceived  to  be  the  direction  of  success.  .  .  . 
The  moral  and  intellectual  condition  of  the  world,  a  position 
from  which  only  a  great  spiritual  palingenesis  can  deliver 
civilization,  is  a  charge  on  the  sheet  which  Lord  Northcliffe 
will  have  to  answer  at  the  seat  of  judgment.  He  has  received 
the  price  of  that  condition  in  the  multitudinous  pence  of  the 
people ;  consciously  or  unconsciously,  he  has  traded  on  their 
ignorance,  ministered  to  their  vulgarities,  and  inflamed  the 
lowest  and  most  corrupting  of  their  passions;  if  they  had  had 
another  guide  his  puise  had  been  empty." 

It  is  true  that  the  same  sketch  gives  Lord  Northcliffe  such 
commendable  qualities  as  being  a  good  son  and  "a  charming 
and  most  considerate  host."  He  is  pronounced  to  be  romantic, 
generous,  and  boyish.  Some  of  his  mistakes  are  excused  on 
the  ground  of  his  health;  others  are  attributed  to  his  romantic 
disposition.  The  final  verdict  is  "He  cannot  be  a  deliberately 
bad  man."  But  it  requires  a  reviewer  who  sees  with  one  eye 
only  to  say  of  an  article  which  accuses  a  man  of  having 
pandered  to  the  lowest  tastes  in  order  to  become  rich  ("he  has 
traded  on  their  ignorance,  ministered  to  their  vulgarities,  and 
inflamed  the  lowest  and  most  corrupting  of  their  passions; 


194  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

if  they  had  had  another  guide  his  purse  had  been  empty") 
that  it  is  benevolent.  The  exact  words  of  the  review  in  so 
far  as  it  refers  to  the  scatch  of  Lord  Northcliffe  (and  it  is 
characteristic  that  whereas  only  nine  out  of  174  pages  in 
the  book  are  given  up  to  Northcliffe,  twenty-nine  out  of  a 
review  of  129  lines,  including  quotations,  are  devoted  to  him) 
are  as  follows :  "His  Lord  Northcliffe  is  subtle,  occasionally 
very  shrewd,  and  on  the  whole  benignant.  Apparently  he  will 
have  to  answer  at  the  judgment  seat  for  'the  moral  and  intel- 
lectual position  of  the  world,'  but  his  political  purpose,  from 
beginning  to  end,  I  am  entirely  convinced,  has  been  to  serve 
what  he  conceives  to  be  the  highest  interests  of  his  country. 
I  regard  him  in  the  matter  of  intention  as  one  of  the  most 
honourable  and  courageous  men  of  the  day.'  And  again : 
'All  the  same,  it  is  the  greatest  mistake  for  his  enemies  to 
declare  that  he  is  nothing  better  than  a  cynical  egoist  trading 
on  the  enormous  ignorance  of  the  English  middle  classes.  He 
is  a  boy,  full  of  adventure,  full  of  romance,  and  full  of  whims, 
seeing  life  as  the  finest  fairy-tale  in  the  world,  and  enjoying 
every  incident  that  comes  his  way,  whether  it  be  the  bitterest 
and  most  cruel  of  fights  or  the  opportunity  for  doing  some  one 
a  romantic  kindness.  You  may  see  the  boyishness  of  his 
nature  in  the  devotion  with  which  he  threw  himself  first  into 
bicycling,  then  into  motoring,  and  then  into  flying.  He  loves 
machinery.  He  loves  every  game  which  involves  physical 
risk  and  makes  severe  demands  on  courage.  His  love  of 
England  is  not  his  love  of  her  merchants  and  workmen,  but 
his  love  of  her  masculine  youth.'  " 

The  Northcliffe  Press  was  at  least  consistent;  for  shortly 
afterwards  it  published  several  articles  by  "The  Author  of 
'The  Mirrors  of  Downing  Street'"!  The  unknown  writer 
was  hardly  equally  so  when  he  consented  to  take  pay  from 
the  newspaper,  which  he  condemned  as  degrading  the  public 
taste.  So  far  as  one  could  make  out,  these  articles  were  meant 
to  be  a  scathing  criticism  of  the  state  of  society  as  disclosed 
by  the  recent  books  of  Colonel  Repington  and  Mrs.  Asquith. 
Indirectly  it  is,  I  think,  the  Northcliffe  Press  which  is  largely 
responsible  for  these  works.     For  if  that  press  had  not  for 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS  195 

the  last  twenty-odd  years  fed  the  reading  public  with  personal 
articles  there  would  never  have  been  the  market  which  there 
is  to-day  for  such  outpourings. 

Colonel  Repington's  book  gives  a  fair  idea  of  society  in  the 
sense  that  his  relation  of  the  usual  kind  of  conversation  which 
prevails  at  dinner  or  luncheon  (and  the  greater  part  of  the 
book  is  taken  up  with  that)  is  sufficiently  accurate.  But  the 
deductions  which  might  naturally  be  drawn  from  such  a  bald 
account  are  such  as  to  shock  those  whose  opinion  is  based 
solely  upon  its  perusal.  The  picture  evidently  was  not  to  the 
taste  of  the  author  of  "The  Mirrors  of  Downing  Street." 
At  the  risk  of  making  an  egregious  error  I  am  inclined  to 
believe  that  that  anonymous  writer  does  not  move  in  the  same 
world   as    Colonel    Repington. 

What  is  of  more  importance  than  that  mysterious  personage 
having  been  shocked  is  that  this  day-to-day  story  of  life  in 
war  time  has  given  a  false  idea  to  many  of  our  Allies.  It 
makes  them  think  that  English  society  was  selfish  and  that 
the  women  of  that  society  were  heartless.  It  is  true  that  in 
Paris  no  music  was  allowed  during  the  War;  that  dancing 
was  a  thing  unknown ;  that  one  did  not  dress  for  dinner ;  that 
the  serious  side  of  everything  was  given  prominence.  Any- 
thing else  was  mauvais  ton. 

In  such  matters  the  different  nations  must  be  guided  by 
their  own  views.  In  England  it  was  considered  bad  taste  to 
dwell  too  much  upon  one's  own  losses  or  sufferings.  But  as 
regards  work  actually  done,  sacrifices  actually  made,  English- 
women of  the  set  most  mentioned  in  Repington's  book  have 
a  record  of  things  accomplished  which  is  unequalled  by  the 
women  of  any  other  country.  While  the  class  to  which  they 
belong  gave  of  its  blood  at  least  as  liberally  as  any  other  section 
of  the  population  of  Great  Britain. 

The  publication  of  this  book  at  this  time  was  regrettable 
because  it  produced  many  misunderstandings  and  served  no 
apparent  purpose.  A  generation  from  now  it  might  have  been 
a  useful  and  interesting  record  without  doing  any  harm.  But, 
above  all,  its  publication  to-day  was  a  breach  of  confidence 
upon  a  wholesale  scale. 


196  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

During  the  period  in  question  I  was  in  the  habit  of  meeting 
Repington  frequently  at  several  of  the  houses  where  he  con- 
tinually lunched  and  dined.  No  one  knows  better  than  he  that 
the  conversation  would  have  been  somewhat  different  had 
everyone  foreseen  that  within  three  or  four  years  their  remarks 
would  be  given  to  the  world  in  print.  No  one  knows  better 
than  Repington  that  the  whole  fabric  of  English  society  would 
be  changed,  that  intercourse  would  be  much  less  free  and 
pleasant,  if  everyone  felt  that  nothing  was  confidential,  that 
talking  at  dinner  was  like  declaiming  from  the  housetops. 

Colonel  Repington  misstates  (only,  I  am  sure,  because  he 
misunderstood)  several  things  I  mentioned  to  him,  in  a  way 
which  caused  me  some  embarrassment.  My  full  compensation 
came  in  the  delight  I  got  from  reading  of  the  indiscretions  of 
others.  Nevertheless,  the  book  recalls  the  rhyme  which  became 
current  upon  the  publication  of  the  first  part  of  Charles 
Greville's  diaries : 

"For  forty  years  he  listened  at  the  door, 
He  heard  some  secrets  and  invented  more." 

Repington  did  not  listen  at  the  door,  but  in  one  way  he  is 
much  more  blameworthy  than  Greville.  The  latter  gave  noth- 
ing to  the  world  in  his  own  lifetime,  and  left  his  diaries  to 
Henry  Reeve  to  be  published  whenever  the  latter  considered 
that  the  proper  time  had  arrived.  If  they  were  published  too 
soon,  as  Queen  Victoria  thought  (though  she  probably 
believed  that  they  should  never  have  seen  the  light  of  day  at 
all),  the  fault  was  Reeve's,  not  Greville's. 

Winston  Churchill  has  written  that  Mrs.  Asquith's 
"Autobiography  might  well  find  a  place  in  the  bibliography 
of  the  Victorian  era,"  while,  according  to  Mr.  Charles  Master- 
man,  "the  first  thing  to  note  is  that  this  book  is  literature. 
Mrs.  Asquith  has  produced  a  volume  which  in  mere  form  and 
texture  alone  might  be  envied  by  the  greatest  of  contemporary 
writers." 

It  is  uncomfortable  to  find  oneself  at  variance  with  such 
distinguished  critics.  But  it  is  not  given  to  everyone  to  see 
this  book  in  the  same  light.     I  think  that  what  it  does  convey 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS   197 

to  those  who  (like  myself)  are  not  in  Mrs.  Asquith's  intimacy, 
is  her  enormous  vitality,  her  kindness  of  heart,  her  loyalty 
to  her  friends,  and  her  amazing  indiscretion.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  say  what  good  end  could  be  served  by  recounting 
such  incidents  as  her  flirtation  with  Peter  Flower,  or  the  un- 
pleasant story  about  the  man  who  followed  her  one  night  in 
Dresden,  or  the  equally  undelectable  one  about  Charles  Dilke. 
They  are  neither  good  literature  nor  history ;  and  they  have  not 
even  the  merit  of  being  wholesomely  amusing. 

One  of  the  best  things  in  the  book  is  the  single  occasion 
when  Mrs.  Asquith  is  funny  without  knowing  it.  She  writes 
(page  79)  :  "I  shrank  then,  as  I  do  now,  from  exposing  the 
secrets  and  sensations  of  life.  Reticence  should  guard  the 
soul.  When  I  peer  among  my  dead,  or  survey  my  living 
friends,  I  see  hardly  anyone  with  this  quality."  It  is  said 
that  Mrs.  Asquith's  friends  (she  names  two  exceptions  apart 
from  her  own  family)  were  not  pleased  to  read  that,  compared 
with  herself,  they  were  lacking  in  reticence.  But  there  is  some 
sense  of  humour  wanting  in  a  woman  who  can  aver  that  she 
shrinks  from  exposing  the  sensations  of  her  life  in  the  same 
book  in  which  she  recounts  in  detail  her  love  affairs,  and  the 
most  intimate  events  of  her  family  existence;  in  which  she 
analyses  her  inmost  feelings  and  drags  before  the  public  the 
virtues  and  failings  of  her  friends  who  are  still  alive. 

The  truth  is  that  both  the  Repington  and  the  Asquith  books 
were  published  because  money  was  to  be  made  by  writing 
personalities  for  which  the  public  appetite  had  been  developed 
by  the  Northcliffe  Press. 

I  have  suggested  that  Lord  Northcliffe  injures  his  own  press 
by  so  closely  identifying  it  with  his  own  personality.  As 
regards  the  majority  of  his  newspapers  that  is  so  because 
everyone  takes  the  opinions  they  express  as  being  Northcliffe's 
own,  which  he  is  propagating  for  his  own  purpose.  No  doubt 
that  purpose  is  generally  high-minded  and  patriotic.  But  even 
Jove  nods  at  odd  moments.  No  one  ever  imagines  that  the 
policy  advocated  by  the  Daily  News  or  by  the  Manchester 
Guardian  is  that  of  an  individual.  Although  Lord  Burnham 
is  the  proprietor  of  the  Daily  Telegraph  no  one  thinks  of  that 


198  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

newspaper's  statements  as  being  his  personl  predilections.  But 
the  sayings  of  the  Northcliffe  Press  are  invariably  taken  to 
express  what  Lord  Northcliffe  thinks  and  wants.  This  does 
not  affect  the  circulation,  but  the  result  is  that  the  influence 
of  these  newspapers  in  forming  public  opinion  is  not  in  pro- 
portion to  their  circulation.  For  in  this  country  there  is  never 
a  disposition  to  regard  any  one  man  as  omniscient,  or  as 
having  impeccable  judgment;  and  if  Lloyd  George  is  some- 
times thought  to  be  wrong,  Lord  Northcliffe  is  not  always 
thought  to  be  right.  The  only  way  in  which  personal 
journalism  can  have  its  full  weight  is  when  the  proprietor 
himself  is  known  to  and  popular  with  the  mass  of  the  people 
by  whom  his  newspaper  is  read.  That  cannot  be  said  of  Lord 
Northcliffe,  but  it  explains  why  the  only  English  journalist 
who  has  successfully  sunk  his  publication  in  his  own  identity 
is  Mr.  Horatio  Bottomley. 

The  case  of  the  Times  is  different.  Not  only  is  it  in  many 
ways  the  greatest  newspaper  in  the  world,  but  in  the  last 
fifteen  years  it  has  improved  more  than  any  of  its  contempo- 
raries. Viewed  merely  from  the  standpoint  of  newspaper 
merit,  no  journal  has  lessened  the  gap  which  separated  the 
Times  from  them  all.  Yet  its  influence  on  the  Continent, 
which,  even  in  our  own  day  was  enormous,  is  now  little  if 
any  greater  than  that  of  two  or  three  of  its  rivals.  The  main 
explanation  of  this  is  exactly  the  one  I  have  already  indicated. 
A  European  statesman  with  whom  I  recently  discussed  the 
question  said :  "The  Times  may,  as  you  say,  be  the  best  news- 
paper, but  it  is  the  voice  of  one  man,  and  although  we  often 
share  that  man's  opinions  we  do  not  forget  that  fact."  It  is 
not  the  voice  of  a  party,  but  the  voice  of  a  person  seeking  to 
influence  parties  or  to  form  one.  The  Times  and  the  Daily 
Mail  say  the  same  thing — at  different  length.  Lord  North- 
cliffe has  not  got  two  voices.  Whether  you  read  his  views  in 
one  or  in  the  other  depends  simply  on  the  style  you  prefer, 
the  time  you  have  to  spare,  or  the  money  you  care  to  pay. 
When  Northcliffe  bought  the  Times,  and  gave  it  and  the 
Daily  Mail  the  same  texts,  he  did  not  make  the  Daily  Mail  a 


LORD  NORTHCLIFFE  AND  HIS  PRESS   199 

little  Times.  On  the  contrary,  he  brought  down  the  Times 
to  the  standard  of  a  big  Daily  Mail." 

A  Times  correspondent  in  a  European  capital  is  no  longer 
the  power  he  once  was.  Naturally  a  de  Blowitz,  upon  whom 
Prime  Ministers  used  to  call,  does  not  appear  twice  in  a 
generation.  But  the  importance  of  the  Times  representative 
abroad  is  now  not  commensurate  with  the  greatness  of  that 
newspaper.  Few  of  them  are  quoted  except  perfunctorily. 
Their  opinion  carries  no  great  weight.  The  unfortunate  truth 
is  that  in  regard  to  their  knowledge  of  foreign  affairs  English 
journalists  are  for  the  greater  part  outclassed  by  their  French 
colleagues,  as  well  as  by  many  German  writers. 

Upon  the  whole,  Northcliffe  does  not  sacrifice  any  principle 
in  order  to  vent  his  personal  feelings  against  Lloyd  George. 
A  Prime  Minister  who  takes  upon  himself  the  burden  of  office 
in  the  period  following  war  must  necessarily  encounter  many 
difficulties  and  make  some  mistakes.  He  has  no  right  to 
expect  that  his  enemies  will  overlook  such  errors.  The  North- 
cliffe Press  has  made  a  great  deal  out  of  alleged  waste  on 
the  part  of  the  Government.  Obviously  it  is  difficult  to  cut 
down  expenses  and  reduce  establishments  as  quickly  as  every- 
one would  like;  while  criticism  is  easy  and  will  always  find 
favour  with  the  taxpayer.  But  when  all  allowances  are  made 
it  must  be  said  that  the  Government  showed  no  disposition 
to  act  vigorously  until  it  was  finally  forced  to  do  so  by  the 
country.  In  this  matter  Lloyd  George  played  into  the  hands 
of  Northcliffe.  As,  however,  the  Northcliffe  Press  has  sup- 
ported his  Government  on  other  subjects,  the  fact  seems  to  be 
that  Northcliffe  will  not  deviate  from  his  own  ideas  merely 
in  order  to  attack  the  Prime  Minister;  but  that  he  is  pleased 
when  the  latter  lays  himself  open,  and  makes  the  most  of  the 
opportunity. 

Lloyd  George  can  do  little  or  nothing  to  hurt  Northcliffe. 
The  latter's  independence  is  his  strength.  It  is  also  his  weak- 
ness, as  it  leaves  him  with  no  responsibility  except  to  himself, 
a  point  which  the  electorate  thoroughly  appreciates.  Yet  it  is 
idle  to  pretend  that  his  imagination  and  his  energy  are  not 
used  for  what  he  considers  to  be  the  good  of  his  country. 


200  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

When  one  reads  the  account  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  vacil- 
lations at  the  Peace  Conference,  his  gloomy  prediction  that 
the  Germans  would  not  sign  whenever  he  had  been  frightened 
by  the  conversation  of  a  Labour  leader,  his  desire  to  change 
all  decisions  and  to  yield  to  Germany  on  every  important  point 
at  the  last  moment,  when  one  remembers  all  that  has  happened 
since  the  Treaty  was  signed,  one  regrets  that  the  Prime  Min- 
ister did  not  have  Lord  Northcliffe  by  his  side  at  Versailles  and 
afterwards;  the  situation  in  Europe  would  to-day  have  been 
clearer  and  healthier. 


CHAPTER  XI 
The  Frankfort  Incident  and  M.  Krassin 

Two  misunderstandings  which  have  arisen  between  England 
and  France  since  1919 — one  a  passing  incident  which,  how- 
ever, nearly  precipitated  a  crisis,  the  other  a  difference  in 
policy  which  persists  to  this  day — deserve  separate  notice;  the 
occupation  of  Frankfort  by  the  French  in  April,  1920;  and 
the  commercial  treaty  made  by  the  British  Government  with 
Soviet  Russia. 

On  August  19th,  1919,  Marshal  Foch,  acting  as  Chief  of 
the  Inter-Allied  Staff,  issued  a  protocol  which  limited  the 
number  of  German  troops  in  the  Ruhr  to  17,000  until  April 
10th,  1920;  and  provided  that,  after  that  date  no  German 
troops  whatever  should  be  left  in  that  zone.  This  protocol 
was  accepted  by  the  German  Government. 

On  March  28th,  1920,  M.  Millerand  told  the  German 
Charge  d'Affaires  that  the  French  Government,  so  far  as  it 
was  concerned,  would  not  authorise  any  increase  of  the  num- 
ber of  German  troops  in  the  Ruhr,  unless  the  French 
troops  also  simultaneously  occupied  Frankfort,  Darmstadt, 
Homburg,  Dalou,  and  Dieburg. 

The  following  day  M.  Goeppert,  the  Envoy  Extraordinary 
sent  to  Paris  by  the  German  Government  to  discuss  this  matter, 
assured  the  French  Government  that  further  troops  would  not 
be  allowed  to  penetrate  into  this  district  unless  consent  had 
first  been  obtained. 

On  April  2nd  M.  Millerand  repeated  to  the  German  Charge 
d'Affaires  the  declaration  he  had  already  made  to  him  on 
March  28th. 

Nevertheless,  on  the  evening  of  April  3rd  M.  Goeppert  ad- 
mitted that  troops  in  excess  of  the  number  authorised  by  the 
Inter-Allied  Protocol  had  been  sent  to  the  Ruhr.     He  asked 

201 


202  THE  TOMP  OF  POWER 

that  a  formal  authorisation  should  then  be  given  to  cover  what 
had  already  been  done  without  authorisation;  what  had  been 
done  in  violation  of  the  Treaty;  what  had  been  done  against 
the  express  refusal  of  the  French  Government  to  agree;  and 
what  had  been  done  in  breach  of  his  own  promise  that  no  such 
step  should  be  taken  unless  that  consent  had  previously  been 
given. 

Moreover,  on  the  same  day  the  German  Under-Secretary 
for  Foreign  Affairs  told  General  Barthelmy,  in  Berlin,  that 
the  German  Government  had  given  the  Imperial  Commissaire 
entire  liberty  of  action  regarding  the  employment  of  troops 
in  the  Ruhr,  and  that  he  assumed  full  responsibility  for  this. 

On  April  6th  French  troops  entered  Frankfort  and  other 
German  territory. 

It  should  be  added  that  the  question  had  already  been  con- 
sidered at  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme  Council  in  London,  which 
on  March  25th  had  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  time  was  not 
opportune  for  the  occupation  of  Frankfort  and  Darmstadt. 

The  only  reproach  which  could  fairly  be  made  to  France 
(the  country  most  affected  and  possibly  menaced  by  this 
defiance  of  the  Treaty)  was  that  perhaps  sufficient  time  was 
not  given  for  a  reasonable  notice  to  all  the  Allies  between  the 
day  when  the  occupation  was  decided  upon  and  the  date  of  its 
actual  execution. 

When  the  news  arrived  in  England  Parliament  had  ad- 
journed for  a  few  days  on  account  of  the  Easter  holidays. 
In  many  instances  of  German  derelictions  from  the  Treaty 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Government  had  prudently  (sometimes 
perhaps  too  prudently)  avoided  taking  the  public  into  its 
confidence  until  forced  to  do  so  by  the  House  of  Commons; 
and  even  then  had  done  so  only  partially  and  with  evident 
reluctance.  But  upon  this  occasion  no  advantage  was  taken 
of  the  fact  that  Parliament  was  not  sitting.  The  Government 
did  not  wait  to  be  asked  its  opinion  about  the  French  occu- 
pation of  Frankfort.  Much  less  did  it  wait  to  be  pressed.  On 
the  contrary  journalists  were  summoned  in  all  haste,  use  was 
made  of  a  press  agency,  and  the  Government  itself  issued  a 
semi-official  statement  to  the  effect  that  there  was  no  reason 


THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT         203 

why  the  whole  world  should  not  know  that  all  the  Allies  dis- 
approved of  what  France  had  done. 

This  extraordinary  announcement  was  sent  forth  by  a 
Government  official,  from  a  Government  office,  at  the  sole 
instance  of  the  Government.  The  moving  spirit  was  Mr. 
Philip  Kerr,  of  the  Prime  Minister's  secretariat,  and  his 
private  adviser  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs.  How  far  the 
Foreign  Office  was  consulted  beforehand,  or  how  far  it  was 
faced  with  a  fait  accompli  and  was  thus  obliged  to  follow  in 
the  wake  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  henchman,  it  is  impossible  to 
say.  In  any  event,  it  would  not  have  been  the  first  time  that 
Lord  Curzon  had  seen  himself  ousted  by  Mr.  Philip  Kerr. 
Any  more  than  it  would  have  been  the  first  time  that  the  latter 
had  given  a  startling  example  of  his  indiscretion.  His  lack  of 
sagacity  had  already  been  demonstrated,  to  his  own  confusion, 
by  the  Bullitt  episode. 

The  most  regrettable  feature  of  this  strange  performance 
was  that  the  facts  stated  were  absolutely  incorrect.  It  was 
untrue  that  all  the  Allies  disapproved  of  what  France  had 
done.  On  the  contrary,  Belgium  showed  her  approbation  by 
placing  her  railways  at  the  disposal  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment. While  at  the  time  the  statement  was  issued  to  the  Press 
neither  Japan  nor  Italy  had  expressed  any  opinion  whatever. 
It  was,  indeed,  the  first  of  several  occasions  in  which  Mr. 
Lloyd  George's  Government  seemed  to  take  the  stand  that  in 
addressing  France  it  could  presume  to  speak  alone  in  the  name 
of  all  the  Allies. 

At  the  outbreak  of  this  disagreement  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had 
left  London  to  meet  the  other  Ministers  of  the  Allied  Powers 
at  San  Remo.  Going  by  sea  he  was  for  some  days  able  to  let 
matters  take  their  course.  In  the  meantime  Parliament 
reassembled.  Mr.  Bonar  Law  properly  avoided  various  ques- 
tions of  which  notice  had  been  given  by  undertaking  to  make 
a  pronouncement  in  the  name  of  the  Government.  The  gist 
of  his  remarks  was  that  even  if  the  English  and  French  point 
of  view  was  different,  it  was,  above  all,  important  that  there 
should  be  no  discussion  which  should  direct  the  attention  of 
Germany  to  this  passing  disaccord.     The  idea  was  in  itself 


204  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

well  founded.  But  in  the  circumstances  its  expression  by  the 
spokesman  of  the  Government  was  impudent.  Its  audacity 
could  only  be  excused  upon  the  plea  that  desperate  cases 
demand  desperate  remedies.  For  it  was  the  Government  itself 
which  had  gone  out  of  its  way  to  do  its  utmost  to  draw  the 
attention  of  Germany  to  the  fact  that  it  dissented  from  the 
French  action   in   occupying  Frankfort. 

Some  days  later  Mr.  Bonar  Law  was  asked  directly  in  the 
House  of  Commons  whether  or  not  the  Government  admitted 
its  responsibility  for  the  communication  made  to  the  Press — 
that  there  was  no  reason  why  the  whole  world  should  not 
know  that  all  the  Allies  disapproved  of  the  French  occupation 
of  Frankfort.  There  was  no  indignant  denial  on  the  part  of 
Mr.  Bonar  Law.  On  the  contrary  his  reply  was  "I  must  beg 
my  honourable  friend  not  to  press  the  question." 

No  admission  could  be  more  complete. 

The  occupation  of  Frankfort  was  one  of  the  rare  instances 
in  which  German  disregard  of  the  Treaty  and  defiance  of  the 
Allies  has  been  followed  by  prompt  action,  instead  of  by 
lengthy  conferences,  by  temporising,  and  often  by  yielding. 
The  effect  was  excellent. 

Moreover,  the  occupation  itself  was  admirably  conducted. 
There  was  neither  disorder  at  the  outset  nor  oppression  of 
any  kind  during  its  continuance.  When  the  French  left 
Frankfort  they  were  able  to  placard  the  town  with  posters  in 
German  reading:     "The  French  keep  their  word." 

From  this  period  there  was  ground  for  the  impression  that 
the  sanctity  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  attached  to  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  varied  in  degree  according  as  to  whether  or  not 
what  he  had  promised  to  his  electors  was  involved. 

When  the  Prime  Minister  arrived  at  San  Remo  he  followed 
his  habitual  course  when  embarrassed  by  his  own  actions;,  he 
defended  the  position  he  had  taken  by  himself  attacking.  He 
assailed  M.  Millerand,  suggesting  that  by  the  occupation  of 
Frankfort  France  had  shown  that  she  harboured  designs  of 
territorial  expansion.  He  became  white  in  the  face  (so  M. 
Millerand  afterwards  related)  as  he  denounced  Great  Britain's 
Ally   for  having   shown   Germany   that   she  could   not  with 


THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT         205 

impunity  flout  the   Treaty  of  Versailles  and   the   orders   of 
Marechal   Foch. 

It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  explosion 
proceeded  from  any  sincere  belief  that  France  had  any 
covetous  designs  upon  Germany,  or  had  any  intention  to  go 
beyond  the  terms  of  the  Treaty.  His  advisers  must  have  been 
singularly  ill-informed  and  strangely  deluded  if  they  had  con- 
ceived such  ideas.  They  certainly  had  no  facts  in  support 
of  that  theory;  and  M.  Millerand  was  doubtless  surprised  that 
he  should  have  been  called  upon  to  calm  such  unjustifiable 
alarms. 

But  the  whole  scene  is  in  keeping  with  the  Prime  Minister's 
procedure  throughout  the  Peace  Conference.  According  to 
the  opinion  of  Mr.  Lansing,  the  American  Secretary  of  State, 
he  acted  more  like  a  politician  than  a  statesman,  and  was 
prone  to  attack  his  opponents  whenever  he  himself  had  made 
a  mistake.  "He  was  better  in  attack  than  defence.  .  .  . 
Sometimes,  if  he  seemed  to  be  getting  the  worst  of  the  argu- 
ment, he  assumed  a  scoffing  and  even  blustering  manner  which 
did  not  harmonise  with  the  sedateness  of  the  Counsel  of 
Ten.  ...  If  shown  that  his  argument  was  based  on  false 
premises  he  unblushingly  changed  the  premises,  but  not  the 
argument." 

M.  Millerand  was  in  such  good  faith  regarding  the  Frank- 
fort incident  that  he  had  no  trouble  in  making  his  position 
clear.  Nor,  indeed,  did  he  take  very  seriously  the  attitude 
assumed  by  the  Prime  Minister  upon  this  subject.  It  was, 
however,  an  inauspicious  beginning  for  the  San  Remo  Con- 
ference. Nor  was  the  general  situation  improved  by  the  tone 
which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  adopted  in  discussing  the  French 
reparation  claims.  In  some  quarters  he  was  thought  to  have 
gone  so  far  as  to  have  shown  absolute  hostility  to  France. 
The  secret  Government  report  of  the  discussions  which  took 
place  at  San  Remo  created  the  profoundest  surprise  in  Paris. 
Neither  M.  Deschanel  (who  was  then  President  of  the 
Republic)  nor  M.  Poincare  hesitated  to  express  their  amaze- 
ment and  disappointment  when  they  spoke  of  the  subject  some 
days  later  to  an  English  politician. 


206  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Undoubtedly,  in  this  instance,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  did  not 
give  France  the  support  which  she  had  the  right  to  expect, 
and  by  his  conduct  both  impaired  the  Treaty  and  weakened  the 
Entente  between  the  two  countries. 

It  is,  however,  difficult  to  see  how  the  Prime  Minister  can 
justly  be  criticised  for  adopting  a  policy  which  he  thinks  is 
in  the  best  interests  of  Great  Britain  upon  another  matter  not 
covered  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  That  the  views  of  our 
Ally  should  be  given  due  consideration  goes  without  saying. 
But  there  is  no  reason  why  the  Government  should  adopt  the 
opinions  of  the  Ouai  d'Orsay  unless  it  is  satisfied  that  they 
are  to  the  advantage  of  Great  Britain  or  of  the  Allies  as  a 
whole. 

The  French  Press  has  constantly  blamed  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  Government  for  having  made  a  commercial  arrange- 
ment with  Soviet  Russia.  It  had  every  right  to  express  its 
opinion  when  it  was  limited  to  suggesting  that  the  agreement 
was  futile  or  one  which  was  inadvisable  from  a  British  stand- 
point. But  the  idea  that  the  Government  should  have 
abstained  from  making  any  pact  with  M.  Krassin  merely  be- 
cause France  did  not  want  to  do  likewise,  is  essentially 
ill-founded.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  may  have  been  right  or  may 
have  been  wrong  in  his  conception  of  the  subject  and  in  his 
belief  of  the  results  of  the  transaction.  But  there  is  nothing 
to  prove  that  the  French  view  was  correct;  and  the  British 
Government  did  its  duty  in  carrying  out  negotiations  for  which 
it  took  full  responsibility  before  the  country. 

Such  incidents  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  message  to  Poland 
in  1920,  sent  without  prior  notice  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  and 
the  equally  regrettable  action  of  the  French  Foreign  Office 
itself  (due,  it  is  said,  to  M.  Maurice  Paleologue,  formerly 
Ambassador  to  Russia)  in  recognising  Wrangel  without 
frankly  forewarning  Downing  Street,  led  to  misunderstand- 
ings which  were  more  stupid  in  their  origin  than  serious  in 
their  consequences.  The  resulting  disagreements  were  fleeting 
in  their  nature.  But  upon  the  subject  of  recognising  or  having 
any  dealings  with  the  Soviet  Government  the  views  of  the 


THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT         207 

British  and  the  French  Governments  were  as  far  apart  in 
June,  1 92 1,  as  they  were  a  year  ago. 

When  the  question  arose  during  the  Peace  Conference  M. 
Clemenceau  expressed  himself  as  being  opposed  to  having 
any  meeting  or  communication  with  representatives  of  the 
Bolshevist  Government,  fearing  that  the  prestige  of  that 
regime  would  thereby  be  increased.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had 
objected  to  various  conditions  which  France  wished  to  impose 
on  Germany  upon  the  ground  that  to  exasperate  the  latter 
country  would  indirectly  have  the  effect  of  strengthening  the 
Soviet  Government.  Nevertheless,  he  did  not  see  things  in 
the  same  light  when  the  idea  of  negotiations  with  Moscow  was 
discussed.  Finally,  he  was  mainly  responsible  for  the  absurd 
Prinkipo  plan,  which  in  its  sequence  afforded  Clemenceau  more 
ironical  amusement  than  serious  anxiety. 

In  respect  to  the  Bullitt  episode  it  may  be  dismissed  by 
saying  that  if  Mr.  Philip  Kerr  was  indiscreet  and  ill-advised 
in  writing  such  a  letter  (even  if  it  was  marked  "Private  and 
Confidential")  that  does  not  in  the  slightest  degree  excuse 
Bullitt  for  making  the  public  use  which  he  did  of  it. 

The  incident  forcibly  recalls  the  story  (doubtless 
apocryphal)  of  the  German  submarine  officer  who  was  re- 
ported to  have  said  to  his  British  captor,  "You  know  that  we 
shall  never  be  gentlemen,  but  you  will  always  be  fools."  1 

The  status  of  the  Russian  Government  was  again  discussed 
at  the  San  Remo  Conference.  It  was  then  agreed,  at  the 
urgent  instance  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  that  the  Allies  should 
have  conversations  with  the  representatives  whom  the  Soviet 
Government  were  sending  to  England.  But  it  was  understood 
that  these  interviews  should  be  strictly  limited  to  negotiations 
for  a  commercial  arrangement  with,  and  not  a  political  recog- 
nition of,   the  Bolshevists. 

The  Prime  Minister  gave  what  at  first  seemed  to  be  a 
liberal  interpretation  to  this  compact.     For  some  time  after 

*  It  was  not  only  the  indiscreet  and  unwary  Mr.  Philip  Kerr  who 
had  cause  to  complain  about  Mr.  W.  C.  Bullitt's  disregard  of  the 
principles  which  generally  prevail  regarding  confidential  communica- 
tions. Mr.  Bullitt's  own  countryman,  Mr.  Robert  Lansing,  censures 
him  for  a  similar  lapse.     (The  Peace  Negotiations,  pp.  240  and  241.) 


208  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

his  return  to  London  he  himself,  together  with  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Lord  Curzon,  received  M. 
Krassin. 

A  few  days  later,  on  the  Friday  following,  I  had  a  long 
conversation  with  the  latter.  It  was  at  that  time  agreed 
between  us  that,  whatever  might  be  the  outcome,  neither 
should  then  divulge  what  was  said  at  our  meetings.  This 
understanding  M.  Krassin  faithfully  observed.  On  my  side 
I  now  refer  to  the  matter  for  the  first  time  and  without  dis- 
closing any  details  communicated  to  me  which  were  in  any 
way  confidential.  I  am  bound  to  say  that  M.  Krassin  not  only 
talked  freely,  but  answered  without  undue  reserve  all  pertinent 
questions,  even  when  the  replies  were  not  such  as  to  support 
his  own  case.  It  is  perhaps  unnecessary  to  add  that  I  never 
heard  a  syllable  of  propaganda;  nor,  for  that  matter,  did  I 
ever  exchange  a  word  with  anyone  except  M.  Krassin. 

Krassin  impressed  me  as  being  a  man  of  affairs  rather  than 
a  dreamer  or  a  fanatic;  and  as  one  who  would  prefer  to 
construct  rather  than  to  destroy.  Nor  did  he  appear  to  be  a 
politician.  This  view  was  confirmed  when  he  expressed  his 
regret  that  the  British  Government  had  refused  to  allow 
Litvinoff  to  enter  England,  saying  that  while  he  himself  was 
prepared  to  discuss  commercial  matters  he  did  not  feel  equally 
at  home  in  respect  to  the  political  and  diplomatical  considera- 
tions which  might  be  raised  by  the  question  of  the  External 
Debt  or  otherwise. 

When  the  war  broke  out  Krassin  was  the  Russian  repre- 
sentative of  an  important  group  of  German  electrical  interests. 
His  friendship  with  Lenin  dates  back  many  years.  The  late 
Joseph  Reinach  once  told  me  that  M.  de  Saint-Sauveur,  who 
acted  for  the  Creusot-Schneider  firm  in  Russia,  had  business 
relations  with  Krassin  which  sometimes  led  them  to  lunch 
together,  and  that  upon  one  such  occasion  M.  de  Saint- 
Sauveur  remarked  that  possibly  Krassin  would  be  embarrassed 
by  the  recent  announcement  that  someone  bearing  his  name 
had  become  a  member  of  the  Bolshevist  administration. 
Krassin  replied  that  he  himself  was  the  individual,  and  that 
Lenin,  who  was  a  former  schoolfellow,  had  previously  pro- 


THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT         209 

tected  him  during  a  period  when  he  was  in  some  personal 
clanger. 

Certainly  Krassin's  views  have  been  a  marked  factor  in 
Lenin's  gradual  evolution. 

The  representative  of  the  Soviet  Government  and  myself 
naturally  saw  many  things — most  things — from  an  entirely 
different  angle.  However,  we  were  not  interested  in  debating 
political  theories,  but  only  in  discussing  whether  or  not  it 
might  be  possible  to  arrive  at  a  certain  practical  result.  M. 
Krassin  desired  to  enter  into  negotiations  with  France  as  well 
as  with  England.  He  admitted  that  France  would  never 
entirely  abandon  her  claim  to  the  repayment  of  the  Russian 
loans  floated  in  France;  that  no  French  Government  could  do 
so,  even  if  it  would.  But  he  contended  that  any  mode  of 
eventual  settlement  was  necessarily  a  matter  for  negotiation, 
and  also  that  such  settlement  should  be  dependent  upon  some 
recognition  of  the  Soviet  Government  by  the  French  Republic. 
He  complained  that  whereas  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Lord 
Curzon  had  opened  their  doors  to  him,  France  had  sent  only 
commercial  attaches  who  had  no  power  or  authority  to  go  into 
the  whole  subject. 

M.  Krassin  did  not  hide  from  me  that  the  result  of  England 
and  France  both  absolutely  refusing  to  have  any  dealings  with 
Russia  would  mean  a  war  with  Poland.  He  admitted  that 
such  a  war  might  be  lengthy,  and  said  that  Russia  was  making 
preparations  accordingly. 

Neither  then  nor  later  did  I  discuss  with  M.  Krassin  the 
Bolshevist  doctrine,  its  aim,  or  its  effect.  But  I  did  take  it 
upon  myself  to  lay  stress  upon  the  fact  that  if  Soviet  Russia 
was  making  application  for  re-admission  to  the  General 
Society  of  Nations,  it  must  be  prepared  to  conform  to  the 
established  rules  and  customs  of  international  intercourse, 
and  especially  in  respect  to  propaganda;  that  otherwise  any 
arrangement  would  certainly  only  be  temporary;  and  that  its 
abrupt  termination  would  leave  the  situation  worse  than  it 
then  was.  I  added  that  the  attitude  of  the  French  Government 
was  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  San  Remo  Agreement — 
commercial  but  not  political  negotiations — and  that  it  was  no 


210  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

secret  that  the  Quai  d'Orsay  was  surprised  that  he  had  been 
received  by  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign  Secretary. 

Nevertheless,  at  my  second  interview  with  M.  Krassin  on 
the  following  clay  (Saturday),  and  after  a  conversation  which 
I  do  not  feel  at  liberty  to  transcribe  fully  from  my  notes,  I 
agreed  to  see  M.  Millerand,  and  to  submit  certain  proposals 
to  him.  I  telephoned  later  in  the  same  day  to  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  got  a  reply  that  M.  Millerand  would  receive 
me  on  Sunday,  and  crossed  to  Paris  that  evening. 

I  am  naturally  obliged  to  refrain  from  repeating  in  detail 
what  M.  Millerand  said  in  the  course  of  our  conversation  at 
the  Quai  d'Orsay.  The  result  may  be  summed  up  by  stating 
that  the  French  Prime  Minister  did  not  care  to  enter  into 
any  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Government  or  to  receive 
an  envoy  who  would  then  place  before  him  formally  the  pro- 
posals which  were  thus  being  unofficially  submitted  to  him. 

Whatever  the  exact  measure  of  the  arrangement  made  with 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  at  San  Remo  it  was  evident  that  it  had  been 
largely  due  to  the  latter's  insistence;  that  M.  Millerand 
conceived  that  he  had  done  his  part  in  deputing  commercial 
attaches  to  be  present  at  interviews  with  M.  Krassin ;  and  that 
he  had  no  intention  of  going  further.  Apparently  he  counted 
upon  some  future  developments  in  Russia,  but  without  any 
fixed  notion  of  what  turn  they  would  take.  Upon  the  other 
hand,  he  was  somewhat  surprised  that  the  Prime  Minister  and 
the  Foreign  Secretary  should  have  seen  M.  Krassin,  thus 
possibly  according  some  political  significance  to  his  mission.2 
The  obvious  answer  was  that  in  dealing  with  Russia  it  was 
difficult  to  define  exactly  where  commercial  questions  ended 
and  political  questions  began. 

My  own  part  in  the  conversation,  aside  from  placing  certain 
proposals  before  M.  Millerand  and  answering  his  queries  on 
certain  points,  was  limited  to  urging  upon  the  President  my 

3 1  returned  to  London  on  Monday  evening  and  went  to  the  House 
of  Commons,  as  it  was  announced  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  to  speak 
on  this  subject.  I  arrived  in  time  to  hear  the  Prime  Minister  say  that 
in  all  he  had  done,  including  his  reception  (together  with  Lord  Curzon) 
of  M.  Krassin,  he  had  acted  in  complete  accordance  with  M.  Millerand. 
This  statement  was  inexact.  M.  Millerand  had  told  me  the  day  before 
that  he  had  been  amazed  when  he  heard  of  that  meeting. 


THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT         211 

conviction  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  would  undoubtedly  come 
to  an  arrangement  with  Soviet  Russia;  and  that  although 
there  would  probably  be  criticism  in  some  quarters,  yet  that 
the  Prime  Minister  would  not  be  clashing  with  public  opinion 
in  doing  so.  While  I  ventured  to  suggest  that  the  fact  that 
France  was  Russia's  heaviest  creditor  would  not  be  considered 
in  England  an  obstacle  to  commercial  relations  unless  France 
herself  could  suggest  a  policy  more  feasible  than  that  of  mili- 
tary interference  or  more  practical  than  that  of  doing  nothing 
and  letting  events  take  their  course. 

Nothing  which  has  happened  since  has  falsified  those  pre- 
dictions or  changed  my  views.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  did  make 
the  agreement  with  M.  Krassin,  as  he  always  intended  to  do. 
It  is  true  that  the  brilliant  campaign  directed  by  General 
Weygand  bred  illusions  in  some  quarters  that  the  Soviet  power 
was  tottering.  But  the  only  real  effect  of  the  Polish  success 
was  a  treaty  which  gave  the  Moscow  Government  time  to  turn 
around  and  to  drive  out  of  the  country  Wrangel,  who  had 
been  recognised  by  the  French  Government.3 

The  practical  wisdom  of  the  French  attitude  may  be  ques- 
tioned. It  is  all  the  more  doubtful  because  France  is  the  one 
country  in  Europe  which  need  have  little  fear  of  the  inroads 
of  Bolshevism.  The  primary  effect  of  that  political  theory 
seems  to  have  been  the  division  of  land  amongst  the  peasants 
(it  is  said  that  more  than  99  per  cent,  of  it  is  now  so  held) 
while  coupling  with  that  division  the  theory  of  communism 
which  deprives  the  holder  of  any  personal  property  in  the 
products.  But  in  a  country  where  nearly  everyone  is  a 
proprietor  there  is  little  chance  of  success  for  a  political 
doctrine  which  wishes  to  limit  that  already  acquired  ownership 
by  the  addition  of  communistic  principles,  which  proprietors 
would  regard  only  as  a  handicap. 

Perhaps  more  than  any  other  country  France  should  remem- 
ber that  a  revolution  cannot  be  judged  until  the  next 
generation.     The    French    Revolution    was    accompanied    by 

3  Most  of  Wrangel's  troops  managed  to  escape  to  Turkey.  For  some 
time  they  were  supported  by  the  French  Government;  but  finally  they 
were  faced  with  the  option  of  being  taken  back  to  Russia,  being  sent  to 
Brazil  or  elsewhere,  or  being  left  to  shift  for  themselves. 


212  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

excesses  which  for  a  time  almost  debarred  France  from  the 
society  of  nations.  Yet  it  left  its  indelible  mark  upon  Europe. 
When  its  results  were  sifted  something  remained,  and  has 
remained  to  this  day.  It  was  M.  Clemenceau  himself  who, 
upon  a  memorable  occasion,  pronounced  that  the  French  Rev- 
olution had  to  be  taken  en  bloc — the  bad  with  the  good. 

In  Russia,  a  country  so  much  vaster  in  its  extent  than 
France,  so  much  more  sparsely  populated,  and  where  the  mass 
of  the  people  in  191 6  was  more  ignorant  and  less  interested 
in  political  development  than  were  the  French  in  1789,  it  was 
obvious  that  any  upheaval  would  be  mightier  and  more 
appalling;  and  that  the  immediate  result  would  be  to  place 
absolute  power  in  the  hands  of  some  small  group. 

M.  Maurice  Paleologue,  in  the  diary  he  kept  during  his 
Ambassadorship  at  Petrograd,  has  repeated  the  words  which 
a  great  Russian  financier  used  to  him  in  June,  191 5: 

"In  our  country  the  Revolution  is  bound  to  be  destructive 
because  the  educated  class  represents  only  an  infinitesimal 
minority,  without  organisation  or  political  experience,  without 
any  contact  with  the  masses.  There,  according  to  my  opinion, 
lies  the  great  crime  of  Tsarism ;  it  has  refused  to  allow  outside 
of  its  own  bureaucracy  any  foyer  of  political  life."  4 

It  is  difficult  to  conceive  how  British  loyalty  to  France 
exacted  that  she  should  have  no  dealings  with  Soviet  Russia. 
Even  if  France  had  suggested  some  definite  course  it  would 
have  been  the  duty  of  the  British  Government  to  examine  with 
great  care  how  far  it  should  sacrifice  to  the  Entente  a  policy 
which  it  considered  to  be  in  the  interests  of  Great  Britain. 
But  that  point  never  arose,  for  France  never  advanced  any 
practical  plan. 

By  standing  aside  and  doing  nothing  France  is  not  hasten- 
ing the  date  of  the  payment  of  the  Russian  debt.  On  the 
contrary,  probably  the  main  security  which  remains  for  that 
debt — the  natural  resources  of  the  country — is  thus  being 
diminished  in  value.     Certainly  its  realisation  is  being  delayed. 

4  La  Russie  des  Tsars  pendant  la  Guerre:   Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
May  1st,  1 92 1,  page  136. 


THE  FRANKFORT  INCIDENT        213 

While  France  does  not  gain  by  other  countries  getting  the 
start  in  renewing  relations  with  Russia  and  doubtless  soon 
obtaining  valuable  concessions.  Unfortunately  no  French 
Government  has  suggested  any  policy  upon  this  question  except 
"wait  and  see."  That  is  exactly  what  other  countries  will 
not  do. 

The  situation  would  be  different  if  there  was  any  suggestion 
that  the  Romanoffs  might  be  restored.  But  that  is  no  longer 
within  the  realm  of  practical  politics.  Doubtless  the  Soviet 
Government  does  not  represent  the  Russian  People  in  a  con- 
stitutional sense.  But  it  is  the  de  facto  Government.  While 
just  as  there  is  no  restoration  to  be  anticipated  from  outside 
so  there  is  no  immediate  prospect  of  any  proper  constitutional 
development  from  within.  What  is  much  more  probable  is 
that  the  present  regime,  after  some  dissension  between  its  two 
extreme  elements,  will  adapt  itself  to  the  needs  of  the  country 
and  will  continue  to  retain  the  actual  power. 

During  recent  months  the  scission  between  Lenin  and  the 
Extremists  has  become  more  pronounced.  Lenin's  actions 
seem  to  show  that  he  has  deserted  the  principles  of  absolute 
communism.  In  a  private  letter  which  was  published  in 
August,  1 92 1,  by  La  Vie  Russe,  the  authenticity  of  which  has 
not  been  denied,  he  explicitly  admits  the  errors  and  the  im- 
practicability of  the  views  he  formerly  held.  But  the  failure 
of  his  theories  has  doubtless  sapped  his  energy;  and  it  is 
improbable  that  he  will  have  the  same  driving  force  in  leading 
any  reaction. 

The  famine  may  well  have  no  political  effect  other 
than  eliminating  the  Extremist  opponents  of  Lenin  and 
Krassin,  and  possibly  of  indirectly  paving  the  way  to  the 
revival  of  relations  with  the  outside  world. 

In  the  interval  time  is  running  against  the  interests  of 
France.  It  is  still  to  the  advantage  of  the  Soviet  Government 
to  enter  into  commercial  relations  with  the  French  Republic. 
But  it  is  less  essential  than  when  M.  Krassin  recognised  its 
preponderating  importance  in  June,  1920,  and  wished  to  obtain 
M.  Millerand's  consideration  for  certain  proposals.  It  is  less 
essential  because  the  British   Government  has  already  made 


214  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

a  treaty  with  Russia,  because  other  Governments  are  on  the 
verge  of  doing  so,  and  because  each  of  these  arrangements  is 
an  additional  assurance  that  France  must  sooner  or  later  do 
likewise  in  order  to  protect  herself.  But  the  later  France 
agrees  to  negotiate  the  less  chance  she  has  of  imposing  terms 
and  conditions.5 

6  Since  the  above  was  written  the  French  Government  has  begun 
(February,  1922)  certain  negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Government.  It 
is  worth  noting  that  this  possibility  of  some  arrangement  is  seriously 
alarming  the  Wilhelmstrasse. 


CHAPTER  XII 
The  Treaty  of  Versailles 

Napoleon  once  said:  "Vaincre  n'est  rien;  il  faut  profiter 
du  succes."  What  has  happened  since  the  Armistice  illustrates 
the  truth  of  that  remark. 

Throughout  the  war  there  were  in  various  countries  clashes 
between  the  military  and  political  powers.  Upon  more  than  one 
occasion,  in  more  than  one  instance,  each  thought — and  some- 
times said — that  the  other  was  limited  in  conception  and  unin- 
telligent in  execution.  This  was  simply  a  repetition  of  the  dis- 
pute which  always  occurs,  and  which  always  will  occur,  when  a 
country  having  parliamentary  institutions  goes  to  war.  The  ex- 
act balance  of  indispensability  and  usefulness  between  generals 
and  statesmen  will  never  be  struck.  The  one  undeniable  fact  is 
that  in  the  last  analysis  no  war  can  be  won  without  the  man  at 
the  Front  who  bears  the  brunt  of  the  battle. 

But,  since  the  Armistice,  the  politicians  have  had  a  free  hand. 
They  certainly  have  not  made  the  most  out  of  what  the  soldiers 
won.  In  their  three  years  of  talking  they  have  even  sometimes 
imperilled  what  was  so  hardly  conquered  by  four  years  of  fight- 
ing. 

In  any  attempt  to  fix  responsibility  one  is  faced  by  three  pri- 
mary questions.  Was  the  Armistice  granted  at  the  proper  time, 
and  did  its  conditions  sufficiently  safeguard  the  victory?  Does 
the  main  fault  for  the  present  situation  lie  at  the  door  of  the 
makers  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  ?  Or,  in  the  alternative,  is  it 
those  charged  with  the  execution  of  that  Treaty  who  are  to 
blame  ? 

The  first  point  can  be  disposed  of  summarily  and  conclusively. 
This  has  already  been  done  by  more  than  one  published  state- 
ment. But,  in  view  of  an  absurd  legend  which  has  found  many 
adherents,  the  truth  cannot  be  too  widely  spread. 

2X5 


216  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

On  October  25th,  1918,  Marechal  Foch  (to  whom  the  Allied 
War  Council  had  referred  the  whole  question)  asked  Petain, 
Haig,  and  Pershing  to  meet  him  at  Senlis,  and  to  express  their 
views.  Haig,  who  spoke  first,  thought  that  the  chief  considera- 
tion was  to  draft  terms  so  moderate  that  the  Germans  would  be 
certain  to  accept  them.  In  his  opinion  the  Allied  Armies  were 
out  of  breath,  the  military  power  of  Germany  was  not  broken, 
and  it  was  therefore  desirable  not  to  miss  this  chance  to  end 
the  combat.  He  suggested  that  it  would  suffice  if  the  main  con- 
ditions were  the  evacuation  of  Belgium,  the  invaded  parts  of 
France,  and  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Petain  had  an  entirely  different  idea  of  what  the  Armistice 
should  be.  His  proposal  was  that  the  German  troops  should 
retire  to  Germany  without  taking  with  them  a  single  cannon 
or  any  war  material  except  the  arms  they  carried ;  while  he 
thought  it  essential  that  the  Allied  Armies  should  occupy  both 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  a  zone  of  fifty  kilometres  on  the 
right  bank. 

Pershing  agreed  with  Petain.1 

Foch  did  not  then  intimate  that  he  had  arrived  at  any  de- 
cision, but  on  the  following  day  he  sent  M.  Clemenceau  a  con- 
cise memorandum  embodying  the  terms  which  he  believed  to  be 
necessary.  Briefly,  it  may  be  said  that  his  plan,  while  going 
further  than  that  of  Haig,  was  not  quite  so  stringent  as  that 
put  forward  by  Petain ;  the  main  difference  being  that  it  did  not 
require  that  all  the  German  artillery  should  be  abandoned. 

Some  days  later  (October  27th  to  31st)  this  memorandum 
was  considered  by  the  representatives  of  the  Allied  Powers  and 
of  the  United  States.  In  the  course  of  these  conferences  Foch 
was  asked  directly  by  Colonel  House  whether,  as  a  soldier,  he 
would  prefer  that  Germany  should  accept  or  refuse  the  terms 
offered.  Foch  answered :  "War  is  waged  only  in  order  to  ob- 
tain results.  If  the  Germans  sign  the  Armistice  upon  which  we 
have  decided,  we  shall  have  got  those  results.     The  end  being 

1  General  Gillain,  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  Belgian  armies,  had 
also  been  asked  to  attend  this  meeting,  but  was  unable  to  arrive  in 
time. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       217 

attained,  no  one  has  the  right  to  cause  a  single  drop  more  of 
blood  to  be  shed." 

While  later,  in  reply  to  another  query,  Marechal  Foch  said : 
"The  conditions  proposed  by  your  military  advisers  are  the 
same  which  we  ought,  and  should  be  able,  to  impose  after  the 
success  of  our  next  operations.  Therefore,  if  the  Germans  ac- 
cept them  now,  it  is  useless  to  continue  the  battle." 

It  is  thus  beyond  question  that  it  was  upon  the  advice  of 
Marechal  Foch  that  the  struggle  was  not  prolonged,  and  that 
the  conditions  of  the  armistice  were  those  which  he  himself 
proposed.2 

It  is  true  that  later  Foch  disagreed  bitterly  with  M.  Clemen- 
ceau  about  certain  clauses  of  the  Treaty.  But  that  dissension 
(to  which  I  shall  refer  hereafter)  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
Armistice,  for  which  Foch  is  primarily  responsible.  It  would 
be  futile,  upon  a  military  question,  to  seek  to  go  behind  the 
high  authority  of  the  Commander  of  the  Allied  Forces,  or  to 
place  in  doubt  the  wisdom  of  an  arrangement  in  favour  of 
which  he  pronounced  in  such  categoric  terms.  But  it  is  worth 
remembering  that  M.  Poincare  was  amongst  those  who  always 
held  the  opinion  that  an  armistice  should  not  be  granted  before 
a  final  and  decisive  victory.  Early  in  October  the  outline  of 
the  proposals  which  Foch  then  had  in  mind  (they  were  prob- 
ably less  severe  than  those  he  finally  suggested)  were  communi- 
cated to  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The  latter  thought  that 
they  were  so  far  from  covering  what  the  Allies  had  a  right  to 
exact  that  he  strongly  urged  this  view  upon  M.  Clemenceau  in  a 
conversation  which  took  place  on  October  12th  or  13th.  A 
day  or  two  later  he  repeated  his  objections  in  a  letter  to  Clem- 
enceau, protesting  against  an  armistice  which  would  "couper  les 
jarrets  de  nos  soldats."  M.  Poincare  was  in  the  habit  of  writ- 
ing frequently  and  at  great  length  to  the  various  Prime  Minis- 
ters who  held  office  during  the  war.  As  a  rule,  M.  Clemenceau 
never  answered  these  letters.  But  on  this  occasion  he  did  so 
with  some  acidity;  expressed  his  astonishment  that  the  Presi- 
dent did  not  realise  that  the  Cabinet,  being  alone  responsible, 

1  Some  slight  changes  in  Foch's  original  proposals  were  made  during 
these  meetings. 


218  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

had  the  sole  right  to  decide  as  it  saw  fit ;  and  threatened  to  re- 
sign if  he  was  troubled  with  further  interventions  of  the  same 
nature. 

It  may  be  added  that  this  view  of  the  respective  rights  of  the 
Executive  and  the  Cabinet  under  the  Constitution  is  not  uni- 
versally acknowledged  in  France. 

Any  criticism  of  the  Peace  Conference  must  be  premised  by 
admitting  that  it  was  confronted  by  a  task  of  stupendous  dif- 
ficulty. From  the  outset  it  must  have  been  apparent  to  all  (ex- 
cept, perhaps,  to  President  Wilson)  that  no  result  could  possibly 
satisfy  all  the  nations  interested.  The  very  fact  that  in  every 
country  there  is  a  strong  body  of  public  opinion  dissatisfied 
with  the  Treaty,  a  feeling  that  its  representatives  were  over- 
reached by  those  of  other  countries,  is  the  surest  sign  that,  if 
the  Treaty  is  not  perfect,  at  least  it  is  not  unjust  and  one-sided. 

The  truth  is  that  not  one  of  the  Four  constantly  got  the  bet- 
ter of  his  colleagues.  As  Clemenceau  once  remarked,  the  Con- 
ference showed  each  of  them  that  they  were  more  English,  more 
French,  more  Italian,  or  more  American  than  they  had  them- 
selves thought.  In  brief,  that  national  feeling  was  as  strongly 
implanted  as  ever  in  the  human  breast. 

Upon  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  Clemenceau  got  what  he 
could,  Lloyd  George  got  practically  all  he  wanted,  while  Wil- 
son sacrificed  everything — including  the  immediate  future  of 
Europe — to  his  obstinate  resolution  to  have  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  incorporated  as  part  of  the  Treaty.  It 
would,  indeed,  have  been  much  better  for  the  whole  world  had 
the  United  States  made  more  material  demands  (as  it  could 
fairly  have  done)  in  compensation  for  the  part  it  had  taken  in 
the  war.  President  Wilson  would  then,  in  the  game  of  give 
and  take,  have  been  obliged  to  face  practical  questions  in  a 
practical  way. 

By  personally  participating  in  the  Conference,  Wilson  flouted 
the  advice  of  some  of  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  counsel  him, 
as  well  as  the  judgment  of  many  other  people.  The  view  held 
by  Colonel  House  is  not  yet  generally  known.  But  it  would 
not  be  surprising  if  that  discreet  man  thought  from  the  very 
beginning  that  Wilson  would  have  more  power  if  he  stayed  in 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       219 

Washington,  and  knew  from  the  very  beginning  that  it  would 
be  useless  to  urge  that  course. 

Woodrow  Wilson  has  spent  most  of  his  life  as  a  schoolmas- 
ter or  as  a  professor.  He  is  not  a  scholarly  man  according  to 
the  meaning  which  in  Europe  is  generally  given  to  that  phrase. 
Mr.  Keynes  is  quite  accurate  in  his  comment  on  that  point.  But 
he  has  all  the  characteristics  of  those  who  follow  a  calling  in 
which,  day  in  and  day  out,  they  can  lay  down  the  law  to  others 
who  have  no  right  of  appeal :  a  schoolmaster. 

This  was  illustrated  in  a  curious  manner  soon  after  Wilson 
became  President.  Theodore  Roosevelt  had  a  hold  on  his  coun- 
try which  Wilson  never  obtained.  If  Roosevelt  fell  ill — or 
when,  for  instance,  an  attempt  was  made  to  assassinate  him 
during  a  political  campaign — the  daily  state  of  his  health  was 
a  question  of  national  concern.  When  Wilson  broke  down  dur- 
ing his  tour  to  persuade  the  country  to  support  what  he  had 
done  in  Paris,  the  general  indifference  amounted  almost  to  bru- 
tality. Nevertheless,  Roosevelt,  with  his  great  courage  and  his 
immense  popularity,  was  never,  upon  domestic  questions,  able 
to  control  his  own  party  as  did  Wilson.  Time  and  again 
Roosevelt  had  to  make  concessions  to  those  powerful  person- 
ages known  in  America  as  "Party  bosses."  It  was  partly  be- 
cause he  finally  decided  to  put  up  with  that  system  no  longer 
that  he  made  the  ill-advised  attempt  to  form  a  third  party,  and 
•thus  delivered  himself  into  the  hands  of  his  political  foes. 

But  Wilson  adopted,  and  with  great  success,  the  system  of 
the  schoolmaster.  The  last  step  which  a  headmaster  takes  with 
a  refractory  boy  is  to  write  to  his  parents.  Wilson  inaugurated 
the  custom  of  going  himself  to  Congress  when  he  wished  to  get 
something  done,  and  of  announcing  his  intentions  and  his  rea- 
sons to  the  assembled  legislators.  An  hour  later  his  words 
were  published  throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  coun- 
try. From  that  moment  senators  and  congressmen  were  put 
on  the  defensive  to  explain  to  their  constituents  their  opposition 
to  the  President.  The  case  rested  pretty  well  upon  its  merits. 
There  was  little  room  for  the  back-stairs  methods  of  profes- 
sional politicians.    Wilson's  public  statements  at  the  Capitol  had 


220  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

a  more  powerful  effect  than  any  number  of  private  conferences 
at  the  White  House. 

But  this  practice,  like  all  others,  had  its  limits  of  usefulness. 
Mr.  Wilson  made  the  vital  mistake  of  trying  to  apply  it  in  his 
intercourse  with  other  nations :  forgetting  that  all  the  world 
did  not  accept  him  as  its  headmaster;  and  ignoring  that  those 
with  whom  he  was  negotiating  were  not  dishonest  or  tricky 
political  bosses,  but  men  inspired  by  as  high  a  patriotism  as  his 
own,  while  possessed  of  a  much  more  profound  knowledge  of 
the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 

Unfortunately  Mr.  Wilson  not  only  failed  to  recognise  this 
fact;  he  also  lost  all  sense  of  proportion.  M.  Stephane  Lau- 
zanne  has  published  the  account  of  an  interview,  which,  before 
coming  to  Europe,  Mr.  Wilson  gave  in  Washington  to  a  num- 
ber of  foreign  journalists.  At  the  time  it  was  communicated 
only  to  the  Allied  Governments.  It  fully  bears  out  the  sugges- 
tion made  above.  The  President  of  the  United  States  talked 
as  if  he  were  the  dictator  of  the  universe.  M.  Lauzanne  seems 
to  have  suspected  that  it  presaged  a  physical  or  mental  collapse. . 
But  a  more  public  and  more  lamentable  exhibition  of  the  same 
nature  was  given  some  months  later  when  Wilson  outraged  all 
decency  by  presuming  to  address  the  Italian  people  over  the 
heads  of  its  own  Government.  All  this  was  perhaps  the  natural 
development  of  a  man  who  had  always  been  intellectually  arro- 
gant; who  never  took  kindly  to  opposition  or  even  criticism; 
who,  for  many  years,  as  a  schoolmaster  or  professor,  had,  to  a 
large  extent,  been  exempt  from  either ;  and  who  was  suddenly 
placed  in  a  position  where  he  wielded  more  power  than  had 
anyone  in  modern  history. 

Colonel  House's  opinion  about  the  measure  of  sagacity  shown 
by  Mr.  Wilson  in  going  to  Paris  may  possibly  never  be  known. 
But  Mr.  Robert  Lansing,  who  was  Secretary  of  State  in  Mr. 
Wilson's  Cabinet,  and  also  one  of  the  five  American  plenipoten- 
tiaries to  the  Peace  Conference,  has  told  the  world  that  he  fore- 
saw the  difficulties  that  might  arise,  and  that  he  advised  the 
President  to  stay  in  Washington. 

Mr.  Lansing's  book  throws  a  curious  but  not  an  unexpected 
light  upon  the  way  Mr.  Wilson  treated  the  other  American 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      221 

Commissioners.  None  of  them,  except  Colonel  House,  ever 
knew  fully  what  was  taking  place.  Wilson  acted  without  tell- 
ing Lansing  (who,  as  Secretary  of  State,  was  to  some  extent 
equivalent  to  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs)  3  of  what  he  in- 
tended to  do ;  any  more  than  he  communicated  to  him  what  he 
had  done.  Moreover,  when  Lansing,  from  time  to  time,  wrote, 
urging  his  views  on  some  important  question,  his  letters  gen- 
erally remained  without  even  an  acknowledgment.  On  De- 
cember 23rd,  19 1 8,  Lansing  sent  the  President  a  long  letter, 
enclosing  various  memoranda  regarding  "The  Power  of  Guar- 
anty proposed  for  the  League  of  Nations."  The  letter  was 
marked  "Secret  and  Urgent,"  "But,"  writes  Mr.  Lansing,  "I 
never  received  a  reply  or  even  an  acknowledgment."  Lansing 
rather  maliciously  suggests  that  this  failure  was  because  Wil- 
son's "Visits  to  Royalty  exacted  from  him  so  much  of  his 
time  that  there  was  no  opportunity  to  give  the  matter  consid- 
eration." It  seems,  however,  to  have  been  Wilson's  habit  to 
ignore  any  letter  from  his  advisers  if  they  in  any  way  pre- 
sumed to  differ  from  him.  In  January,  1919,  Lansing  again 
wrote,  urging  a  certain  policy.  This  letter  also  "was  never 
answered  or  acknowledged,  and  he  did  not  act  upon  the  sug- 
gestion or  discuss  it,  to  my  knowledge,  with  any  of  his  col- 
leagues." 

On  February  3rd,  19 19,  Mr.  Lansing  wrote  to  the  President 
respecting  the  tribunals  to  be  established  under  the  League  of 
Nations.  This  was  a  purely  legal  question,  upon  which  Lan- 
sing's opinion  was  obviously  of  some  value,  not  only  because 
he  was  a  distinguished  jurist  (while  Mr.  Wilson  was  a  lawyer 
in  name  only),  but  because  he  had  taken  part  in  the  proceedings 
of  five  international  courts  of  arbitration.  Nevertheless,  this 
letter  shared  the  fate  of  the  others.  "No  acknowledgment, 
either  written  or  oral,  was  ever  made  of  my  letter  of  February 
3rd." 

Wilson's  self -sufficiency  led  him  into  the  mistake  of  choosing 
for  his  colleagues  as  plenipotentiaries  men  whom  he  could  over- 
rule or  ignore.     He  made  equally  grave  errors  in  selecting  his 

3  But  of  course,  according  to  the  American  Constitution,  Lansing  was 
not  directly  responsible  to  Congress. 


222  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

other  advisers.  The  lamentable  impression  made  in  Paris  by 
those  who  seemed  nearest  to  the  President  persists  to  this  day. 
Writing  in  Le  Matin  in  July,  192 1,  M.  Stephane  Lauzanne 
(whose  acquaintance  with  American  politics  and  politicians  cov- 
ers more  than  a  generation)  said:  "Wilson  was  an  honest 
man;  and  if  his  mind  was  hazy  it  did  not  lack  a  sense  of  jus- 
tice. But  beside  him  were  his  partners;  and  behind  him  were 
the  disturbing  shadows  of  a  Warburg,  an  international  finan- 
cier ;  of  a  Baruch,  boaster  and  frivolous ;  of  a  Tumulty,  bustling 
and  pleasure-loving;  of  a  Creel,  ignorant  and  vulgar";  and  he 
compared  these  men,  to  their  disadvantage,  to  Hughes,  Harvey 
and  Lodge,  who,  to-day,  surround  Harding. 

In  the  first  of  his  famous  "Fourteen  Points,"  Mr.  Wilson 
had  laid  down  as  essential  to  the  world's  welfare,  "Open  cove- 
nants of  peace  openly  arrived  at."  M.  Andre  Tardieu,  who, 
throughout  his  account  of  the  Peace  Conference,  is  scrupulously 
fair,  and  even  generous,  in  his  comments  on  Mr.  Wilson,  says 
that  the  latter  explained  that  he  had  not  meant  public  negotia- 
tions, but  only  public  debates  upon  all  decisions  arrived  at  be- 
fore they  should  become  final.  Although  this  does  not  seem 
to  be  quite  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Wilson's  earlier  declara- 
tion, it  was  a  wise  and  practical  reserve.  But  in  reality  the 
President  seems  to  have  concealed  his  own  negotiations  even 
from  the  majority  of  his  colleagues.  Mr.  Lansing  relates  that 
"The  American  Commissioners,  other  than  Colonel  House, 
were  kept  in  almost  complete  ignorance  of  the  preliminary  ne- 
gotiations (he  is  referring  to  the  League  of  Nations),"  and 
were  left  to  gather  such  information  as  they  were  able  from 
the  delegates  of  other  Powers,  who,  naturally  assuming  that 
the  Americans  possessed  the  whole  confidence  of  the  President, 
spoke  with  much  freedom.  .  .  .  But  in.  addition  to  the  embar- 
rassment caused  the  American  Commissioners,  and  the  unenvi- 
able position  in  which  they  were  placed  by  the  secrecy  by  which 
the  President  surrounded  his  intercourse  with  foreign  states- 
men, and  the  proceedings  of  the  Commission  on  the  League  of 
Nations,  his  secret  negotiations  caused  the  majority  of  the  dele- 
gates to  the  Conference,  and  the  public  at  large,  to  lose  in  a 
large  measure  their  confidence  in  the  actuality  of  his  devotion  to 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       223 

'open  diplomacy'  which  he  had  so  unconditionally  proclaimed 
in  the  first  of  his  'Fourteen  Points.'  " 

Another  dangerous  phrase  which  Wilson  had  coined  or  had 
adopted  as  his  own,  was  "self-determination."  He  had  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  state  at  a  joint  session  of  the  Senate  and  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  February  nth,  1918,  that  "Self- 
determination  is  not  a  mere  phrase.  It  is  an  imperative  prin- 
ciple of  action  which  statesmen  will  henceforth  ignore  at  their 
peril." 

Mr.  Wilson,  who  is  the  author  of  a  history  of  the  United 
States,  should  have  remembered  that  his  own  country,  in  four 
years  of  the  most  desperate  civil  war  which  the  world  has  ever 
seen,  denied  that  right. 

Nevertheless,  in  Article  III.  of  his  original  draft  of  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League  of  Nations,  Wilson  inserted  these  words. 
But  they  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  revised  Article  VII.  (which 
took  the  place  of  Article  III.),  which  he  submitted  to  the  Com- 
mission on  the  League  of  Nations;  or  in  the  corresponding 
Article  X.  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Mr.  Lansing  suggests 
that  the  elimination  was  due  to  opposition  on  the  part  of  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  and  some  of  his  colleagues.4 

Be  that  as  it  may,  Mr.  Wilson  had  other  opportunities  of 
showing  his  belief  in  that  "Imperative  principle  of  action  which 
statesmen  will  henceforth  ignore  at  their  peril."  Nevertheless, 
the  Treaty  which  he  signed  denied  the  right  of  Austria  to  form 
any  political  union  with  Germany,  in  obvious  contradiction  to 
Wilson's  perilous  doctrine  of  self-determination.  I  pass  over 
the  notorious  case  of  Fiume.  But  the  Shantung  Settlement  de- 
serves notice,  both  because  Mr.  Wilson  acquiesced  in  it,  despite 
the  outspoken  protest  of  three  of  his  four  colleagues;  and  also 
because  Mr.  Lansing  states  that  Wilson  did  so  solely  because 
he  thought  that  otherwise  Japan  would  not  adhere  to  the  League 
of  Nations. 

4  Mr.  Lansing  says  "The  opposition  of  those  statesmen  who  repre- 
sented the  British  Empire,  in  contradistinction  to  those  who  represented 
the  self-governing  British  Dominions."  The  self-governing  British 
Dominions  are  essentially  part  and  parcel  of  the  British  Empire.  .Pre- 
sumably, when  Mr.  Lansing  wrote  "British  Empire,"  he  meant  to  indicate 
the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 


224  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

To  the  justice  or  necessity  of  the  Shantung  decision  itself 
I  do  not  propose  to  refer  further  than  to  say  that,  while  it 
may  be  supported  on  several  grounds,  no  one  can  possibly  con- 
tend that  it  is  consistent  with  any  theory  of  self-determination ; 
and  to  note  that  the  immediate  result  was  that  China  protested 
in  the  only  dignified  way  open  to  her — by  refusing  to  be  a 
party  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

On  this  occasion  it  was  General  Bliss  who  wrote  to  the  Presi- 
dent. He  stated  that  in  doing  so  he  was  also  expressing  the 
opinions  of  Mr.  Lansing  and  of  Mr.  Henry  White;  in  other 
words,  the  views  of  three  of  the  five  American  plenipotentiaries. 
General  Bliss  apparently  chose  his  words  with  the  single  ob- 
ject of  making  his  meaning  abundantly  clear  to  the  President. 
The  conclusion  of  his  letter,  which  follows  a  sustained  argu- 
ment, is  worth  quoting : 

"If  it  be  right  for  a  policeman  who  recovers  your  purse  to 
keep  the  contents  and  claim  that  he  has  fulfilled  his  duty  in 
returning  the  empty  purse,  then  Japan's  conduct  may  be 
tolerated. 

"If  it  be  right  for  Japan  to  annex  the  territory  of  an  ally, 
then  it  cannot  be  wrong  for  Italy  to  retain  Fiume  taken  from 
the  enemy. 

"It  can't  be  right  to  do  wrong,  even  to  make  peace.  Peace 
is  desirable,  but  there  are  things  dearer  than  peace — justice  and 
freedom." 

The  last  sentiment  is  curiously  reminiscent  of  some  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson's  own  speeches.  But  his  actions  were  based  upon 
other  considerations.  Mr.  Lansing  says  that  the  President  ac- 
tually sent  a  letter  to  a  member  of  the  Chinese  Delegation  re- 
gretting that  he  had  been  unable  to  do  more  for  China,  and 
saying  that  he  had  been  compelled  to  accede  to  Japan's  de- 
mands in  order  to  save  the  League  of  Nations. 

Mr.  Wilson  got  his  League  of  Nations  as  he  wanted  it :  as 
part  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  He  made  good  his  threat 
that  he  would  weld  them  together  in  such  a  manner  that  his 
political  opponents  would  be  unable  to  accept  the  Treaty  and 
reject  the  League.    But  in  so  doing  he  proved  that  his  colossal 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       225 

egotism  had  obscured  any  talent  he  may  ever  have  had  as  a  po- 
litical tactician.  He  knew  that  his  party  was  in  a  minority  in 
both  Houses  of  Congress.  The  Democrats  had  been  defeated 
in  November,  1918,  probably  because  almost  on  the  eve  of  the 
election  the  President  had  been  so  ill-advised  as  to  issue  a  let- 
ter to  the  American  people  in  which  he  practically  asserted 
that  it  would  be  unpatriotic  to  support  the  Republican  candi- 
dates. Wilson,  unlike  Roosevelt,  never  had  any  personal  fol- 
lowing or  influence  in  the  United  States;  and  this  unwar- 
ranted suggestion  turned  the  floating  vote  against  his  own 
party. 

Knowing  that  any  treaty  he  brought  back  from  Paris  could 
only  be  confirmed  provided  it  was  supported  by  his  political 
adversaries,  elementary  prudence  would  have  suggested  taking 
them  into  counsel  and  making  them  partly  responsible  for  what- 
ever was  done  at  the  Peace  Conference.  But  Mr.  Wilson  ig- 
nored the  leaders  of  public  opinion  who  were  not  of  his  own 
party  and  who  could  not  be  trusted  to  act  as  his  instruments.5 
He  blindly  relied  upon  forcing  the  legislature  to  ratify  whatever 
he  did.  He  went  further.  In  a  speech  made  in  New  York  prior 
to  his  departure  for  France,  he  publicly  threatened  to  compel 
the  Republican  majority  to  accept  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  in  the  way  above  indicated — by  making  it  part  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace.  Presumably  he  relied  upon  rousing  public 
opinion  to  such  an  extent  that  Congress  would  not  dare  to  dis- 
avow what  the  President  of  the  country  had  done  in  Paris. 
In  his  fatuity  he  seems  never  to  have  imagined  that  the  result 
of  his  manoeuvre  would  be  the  rejection  of  the  Treaty  itself, 
and  that  the  Senate  would  have  the  country  behind  it  in  refus- 
ing ratification.  Probably  this  fact  first  dawned  upon  the  un- 
fortunate man  when  he  saw  what  little  success  he  was  achieving 
in  the  tour  he  took  upon  his  return  from  Paris — the  tour  which 
ended  so  tragically. 

President  Wilson's  part  in  the  Peace  Conference  may  be 
summed  up  by  saying  that  he  was  responsible  for  between  two 

0  Certainly,  if  Mr.  Elihu  Root  or  Mr.  Taft  had  been  amongst  the 
American  plenipotentiaries,  they  would  never  have  signed  a  treaty  of 
which  they  disapproved  upon  several  vital  points ;  which,  according  to 
his  own  account,  is  what  Mr.  Lansing  did. 


226  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

and  three  months  being  wasted  in  drafting,  out  of  its  time,  a 
document  which  was  rejected  by  his  own  country,  thus  leading 
to  complications  which  might  have  been  avoided  had  Congress 
ratified  the  Treaty  itself.  To  achieve  that  end  Mr.  Wilson  sac- 
rificed his  own  principles  and  the  interests  of  the  civilised 
world. 

Clemenceau  got  all  he  could  for  his  country,  yet  finally  he 
was  not  able  to  procure  in  the  degree  desired  the  two  things 
which  France  most  needed — military  security  and  financial  re- 
lief. The  case  for  both  seemed  clear  and  overwhelming.  But 
the  interests  involved  were  too  conflicting.  Probably  no  one 
else  would  have  obtained  so  much  as  did  M.  Clemenceau.  While 
it  is  likely  that,  had  either  he  or  M.  Tardieu  been  in  power, 
they  would  have  made  their  own  handiwork  more  productive 
than  have  their  successors  during  the  past  two  or  three  years. 

In  respect  to  military  security  M.  Clemenceau  demanded  the 
permanent  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  To  this 
both  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  President  Wilson  were  opposed. 
They  suggested,  as  an  alternative,  treaties  between  France  on 
the  one  side,  and  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  respec- 
tively on  the  other,  whereby  the  latter  countries  agreed  to  bring 
military  assistance  to  the  former  in  the  event  of  German  ag- 
gression. M.  Clemenceau  took  some  time  to  consider  the  pro- 
posal. Finally,  in  exchange  for  the  promise  of  these  treaties, 
he  agreed  that  the  occupation  should  be  limited  to  fifteen  years. 
As  such  treaties  could  only  be  effective  if  and  when  ratified  by 
Parliament  and  Congress,  it  was  provided  that  the  obligation 
of  either  country  should  not  become  effective  unless  the  other 
likewise  agreed  to  a  similar  treaty. 

But,  during  this  Conference,  Marechal  Foch  had,  at  the  in- 
stance of  M.  Clemenceau,  submitted  his  views  to  the  "Four." 
Foch  read  a  report  of  which  the  conclusion  was  that,  without 
permanent  occupation,  there  was  no  certainty  of  disarmament ; 
and  that  the  Rhine  was  the  indispensable  barrier  for  the  safety 
of  Western  Europe,  and,  consequently,  for  the  safety  of  civil- 
isation. 

When  Clemenceau  compromised  upon  an  occupation  of  fif- 
teen years  (the  area  being  diminished  after  each  five  years), 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       227 

Foch  repeated  his  objections,  first  to  the  French  Government,6 
and  later,  on  May  6th,  1919  (24  hours  before  the  Treaty  was 
handed  to  the  Germans),  to  the  full  Conference.  He  made  it 
clear  that  what  he  demanded  was  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine, 
"From  Cologne  to  Coblence,  and  to  Mayence,  and  not  of  the 
Pays  Rhenans."  To  some  extent  he  based  his  argument  upon 
economic  grounds.  This  has  given  M.  Tardieu  the  opportunity 
to  retort  that  subsequent  experience  has  proved  that  military 
occupation  is  not  efficacious  for  obtaining  payment.  But,  never- 
theless, the  fact  remains  that  Foch  insisted  that,  from  the 
purely  military  standpoint,  permanent  occupation,  or  a  relatively 
independent  "buffer"  State,  was  necessary  for  the  safety  of 
France  and  Belgium.  The  authority  of  Marechal  Foch  upon 
economic  matters  may  be  questioned.  It  is  otherwise  when  he 
speaks  of  military  necessities.  But  his  advice,  which  was  ac- 
cepted for  the  armistice,  was  rejected  in  regard  to  the  Treaty.7 

Upon  the  whole  I  do  not  think  that  M.  Tardieu's  comments 
upon  the  facts,  as  he  himself  states  them,  throw  a  fair  light 
upon  this  subject. 

When  Germany  asked  for  an  armistice,  Foch,  as  the  supreme 
commander  and  military  adviser  of  all  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  on  the  Western  Front,  was  asked  to  draft  the  terms. 
He  took  full  responsibility  for  doing  so;  and  did  not  hesitate 
to  bind  himself  without  reservation  of  any  kind  whatever.  To- 
day, when  there  are  suggestions  that  the  contest  should  have 
been  prolonged,  that  Germany  should  have  been  driven  further 
back,  M.  Tardieu  and  other  political  friends  of  M.  Clemenceau 
cover  themselves  by  referring  to  Foch's  considered  decision. 

When  the  question  of  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  was  dis- 

9  This  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  was  held  on  April  25th,  Foch's  previous 
demand  to  be  heard  by  the  French  Delegation  to  the  Conference  having 
been  refused.  Foch  gave  each  member  of  the  Government  a  memorandum, 
and  then  himself  spoke  in  support  of  it.  His  views  were  supported 
only  by  M.  Poincare.  Apart  from  members  of  the  Cabinet,  M.  Jules 
Cambon,  M.  Tardieu,  and  General  Weygand  were  also  present. 

7  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  only  in  1815  that  Prussia  got  a  footing 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Throughout  the  war  French  statesmen 
had  this  idea  in  mind,  but  were  rather  coy  about  putting  it  forward ; 
and  perhaps  not  altogether  frank,  for  when  M.  Doumergue  went  to 
Russia  in  January,  1917,  he  got  a  formal  promise  that  the  Czar's 
Government  would  support  France  upon  this  point.  This  understanding 
was  not  disclosed  to  the  British  Government. 


228  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

cussed  Foch  was  still  the  military  adviser  of  the  Allies.  It  was 
in  that  capacity  that  M.  Clemenceau  (as  stated  above)  called 
him  before  the  "Four"  to  give  his  views:  views  which  Foch 
(at  his  own  instance,  I  believe)  repeated  very  forcibly  before 
the  whole  Conference.8  M.  Tardieu  might  well  have  made 
the  point  that,  upon  a  matter  affecting  in  varying  degree  all  the 
Allies,  the  opinion  of  their  military  adviser  was  ignored.  He 
might  have  done  so  with  all  the  more  reason  because  the  long 
memorandum  which  he  himself  made  early  in  19 19,  and  which 
served  as  the  basis  for  the  whole  discussion  at  the  Confer- 
ence, was  (as  he  admits)  the  direct  result  of  a  note  submitted 
by  Foch  to  Clemenceau  on  November  27th,  19 18,  the  conclu- 
sions of  which  the  latter  had  at  that  time  decided  to  support. 

Tardieu's  memorandum  dwelt  particularly  upon  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  any  guarantees  resulting  from  the  limitation  of  the 
military  forces  of  Germany,  or  the  authority  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  He  himself  concluded  that  it  was  military  occupa- 
tion, and  military  occupation  only,  which  could  afford  the 
necessary  security  against  German  aggression  at  some  future 
time.  There  was  then  no  question  of  occupation  for  fifteen 
years  or  any  other  limited  period.  According  to  M.  Tardieu 
(M.  Tardieu  early  in  1919),  nothing  except  the  fixing  of  the 
German  frontier  at  the  Rhine,  and  the  holding  of  the  Rhine 
bridges  by  Allied  forces,  would  mean  safety  for  France  and 
Belgium — and,  eventually,  for  the  other  Allies. 

At  first  sight  one  is  inclined  to  regard  M.  Tardieu's  memo- 
randum (fortified  by  the  opinion  of  Marechal  Foch)  as  con- 
clusive :  and  none  the  less  because  there  is  much  to  be  said 
for  the  contention  that,  in  the  event  of  another  war  with  Ger- 
many, the  British  frontier  would  practically  be  at  the  Rhine 
rather  than  at  Dover.  But  it  is  rather  disturbing,  after  having 
powerful  arguments,  to  read  that  while,  early  in  1919,  he  was 
certain  that  permanent  occupation  was  a  necessity,  yet  that 
he  does  not  frankly  admit  that  what  was  finally  agreed  upon 
was,  according  to  his  own  thesis,  a  virtual  denial  of  security 

8  According  to  his  own  account  Foch  told  Clemenceau  that  he  was 
doubtful  whether  he  could  conscientiously  be  present  when  these  treaties 
were  to  be  signed  at  Versailles.  He  was  finally  persuaded  by  the  late 
M.  Jean  Dupuy,  whom  Clemenceau  sent  to  see  him  later. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       229 

for  the  future :  that  security  which  throughout  the  war  France 
had  contended  was  an  essential  condition  of  Peace. 

M.  Tardieu  intimates  that  to  press  the  matter  further  would 
have  been  to  break  the  Entente,  and  possibly  to  disrupt  the 
Conference  itself.     "II  etait  impossible  d'aller  plus  loin." 

That  is  doubtless  true.  But  he  would  probably  have  been 
wise  to  rest  his  case  upon  that  admission. 

Few  will  contend  that  what  M.  Clemenceau,  seconded  by  M. 
Tardieu  and  M.  Loucheur,  was  unable  to  obtain,  anyone  else 
would  have  been  likely  to  get.  But  that  does  not  affect  the 
main  fact.  If  M.  Tardieu  was  sincere  in  his  memorandum, 
then,  according  to  his  own  view,  the  Treaty  does  not  properly 
secure  France  from  a  future  German  attack. 

M.  Tardieu  only  confuses  the  issue  by  controverting9  the 
accuracy  of  Marechal  Foch's  remark :  "Occupons  la  rive  gauche 
et  nous  serons  payes." 

Foch  might  have  been  wrong  on  this  point,  although  it  is 
worth  noting  that  M.  Poincare  has  expressed  his  regret  that  no 
direct  relation  has  been  established  between  the  occupation  of 
the  Rhine  and  the  payment  of  the  German  debt — a  relation 
similar  to  that  established  when,  after  1870,  General  de  Man- 
teuffel  had  his  headquarters  at  Nancy. 

In  any  event,  Foch's  duties  were  those  of  a  military  adviser, 
and  not  of  an  economic  expert.  His  counsel  respecting  the 
military  aspect  of  the  question  was  given  clearly.  It  was 
adopted  and  expanded  by  M.  Tardieu ;  and  it  would  have  been 
more  useful  to  have  had  M.  Tardieu's  opinion  about  the  advice 
having  been  rejected  than  his  comments  upon  Foch's  view  of 
occupation  as  a  means  of  forcing  payment.10 

Certainly  M.  Clemenceau  and  his  French  colleagues  did  not 

9  See  La  Pair,  p.  268. 

10  M.  Tardieu  recounts  that,  on  May  6th,  1019,  after  Marechal  Foch 
(who,  with  some  indiscretion,  had  allowed  his  views  to  become  public) 
had  told  the  Conference  in  no  uncertain  language  what  he  thought  was 
necessary,  Mr.  Bonar  Law  remarked  to  one  of  his  colleagues :  "If  an 
English  general  adopted  such  an  attitude  towards  his  Government  he 
would  not  retain  his  command  for  five  minutes."  Mr.  Bonar  Law 
momentarily  forgot  that  during  the  war  the  British  Government  was, 
on  one  occasion  at  least,  defied  by  Haig;  and  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
himself  told  a  French  minister  that  Haig's  strength  in  the  country 
was  such  that  he  could  not  force  him  to  do  what  he  would  like. 


230  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

attach  sufficient  importance  to  the  probability  of  the  Treaty  not 
being  ratified  by  Congress.  That  appears  clearly  from  M.  Tar- 
dieu's  own  statement  to  the  Chambre  des  Deputes  on  Septem- 
ber 2nd,  1919: 

"La  question  qui  se  pose  a  vous,  apres  s'etre  posee  a  nous, 
est  aussi  simple  qu'elle  est  grave.  Elle  se  pose  dans  une  seule 
formule  que  je  vais  mettre  devant  vos  yeux,  et  sur  laquelle 
de  raeme  que  le  Gouvernement  a  decide,  vous  aurez  dans  quel- 
ques  jour  a  decider  aussi.  Cette  question,  la  voici :  laquelle 
des  deux  solutions  suivantes  valait  le  mieux  pour  la  France? 
Ou  bien  l'occupation  d'une  rive  gauche  du  Rhin  separee  de 
rAllemagne  pour  une  duree  non  definie,  mais  avec  nos  seuls 
moyens,  mais  sous  notre  propre  responsabilite,  mais  dans  une 
position  d'isolement  politique  et  militaire  en  face  d'un  pays 
toujours  plus  peuple  que  le  notre,  mais  aussi  sans  droit  con- 
tractuel  de  verifier  ce  qui  se  passait  en  Allemagne  au  point  de 
vue  militaire :  mais  enfin  et  surtout  malgre  les  objections  for- 
melles  de  la  Grande  Bretagne  et  des  Etats  Unis ;  ou  bien,  l'oc- 
cupation de  cette  meme  rive  gauche  qui  demeure  allemande 
dans  les  conditions  qui  definit  le  traite,  mais  avec  le  droit  de 
prolonger  l'occupation  et  de  reoccuper,  mais  aussi  avec  la  de- 
struction des  fortresses  Rhenanes  et  la  neutralisation  de  la  rive 
gauche  de  50  kilometres  sur  la  rive  droit,  mais  aussi  avec  le 
droit  d'investigation,  mais  aussi  avec  la  participation  de  nos 
Allies  a  l'occupation  Rhenane,  mais  enfin  et  surtout  avec 
l'engagement  d'aide  militaire  immediate  de  la  Grande  Bretagne 
et  des  Etats  Unis?" 

This  succinct  statement  proves  clearly  that  either  M.  Tardieu 
did  not  take  into  account  the  possibility  of  the  treaties  being 
rejected  by  the  United  States  (thus  causing  the  alliance  with 
Great  Britain  also  to  fall  to  the  ground)  ;  or  that  he  con- 
sciously did  not  place  the  matter  fairly  before  the  Chambre. 
The  latter  hypothesis  is  of  course  untenable.  There  remains, 
therefore,  no  doubt  that  the  repudiation  of  the  treaties  by  Con- 
gress was  not  seriously  considered.  Otherwise,  would  M.  Tar- 
dieu have  dared  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  Chambre  "Enfin 
et  surtout"  to  the  military  engagements  of  Great  Britain  and 
France,  without  drawing  attention  to  the  fact  that,  in  the  event 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       231 

of  such  rejection,  France  would  be  in  the  position  of  having 
irrevocably  surrendered  her  claim  to  permanent  occupation 
without  getting  any  guarantee  of  assistance  if  attacked? 

Moreover,  when  M.  Barthou,  the  rapporteur  general  of  the 
Treaty,  said:  "Le  Gouvernement  francais  .  .  .  a  apporte  a  la 
France  des  garanties  solides.  Peut-on  nier  la  force  importante 
qu'elles  represented?  Elles  se  complement  les  unes  les  autres," 
he  was  undoubtedly  referring  mainly  to  those  military  engage- 
ments which  rested  upon  so  flimsy  a  fabric.  Indeed,  M.  Tar- 
dieu  himself,  elsewhere  in  his  book,11  states  explicitly  that  it 
was  "En  echange  de  ce  double  engagement"  (the  military  as- 
sistance of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States)  that  M.  Cle- 
menceau  yielded  on  his  contention  that  the  German  frontier 
should  be  at  the  Rhine. 

But  if  there  could  be  any  doubt,  it  is  dispelled  by  the  way  in 
which  M.  Clemenceau  himself  posed  the  essential  question. 
Speaking  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes  on  September  24th,  19 19, 
he  said,  referring  to  the  treaty  of  guarantee:  "If  the  United 
States  does  not  vote  for  it,  if  England  had  not  voted  for  it,  if 
nobody  votes  for  it,  then  there  will  be  nothing;  that  is  under- 
stood, and  the  vote  which  you  will  have  given  will  be  null." 

It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  M.  Clemenceau  fully  realised  the 
effect  of  non-ratification  by  Congress.  But  he  never  thought 
there  was  any  prospect  of  the  treaty  being  rejected.  That  is 
the  best  excuse  which  can  be  made  for  him. 

In  brief,  M.  Clemenceau  gave  up  something  definitely  in  ex- 
change for  the  chance  of  getting  something.  The  arrangement 
would  have  been  what  M.  Tardieu  seeks  to  make  out  that  it  is 
had  the  Treaty  provided  that  the  German  frontier  should  be 
the  Rhine  unless  the  British  and  American  legislatures  ratified 
the  Treaties.  I  do  not  suggest  that  that  course  would  have  been 
feasible,  but  simply  am  illustrating  the  inexactitude  of  M.  Tar- 
dieu's  statement. 

M.  Tardieu  says  that  the  possibility  of  President  Wilson 
not  being  supported  by  Congress  was  considered.  He  pro- 
tests that  no  course  was  open  other  than  to  treat  with  Wilson. 
Undoubtedly  that  was  so.     But  as,  according  to  M.  Tardieu's 

11  La  Paix,  p.  233. 


232  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

own  contention,  the  proposed  Treaties  were  of  such  impor- 
tance that  their  offer  had  the  effect  of  reducing  the  French 
demand  for  permanent  occupation  to  one  for  occupation  for  a 
period  of  fifteen  years,  against  the  advice  of  their  principal  mili- 
tary adviser,  one  would  have  thought  that  the  chances  of  Mr. 
Wilson  being  supported  or  otherwise  would  have  been  carefully 
scrutinised.  For,  although  undoubtedly  the  Treaties  would 
have  been  a  source  of  security  to  France,  yet,  as  shown  above, 
they  were  offered  on  condition  that  France's  first  claim  for  se- 
curity— permanent  occupation — should  be  abandoned. 

Moreover,  if  Mr.  Wilson  had  been  warned  that  he  ran  a  risk 
of  not  having  his  work  adopted  by  the  Senate,  the  British 
and  French  Governments  also  were  not  unaware  of  the  posi- 
tion. M.  Tardieu  admits  it.  He  asks  what  else  the  French 
plenipotentiaries  could  have  done.  The  point  at  issue  is  plain. 
It  is  simply  whether  or  not  they  staked  too  much  upon  the 
chance  of  getting  something  else.  If  it  was  to  be  done  over 
again,  would  M.  Tardieu  waive  all  claim  to  any  occupation 
beyond  fifteen  years  if  there  was  to  be  no  defensive  guarantee 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States?  If  the 
answer  is  "Yes,"  then  the  French  representatives  got  what  they 
wanted  (although  it  is  not  what  Foch  thinks  is  necessary  for 
safety),  and  took  a  legitimate  gamble  upon  the  prospect  of  get- 
ting some  further  security.  If  the  answer  is  "No,"  then  they 
risked  too  much  upon  a  chance. 

My  own  conviction,  based  upon  various  conversations  which 
took  place  at  that  period,  is  that,  whatever  M.  Tardieu  himself 
might  have  thought,  the  belief  prevalent  amongst  both  French 
and  English  statesmen  was  that  Mr.  Wilson  would  obtain  rati- 
fication of  the  Treaty.  They  appeared  to  attach  little  impor- 
tance to  the  fact  that  the  American  Senate  had  on  prior  occa- 
sions rejected  treaties  signed  by  American  plenipotentiaries. 
Nor  were  their  views  greatly  influenced  by  the  knowledge  that 
Wilson  was  faced  by  a  hostile  majority,  which  he  had  done 
nothing  to  conciliate  and  had,  indeed,  further  antagonised. 
They  never  seemed  fully  to  understand  what  Roosevelt  made 
clear  in  a  statement  published  shortly  before  his  death :  that 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       233 

the  President,  though  a  vehicle  of  negotiation,  was  only  half 
the  treaty-making  power,  and  could  bind  nobody  except  him- 
self. The  situation  was  the  same  as  if  King  George  per- 
sonally signed  a  treaty  which  he  had  every  reason  to  know 
would  be  opposed  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  his  majority  if  it 
was  submitted  to  the  House  of  Commons. 

M.  Tardieu  relates  that  the  possibility  of  non-ratification  was 
discussed  with  President  Wilson,  and  that,  as  a  result,  Article 
429  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  changed.  Basing  his  con- 
tention upon  the  final  paragraph  of  that  article,  he  says  that 
there  is  now  a  full  guarantee.  The  paragraph  reads  as  follows  : 
"Si  a  ce  moment  (au  bout  de  15  ans),  les  garanties  contre  une 
agression  non  provoquee  de  l'Allemagne  n'etaient  pas  con- 
siderees  suffisantes  par  les  Gouvernements  Allies  et  As- 
socies,  l'evacuation  des  troupes  d'occupation  pourrait  etre  re- 
tarded dans  le  mesure  jugee  necessaire  a  l'obtenir  des  dites 
garanties. " 

M.  Tardieu  argues  that  one  of  the  cases  in  which  the  guaran- 
tees would  be  considered  insufficient  in  1935  would  be  if  the 
guarantee  treaties  between  France  and  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  was  then  non-existent.  He  contends  that  in  that 
event,  even  if  Germany  had  fulfilled  her  financial  obligations, 
the  occupation  might  be  postponed  until  those  treaties  were  rati- 
fied, or  some  equivalent  treaty  was  given. 

M.  Tardieu  must  necessarily  know  what  this  Article  was 
meant  to  convey.  For  every  reason  I  should  like  to  be  able  to 
read  it  as  he  interprets  it.  However,  the  paragraph  states  that 
the  prolongation  of  the  occupation  is  to  be  dependent  upon 
the  decision  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments. 

The  year  1935  is  a  long  way  ahead.  Surely  what  M.  Tardieu 
sees  in  1922  is  not  of  a  nature  to  reassure  him  that  he  can 
count  with  any  certainty  upon  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  agreeing  to  such  occupation  thirteen  years  hence. 

Since  the  above  lines  were  written,  M.  Tardieu  has  asserted 
in  a  letter  to  Le  Temps  (September  13th,  192 1)  that  France's 
right  to  continue  the  occupation  after  the  fifteen  years  would 
not  be  affected  even  if  the  other  Allies  withdrew.     Certainly 


234  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

neither  the  French  nor  the  English  version  seems  to  bear  that 
construction.12 

M.  Tardieu  also  laid  stress  on  the  fact  that  no  Ally  had  raised 
any  objection  to  the  interpretation  which  he  had  publicly  given 
of  this  article,  both  in  his  book  and  elsewhere.  But  that  seems 
to  be  begging  the  question.  The  Allied  Governments  are  not 
in  the  habit  of  replying  to  statements  made  by  those  who  no 
longer  hold  any  official  position.  Nor  do  they  go  forward  to 
meet  difficulties.  France  has  several  rights  under  the  Treaty 
which  were  not  denied,  but  which  were  not  fulfilled  when  the 
proper  time  arrived.  In  any  event,  the  negotiations  were  un- 
necessarily prolonged  if  one  negotiator  is  to-day  sincerely  satis- 
fied when  he  contemplates  the  possibility  of  French  troops  oc- 
cupying this  territory,  in  disaccord  with  their  former  Allies, 
but  without  being  forcibly  ousted  by  them. 

Regarding  the  payments  to  be  made  by  Germany  under  the 
Treaty,  it  is  certain  that  they  will  not  give  France  all  she  hoped. 
It  is  almost  equally  certain  that  they  will  not  provide  what 
France  has  a  right  to  expect.  While  the  defaults  already  made 
by  Germany  have  aggravated  the  situation. 

Unfortunately,  some  members  of  the  French  Government 
had  led  the  country  to  believe  that  German  payments  would 
relieve  the  financial  strain  almost  immediately.  In  this  respect 
M.  Klotz,  who  was  then  Minister  of  Finance,  was  particularly 
to  blame.  In  one  speech  he  held  out  the  hope  that  France  alone 
would  eventually  obtain  at  least  400  milliards  of  francs  from 
Germany.  It  is  worth  recalling  that  it  was  to  M.  Klotz  that 
Marechal  Foch,  immediately  after  the  Treaty  was  signed  at 
Versailles,  said :  "Monsieur  le  ministre  des  finances  de  la  Re- 
publique  franchise,  avec  un  pareil  traite,  vous  pourrez  vous  pre- 
senter aux  guichets  de  l'empire  allemand,  et  vous  serez  paye — 
en  monnaie  de  singe." 

13  M.  Poincare,  in  replying  to  M.  Tardieu  (Le  Temps,  September  15th, 
iQ2i),  disagreed,  and  took  the  view  expressed  above. 

The  English  version  of  this  article  differs  slightly  from  the  French 
text.  It  reads  as  follows:  "If  at  that  date  the  guarantees  against 
unprovoked  aggression  by  Germany  are  not  considered  sufficient  by  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  the  evacuation  of  the  occupying 
troops  may  be  delayed  to  the  extent  regarded  as  necessary  for  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  the  required  guarantees." 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       235 

It  is  true  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  also  said :  "Germany 
will  pay  for  everything,"  but  with  the  British  Prime  Minister 
that  was  mainly  an  election  cry,  for  at  the  Conference  the  same 
Lloyd  George  did  not  hesitate  to  protest  against  exacting  from 
Germany  the  payments  which  the  French  plenipotentiaries 
wanted.  It  is  curious  to  reflect  that  one  of  his  arguments  was 
that  excessive  demands  might  result  in  throwing  Germany  into 
the  arms  of  the  Bolshevists,  and  thus  increasing  the  power  of 
the  latter.  While  later  he  himself  paid  no  heed  to  the  French 
contention  that  Great  Britain  would  increase  the  prestige  of  the 
Soviet  Government  by  making  a  commercial  treaty  with  it.13 

Throughout  the  Conference  the  French  representatives  held 
firmly  to  one  idea :  they  did  not  want  the  total  of  the  German 
debt  to  be  fixed  then.  In  their  opinion  it  was  impossible  to  ar- 
rive at  any  fairly  approximate  figure  without  investigations, 
which  would  take  many  months.  They  gained  their  point,  and 
the  Treaty  provided  that  the  Reparations  Commission  should 
settle  the  amount  before  May  ist,  1921. 

The  French  view  was  probably  sound  in  theory.  But  it 
was  apparent  throughout  the  Conference  that  it  was  only  by 
a  daily  struggle  that  France  could  get  even  part  of  what  she 
asked.  M.  Tardieu  has  put  it  on  record  that  France  was  the 
great  sufferer  from  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  contradictions.  More- 
over, what  was  won  one  week  was  often  imperilled  the  next. 
Thus,  after  the  British  Prime  Minister  had  agreed  to  the  oc- 
cupation of  German  territory  for  fifteen  years,  he  subsequently 
(when  Germany  had  presented  her  objections)  changed  his 
mind,  and,  supported  by  Mr.  Bonar  Law  and  Mr.  Barnes, 
wished  to  re-open  the  whole  question.14 

It  was  only  because  M.  Clemenceau  held  firm  for  three  weeks, 
stating  boldly  that  he  would  not  agree  to  any  change  in  the  de- 
cision already  arrived  at  after  the  fullest  discussion,  that  Mr. 

13 1  am  not  criticising  the  policy  which  led  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to 
make  an  arrangement  with  the  Soviet  Government.  On  the  contrary, 
as  stated  in  a  former  chapter,  I  think  it  was  the  right  one  in  the 
circumstances. 

"Mr.  Bonar  Law  summed  up  his  view  of  this  matter  by  saying: 
"The  occupation  has  only  two  objects — to  protect  France  and  to  guarantee 
the  execution  of  the  Treaty.  In  neither  case  is  the  period  of  fifteen 
years  justified." 


236  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Lloyd  George  and  his  colleagues  finally  yielded.  But  these  ex- 
periences ought  to  have  taught  the  French  plenipotentiaries  to 
settle  matters  once  and  for  all,  and,  so  far  as  possible,  to  avoid 
the  necessity  of  future  debates  with  their  Allies.  If  the  latter 
were  not  easy  to  convince  in  19 19,  there  was  no  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  they  would  become  more  so  as  their  own  interests  un- 
der the  Treaty  were  satisfied.  This  consideration  applied  with 
particular  force  to  the  payments  to  be  made  by  Germany.  For, 
although  the  exact  division  between  the  Allies  was  not  fixed  un- 
til some  months  later,  it  was  always  understood  that  the  larger 
share  would  naturally  fall  to  France.15 

Thus,  although  it  would  certainly  have  been  difficult  to  have 
settled  the  German  indebtedness  at  the  time  the  Treaty  was 
signed,  France  probably  lost  more  (and  certainly  ran  a  great 
risk  of  losing  more)  by  leaving  the  question  open  than  by  ac- 
cepting, and  having  stated  in  the  Treaty,  a  figure  which  doubt- 
less would  have  been  inaccurate.  It  was  one  of  the  points  in 
regard  to  which  M.  Clemenceau  got  his  way,  thanks  to  his 
strength  of  will  and  his  consummate  patience.  Mr.  Wilson, 
who  had  to  be  won  over,  said  that  he  was  in  favour  of  the 
amount  being  named  at  once,  not  because  he  wished  to  make  any 
concession  to  Germany,  but  only  because  he  was  advised  by 
the  American  experts  that,  for  reasons  of  a  practical  nature, 
it  was  better  to  settle  it  immediately.  Subsequent  events  may 
be  said  to  have  confirmed  that  view. 

It  is  fair  to  add  that  neither  M.  Clemenceau  nor  M.  Tardieu 
nor  M.  Loucheur  foresaw  that  the  Reparations  Commission 
would  become  a  body  which  the  politicians  in  power  would 
oust  or  would  make  use  of  as  might  best  serve  their  purpose 
from  time  to  time. 

Finally,  the  transcendent  fault  of  the  makers  of  the  Treaty 
was  not  to  include  therein  unambiguous  and  sufficient  penalties 
for  its  infraction.  M.  Tardieu,  in  articles  of  singular  force  and 
lucidity,16  has  protested  with  his  usual  vigour  against  the  con- 
stant breach  of  the  pact  of  which  he  was  one  of  the  principal 

16  The  division  as  finally  agreed  upon  was  as  follows :  52  per  cent,  to 
France  and  22  per  cent,  to  Great  Britain. 
18 1  refer  to  M.  Tardieu's  series  of  articles  in  V Illustration. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       237 

makers.  He  contends  that  the  Treaty  does  contain  proper 
penalties.  It  certainly  contains  none  which,  in  the  opinion  of 
successive  French  Governments,  are  adequate  automatically  to 
enforce  the  execution  of  the  German  obligations.  Otherwise 
there  would  have  been  no  necessity  for  any  French  participation 
in  the  various  conferences  between  the  Allies,  provoked  by  vio- 
lations of  the  Treaty  on  the  part  of  Germany. 

M.  Tardieu  is  entitled  to  make  out  the  best  case  he  can  for 
himself.  Nevertheless,  such  comments  do  not  come  with  the 
best  of  grace  from  one  who,  with  his  French  colleagues,  is 
largely  to  blame  for  the  fact  that  the  Treaty  is  incomplete  in 
this  respect.  It  is  true  that  the  same  reproach  might  be  ad- 
dressed to  all  the  principal  members  of  the  Conference.  But  it 
is  France  who  complains  most  loudly  that  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  are  not  being  carried  out.  It  is  France  who  is  suffering 
most  to-day  from  its  non-execution.  During  the  Conference 
her  representatives  argued  time  and  again  that  they  understood 
Germans  and  the  German  character  better  than  any  of  the 
others.  M.  Clemenceau  once  said  that  he  did  not  foresee  a 
peace  of  kindness  with  Germany.  He  seemed  to  realise  that, 
whatever  she  might  say,  whatever  she  might  promise,  Germany 
would  react  only  to  coercion.  It  is  inconceivable  that,  holding 
that  firm  conviction,  and  with  the  knowledge  that  any  discus- 
sion with  some  of  the  Allies  upon  this  question  meant  a  contest, 
the  French  plenipotentiaries  should  have  left  loop-holes  leading 
to  future  conferences,  whereby  their  claims  might  again  be  put 
in  jeopardy. 

But  if  it  is  possible  to  indicate  some  points  in  which  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  is  defective,  M.  Clemenceau  and  M.  Tar- 
dieu can  retort  that  it  is  those  charged  with  its  execution  who 
must  bear  the  greater  responsibility  for  the  unsatisfactory  posi- 
tion which  prevails  two  years  after  its  signature. 

M.  Clemenceau  gave  them  warning  that  the  document  itself 
with  the  signature  of  Germany  alone  would  not  suffice.  "Ce 
texte,  si  complexe,  vaudra  parce  que  vous  vaudrez  vous  memes ; 
il  sera  ce  que  vous  le  ferez''  were  his  words. 

If  I  have  ventured  to  indicate  certain  omissions  in  the 
Treaty,  omissions  which  were  obviously  bound  to  give  rise  to 


238  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

complaints  that  France  was  not  being  fairly  compensated  or 
properly  protected,  I  admit  that  all  criticisms  of  that  nature 
are  fully  answered  by  the  reply:  "We  could  not  get  more." 
For  throughout  the  Conference  M.  Clemenceau  was  deter- 
mined not  to  cause  a  rupture  of  the  Entente  or  a  premature  dis- 
solution of  the  Conference  itself.  Any  full  account  of  the  pro- 
ceedings will  show  how  nearly  that  occurred  on  at  least  two 
occasions ;  and  will  prove  that  M.  Clemenceau  went  as  far  as 
he  could  without  causing  an  absolute  breach.  In  avoiding  that 
he  was  doing  his  best  for  his  country ;  for,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
the  world  would  then  have  pronounced  that  the  French  demands 
were  responsible  for  the  collapse. 

My  slight  criticism  of  M.  Tardieu's  book  is  that  he  does  not 
rely  enough  upon  this  firm  ground  of  the  inability  of  his  col- 
leagues and  himself  to  get  better  terms ;  and  that  he  is  led  into 
the  error  (a  very  human  one)  of  magnifying  what  they  did 
get  and  of  not  throwing  a  full  light  upon  what  they  failed  to 
obtain. 

The  fact  is  that  the  Treaty  was  necessarily  the  result  of  con- 
cessions on  the  part  of  each  of  the  great  Powers ;  concessions 
sometimes  of  conflicting  interests,  often  of  conflicting  views. 
It  was  a  work  produced  by  months  of  labour :  during  which 
divergences  of  opinion  more  than  once  reached  the  breaking- 
point.  But  throughout,  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  nations  kept  in  view  the  need  of  reaching  an  agree- 
ment which  they  could  finally  present  to  Germany  as  their 
unanimous  decision.  When  such  differences  were  overcome  in 
order  to  achieve  that  end,  one  would  naturally  have  thought 
that,  having  compromised  among  themselves,  they  would  hence- 
forth have  been  equally  at  one  in  insisting  upon  a  due  perform- 
ance of  that  compromise  by  Germany.  Unfortunately  that  has 
not  been  the  case. 

M.  Clemenceau  and  M.  Tardieu  may  well  plead  that,  had 
they  represented  France  subsequently  to  signing  the  Treaty, 
they  would  have  derived  more  from  it  than  did  others.  Many 
will  assent  to  this  contention.  More  will  admit  that  it  is  unfair 
to  render  the  authors  of  the  Treaty,  who  had  nothing  to  do 
with  its  execution,  responsible  for  the  errors  of  others. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       239 

M.  Clemenceau  and  Mr.  Wilson  both  ceased  to  have  any 
power  some  months  after  the  Treaty  was  signed,  the  former 
absolutely,  the  latter  to  all  practical  intents  and  purposes. 

But  there  is  one  of  the  principal  authors  of  the  Treaty  who 
has  taken  a  part,  and  a  predominant  part,  in  all  subsequent  ne- 
gotiations :  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  No  account  of  the  peripathetic 
course  of  the  Treaty,  no  examination  of  the  causes  of  its  com- 
parative failure,  would  be  complete  without  a  full  considera- 
tion of  the  attitude  of  the  Prime  Minister,  both  at  the  Peace 
Conference  and  since. 

Mr.  Keynes's  picture  of  the  three  chief  negotiators,  Clemen- 
ceau, Lloyd  George,  and  Wilson,  will  doubtless  pass  into  his- 
tory when  his  economic  views  and  predictions  have  long  been 
forgotten.  It  is  worth  recalling  here,  if  only  because  it  lays 
stress  upon  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  mental  agility  and  his  suscepti- 
bility to  atmosphere. 

M.  Clemenceau  had  principles  to  which  he  clung  throughout. 
There  was  never  any  doubt  in  his  own  mind  about  what  he 
wanted,  and  about  what  his  stand  would  be  upon  any  question. 
Once  he  had  stated  his  opinion  everyone  knew  that  he  would 
not  replace  it  the  next  day  by  another  one.  Mr.  Wilson  was 
generally  groping  in  the  dark,  and  groping  slowly  and  awk- 
wardly, as  befitted  his  caution  and  mental  rigidity.  In  the 
meantime,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  arrived  at  his  conclusion — 
for  the  day. 

But,  apart  from  Mr.  Keynes,  there  were  two  delegates  to  the 
Peace  Conference,  both  of  whom  had  a  fuller  and  closer  oppor- 
tunity of  judging,  who  have  made  public  their  impression  of 
Mr.  Lloyd  George :  Mr.  Robert  Lansing,  and  M.  Andre  Tar- 
dieu. 

Mr.  Lansing,  as  one  probably  far  removed  from  the  future 
conduct  of  European  affairs,  has  recorded  his  recollections  with- 
out reticence.  M.  Tardieu,  doubtless  mindful  of  the  fact  that 
he  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  may  one  day  again  find  themselves 
in  conference  together,  has  written  with  more  discretion,  but, 
perhaps,  also  with  more  insight. 

Mr.  Lansing  ranks  Lloyd  George  as  third  in  importance 
and  influence  amongst  those  whom  he  calls  the  "Big  Four," 


240  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  Wilson,  and  Orlando.  He  thinks 
that,  more  than  any  of  the  others,  the  British  Prime  Minister 
permitted  the  Parliamentary  situation  in  his  own  country  to 
govern  his  every  action.  Apart  from  his  steadfastness  in  seek- 
ing fulfilment  of  his  own  popular  election  cries  (such  as  the 
public  trial  of  the  ex-Kaiser),  he  seemed  to  have  neither  fixed 
principles  nor  a  settled  programme.  Moreover,  once  the  mat- 
ters affecting  Great  Britain  were  decided,  he  appeared  to  think 
that  any  other  questions  were  of  comparatively  slight  impor- 
tance, and  that  to  study  them  carefully  would  be  a  waste  of 
time  and  energy.  His  rapid  decisions  indicated  "Alertness 
rather  than  a  depth  of  mind  ...  his  logic,  if  one  can  use  that 
word,  was  that  of  an  opportunist,  and  was  in  no  way  convinc- 
ing. He  was  better  in  attack  than  on  the  defence,  for  the  latter 
exacted  a  detailed  knowledge  of  all  the  phases  of  a  question, 
while  in  attacking  he  could  choose  the  ground  which  suited  him 
best." 

In  Mr.  Lansing's  opinion,  Lloyd  George  was  a  politician 
rather  than  a  sagacious  statesman.  "His  quickness  in  thought 
and  speech,  and  his  self-confidence,  made  him  what  he  was,  a 
great  Parliamentarian.  In  certain  respects  he  had  talents  which 
resembled  those  of  M.  Clemenceau,  although  the  latter  seemed 
to  be  more  stable  than  his  British  colleague.  In  the  Conference 
at  Paris  these  qualities  were  in  no  way  so  efficacious  as  in  the 
House  of  Commons  or  on  the  political  platform.  M.  Clemen- 
ceau judiciously  put  them  on  one  side.  But  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
could  not  banish  them.  Without  them  he  would  have  been  lost. 
In  negotiations  conducted  by  the  heads  of  the  Governments  and 
by  the  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Five  Great  Powers, 
precise  knowledge  counted  for  something,  and  intellectual 
weight  took  the  first  rank.  Without  the  assistance  of  Mr.  Bal- 
four and  the  constant  advice  of  his  subordinates,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  would,  I  fear,  have  been  positively  outclassed." 

Above  all,  Lansing  was  struck  by  Lloyd  George's  desire  for 
secrecy,  due  to  his  fear  of  giving  any  weapon  to  his  Parliamen- 
tary opponents.  This  was  illustrated  at  a  meeting  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  Ten,  in  April,  1919,  when  the  Prime  Minister  urged  that 
the  Treaty  should  not  be  shown  to  the  minor  states  before  it 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       241 

was  given  to  the  representatives  of  Germany.  In  the  result, 
"the  delegates  of  the  smaller  belligerent  nations  were  not  per- 
mitted to  examine  the  actual  text  of  the  document  before  it  was 
seen  by  their  defeated  adversaries.  Nations  which  had  fought 
valiantly  and  suffered  agonies  during  the  war  were  treated  with 
less  consideration  than  their  enemies  so  far  as  knowledge  of  the 
exact  terms  of  peace  were  concerned.  The  arguments  which 
could  be  urged  on  the  ground  of  the  practical  necessity  of  a 
small  group  dealing  with  the  questions,  and  determining  the 
settlements,17  seem  insufficient  to  justify  the  application  of  the 
rule  of  secrecy  to  the  delegates  who  sat  in  the  Conference  on  the 
Preliminaries  of  Peace.  It  is  not  too  severe  to  say  that  it  out- 
raged the  equal  rights  of  independent  and  sovereign  states,  and, 
under  less  critical  conditions,  would  have  been  resented  as  an 
insult  by  the  plenipotentiaries  of  the  lesser  nations.  Even 
within  the  delegations  of  the  Great  Powers  there  were  indig- 
nant murmurings  against  this  indefensible  and  unheard-of 
treatment  of  Allies.  No  man  whose  mind  was  not  warped  by 
prejudice  or  dominated  by  political  expediency  could  give  it  his 
approval  or  become  its  apologist."  18 

As  has  been  already  stated,  Mr.  Wilson  explained  or  quali- 
fied the  first  of  his  Fourteen  Points — "Open  covenants  of  peace, 
openly  arrived  at" — by  saying  that  he  had  never  meant  that  the 
negotiations  should  be  public,  but  only  that  there  should  be  an 
opportunity  for  public  debates  upon  the  decisions  at  which  the 
plenipotentiaries  had  arrived.  But  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  pro- 
posal that  the  Treaty  should  be  given  to  the  representatives  of 
Germany  before  it  was  shown  to  the  delegates  of  the  smaller 
nations  went  much  further  than  anything  Mr.  Wilson  had  sug- 
gested. For  what  could  be  more  futile  than  a  Parliamentary 
debate  in  a  country  where  no  plenipotentiary  could  say  that  he 
had  seen  the  Treaty  as  a  whole  before  it  was  handed  to  Ger- 
many?   That  is  the  plan  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  suggested; 

17  At  the  outset  of  the  Conference  M.  Clemenceau,  in  answer  to  a 
protest  made  by  Sir  Robert  Borden,  had  boldly  stated  that  the  settle- 
ment of  the  terms  of  peace  was,  in  the  final  analysis,  the  business 
of  the  Great  Powers. 

18  Mr.  Lansing  is  evidently  referring  to  Mr.  Wilson  as  being  "Warped 
by  prejudice,"  and  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  as  being  "Dominated  by  political 
expediency." 


242  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

that  is  the  plan  to  which  Mr.  Wilson  assented ;  and  that  is  what 
was  done. 

I  am  far  from  being  an  advocate  of  open  diplomacy  as  that 
treacherous  term  is  generally  understood.  But  it  is  difficult 
to  justify  these  proceedings.  While  in  view  of  their  previous 
professions  it  is  strange  to  find  that  those  responsible  for  this 
policy  were  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Wilson. 

In  the  meantime  M.  Clemenceau  was  wrapped  in  sardonic 
contemplation  of  his  English  and  American  colleagues  nullify- 
ing in  private  their  political  utterances.  Clemenceau  believed 
that  the  Great  Powers  should  decide  all  questions  as  they 
thought  fit.  He  had  said  so  boldly  at  the  beginning  of  the  Con- 
ference in  reply  to  a  protest  made  by  Sir  Robert  Borden.  But 
he  had  never  compromised  himself  by  any  remarks  about  open 
diplomacy.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  had  not  talked  in  that 
sense,  he  had  by  his  actions  shown  that  he  dreaded  publicity 
much  less  than  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  criticism  much  less  than 
Mr.  Wilson.  One  of  his  first  acts  upon  becoming  Prime  Min- 
ister had  in  fact  been  to  abolish  the  censorship  in  respect  to 
attacks  upon  himself.  However,  at  the  Conference  he  was 
obliged  to  take  steps  to  protect  the  feelings  of  his  more  sensi- 
tive and  less  consistent  colleagues. 

Mr.  Lansing  sums  up  the  matter  as  follows  :  "The  insistence 
of  the  British  Prime  Minister  on  secrecy  was  one  of  the  mani- 
festations of  that  opportunism  which  distinguished  his  public 
career.  He  did  not  accept  a  principle,  or  showed  no  disposi- 
tion to  apply  it,  unless  it  appeared  to  lead  to  some  practical 
advantage  for  his  Government,  and  if  he  found  his  anticipa- 
tion of  the  result  was  wrong  he  unhesitatingly  abandoned  the 
principle  and  assumed  another." 

M.  Tardieu  likewise  refers  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  dislike  of 
publicity  and  his  intolerance  of  criticism.  As  early  as  January 
15th,  1919,  the  latter  was  complaining  of  the  comments  in  the 
French  Press.  While  a  few  weeks  later  he  was  threatening  to 
withdraw  from  the  Conference  if  various  newspapers  continued 
to  publish  certain  statements  about  the  proceedings.  Fortu- 
nately for  all  concerned  M.  Clemenceau  did  not  take  him  at  his 
word. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       243 

M.  Tardieu,  like  Mr.  Lansing,  remarked  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
insistence  on  the  punishment  of  the  ex-Kaiser  and  his  accom- 
plices. In  eleven  sessions  (February  3rd  to  March  29th,  191 9) 
of  the  Commission  on  the  Question  des  Coupables,  Sir  Ernest 
Pollock  maintained,  in  opposition  to  the  American  view,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George's  contention  that  those  accused  should  be  sur- 
rendered for  trial  by  the  Allies.  The  Prime  Minister  himself, 
at  seven  meetings  of  the  Council  of  Four  (April  1st  to  May  5th, 
1919),  demanded  that  the  conclusions  arrived  at  by  the  Com- 
mission should  be  increased  in  severity.  While  on  June  16th, 
1919,  his  principal  secretary,  Mr.  Philip  Kerr,  drafted  the  letter 
by  which,  in  answer  to  the  protests  of  Count  de  Brockdorff- 
Rantzau,  the  Allies  refused  to  allow  those  guilty  to  be  judged 
by  "The  accomplices  of  their  crimes."  19 

Nevertheless,  a  few  months  later,  in  February,  1920,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  was  responsible  for  the  first  mutilation  of  the 
Treaty  when  he  abandoned  the  clause  which  called  for  these 
men  being  handed  over  to  the  Allies. 

M.  Tardieu  states  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  gave  away  that  for 
which  he  had  so  loudly  clamoured  because  of  an  adverse  by- 
election  won  by  the  Labour  party.  Whatever  the  reason,  M. 
Tardieu's  experience  of  the  Conference  should  have  habitu- 
ated him  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  frequent  changes  and  contra- 
dictions. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George's  almost  constant  fear  was  that  the  Ger- 
mans would  not  sign  the  Treaty.  No  matter  what  agreement 
he  had  reached  with  his  colleagues,  they  were  never  certain  that 
he  would  not,  on  that  plea,  want  to  re-open  the  whole  discus- 
sion. "Under  the  influence  of  certain  of  his  associates,  such  as 
General  Smuts,  or  after  breakfast  with  a  prominent  Labour 
leader,  he  would  arrive  at  the  meeting  with  a  gloomy  air,  an- 
nouncing, 'They  will  not  sign  !'  " 

This  tendency  to  yield  was  even  more  pronounced  during 
the  period  after  the  Treaty  had  been  handed  to  the  Germans 
and  their  objections  began  to  be  presented,  from  May  25th  to 
June  26th.    It  is  fair  to  add  that,  in  M.  Tardieu's  opinion,  these 

19  If  Mr.  Philip  Kerr  was  right,  then  the  Government  is  wrong  now  in 
assenting  to  the  Leipzig  farces. 


244  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

fears  were  then  partly  inspired,  or  were  augmented,  by  the 
views  of  some  members  of  his  Cabinet.  In  any  event,  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  was  so  alarmed  at  the  prospect  that  Germany 
might  refuse  to  accept  the  Treaty  that  (while  excusing  himself 
for  doing  it  so  late  in  the  day),  he  proposed  making  inadmissi- 
ble concessions  upon  every  question — disarmament,  occupation, 
reparations,  Dantzig,  Upper  Silesia.20 

Count  de  Brockdorff-Rantzau  little  knew  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
state  of  mind  at  the  time.  I  have  been  told  in  Germany,  by  a 
high  authority,  that  to  this  day  he  deplores  that  ignorance.  Nor 
did  the  Prime  Minister's  subsequent  speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons  indicate  that  he  had  been  the  one  who  had  lagged  be- 
hind or  that  he  had  ever  wavered  about  imposing  what  he  him- 
self called  a  stern  but  a  just  peace. 

It  is  undeniable  that  the  various  mutilations  of  the  Treaty — 
the  serious  changes  to  which  the  Allies  made  themselves  par- 
ties, and  also  the  German  defaults  which  did  not  call  forth  any 
action  at  the  proper  time — gave  Germany  reason  to  believe  that 
she  could  with  impunity  ignore  her  obligations. 

At  the  worst,  it  appeared  to  her  that  by  repudiating  her  un- 
dertakings as  they  fell  due,  she  could  lose  nothing,  and  might 
possibly  gain  something;  and  therefore  to  that  practice  she  has 
faithfully  adhered. 

Without  attempting  to  give  a  complete  list  of  these  deroga- 
tions from  the  Treaty,  I  propose  to  enumerate  a  few  of  the 
most  culpable.  The  necessity  of  German  disarmament  was  a 
subject  upon  which  all  the  Allies  agreed,  but  obviously  it  was 
one  of  capital  importance  for  France,  as  she  would  be  unable 
to  reduce  her  army  to  the  final  limits,  and  to  turn  her  whole 

20  Since  the  above  was  written,  M.  Andre  Tardieu  has  stated  cate- 
gorically in  a  letter  to  Le  Temps  (September  13th,  1921)  that  between 
June  2nd  and  16th,  1919,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  continuously  demanded 
(and  stated  that  he  was  expressing  the  unanimous  opinion  of  his  Cabinet) 
that  the  Reparation  Clauses  of  the  Treaty  should  be  made  more  favourable 
to  Germany;  that  that  country  should  be  allowed  to  maintain  an  army 
of  200,000  instead  of  100,000  men ;  that  she  should  be  admitted  to  the 
Society  of  Nations  almost  immediately;  and  that  there  should  be  a 
plebiscite  in  Upper  Silesia :  but  that  it  was  only  on  the  last  point  that 
M.  Clemenceau  could  be  induced  to  cede. 

M.  Tardieu  (who  added  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  throughout 
hostile  to  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine)  disclosed  much  which  the  Prime 
Minister  did  not  see  fit  to  tell  Parliament. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       245 

attention  to  the  work  of  recuperation,  until  she  was  assured 
that  the  fangs  of  the  invader  had  been  drawn. 

According  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Germany  should  have 
abandoned  to  the  Allies  all  arms  and  war  materials,  over  and 
above  what  she  was  authorised  to  retain,  not  later  than  March 
ioth,  1920.  At  that  date  there  was  no  semblance  of  any  ma- 
terial compliance.  Nevertheless,  no  step  was  taken  to  remind 
Germany  of  her  engagement,  or  to  compel  her  to  execute  it. 
At  the  Spa  Conference,  some  months  later,  in  July,  1920,  it  was 
found  that  15,000  guns  and  more  than  9,000  aeroplanes  (not 
to  mention  considerable  quantities  of  other  war  material)  had 
not  even  then  been  surrendered.  A  further  delay  until  Janu- 
ary 1st,  1 92 1,  was  granted.  But  on  May  5th,  1921,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  told  the  House  of  Commons  that,  although,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  Allies,  the  destruction  of  the  German  big  guns  had 
been  "most  satisfactory,"  it  was  not  yet  complete.  While  the 
Prime  Minister  proceeded  to  admit  that  "There  are  still  far 
too  many  rifles  and  machine-guns  unsurrendered — enough  ma- 
chine-guns to  arm  very  formidable  forces." 

In  respect  to  the  number  of  men  under  arms  the  tale  is 
still  more  significant.  By  the  Treaty  Germany  bound  herself 
to  reduce  her  army  to  200,000  men  of  the  Reichswehr  by 
April  ioth,  1920,  and  to  100,000  men  by  May  ioth,  1920; 
and  was  likewise  (in  conformity  to  an  Order  of  the  Supreme 
Council,  dated  December  1st,  1919)  obliged  by  the  latter  date 
to  suppress  all  the  camouflaged  forces  organised  by  Noske  and 
others. 

These  engagements  were  not  fulfilled,  nor  did  the  Allies  do 
anything  practical  to  enforce  observance  of  the  Treaty.  Pre- 
sumably, therefore,  no  one  was  surprised  to  discover,  at  the 
Spa  Conference  in  July,  1920,  that  conscription  had  not  been 
legally  suppressed,  and  that  the  hidden  forces  then  numbered 
800,000  men.  In  this  instance  also  the  date  for  performance 
was  extended  to  January  1st,  192 1.  The  threat  was  made  that 
if  there  was  then  any  default  in  respect  either  to  war  material 
or  the  men  under  arms  the  Ruhr  would  be  occupied  "auto- 
matically" without  further  warning. 

The  appointed  day  passed.    Four  months  later,  on  May  5th, 


246  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

192 1,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  told  the  House  of  Commons  that 
while,  since  the  Spa  Conference,  the  German  Army  had  been 
reduced  from  200,000  to  100,000  men,  yet  that  the  situation 
was  still  unsatisfactory.  In  his  own  words :  "Probably  the 
most  disquieting  factor  is  that  irregular  organisations  called 
the  Einwohnerwehr  and  Sicherheitswehr  and  other  names  are 
still  in  existence  in  Germany.  In  Bavaria  alone  there  is  a  force 
of  300,000  men  called  the  Einwohnerwehr,  a  very  considerable 
force  in  East  Prussia,  in  Wurtemberg,  and  in  other  parts  of 
Germany ;  and  these  forces  added  together  would  no  doubt  be- 
come the  nucleus  of  a  most  formidable  army.  They  are  armed 
with  rifles,  they  have  machine-guns,  and  it  is  suspected  that 
they  have  a  number  of  cannon." 

But  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  avowal  does  not  tell  the  whole  story. 
The  Bavarian  Secretary  of  State  declared  publicly  in  the  Land- 
tag that  the  Bavarian  Einwohnerwehr  consisted  of  about  320,- 
000  men,  that  it  had  240,000  rifles,  2,780  machine-guns,  and 
forty-four  camion.  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  these 
figures  were  then  below  the  reality.  While,  in  defiance  of  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  and  in  mocking  derision  of  the  Allies,  this 
force  was  openly  subsidised  by  the  State.  For  the  year  1920- 
192 1  the  credit  allowed  was  15,074,000  marks.  The  Technische 
Nothilfe,  which  is  connected  with  the  Einwohnerwehr,  received 
a  subsidy  of  210,000  marks  from  the  Reich. 

The  Einwohnerwehr  was  armed  gratuitously  by  the  official 
organisation  charged  with  the  destruction  of  armaments,  the 
Reichstreuhandgesellschaft.  Its  members  were  carefully  di- 
vided into  those  who  could  be  mobilised  for  service  abroad,  and 
those  who  would  be  useful  only  in  home  defence. 

This  is  the  bare  outline  of  a  plan,  each  detail  of  which  shows 
that  these  forces  were  meant  to  be  the  basis  of  a  military  ma- 
chine for  future  use,  and  that  it  was  a  deliberate  attempt  to 
render  abortive  one  of  the  most  essential  provisions  of  the 
Treaty.  The  intent  is  all  the  more  apparent  in  view  of  what 
happened  when  Napoleon  made  a  similar  attempt  to  disarm 
the  most  treacherously  aggressive  country  known  in  the  history 
of  Europe.  His  plans  were  perfect  on  paper.  They  exacted 
that  the  Prussian  Army  should  not  exceed  a  fixed  figure.    The 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       247 

order  was  observed  in  the  letter.  But  its  spirit  was  evaded  by 
the  ingenious  device  of  Scharnhorst,  who  made  soldiers  of  the 
whole  male  population  by  changing  the  personnel  of  the  army 
at  short  intervals,  and  thus  giving  all  a  brief  period  of  inten- 
sive military  training.  There  was,  therefore,  every  reason  to 
imagine  that  the  Germans  would  again  try  to  elude  their  en- 
gagements, which  renders  all  the  more  inexplicable  the  conduct 
of  the  Allies  since  the  Treaty  was  signed. 

The  desirability  of  disarming  Germany  was  settled  once  and 
for  all  by  the  Allies  at  the  Peace  Conference.  It  rests  with 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  others  to  explain  why  they  have  allowed 
their  decision  to  be  derided.  The  situation  to-day  is,  indeed, 
much  more  in  accord  with  the  disarmament  clauses  of  the 
Treaty.  But,  as  M.  Briand  showed  at  Washington,  France 
has  still  some  ground  for  alarm  about  the  future.  She  is  left 
without  that  security  for  which  throughout  the  war  she  stead- 
fastly contended,  and  which  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  guaran- 
teed to  her.  It  is  idle  to  pretend  that  the  League  of  Nations 
could  form  any  barrier  to  German  desires.  Undoubtedly  an 
organisation  of  that  nature  was  necessary.  Everything  which 
makes  it  more  difficult  for  war  suddenly  to  break  out,  or  which 
limits  the  area  of  any  conflict,  is  so  much  gained  for  humanity 
and  for  the  cause  of  civilisation.  But  there  is  no  reason  what- 
ever to  think  that  at  present  the  League  has  any  practical  power. 
It  might  possibly  have  been  otherwise  had  not  Mr.  Wilson  re- 
coiled from  his  own  words  on  the  day  when  he  could  have  con- 
verted them  into  deeds.  In  191 7  the  President  of  the  United 
States  said :  "There  cannot  be  peace  without  concession  and 
sacrifices" ;  and  he  proceeded  to  suggest  that  after  the  war  a 
force  should  be  created  which  should  be  so  superior  to  the 
forces  of  all  nations  and  all  combinations  of  nations  that  the 
edicts  of  the  international  body  directing  it  could  never  be  re- 
sisted. 

In  effect  that  was  a  proposal  for  general  disarmament,  or 
for  limitation  of  armaments.  Whether  such  a  plan  is  feasible 
may  be  questioned.  But  what  is  beyond  all  question  is  that 
without  some  species  of  disarmament  no  League  of  Nations 
will  ever  have  a  predominant  power. 


248  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

M.  Clemenceau,  with  his  usual  realisation  of  the  practical, 
and  his  delight  in  the  logical,  carried  Mr.  Wilson's  idea  to  its 
obvious  conclusion.  He  suggested  that  the  verification  of  arma- 
ments should  be  obligatory,  and  that  military  measures  should 
be  taken  to  enforce  obedience  to  the  decrees  of  the  super  gov- 
ernment which  Mr.  Wilson  had  in  mind.  Possibly  Clemen- 
ceau was  actually  in  favour  of  the  proposal.  I  venture  to 
think,  however,  that  he  merely  wished  to  place  Wilson  face  to 
face  with  the  situation  which  his  words  created.  In  any  event, 
the  President  would  not  agree.21 

Later  Wilson  expressly  recognised  that  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, as  constituted,  gave  France  no  adequate  protection.  Dur- 
ing the  discussion  regarding  the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  coun- 
try, to  which  Wilson  was  at  first  opposed,  Clemenceau  said : 
"The  Pact  may  be  able  to  guarantee  us  the  victory.  But  for 
the  moment  it  is  insufficient  to  guard  us  against  invasion." 

The  President  assented  and  yielded. 

To-day  the  League  of  Nations  is  suffering  from  the  effects 
of  promising  too  much  and  accomplishing  too  little.  It  has 
made  the  average  man  reflect  upon  the  wisdom  of  our  fore- 
fathers, who,  more  practical  if  less  idealistic,  were  content  to 
pray  "Give  peace  in  our  time,  O  Lord." 

The  United  States  has  resolutely  stood  aside.  President 
Harding  lost  no  time  in  indicating  that  he  saw  no  solution,  ex- 
cept possibly  partial  disarmament.  The  American  Ambassador 
to  the  Court  of  St.  James'  was  allowed  to  make  it  clear  in  his 
first  public  speech  that  the  Administration  intended  to  ignore 
the  League.  Mr.  Harvey's  words  left  no  room  for  any  doubt. 
"Inevitably  and  irresistibly  our  present  Government  could  not, 
without  the  betrayal  of  its  creators  and  masters,  and  will  not,  I 
assure  you,  have  anything  whatsoever  to  do  with  the  League, 
or  with  any  commission  or  committee  appointed  by  it  or  re- 
sponsible to  it,  directly  or  indirectly,  openly  or  furtively." 

All  those  who  were  in  touch  with  American  politics  and  with 

a  Disarmament  may  or  may  not  be  practicable.  But  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  why  military  attaches,  part  of  whose  duty  it  is  to  ferret 
out  the  military  secrets  of  the  countries  to  which  they  are  accredited, 
while  pretending  not  to  do  so,  should  not  be  used  openly  for  the  purpose 
of  the  verification  of  armaments. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      249 

American  public  feeling  confidently  predicted  that  this  would  be 
the  result  when  it  became  apparent,  in  the  autumn  of  1919, 
that  the  Republican  party  would  probably  come  into  power  in 
1921.  Although  some  with  no  knowledge  of  the  United  States, 
and  others  who  thought  they  had  acquired  some  from  having 
passed  a  few  months  at  the  British  Embassy  in  Washington 
with  Lord  Grey,  tried  to  spread  the  conviction  that  Washing- 
ton would  rally  to  the  League  after  the  presidential  election. 

As  a  consequence  of  this  stand  many  of  the  South  and  Cen- 
tral American  republics  have  begun  to  treat  the  Society  of  Na- 
tions with  scant  respect.  They  realise  that  their  safety  and  in- 
terest lies  in  the  Monroe  doctrine  rather  than  in  any  universal 
formula.  They  look  to  Washington  rather  than  to  Geneva; 
while  some  of  them  have  already  begun  to  complain  about 
the  burden  of  contributing  to  support  an  institution  which  is 
occupied  chiefly  by  the  consideration  of  European  questions, 
and  whose  decisions  would  probably  be  of  little  binding  effect 
in  the  Americas. 

The  primary  result  has  been  that  the  highly-paid  officials  of 
the  organisation  have  been  obliged  to  submit  to  a  diminution 
of  their  salaries,  despite  the  high  rate  of  exchange  which  pre- 
vails in  Switzerland. 

Certainly  nothing  which  has  happened  since  1919  goes  to 
prove  that  the  League  of  Nations  could  bar  the  path  to  anything 
Germany  wanted  to  do.  It  has  even  been  powerless  to  pre- 
vent minor  wars  in  various  parts  of  Europe.  Mr.  Balfour  put 
the  matter  in  its  true  light.  Speaking  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons on  April  21st,  1921,  he  said:  "The  Society  of  Nations 
has  no  arms  except  universal  public  opinion."  It  may  be  re- 
marked that  public  opinion  is  rarely  universal.  But  at  the  best 
it  is  not  an  arm  which  France  considers  (or  which  Mr.  Wilson 
or  Mr.  Lloyd  George  considered)  a  sufficient  protection  against 
Germany. 

Another  vital  infringement  upon  the  Treaty  was  the  agree- 
ment made  at  Spa  regarding  coal.  Under  the  Treaty  Germany 
was  obliged  to  deliver  to  the  Allies  3,500,000  tons  per  month  for 
six  months.  At  Spa  this  amount  was  reduced  to  2,000,000 
tons.    Moreover,  the  Treaty  provided  that  the  price  of  this  coal 


250  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

should  be  that  which  was  payable  at  the  mine.  The  Spa  agree- 
ment increased  this  price  by  a  fixed  amount  of  five  marks  gold 
per  ton,  plus  a  variable  augmentation,  viz.,  the  difference  be- 
tween the  price  at  the  mine,  plus  the  five  marks  added,  and  the 
exportation  price,  f  .o.b.  to  a  German  or  English  port. 

This  difference,  according  to  M.  Tardieu  (and  I  see  no  criti- 
cism which  can  be  made  of  his  figures),  worked  out  as  fol- 
lows (of  course  the  value  in  paper  francs  of  the  5  marks  gold 
varied  with  the  course  of  the  exchange)  : 

British  Exportation  Price  ....        frs.  240 

Domestic    German    Price  .        .        .  frs.  70 

Premium  allowed  at   Spa  ...  "      13-75 

8375 

Difference         .        .        .        frs.    156.25   per  ton. 

In  brief  this  change  in  the  Treaty  involved  monthly  pay- 
ments of  about  27,500,000  frs.  in  respect  to  the  fixed  increase, 
and  of  about  312,500,000  frs.  on  account  of  the  variable  ad- 
vance allowed  in  the  manner  above  stated. 

Of  this  amount,  by  virtue  of  the  proportion  of  the  German 
coal  which  was  allotted  to  her,  France  had  to  pay  206,000,000 
frs. 

It  was  France  more  than  any  of  the  Allies  which  was  ad- 
versely affected  by  this  alteration.  One  of  the  very  objects  of 
these  provisions  of  the  Treaty  was  to  compensate  and  protect 
a  country  in  which  the  mines  had  been  systematically  destroyed 
by  the  invader,  and  which  needed  a  plentiful  supply  of  coal  to 
re-start  industrial  life.  The  same  clauses  necessarily  put 
France  in  a  favourable  position  to  compete  with  Great  Britain. 
Neither  English  nor  French  Delegates  to  the  Conference  ig- 
nored that  point.  But  the  result  of  the  Spa  agreement  was  to 
eliminate  or  diminish  that  benefit,  and  to  place  a  handicap  upon 
France.  No  Englishman  can  deny  that,  at  the  time,  the  altera- 
tion made  at  Spa  appeared  to  be  to  the  advantage  of  this  coun- 
try. But  also,  every  fair-minded  Englishman  must  admit  that 
it  was  an  advantage  for  which  France  paid  the  bill ;  that  it  was 
a  derogation  from  the  Treaty ;  that  only  Germany  and  England 
gained  by  that  derogation;  and  that  (leaving  aside  any  higher 
ideal)  it  was  a  gain  for  which,  perhaps,  too  high  a  price  was 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       251 

paid  in  view  of  the  temporary  ill-feeling  which  it  engendered. 

The  French  Government  had  been  afraid  that  there  would 

be  some  attempt  to  alter  the  Treaty  at  the  Spa  Conference.  The 

following  extract  from  my  diary,  recounting  a  conversation  I 

had  with  M.  Millerand  soon  after  his  return  from  San  Remo, 

shows  the  anxiety  on  this  point  of  the  President  du  Conseil : 

"M.  Millerand  told  me  that  he  had  been  entirely  opposed  to  the 

Germans  being  called  to  Spa,  and  that  eventually  he  said  he 

would  consent  only  on  two  conditions :  first,  that  there  should 

be  no  revision  of  the  Treaty,  and,  secondly,  that  the  Allies 

should  agree  amongst  themselves  what  they  should  say  at  each 

meeting.     He  said  that  Lloyd  George  had  first  agreed  to  the 

conditions,  had  then  said  that  he  would  not  accept  them,  but 

finally  did  so.     Nevertheless,  M.  Millerand  says  that  before 

they  meet  at  Spa  he  means  to  get  it  in  black  and  white  from 

Lloyd  George,  which  is  entirely  right.     His  own  opinion  is 

that  there  should  be  no  conversations  with  the  Germans,  but 

that  they  might  be  heard,  and  then  any  proper  use  might  be 

made  of  anything  they  had  to  say.     That,  of  course,  is  the 

proper  view." 

I  do  not  propose  to  recount  the  story  of  the  meetings  at 
San  Remo,  at  Hythe,  at  Boulogne;  meetings  more  instructive 
in  lessons  than  productive  in  results.  Nor  the  miserable  idea  of 
a  conversation  with  the  Germans  at  Geneva,  which  came  to 
nothing  because  the  French  Government  wisely  and  properly 
refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  it. 

These  various  and  varied  vacillations  upon  the  part  of  the 
Allies  may  almost  be  said  to  form  some  excuse  for  the  derelic- 
tions of  Germany.  She  has  been  encouraged  to  think  that  if 
this  particular  Treaty  was  not  a  scrap  of  paper,  at  least  it  was 
something  very  flimsy.  It  would  be  a  step  backwards  if  civil- 
ised nations  ever  adopted  the  barbarous  German  conception  of 
warfare,  or  the  brutal  German  method  of  imposing  peace.  But 
a  lesson  might  well  be  learned  from  the  German  system  of  en- 
forcing the  execution  of  a  treaty  which  has  been  duly  signed  by 
both  victor  and  vanquished.  One  is  thus  logically  led  to  inquire 
what  is  the  basic  cause  of  these  changes  and  concessions,  and 
who  is  primarily  responsible  for  them. 


252  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  ratified  by  the  legislature  of 
various  nations,  and  especially  by  the  Parliaments  of  the  two 
countries  whose  relations  to  each  other  I  am  discussing — Great 
Britain  and  France.  As  the  majorities  in  both  these  Assem- 
blies pronounced  in  favour  of  the  Treaty  there  can  now  be  no 
suggestion  that  either  country  considers  it  unjust.  Moreover, 
the  only  complaint  which  France  makes  is  that  the  Treaty  is 
not  being  executed. 

When  Mr.  Lloyd  George  placed  the  Treaty  before  the  House 
of  Commons  he  claimed  that  he  and  his  colleagues  had  done 
their  work  faithfully,  and  had  brought  their  vast  task  to  a 
creditable  conclusion.  Presumably,  he  still  holds  the  same  opin- 
ion. Otherwise,  it  would  manifestly  have  been  his  duty  to  tell 
the  country  through  Parliament  that  he  had  been  mistaken  in 
asserting  that  the  Treaty  was  a  good  one  and  a  workable  one ; 
and  to  ask  for  a  mandate  to  revise  it. 

A  revision  (except  upon  the  ground  that  the  Treaty  was  ab- 
solutely unworkable)  is  open  to  the  practical  objection  that 
an  equally  legitimate  demand  might  be  made  for  a  revision 
of  the  revised  Treaty.  Even  those  who  (like  myself)  concur 
in  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  favourable  view  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, taken  as  a  whole,  freely  admit  that,  like  every  human 
handiwork,  it  is  defective  in  certain  points.  But  any  revision, 
while  satisfying  some  strictures,  would  undoubtedly  give  rise 
to  others.  It  would  certainly  be  neither  perfect  nor  entirely 
satisfactory  to  all  the  Allies. 

But  if  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  never  gone  so  far  as  to  state 
that  he  wished  to  change  the  work  upon  which  he  prided  him- 
self in  June,  19 19,  it  is  equally  true  that  he  is  largely  responsi- 
ble both  for  the  failure  to  enforce  its  provisions,  and  also  for 
the  changes  which  have  actually  been  made  from  time  to  time. 

Germany  is  the  country  which  has  derived  the  most  benefit 
from  these  alterations,  whether  by  various  delays  granted  or 
otherwise;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  these  modifications  have 
not  injured  England  in  anything  like  the  same  degree  as  they 
have  France.  I  have  already  referred  to  the  Spa  coal  agree- 
ment. In  regard  to  payments  to  be  made  by  Germany,  al- 
though Great  Britain  is  heavily  overtaxed,  yet  the  delay  is  even 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       253 

more  disastrous  to  France,  both  because  she  needs  the  money 
for  reparations,  and  also  because  she  receives  52  per  cent., 
while  England  gets  only  22  per  cent,  of  these  payments.22 

Again,  the  failure  of  Germany  to  disarm  may  be  disquieting 
to  some  British  statesmen.  But  it  neither  keeps  the  country  in 
a  state  of  alarm  nor  costs  the  taxpayer  a  single  shilling,  whereas 
France  is  unable  to  betake  herself  to  the  work  of  restoration 
in  complete  tranquillity,  and  is  also  obliged  to  keep  under  arms 
forces  superior  to  her  needs  if  she  were  given  the  security 
guaranteed  by  the  Treaty. 

But,  if  France  is  no  more  (and  probably  less)  satisfied  than 
any  of  the  other  Allies,  the  facts  are  distorted  by  those  who 
suggest  that  she  is  trying  to  go  outside  the  Treaty,  or  to  obtain 
anything  more  than  it  .gives  her.  All  that  France  demands 
is  that  she  should  get,  without  undue  delay,  the  compensation, 
relief,  and  protection  which  is  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty.  All 
that  France  asks  is  that  the  judgment  which  was  pronounced 
by  the  Peace  Conference  shall  not  be  ignored  or  repealed  where 
it  is  in  her  favour,  while  it  has  already  been  largely  executed 
where  it  is  to  the  advantage  of  some  of  her  Allies. 

Yet  every  one  of  the  principal  alterations  of  the  Treaty  has 
been  either  entirely  or  mainly  at  the  expense  of  France. 

The  history  of  the  Peace  Conference  shows  that  throughout 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  insisting  upon  the  importance  to  be  at- 
tached to  British  public  opinion.  Time  and  again  he  objected 
to  follow  a  certain  course,  giving  as  his  reason  that  the  country 
would  be  against  him ;  while  upon  at  least  one  occasion  he  even 
sought  on  the  same  ground  to  reverse  his  decision  upon  ques- 
tions of  prime  importance — the  occupation  of  the  Rhine  and 
reparations. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  whether  the  Prime  Minister 
of  a  country  having  parliamentary  institutions  should  stand  on 
fixed  principles  and  try  to  mould  public  opinion :  or  whether 
he  should  allow  himself  to  be  governed  by  that  opinion  in  the 
exercise  of  his  mandate  from  day  to  day.  It  will  suffice  to  say 
that  M.   Clemenceau  belongs  to  the  former  school  and  Mr. 

a  I    purposely    made    no    reference    to    the    recent    dispute    about    the 
division  of  the  first  milliard. 


254.  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Lloyd  George  to  the  latter.  But  one  thing  which  the  British 
Prime  Minister  was  always  at  pains  to  impress  upon  his  col- 
leagues is  the  importance  which  he  thought  ought  to  be  at- 
tached to  the  force  of  public  opinion. 

It  is,  therefore,  inconceivable  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  should 
not  realise  that  "public  opinion"  exists  in  France  as  well  as  in 
England — a  public  opinion  which  is  well  informed  (much  more 
so  in  respect  of  foreign  affairs  than  is  the  case  in  this  coun- 
try), and  which,  upon  the  whole,  is  reasonable. 

When  in  February,  1920,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  himself  sug- 
gested that  it  was  expedient  to  abandon  the  clauses  regarding 
the  delivery  to  the  Allies  of  war  criminals,  the  French  Govern- 
ment did  not  remind  him  that  he  himself  was  the  author  of 
those  sections,  for  which  he  fought  so  long  and  strenuously,  as 
has  been  related.  The  French  thought,  rightly  or  wrongly, 
that  his  change  of  heart  was  inspired  by  a  by-election  which 
had  gone  against  the  Government,  thus  reversing  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  view  on  the  requirements  of  public  opinion.  He  relin- 
quished in  1920  what  he  had  struggled  to  obtain  in  191 9.  He 
was  giving  away  what  was  his  own.  The  French  people  were 
indifferent.     The  French  political  world  was  mildly  amused. 

But  it  was  natural  that  the  feeling  in  France  should  be 
otherwise  when  Mr.  Lloyd  George  began  to  give  away  the 
French  rights  under  the  Treaty.  I  say  Mr.  Lloyd  George  be- 
cause at  the  successive  conferences  he  has  never  hesitated  to 
make  the  most  of  two  facts :  his  predominant  personal  position 
as  the  sole  political  survivor  of  the  makers  of  the  Treaty  (a 
position,  however,  which  began  to  count  for  less  when  he  had 
to  contend  with  M.  Briand),  and  the  desire  of  France  to  pre- 
serve the  alliance  and  possibly  get  some  compensation  for  the 
conditional  support  promised  by  the  Treaty,  which  came  to 
naught  by  reason  of  the  American  defection. 

In  many  speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  has  referred  sympathetically  to  the  future  fears  and 
to  the  present  position  of  France.  But  whatever  may  be  the 
effect  he  makes  in  Parliament,  he  no  longer  deludes  either 
France  or  Germany  upon  one  point.  Both  of  these  countries 
know  that  his  attitude  at  the  conferences  of  the  Allies  and  his 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      255 

public  utterances  are  often  absolutely  at  variance  the  one  with 
the  other. 

M.  Poincare  wrote  in  November,  1920,  that  the  desire  of  a 
certain  political  group  in  England  to  cultivate  closer  friendship 
with  Germany  did  not  constitute  a  sufficient  reason  for  taking 
from  French  pockets  the  gifts  it  wanted  to  make  to  Berlin. 
The  former  President  of  the  Republic  suggested  with  irony, 
but  with  some  aptness,  that  England,  if  she  wanted  to  make 
presents  to  Germany,  might  give  back  her  share  of  the  German 
merchant  shipping  and  some  of  the  former  German  colonies. 
He  admitted  that  Great  Britain  was  entitled  to  the  compensa- 
tions she  had  received,  but  protested  that  the  losses  of  France 
were  such  as  at  least  to  entitle  her  to  get  what  the  Treaty 
guaranteed.23 

Writing  six  months  later,  in  May,  1920,  General  de  Castelnau 
was  in  accord  with  the  prevalent  feeling  in  France  when  he  ex- 
pressed the  same  views  in  language  equally  precise : 

"Our  Allies  cannot  fail  to  recognise  the  moderation  of  our 
demands   as   compared  to   the   advantages   which   they   have 

23  The  losses  of  the  various  Allies  were: 
Dead  on  the  field  of  battle  :- 

Russia    1 ,700,000 

France     1,364,000 

Great   Britain    754,000 

Italy    496,000 

Total    dead    (battles,    results    of    wounds,   and   illness)  :- 

United   States    1 15,000 

Percentage  of  dead  in  proportion  to  the  population: 

France    3.8 

Great  Britain   1.35 

Italy     1.24 

United  States   , •  • 0.10 

The  expenses,  counted  in  milliards  of  francs,  were: 

Great   Britain    190 

United  States    160 

France     143 

Russia  92 

Italy    65 

These  figures  are  taken  from  the  War  zvith  Germany,  by  Colonel 
Leonard  P.  Ayres,  of  the  United  States  Army.  They  are  cited  and 
adopted  by  M.  Andre  Tardieu  in  his  book  La  Paix.  They  differ  in  no 
material  respect  from  such  official  figures  as  are  available.  M.  Mer- 
meix  gives  680,000  and  1,398,000  as  the  respective  English  and  French 
losses  in  killed  and  disappeared,  and  states  that  the  latter  figure  is 
official   (Foch  et  les  Armies  d' Occident,  p.   119). 


256  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

acquired  by  the  Armistice  of  November  nth,  and  by  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  By  these  agreements  England  has  in- 
creased, or  rather,  destroyed  to  her  own  profit,  not  the  terri- 
torial fortune  of  Germany  (about  which  she  cared  nothing), 
but  the  redoubtable  maritime  fortune  of  the  German  Empire, 
whose  fleets  boldly  menaced  and  hotly  contested  the  political, 
industrial,  and  commercial  destinies  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
England  further  obtained  fruitful  'mandates'  which  enlarged 
the  extent  of  her  former  colonial  possessions,  and  naturally 
permitted  her  to  contemplate  with  serenity  the  ever  increasing 
value  of  oil-producing  territories.  France,  on  her  part,  limits 
her  modest  ambitions  to  the  temporary  seizure  of  a  tangible 
political  and  substantial  security  which  will  safeguard  the  repa- 
ration of  her  ruins,  threatened  by  the  quibbles  and  the  tricks  of 
a  Germany  who  was  listened  to  with  too  much  complacency. 
The  country  is  undeceived,  and  is  tired  of  conferences,  pro- 
tocols, agreements,  and  default  notices,  of  which  the  high- 
sounding  names  have  until  now  masked  the  desolating  empti- 
ness." 

These  statements  by  M.  Poincare  and  General  de  Castelnau 
throw  into  bold  relief  the  point  which  is  too  often  lost  sight 
of  or  ignored  when  the  French  claims  are  discussed  in  Eng- 
land. It  is  not  a  question  of  France  protesting  that  the  Treaty 
gives  her  less  than  her  Allies.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  every  coun- 
try seems  to  think  that  the  result  of  the  Peace  Conference  was 
to  her  own  comparative  disadvantage,  which  in  itself  is  a 
healthy  sign  and  a  testimony  to  the  all-round  fairness  of  the 
Treaty.  But  the  stand  taken  by  France  to-day  is :  "Whatever 
our  hopes  may  have  been,  we  are  not  complaining  about  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  We  accepted  it  when  we  signed  it.  All 
we  ask  is  that  we  should  be  paid  under  that  agreement — paid 
exactly  as  you  have  already  been  paid.  That  the  provisions 
that  happen  to  be  in  our  favour  should  be  executed  as  were 
the  provisions  which  were  in  your  favour.  We  want  nothing 
more  than  what  is  given  us  by  the  Treaty.  We  will  accept 
nothing  less."  24 

In  another  way  Mr.  Lloyd  George  irritates  public  opinion 

34  General  de  Castelnau  in  L'Echo  de  Paris  of  May  nth,  1921. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       257 

in  France  by  either  arrogating  to  himself  personally,  or  by  as- 
suming for  Great  Britain  a  position  to  which  the  Prime  Min- 
ister has  no  right,  and  for  which  his  country  has  no  desire. 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  in  the  habit  of  setting  himself  up  as  an 
arbitrator  between  France  and  Germany.  He  forgets  altogether 
that  the  spirit  of  the  Treaty  is  that  England  and  France  should 
be  Allies  in  obtaining  its  execution  just  as  much  as  they  were 
in  waging  the  war  which  led  to  it.  One  can  easily  imagine 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  fiery  indignation  if,  for  instance,  M.  Bri- 
and  should  have  had  the  opportunity  (and  should  have  been  so 
ill-advised  as  to  take  it)  to  speak  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes 
urging  England  to  patience  and  moderation  in  respect  to  getting 
possession  of  the  German  colonies  and  ships  given  to  her  by 
the  Treaty;  and  setting  himself  up  as  one  who  (his  own  coun- 
try having  been  already  largely  satisfied)  wanted  to  be  equitable 
between  England  and  Germany.  Yet  that  was  exactly  the 
language  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  May  5th,  1921,  when  telling 
the  House  of  Commons  of  the  result  of  the  Conference  held 
in  London.  While  some  weeks  later  he  used  the  same  tone  in 
speaking  of  the  trouble  in  Poland — an  episode  to  which  I  shall 
refer  hereafter.  Undoubtedly  this  attitude  is  in  some  degree 
personal  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  But  when  the  French  are 
exasperated  by  it,  they  may  well  regret  that  they  were  so  hasty 
in  exiling  M.  Clemenceau  from  public  life — in  preventing  him 
from  taking  any  further  part  in  securing  the  execution  of  the 
Treaty  which  was  so  largely  his  own  work.  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
would  have  acted  differently  had  he  been  faced  by  the  fixity  of 
purpose,  the  patience,  and,  at  times,  the  sardonic  irony  of 
M.  Clemenceau. 

But  it  is  interesting  to  consider  what  is,  in  fact,  British  pub- 
lic opinion  upon  the  question  of  the  execution  of  the  Treaty. 

In  the  first  place  the  public  is  not  well-informed :  partly  by 
reason  of  its  own  neglect,  and  partly  on  account  of  the  omis- 
sions of  the  Government.  Upon  one  occasion  at  the  Peace 
Conference  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  spokesman  protested  against 
the  proposed  occupation  of  the  Rhine,  saying  (inter  alia)  that 
the  English  public  would  not  understand  the  necessity  for  that 
action.     To  this  M.  Tardieu  very  aptly  replied :     "You  say 


258  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

that  the  English  public  does  not  understand  this  question.  It 
is  the  business  of  the  British  Government  to  make  the  country 
understand.  The  English  people  did  not,  any  more,  understand 
in  1 9 14  the  necessity  for  conscription.  The  war  taught  it  many 
things." 

Secondly,  public  opinion  in  England  is  absolutely  opposed  to 
participation  in  any  plans  or  undertakings  for  the  territorial  ag- 
grandisement of  France :  partly  because  of  the  burden  which 
would  be  imposed  upon  the  taxpayer,  but  above  all  because  the 
country  hopes  to  avoid  further  warfare  in  this  generation  at 
least. 

Simply  in  order  to  make  my  argument  clear,  I  state  here  that 
I  am  unreservedly  in  accord  with  that  view. 

The  stand  taken  upon  the  question  by  the  Manchester  Guard- 
ian and  the  Daily  News  (from  which  I  entirely  dissent)  is  at 
least  comprehensible  and  logical.  Those  journals  thought  from 
the  outset  that  the  Treaty  was  imperialistic,  and  in  some  re- 
spects unfair,  and  have  always  been  more  or  less  opposed  to 
the  execution  of  many  of  its  terms. 

But  the  Prime  Minister  has  never  said  that  he  thought  the 
Treaty  was  unjust :  on  the  contrary,  he  pronounced  it  a  just 
one.  He  is  therefore  unable  to  make  the  same  plea.  Yet  M. 
Millerand  told  me  some  days  after  the  meeting  at  San  Remo 
that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  become  white  in  the  face  when  he 
accused  France  of  having  territorial  designs  because  she  had 
occupied  Frankfurt.  While  in  the  following  year  he  asked  M. 
Briand  to  make  some  statement  to  a  press  agency  whereby  he 
would  place  himself  on  record  as  having  no  such  intentions. 

All  that  France  has  ever  asked  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  Treaty. 
Possibly  Mr.  Lloyd  George  may  find  these  demonstrations  use- 
ful in  order  to  conciliate  a  certain  political  section  which  he 
does  not  wish  to  antagonise.  But  he  certainly  has  never  been 
able  to  indicate  one  single  instance  in  which  France  has  sought 
to  go  beyond  the  conditions  of  the  Treaty. 

At  the  time  of  the  Frankfurt  incident  in  1920,  the  one  occa- 
sion when  his  Government  (or  anyway  his  secretary,  Mr.  Philip 
Kerr :  it  is  difficult  to  say  how  far  Lord  Curzon  was  responsi- 
ble) was  so  ill-advised  as  to  make  the  attempt,  Mr.  Bonar  Law 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      259 

(as  told  in  a  former  chapter)  was  forced  to  ask  that  he  should 
not  be  compelled  to  explain  fully  the  conduct  of  the  Government 
in  giving  a  certain  statement  to  the  Press. 

Similarly,  invidious  attempts  have  been  made  to  convince 
the  public,  first,  that  France  was  not  working,  as  every  coun- 
try must  now  work,  for  her  own  self-preservation;  and  sec- 
ondly, that  she  was  not  taxing  herself  sufficiently. 

Both  suggestions  are  easily  refuted. 

Since  1919 — since  the  conclusion  of  the  war  in  which  she 
lost  1,364,000  in  men  killed,  740,000  mutilated,  and  3,000,000 
wounded,  a  war  which  increased  her  debt  from  35  to  221  mil- 
liards— France  has,  without  outside  assistance,  and  without  the 
aid  of  payment  by  Germany,  spent  25  milliards  on  the  work 
of  reconstruction;  has  brought  back  to  the  destroyed  regions 
75  per  cent,  of  the  population  driven  out  by  the  German  in- 
vasion; has  repaired  her  railways,  52  per  cent,  of  her  roads,  and 
84  per  cent,  of  her  canals ;  got  on  a  working  basis  26  per  cent, 
of  her  destroyed  factories;  has  brought  again  under  cultivation 
68  per  cent,  of  her  devastated  land ;  and,  finally,  has  reopened 
99  per  cent,  of  her  schools. 

Taxation  is  purely  an  internal  question.  It  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

Under  that  Treaty  certain  compensations  were  guaranteed  to 
France.  They  were  guaranteed  unconditionally.  There  were 
no  reservations  to  the  effect  that  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  af- 
fecting France  would  be  operative  only  if  she  taxed  herself  as 
heavily  as  England  (or  any  other  country)  thought  was  proper. 

That  point  being  clear,  it  may  be  added  that,  if  France  does 
not  impose  sufficient  taxation,  she  herself  will  be  the  ultimate 
sufferer.  At  the  present  time  French  taxation,  especially  di- 
rect taxation,  is  very  much  less  severe  than  that  which  prevails 
in  England.  But  that  does  not  tell  the  whole  story.  I  leave 
aside  the  fact  that  a  country  which  has  not  only  for  some  years 
been  partly  in  the  possession  of  the  invader,  but  which  has 
been  purposely  despoiled  by  that  invader,  is  in  a  special  cate- 
gory for  taxation  purposes.  For  there  is  another,  a  deeper  rea- 
son, which  renders  heavy  direct  taxation  almost  impossible  in 
France. 


260  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

I  recall  a  conversation  with  M.  Jean  Dupuy  a  few  months 
before  his  death.  M.  Dupuy  was  a  practical  politician  in  the 
best  sense  of  that  phrase  and  an  astute  man  of  affairs.  He 
said  that  he  did  not  exactly  see  how  France  could  surmount 
her  financial  difficulties,  that  he  could  perceive  no  way  out  of 
what  he  called  a  vicious  circle ;  and  that  he  would  despair,  were 
it  not  for  his  unalterable  conviction  that  his  country  must  in- 
evitably triumph,  that  France  could  not  be  crushed. 

I  referred  to  the  matter  of  direct  taxation.  M.  Dupuy 
pointed  out  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  collect  a  very  heavy 
income  tax  anywhere  in  France,  and  impossible  in  the  country 
districts:  that  it  was  a  tax  so  opposed  to  tradition  (which  in 
France  means  more  than  it  does  in  England)  that  its  payment 
would  be  systematically  evaded. 

The  obvious  retort  is  that  conscription  was  opposed  to  the 
traditions  of  Great  Britain.  But  there  is  a  vast  difference  be- 
tween war-time  measures  and  enactments  operative  in  time  of 
peace. 

Finally,  I  am  convinced  that  British  public  opinion  is  not  in 
favour  of  Great  Britain  taking  advantages  under  the  Treaty, 
and  preventing  or  in  any  way  being  an  obstacle  to  France  get- 
ting what  the  Treaty  guarantees  her.  The  truth  is  that  the 
whole  matter  has  become  so  complicated  by  various  confer- 
ences, which  have  been  the  signal  for  a  cloud  of  official  and 
semi-official  announcements,  that  the  country  is  far  from  be- 
ing clear  about  where  the  matter  rests  to-day.  But  if  the 
point  was  put  plainly — are  we  to  take  our  part  and  not  support 
France  in  getting  hers — the  answer  would  undoubtedly  be  in 
the  negative.  There  is  the  strongest  aversion  to  any  further 
war.  But  the  country  is  equally  at  one  with  France  about  the 
execution  of  the  Treaty,  as  it  was  about  the  waging  of  the  war. 

Nor  is  any  such  stand  openly  taken  by  the  Manchester 
Guardian  and  the  Daily  News.  Their  opposition,  as  stated, 
is  rather  to  the  Treaty  as  a  whole. 

The  only  newspaper  which  to-day  says  that  England  should 
get  what  she  can  and  let  France  make  the  best  of  it  is  the  Daily 
Express.  This  is  the  organ  of  Lord  Beaverbrook,  who  is  at  all 
times  one  of  the  most  insidious  enemies  of  France.    Many  in- 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      261 

stances  might  be  given.  It  will  suffice  to  refer  to  one  of  the 
most  recent.  After  the  London  Conference  in  May,  192 1,  the 
Daily  Express  blamed  Mr.  Lloyd  George  for  having  allowed 
France  to  impose  her  views ;  and  added  that  the  policy  of  the 
Government  ought  to  be  inspired  solely  by  England's  own  in- 
terests. 

But  after  all  France  looks  not  so  much  to  British  public 
opinion  as  to  the  British  Prime  Minister,  who  made  the  Treaty 
with  that  public  opinion  in  view,  always  repeating  that  he  alone 
understood  it,  always  considering  it,  and  always  protesting 
about  the  allowance  which  should  be  made  for  it. 

In  the  result  the  French  view  is  that  since  the  Treaty  was 
signed  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  subordinated  the  interests  of 
France  to  the  exigencies  of  his  own  political  situation.  Un- 
fortunately the  Prime  Minister's  conduct  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence, as  well  as  his  subsequent  attitude,  have  given  some  ground 
for  this  suspicion. 

It  would  be  unfair  to  judge  Mr.  Lloyd  George  solely  upon 
the  evidence  of  French  witnesses.  But  we  have  the  testimony 
of  Mr.  Robert  Lansing,  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  and 
also  one  of  the  plenipotentiaries  to  the  Conference.  Referring 
to  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  insistence  upon  the  inclusion  in  the 
Treaty  of  certain  of  his  election  promises,  he  proceeds : 

"He  was,  besides,  resolved  to  obtain  the  cession  of  the  prin- 
cipal German  colonies  in  Africa,  and  of  the  German  Islands  in 
the  Pacific,  south  of  the  Equator ;  the  control  of  Mesopotamia; 
a  protectorate  over  Egypt,  and  a  protectorate  over  Persia  if  the 
affairs  of  Persia  were  to  be  settled  by  the  Conference;  the  de- 
struction of  German  naval  power,  and  the  elimination  of  the 
German  merchant  marine,  the  rival  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
commerce  of  the  world.  The  British  Prime  Minister  clung 
tenaciously  to  these  precise  and  essentially  concrete  and  egoist 
aspirations  of  his  country;  and  by  his  adroit  way  of  manoeu- 
vring was  able  to  get  satisfaction  upon  almost  all.  But  he 
seemed  to  think  that  once  these  ends  were  attained,  the  decisions 
regarding  other  questions  were  of  relatively  slight  importance 
unless  they  directly  interested  Great  Britain,  and  that  to  study 
them  carefully  was  a  needless  waste  of  time  and  energy." 


262  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

Mr.  Lansing's  unprejudiced  account  proves  once  again  that 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  deserves  the  gratitude  of  his  country.  He 
neglected  no  opportunity  to  get  for  her  what  he  thought  was 
right. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  an  American  observer  thought  that 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  cared  for  nothing  except  getting  what  he 
wanted  for  his  own  country,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Frenchmen 
with  equal  opportunities  of  observation  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  if  the  British  Prime  Minister  was  indifferent  to  their 
claims  during  the  Conference,  he  could  hardly  be  relied  upon  to 
enforce  the  fulfilment  of  the  Treaty  in  favour  of  their  coun- 
try once  his  own  had  actually  been  paid. 

What  has  happened  since  has  strengthened  this  conviction. 
The  destruction  of  the  German  Fleet,  the  dispersal  of  the  Ger- 
man merchant  marine,  the  possession  of  the  German  colonies — 
upon  all  these  points,  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  made  his  chief 
concern  at  the  Conference,  Great  Britain  has  already  received 
full  satisfaction.  But  in  respect  to  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty 
guaranteeing  France  that  the  things  to  which  she,  on  her  part, 
attached  most  importance — disarmament  and  payment  for  re- 
paration— Germany  has  long  been  in  default.  Nor  has  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  been  a  firm  or  consistent  friend  in  supporting 
France  in  her  efforts  to  obtain  fulfilment. 

It  is  admitted  that  his  parliamentary  statements  sometimes 
leave  little  to  be  desired,  but  it  is  thought  that  his  actions  at  the 
decisive  moments  have  not  been  consistent  with  his  speeches. 

Without  having  recourse  to  any  of  the  extreme  (and  some- 
times unjust)  criticisms  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  I  will  quote  two 
from  sources  which  are  moderate.  M.  Andre  Tardieu,  who 
throughout  his  book  is  scrupulously  fair  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
says : 

"Aucun  Franchise  n'oublie,  ni  n'oubliera  le  role  immense  que 
la  Grande  Bretagne  a  joue  dans  la  Guerre,  et,  dans  le  role  im- 
mense, le  role  immense  de  son  premier  ministre.  Mais  aucun 
Franchise  non  plus  ne  se  resignera  a  souscrire  a  la  fagon  dont 
M.  Lloyd  George  a  concu  l'execution  de  la  paix.  Passionement 
amoureux  des  solutions  rapides,  impatient  des  long  efforts,  M. 
Lloyd  George  s'est  laisse  prendre  en  1920  aux  formules  de 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      263 

moindre  energie  qu'il  avait  repudiees  in  1919.  De  ce  fait,  l'An- 
gleterre  est  apparue  a  la  France  comme  moins  soucieuse  que 
celle-ci  d'imposer  a  l'Allemagne  le  respect  de  ses  devoirs.  Trop 
d'Anglais  ont  oublie  que  leur  pays,  si  magnifiquement  qu'il  ait 
travaille  pour  la  victoire,  n'a  ete  ni  envahi  ni  saccage.  Trop 
d'Anglais  ont  meconnu  qu'a  la  France  saignante  et  ruinee  autre 
chose  etait  du  que  le  conseil  quotidien  de  renoncer  a  son  droit. 
L' immense  majorite  du  peuple  brittanique,  ni,  j'en  ai  l'assur- 
ance,  M.  Lloyd  George  lui-meme,  n'ont  varie  dans  leur  senti- 
ments de  loyale  fraternite  a  l'egard  du  peuple  frangais.  Mais 
tant  de  gens  ont  affirme  que  la  France  seule  retarde  l'avenement 
de  la  paix,  en  reclamant  l'execution  d'un  traite  qui  lie  les  vain- 
queurs  entre  eux,  comme  les  vaincus  par  rapport  aux  vain- 
queurs;  si  peu  ont  explique  notre  ineluctable  necessite  d'obte- 
nir  reparation  sous  peine  de  plier,  pour  un  demi-siecle,  sous  le 
faix  in  juste  d'une  charge  ecrasante  que  l'equivoque  orale  dres- 
sait  entre  les  deux  pays  a  irrite  le  nerfs  et  trouble  les  espirits. 
Reduit  a  ses  elements  de  base,  le  probleme  est  simple.  Si  les 
chefs  responsables  de  la  politique  britannique  infligeant  un 
dementi  aux  engagements  souscrits  par  eux  en  191 9,  pensent 
que  les  clauses  de  reparations  sont  inexecutables,  ils  avaient,  en 
conseillant  a  la  France  de  reduire  une  revendication  sanctioned 
par  leurs  signatures,  le  devoir  de  lui  offrir  les  compensations 
financieres  en  leur  pouvoir  et  la  garantie  du  minimum  auquel 
ils  le  pressaient  de  se  resigner.     Ils  ne  l'ont  point  fait.' 


"  25 


Again,  Le  Temps,  after  having  expressed  the  opinion  that 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  attitude  towards  France  would  have  a  per- 
manent effect  on  the  Entente,  returned  to  the  subject  a  few  days 
later  (May  6th,  1921),  saying:  "The  speech  made  yesterday 
by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  will  not  suffice  to  efface  the  impression 
produced  in  France  by  the  decision  of  London,  even  though 
the  British  Prime  Minister  spoke  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons as  one  would  have  liked  to  hear  him  speak  during  the  Ses- 
sions of  the  Supreme  Council." 

France  is  to-day  convinced  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  two 
voices.  This  sentiment  was  in  no  degree  impaired  by  the  Lon- 
don Conference  of  May,  1921.  It  was  recognised  that  what- 
ever had  been  obtained  was  due  more  to  M.  Briand's  firmness 

x  La  Paix,  p.  494. 


264 


THE  POMP  OF  POWER 


than  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  sincerity  or  goodwill.  Moreover, 
the  actual  result  of  that  Conference  was  not  regarded  with  any 
great  satisfaction.  The  arrangement  seemed  to  be  better  than 
the  Paris  plan  in  respect  to  the  amounts  of  the  earlier  pay- 
ments. But  an  element  of  uncertainty  was  introduced  by  mak- 
ing the  trend  of  German  imports  a  basis  of  calculation.  In 
other  ways,  and  as  an  agreement  between  the  Allies  themselves, 
it  was  considered  to  be  upon  the  whole  an  improvement  upon 
former  efforts. 

But  when  these  and  all  other  arguments  in  favour  of  the  last 
ultimatum  were  admitted,  the  fact  remained  that  it  might  re- 
sult only  in  another  promise  being  made  by  Germany.  There 
was  no  desire  in  France  that  Germany  should  reject  it.  But 
there  was  no  illusion  about  the  true  import  of  acceptance.  It 
was  realised  that  it  meant  another  German  signature ;  that  pos- 
sibly it  might  mean  that  and  nothing  more ;  that  the  signature 
of  May,  1921,  might  prove  to  be  of  no  more  practical  value  than 
the  German  signature  of  June,  1919.26  It  was  not  an  encourag- 
ing sign  that  a  large  section  of  the  German  Press  urged  ac- 
ceptance upon  the  ground  that  an  opportunity  might  thus  be 
found  for  later  discussion  of  various  points.  The  fact  that 
the  German  Government  would  have  to  guarantee  execution 
"without  conditions  or  reserves"  seemed  to  mean  nothing  to 
these  newspapers;  whilst  they  held  out  the  hope  that  before 
complete  execution  there  might  be  differences  of  opinion  be- 
tween England  and  France  by  which  Germany  would  profit. 

M.  Poincare  wrote,  after  the  London  Conference,  that  M. 
Briand  had  had  to  contend  against  a  prejudice  on  the  part  of 
some  of  France's  Allies  which  carried  everything  before  it; 
and  that  in  the  result,  not  only  had  further  delay  been  granted, 
but  that  the  conditions  presented  to  Germany  had  been  attenu- 
ated in  various  ways.  Further,  he  alleged  that  it  was  under 
the  pressure  of  those  Governments  that  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission, which  was  summoned  to  come  from  Paris  to  London 
during  the  Conference,  withdrew  the  demand  it  had  previously 

26  This  has   been  borne   out  by   much   which  has   occurred  since  these 
words  were  written. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       265 

made  regarding  the  milliard  marks  gold  deposited  in  the  Reichs- 
bank.27 

Moreover,  the  character  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  speech  in 
the  House  of  Commons  on  May  13th,  1921,  regarding  the 
trouble  in  Silesia,  had  the  unfortunate  but  natural  effect  of  cre- 
ating the  impression  that  he  was  inclined  to  be  more  concerned 
about  infractions  of  the  Treaty  when  Germany  stood  to  lose 
than  he  was  when  they  were  at  the  expense  of  France. 

The  British  Prime  Minister  spoke  with  solemnity  about  the 
necessity  of  observing  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  The  French 
comment  was  that  it  was  regrettable  that  he  had  not  always 
censured  with  equal  severity  and  promptitude  lapses  on  the 
part  of  Germany  more  grave  and  more  clearly  proved  than 
those  charged  against  the  Polish  Government. 

Indeed,  subsequent  developments  have  shown  that  on  this 
occasion  neither  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  statement  of  present  oc- 
currences nor  his  summary  of  Polish  history  would  stand 
very  close  scrutiny. 

It  was,  however,  more  difficult  to  take  seriously  the  sequence 
of  his  discourse.  For  the  Prime  Minister  proceeded  to  draw 
a  picture  of  Germany  at  some  future  time  declining  to  carry 
out  her  obligations,  and  basing  her  refusal  upon  the  example 
of  Poland  having  with  impunity  defied  the  Treaty.  Hence,  ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  imperative  necessity  to  com- 
pel Poland  instantly  to  conform  to  its  terms. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  give  a  better  illustration  of  an  inverted 
argument.  Did  it  never  occur  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  that  if 
Poland  was,  in  fact,  evading  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  (which 
has  not  yet  been  proved),  it  might  well  be  because  he  had  for 
many  months  allowed  Germany  openly  to  set  at  naught  the 
same  Treaty?  It  will  suffice  to  refer  to  the  troops  maintained 
in  Bavaria  and  elsewhere,  after  repeated  summonses. 

27  Whether  or  not  M.  Poincare's  specific  allegation  is  correct,  it  is 
undeniable  that  the  London  Conference  demonstrated  publicly  what  had 
long  been  known  in  certain  circles,  viz.,  that  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission had  been  deprived  of  all  independence,  and  was  used  or  ignored 
as  the  majority  of  the  Allies  desired  from  time  to  time.  It  will  be 
remembered  that  M.  Poincare  himself  resigned  the  Presidency  of  that 
Commission  when  he  came  to  the  conclusion  that  he  could  serve  his 
country  more  usefully  otherwise. 


266  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

The  Prime  Minister's  regrettable  outburst  was  not  allowed 
to  pass  without  a  speedy  retort.  Those  who  read  it  one  morn- 
ing, and  who  knew  M.  Briand,  realised  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
would  undoubtedly  hear  some  plain  speaking  in  reply.  Indeed, 
that  same  afternoon,  M.  Briand  made  to  the  correspondents  of 
the  Foreign  Press  who  came  to  see  him  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  a 
statement  equally  as  pointed,  and  more  founded  on  facts  than 
that  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  After  questioning  the  exactitude 
of  the  Prime  Minister's  history,28  M.  Briand  warned  Germany 
with  impressive  sternness  that  she  would  take  any  action  in 
Silesia  at  the  risk  of  war  with  France.  While  finally  he  said, 
without  any  ambiguity,  that  it  was  not  within  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  province  to  assume  to  settle  these  matters  alone.  "We 
are  great  countries  who  can  talk  looking  each  other  in  the 
face.  Neither  of  us  has  the  right  to  give  any  orders  to  the 
other.  The  British  Prime  Minister  cannot  alone  take  the  initia- 
tive to  authorise  German  troops  to  penetrate  into  Upper 
Silesia." 

In  brief,  M.  Briand  intimated  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  that 
France  would  not  accept  the  role  of  a  brilliant  second.  In  so 
doing  he  both  assuaged  the  wounded  feelings  of  his  own  coun- 
trymen, and  also  once  again  directed  British  public  opinion  to 
the  point  from  which  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  been  leading  it 
astray  (the  point  which  I  venture  to  think  is  undoubtedly  the 
most  important  in  considering  the  present  relations  between 
the  two  countries)  :  that  France  wants  only  that  by  which  Great 
Britain  has  already  benefited — the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles. 

In  all  these  circumstances — in  view  of  what  has  happened  in 
the  past,  and  of  the  atmosphere  created  in  the  present — French 
public  opinion  would  greatly  have  preferred  to  have  some  solid 
security  which  this  time  might  have  bound  Germany  to  her 
engagements. 

It  was  not  M.  Briand's  fault  that  he  returned  to  Paris 
empty-handed.     Upon  that  point  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  ada- 


28  ' 


1  The  Polish  Prime  Minister,  M.  Witas,  speaking  in  the  Diet  on  May 
19th,  1921,  challenged  the  accuracy  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  history  even 
more  bluntly,  and  referred  him  to  "Volume  25,  Page  90,  of  the 
Encyclopedia  Britannica,  a  British  work  of  reference." 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      267 

mant.  Nevertheless  the  London  Conference  may  be  regarded  as 
a  step  in  the  right  direction.  But  it  is  a  step  of  which  the  ulti- 
mate result  depended  mainly  upon  the  policy  pursued  by  Down- 
ing Street. 

Unfortunately  it  has  since  become  known  that  at  least  one 
political  party  in  Germany  withdrew  its  opposition  to  the  ac- 
ceptance of  these  conditions  (and  doubtless  also  to  the  fulfil- 
ment of  them)  by  reason  of  assurances  given  through  the 
British  Ambassador.  Herr  Stresemann,  the  leader  of  the  Peo- 
ple's Party  (of  which  Hugo  Stinnes  is  the  mainspring),  who 
was  a  competitor  with  Herr  Wirth  for  the  Chancellorship,  sub- 
mitted, through  the  British  Embassy,  several  questions  which 
he  desired  to  have  answered  by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  himself. 
According  to  his  own  version  of  this  transaction  29  neither 
Herr  Stresemann  nor  his  party  considered  that  the  reply  made 
by  Lord  d'Abernon,  giving  his  personal  impression  in  respect 
of  the  questions,  was  sufficient  to  modify  their  attitude  towards 
the  ultimatum :  but  that  the  day  after  it  had  been  accepted  "an 
official  reply"  arrived  which  was  communicated  to  Herr  Strese- 
mann by  Lord  d'Abernon.  This  answer  of  "the  English  Gov- 
ernment" was  esteemed  to  be  satisfactory  in  regard  to  the  with- 
drawal of  the  penalties;  and  not  unsatisfactory  respecting 
Upper  Silesia  and  the  other  points  in  question. 

When  the  story  of  this  extraordinary  proceeding  first  be- 
came current  an  official  communique  was  issued  to  the  effect 
that  there  was  not  the  least  foundation  for  the  assertion  that 
the  Prime  Minister  had  been  in  private  communication  with 
Herr  Stresemann  or  with  any  German  statesman  upon  the  sub- 
ject of  Upper  Silesia.  This  was  true  to  the  letter.  But  the 
announcement  was  lacking  in  amplitude.  For  to  the  ordinary 
mentality,  a  German  statesman  who  hands  a  list  of  questions 
to  the  British  Embassy  asking  that  they  should  be  forwarded 
to  the  British  Prime  Minister  for  an  answer,  and  is  subse- 
quently given  by  the  British  Ambassador  a  reply  which  the  lat- 
ter has  received,  and  states  that  he  has  received,  from  Down- 
ing Street,  is  fairly  entitled  to  say  that  the  reply  comes  from 

29  In  a  letter  to  the  Deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung:  quoted  in  Le  Temps, 
August  ist,  1921. 


268  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

the  Prime  Minister.  While  it  is  significant  that  after  Herr 
Stresemann  had  published  the  exact  facts,  as  above  recounted, 
there  was  no  further  official  denial,  or  even  explanation.  The 
fact,  uncontroverted  and  uncontrovertible,  is  that  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  or  his  Cabinet  (if  he  prefers  to  shelter  himself  be- 
hind that  barrier),  did  make  an  independent  official  communi- 
cation to  the  leader  of  a  German  political  party,  upon  a  question 
affecting  all  the  Allies,  and  especially  France. 

The  questions  and  answers  were  as  follows: 

Question :  Will  acceptance  by  Germany  of  the  Allies'  condi- 
tions involve  cancellation  of  the  sanctions  imposed  in  March 
last  after  the  Conference  in  London? 

Answer :  The  sanctions  imposed  on  March  8th,  especially 
those  involving  the  occupation  of  Dusseldorf,  Duisburg,  and 
Ruhrort,  and  the  establishment  of  a  Rhineland  Customs  barrier, 
ought,  in  the  opinion  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  to  be  can- 
celled in  the  event  of  the  acceptance  of  the  Allied  demands. 
The  opinion  of  His  Majesty's  Government  on  this  point  is  be- 
ing communicated  to  the  French  Government. 

Question:  Can  His  Majesty's  Government  give  an  assur- 
ance to  the  effect  that  they  will  not  allow  any  solution  of  Up- 
per Silesian  questions  other  than  the  one  founded  on  the  report 
already  made  by  the  British  representative  of  the  Plebiscite 
Commission? 

Answer :  The  German  Government  may  rely  on  the  desire 
of  His  Majesty's  Government  to  pay  due  regard  to  the  impor- 
tant German  interests  involved,  and,  although  it  is  not  possible 
without  prior  consultation  with  Great  Britain's  Allies  to  give  an 
assurance  in  the  sense  desired,  the  German  Government  may 
rest  assured  that  His  Majesty's  Government  will  press  for  an 
equitable  settlement  on  the  basis  of  strict,  impartial  execution 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

It  was  at  this  very  period  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  urging 
that  France  ought  not  to  send  another  division  to  Upper  Silesia 
(to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  troops  she  already  had  there)  with- 
out a  prior  agreement  with  Great  Britain.  It  has  been  per- 
tinently asked  whether  it  was  more  serious  to  send  a  few  thou- 
sand men  to  Silesia,  which  could  not  affect  British  interests,  or 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      269 

to  promise  Germany  an  abrogation  of  penalties,  thereby  pos- 
sibly causing  a  grave  injury  to  French  interests  and  French 
security. 

Leaving  aside  all  question  of  fidelity  to  the  country's  en- 
gagements, I  propose  now  to  examine  the  effect  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  counsels  from  the  standpoint  of  whether  or  not  it  is 
in  the  interests  of  Great  Britain — irrespective  of  every  other 
consideration.  When  I  refer  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  "policy"  I 
allude  to  what  he  actually  has  done,  not  to  what  he  has  said :  for 
I  am  fain  to  agree  with  the  French  statesmen  who  affirm  that 
upon  this  matter  the  Prime  Minister's  acts  and  words  are  not 
always  reconcilable. 

For  the  past  year  or  more  Mr.  Lloyd  George  has  uncon- 
sciously been  doing  his  utmost  to  prove  that  M.  Caillaux  was 
a  true  prophet.  Caillaux  consistently  maintained  that  a  clash 
with  Germany  would  be  disastrous  for  France,  because  even  if 
she  were  victorious,  thanks  to  English  assistance,  it  would  be 
England  who  would  reap  the  major  benefit,  while  France  would 
be  left  saddled  with  the  greater  burden. 

What  M.  Caillaux  years  ago  foretold  would  happen  is  exactly 
what  many  Frenchmen  to-day  say  has  happened.  Moreover, 
those  most  forward  in  making  such  statements  are  not  jour- 
nalists whom  Mr.  Lloyd  George  imagines  are  prejudiced 
against  him,  not  violent  writers  in  the  Press,  not  confirmed 
opponents  of  M.  Clemenceau,  who  denounce  the  results  of  the 
Treaty  because  it  was  partly  his  handiwork;  but  they  are  men 
who  have  borne  the  same  burden  of  office  as  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
who  are  too  patriotic  to  be  inspired  by  personal  feelings,  and 
who,  finally,  certainly  have  no  traditional  sympathy  with 
M.  Caillaux:  they  include  M.  Poincare,  who  was  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic  throughout  the  war;  M.  Andre  Tardieu, 
who  was  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  colleague  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence ;  M.  Barthou,  and  General  de  Castelnau,  to  recapitulate  the 
names  of  those  only  whose  words  I  have  cited  textually. 

Poincare,  Tardieu,  Barthou,  and  de  Castelnau  stop  short  in 
their  complaints.  But  others  who  hear  them  go  one  step  fur- 
ther and  say,  "Eh  bien !  Apres  tout,  Caillaux  avait  raison." 

In  1920  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  warned  that  M.  Barthou  in- 


270  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

tended  to  speak  in  the  Chambre  des  Deputes,  assailing  his  policy 
(and,  in  fact,  by  chance  M.  Barthou  spoke  the  same  day  as 
the  Prime  Minister  made  a  conciliatory  speech  in  the  House 
of  Commons)  ;  and  was,  I  believe,  told  at  the  time  that  it  was 
muttered  in  a  high  political  circle  in  France  that:  "If  Lloyd 
George  means  to  turn  to  Berlin,  we  had  better  go  there  before 
him."  30 

In  my  opinion,  this  is  an  exaggeration  of  anything  which 
is  likely  to  happen.  But  what  is  true  is  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George's 
policy  is  beginning  to  breed  a  party  which  sincerely  believes 
that  France  is  getting  little  or  nothing  from  the  Entente.  There 
is  no  question  about  the  great  value  placed  upon  a  close  under- 
standing and  upon  close  co-operation  with  Great  Britain.  In- 
deed, it  is  exactly  because  so  much  was  expected  from  those  re- 
lations that  the  disappointment  is  so  bitter.  It  is  known  that 
Clemenceau  said :  "In  exchange  for  the  two  Treaties  I  have 
reduced  the  period  (of  occupation  of  the  Rhine  country)  which 
I  at  first  demanded,"  and  that  in  the  result  France  did  not  get 
the  guarantee.  It  is  known  that  Great  Britain  has  already 
realised  most  of  the  advantages  or  compensations  which  accrued 
to  her  under  the  Treaty.  It  is  known  that  France  cannot  rely 
even  upon  the  full  and  undivided  moral  support  of  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  Government  in  enforcing  execution  of  the  provisions 
which  most  vitally  affect  her. 

It  has  been  said  that  Englishmen  are  wont  to  forget  that 
they  are  also  Europeans.  In  previous  generations  that  may 
have  been  an  error.  To-day  it  is  almost  a  crime.  For  with 
the  changed  mode  of  warfare  and  the  development  of  engines 
of  war  (a  development  which  is  still  in  progress),  England  in 
time  of  conflict  now  has  few  of  the  advantages  of  being  an 
island,  while  retaining  all  the  disadvantages,  and  notably  that 
■of  an  island  which  cannot  feed  herself. 

The  conditions  under  which  invasion  might  be  possible  is  a 
tempting  subject,  barred  to  those  who  can  profess  no  compe- 
tence in  military  speculations.    But  not  many  soldiers  will  dis- 

80  Since  these  lines  were  written,  M.  Loucheur,  the  most  practical  and 
one  of  the  ablest  of  French  statesmen,  has  taken  the  indicated  path  by 
negotiating  directly  with  Herr  Rathenau. 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES       271 

sent  from  the  suggestion  that  the  situation  would  be  parlous 
were  Calais,  Boulogne,  and  other  Channel  ports  in  hostile 
hands. 

Any  policy  of  isolation,  so  far  from  being  "splendid"  would 
be  alike  fatal  to  this  country  and  disastrous  for  the  cause  of 
peace  in  Europe. 

When  General  Smuts  recently  made  such  a  suggestion  the 
Times  pointed  out  that  there  was  no  such  political  tradition  as 
General  Smuts  imagined ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  from  the 
days  of  the  Tudors  downwards,  Great  Britain  had  been  forced 
to  take  an  active  part  in  the  affairs  of  Europe  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  ensuring  her  own  safety. 

For  the  reasons  already  stated,  that  necessity  is  even  stronger 
to-day  than  ever  before.  While  the  manner  in  which  we  some- 
times in  the  past  participated  in  Continental  arrangements  (by 
temporarily  aiding  one  Power  against  another,  such  assistance 
ranging  from  moral  support  to  the  payment  of  subsidies,  as 
circumstances  might  demand)  is  to-day  neither  feasible  nor  in 
harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  times. 

John  Bright  once  called  the  system  of  the  Balance  of  Power 
a  gigantic  scheme  for  the  out-door  relief  of  the  aristocracy 
of  Great  Britain.  There  is  now  neither  demand  nor  room 
for  any  balance  of  Power  of  that  nature.  But  our  only 
security  in  the  event  of  war  is  a  Continental  alliance. 

What  is  more  important,  and  what  is  more  desired  by  British 
public  opinion,  is  some  security  against  war.  That  again  can 
only  be  obtained  by  an  alliance  with  a  country  which  has  ports 
within  a  certain  distance  of  England.  Only  two  countries  come 
within  that  category:  France  and  Germany. 

If  Mr.  Lloyd  George  sincerely  believes  that  France  has 
ideas  of  territorial  expansion  he  is  right  in  rejecting  the  idea 
of  any  closer  understanding.31  That  might  mean  a  war  of 
aggression,  and  Great  Britain  is  almost  unanimously  opposed 
to  any  participation  in  conflicts  of  that  nature. 

But  it  must  be  said  in  passing  that  even  that  sincere  be- 
lief would  not  relieve  Mr.  Lloyd  George  from  the  obligation 

"Written  some  six  months  before  the  Cannes  Conference. 


272  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

of  seeing  that  France  gets  justice  in  the  execution  of  the 
Treaty. 

If  the  Prime  Minister  thinks  that  an  alliance  with  France 
might  commit  the  country,  then  he  must  look  elsewhere.  He 
can  only  look  towards  Germany.  While  if  he  does  not  look  in 
time  he  may  look  there  in  vain. 

To-day  such  statements  may  seem  fantastic.  But  the  face 
of  foreign  affairs  changes  quickly,  and  the  cardinal  error 
of  statesmen  in  power  from  the  days  of  Greece  until  our  own 
time  has  been  to  think  that  the  present  must  always  continue. 
For  instance,  who  would  have  said  in  1900  that  Japan,  a 
country  into  which,  fifty  years  earlier,  no  foreigner  was  al- 
lowed to  enter,  would,  as  the  result  of  the  war,  be  to-day  one 
of  the  four  Great  Powers  of  the  world? 

Who  would  have  said  ten  years  ago  that  Poland,  that  king- 
dom dead  for  two  centuries,  would  be  a  national  entity  in  1920? 

Or,  if  such  examples  fail  to  convince  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
that  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  future  in  foreign  affairs,  that  what 
seems  fanciful  to-day  may  be  a  fact  to-morrow,  he  might  re- 
call the  statement  he  himself  made  in  January,  19 14,  that  the 
idea  of  the  possibility  of  war  with  Germany  was  absurd,  and 
that  the  peace  of  the  world  was  so  assured  that  the  strength 
of  the  British  Navy  ought  to  be  reduced  without  any  further 
delay. 

M.  Tardieu  has  asked — and  has  answered — the  question 
whether  or  not  it  is  too  late  to  repair  the  faults  committed 
since  the  Treaty  was  signed  at  Versailles.  He  naturally  and 
properly  regards  the  question  from  the  standpoint  of  a  pa- 
triotic Frenchman.  No  doubt  he  endorses  what  M.  de  Frey- 
cinet  said  in  his  "Souvenirs" :  "The  security  of  a  great  peo- 
ple ought  not  to  rest  upon  the  goodwill  of  others,  but  upon  the 
precautions  which  it  takes  by  its  armaments  and  its  alli- 
ances." Looking  at  it  from  the  other  side  of  the  Channel, 
I  am  convinced  that  the  prosperity  of  Great  Britain  depends 
upon  the  prompt  execution  of  the  Treaty,  and  the  conclusion 
of  a  defensive  alliance  with  France. 

Mr.  Charles  Schwab,  a  firm  friend  of  the  Allies  from  the 
early  days  of  August,  1914,  and  one  of  the  greatest  economic 


THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAILLES      273 

authorities  in  the  United  States,  speaking  at  a  recent  meeting 
of  the  New  York  Chamber  of  Commerce,  said: 

"I  have  just  returned  from  Europe  and  I  have  come  with 
renewed  admiration  for  the  courage,  enterprise,  and  determi- 
nation displayed  by  France,  England,  Belgium,  and  Italy. 
These  nations  were  wonderful  as  our  Allies  in  the  war,  and  are 
marvellous  in  meeting  the  tasks  of  peace;  but  if  there  is  one 
thought  above  all  others  that  was  borne  in  upon  me  by  my  ob- 
servations in  Europe,  it  is  that  Germany  has  gone  back  to  work 
as  has  no  other  nation  in  Europe. 

"Believing  as  I  do  that  the  strength  and  prosperity  of  a 
nation  depend  on  the  efficiency  of  its  labour,  I  had  something 
of  a  shock  in  contemplating  this  thought :  Is  it  possible,  after 
having  won  the  war,  we  of  the  Allied  nations,  with  everything 
in  our  hands,  will  allow  Germany  to  win  the  peace  through  the 
efforts  of  her  labour? 

"Germany  to-day  can  put  a  ton  of  steel  into  England  twenty 
dollars  cheaper  than  it  costs  England  to  make  it.  Germany 
to-day  is  selling  pneumatic  tools  in  Detroit,  where  formerly  we 
made  such  machinery  and  shipped  it  to  Germany  to  be  sold 
cheaper  than  she  could  make  it.  The  difference  is  solely  a 
matter  of  labour  costs."  32 

Every  time  it  appears  that  Great  Britain  and  France  are 
not  absolutely  unanimous  in  their  determination  to  compel  Ger- 
many to  honour  her  signature;  every  time  that  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  publicly  sets  himself  up  as  an  arbitrator;  every  time 
that  the  Berlin  Press  has  reason  to  announce  that  France 
cannot  persuade  England  to  assist  her  in  forcing  Germany 
to  execute  the  Treaty — the  commercial  superiority  indicated  by 
Mr.  Schwab  is  confirmed  and  enhanced;  and  Germany  is  en- 
couraged to  evade  her  obligations. 

The  only  safe  policy  for  Great  Britain  is  a  strong  defen- 
sive alliance.  If  Mr.  Lloyd  George  impairs  the  understanding 
with  France  the  chances  are  that  he  is  conducting  his  country 
to  a  fate  which  will  obscure  to  posterity  the  great  services  he 
rendered  during  the  war.33     Opportunism  may  sometimes  be 

32  But  the  question  of  exchange  plays  a  great  part  in  that. 

"  I  have  admitted  that,  failing  an  alliance  with  France,  the  most 
logical  and,  in  the  end,  the  safest  policy,  would  be  an  alliance  with 
Germany,  but  do  not  desire  to  consider  the  prospect  further. 


274  THE  POMP  OF  POWER 

temporarily  profitable  in  party  politics.  But  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  affairs  it  can  only  create  confusion  and  breed  bad 
feeling.  In  that  domain  a  settled  policy  is  essential;  and  no 
sporadic  displays  of  clever  manipulations  can  inspire  the  same 
degree  of  confidence  or  ensure  the  same  measure  of  security. 
Unfortunately  it  cannot  be  denied  that  at  present,  instead  of 
going  towards  a  closer  and  more  formal  understanding  with 
France,  he  is  contributing  to  the  degeneration,  if  not  to  the 
dissolution,  of  the  Entente. 

Some  months  ago  the  Times  said  that  the  true  results  of 
the  war  depended  absolutely  upon  the  cordiality  and  the  in- 
timacy of  our  relations  with  France;  that  an  official  under- 
standing was  not  sufficient ;  what  was  necessary  was  a  friend- 
ship, penetrating  men  and  women  of  all  classes  and  condi- 
tions in  both  countries. 

More  than  that,  what  is  necessary  for  the  security  of  Eng- 
land, for  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  for  the  immediate  future 
of  civilisation  is  an  absolute  defensive  alliance  between  the 
two  countries. 

Victor  Hugo,  referring  to  a  peace  conference,  once  wrote: 
"Le  congres,  c'est  l'Angleterre  serrant  la  main  a  la  France, 
c'est  l'Amerique  serrant  la  main  a  l'Europe."  That  is  equally 
true  to-day,  and  in  existing  circumstances  the  first  step  lies 
with  the  British  Government. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


A  Argued    Coalition    only    ar- 
ranged    for     duration     of 

Accambray,  M.  Leon,  50  war,  161 

Addison,  Dr.,  175  Party  ties,    162,   173 

Debate  on  doctor's  salary,  192  Asquith's,  Mrs.,  book,  194-197 

Agadir,      turns     the     tide     in  Auberive,  ^2. 

France,  3  Austrian  and  German  Ambassa- 
Lloyd    George's    warning    to  dors  and  English  neutral- 
Germany,  191 1,  5  ity,  12 
Crisis,  191 1 ;  plans  regarding  Austro-Hungary     treaty     with 


British  troops,  7 

140,   145 
Aitken,    Sir    Max,    afterwards 

Lord  Beaverbrook,  112 
Albert  Gate,  13 
Alenson,  d',  67 
Algeciras,  1906,  3 
Allenby,   105 
Alsace-Lorraine  and  treaty   of 

1892,  2 
Bismarck's  opinion,  15,  216 
America,  7 
American  view  of  disarmament, 

248 
Amiens,  13 
Amsterdam,  178 
Armistice,  42 

Artois,  second  battle  of,  63 
Asquith,  Mr.,  10,  94 

Brilliant    career    at    Oxford, 

no 
Practically  deserted  by  Bonar 


Central  Powers,  1879,  2 
Annexes  Bosnia  and  Herzgo- 


vinia,   1908,  3 
Aux  Ecoutes,  183 
Ayres,  Leonard  P.,  255 

B 

Balfour,  Mr.,  117,  120,  154 
Not    appreciated   by    French 

politicians,  157,  164 
Succeeds  Salisbury,  his  char- 
acter, 168 
On  prevention  of  war,  249 
Bannerman,  Campbell-,  no 
Bapaume,  66,  72 
Barnes,  Mr.,  235 
Barthelmy,  General,  202 
Barthou,  M.,  4,  125,  131,  150, 
231 
On    France   after   the   War, 
270 
Law  and  Balfour,  112,  114,      Bathurst,  Lady,  192 
116,  118,  119  Beauchamp,   Lord,   opposed  to 

His  passing  sounded  knell  of  intervention,  1914,  11 

Gladstonian         Liberalism,  In  favour  of  neutrality,  12 

121,    154,    155  Beauvais,  G.  H.  Q.,  65,  73 

277 


278 


INDEX 


Beaverbrook,  112,  113,  114, 
192,  260 

Belfort  to  Mezieres  line,  24 

Belgian  attitude  to  France  be- 
comes known,   10 

Belgium,  5,  9,  13 

Results  of  invasion,  16 
Violation  of  neutrality,  29 
Opinion   of    French   General 

Staff,  38 
Places    railways   at    France's 
disposal,  203 

Berenger,  Senator  Henry,  73 
Report  on  result  of  two  days' 
offensive,   83 

Beresford,  Lord  Charles,  100 

Berlin,  2,  4,   11 

Berne,    178 

Bernhardi,   15 

On  the  offensive,  23 

Berthelot,  Andre,  127,  128 

Berthelot,   General,   21,   34,   52 

Berthelot,  Philippe,  114,  127 

Bertie,  Lord,  60,  128,  166 

Birkenhead,  Lord,  Lord  Chan- 
cellor, 167 

Bismarck,  1,  2,  15 

Alteration   of    Kaiser's   tele- 
gram, 15 
And  peace  terms,  15 
On  fidelity  of  nations,  16 
On  Lord  Salisbury,  168 

Bliss,  General,  92,  224 

Bloch,  22 

Blowitz,  de,  1,  199 

Bodley,  Mr.,  173 

Bonnal,  General,  18 

Bordeaux,  41 
Sept.,  191 4,  46 

Borden,  Sir  Robert,  241 

Bosnia,  annexation  of,  1908,  3 

Bottomley,  Mr.  Horatio,  198 

Bouillon,  Franklin-,  came  to 
London,  Oct.,  1917,  92, 
150 


Boulanger,  General,  47 

Boulogne,  15 

Bourgeois,  M.  Leon,  140 

Brazil,  211 

Briamont,  projected  attack  on, 

84 
Briand,  M.,  4 

Supports  Joffre,  49 
Resignation  of  Ministry,  53 
At  Calais,  67 

Message  to   British   Govern- 
ment regarding  Haig,  68 
Downfall  of  Government,  69 
Resignation  of,  69,  70 
Resigned,    Dec,    1916,    126, 
128,    129,    130,    131,    132, 
I34>    135,    I38>    146,    148, 
150,  152 
Rated  Lloyd  George's  quali- 
ties at  proper  value,  155 
On  alarm  for  future,  247 
Briey,  29 
Bright,  John,  271 
British  Empire,  16 
British  Fleet,  13 
British     Government,     decision 
regarding     support    of 
France,  10,  16 
British  Mission  at  G.Q.G.,  67 
British    War    Cabinet    met    in 

London,  March  4,  68 
Brodrick,  St.  John,  166 
Broglie,  due  de,  139 
Brougham,   167 
Buat,  Lieut-Colonel,  24 

And  Plan  XVII.,  25 
Bullitt  episode,  203,  207 
Biilow,  von,  25,  42 
Burnham,  Lord,  191,  197 
Burns,  Mr.  John,  11 
Byng,  105 

C 

Cabinet  and  Lord  Haldane,  11 
Meeting,  Aug.  2,  1914,  12 


INDEX 


279 


Second     meeting,     Aug.     4, 

1914,  12 
Division  of  opinion  in  1914, 
10 
Cadorna,  92 
Caillaux,   M.   Joseph,  61,   125, 

Pre-War  policy  of,  140,  141, 

143 
Accused   of    having   negotia- 
tions   with    German    Em- 
bassy in  Paris,  144,  145 
Character  and  temperament, 

146,  147 
Opinion  of  Great  Britain,  148 
Sent  on  commercial  mission 
to   Brazil  and  the  Argen- 
tine, 149,  150,  151 
Forecast  of  the  future,  152 
Accused    of    treachery,    153, 
269 
Calais,  15 

Allied  conference,  67 
Agreement,     Briand's     blunt 
statement,  68 
Cambon,    M.    Jules,    132,    142, 

227 
Cambon,  M.  Paul,  French  Am- 
bassador, 5,   10,   12,   13 
Hope     and     fear     regarding 
Great  Britain,  1914,  13,  17, 
94,  95,  144,  145 
On  Lord  Derby,  165 
On  Lord  Salisbury,  168 
Cambrai — Le  Cateau  zone,   13, 

104 
Cannes,  126 

Conference,  170 
Caporetto,  92 
Capus,     M.     Alfred,     criticises 

Woodrow  Wilson,   159 
Carson,  Sir  Edward,  114 

A  mystery  to  French  politi- 
cians,  157 
Casablanca  deserters,  3 


Castelnau,  General  de,  7,  8,  17, 
21,  32,  46 
Return  from  Salonica,  48 
Suggested        Commander-in- 
Chief,   57,  67 
In  Russia,  67,  yy,  136,  255 
On  France  after  the  War,  269 
Cecil,    Lord   Robert,   much   re- 
spected in  France,  157,  167, 
170 
Central  Powers,  2 
Chamberlain,  Austen,  112 

Present  position,  168,  171 
Chamberlain,  Joseph,  117 
Champagne,  Battle  of,  63 
Chantilly,  French  G.H.Q.,  44 

Joffre  at,  45 
Charleroi,  Battle  of,  34,  36,  37, 

39 
Cherche-Midi,  20 
Churchill,  Lord  Randolph,  116, 

118,   168 
Churchill,  Mr.  Winston,  10,  157 
Character  of,  164 
Opposition  to  Lloyd  George, 
164 
Churchill,  Late  Lady  Randolph, 

164 
Clemenceau,  M.,  3,  4 
Support  of  Gallieni,  42 
And  de  Castelnau,  42 
Succeeds  Painleve,  58 
Fierce  attack  on  Painleve,  70, 
93,  103,  106,  108,  109,  122, 
123,    125,    128,    131,    135, 

136,  150 
Remained  in  office  till  end  of 

War,  150 
Methods  clash  with  Caillaux, 

I5I 

Small  appreciation  of  Lloyd 

George,   who  reciprocated, 
LS6,   158 
And  Bolshevist  Government, 
207 


280 


INDEX 


Report  on  Senlis,  216 

And  Peace  Conference,  226 

And  occupation  of  the  Rhine, 
227 

Ratification     of     Treaty     by- 
Congress,  231 

Holds  firm  on  occupation  of 
Germany,  236 

And  League  of  Nations,  248 
Clynes,   Mr.,   180 
Combes,  M.,  126 
Commission    d'Enquete    sur    la 
role   et   la    situation   de   la 
Metallurgie  en  France,  7 

General    Ruffey's   testimony, 
22 

On  Briey,  28 

Joffre's  evidence  on   Marne, 

39 
General  Percin's  evidence,  26 

Joffre  on  Belgium's  attack,  34 

Compiegne,  35 

Council,   April   6,    1917,   77, 
107 

Concentration  allemande,  La,  24 

Conseil,  President  du,  77 

Conseil  Superieur  de  la  Guerre, 
20 
Records  about  heavy  artillery, 

26^ 
Gallieni's  resignation,  26 

Constantin,     Sarrail's    lack    of 
confidence  in,  59 

Council  of  Ten,  1919,  240 

Cowdray,  Lord,   187 

Craonne,  66 

Crewe,  Lord,  Mr.  Long's  amia- 
ble criticisms  of,  118 

Critique  des  Travaux  du  Grand 
Etat-Major,  23 

Cromer,  Lord,  117 

Cunliffe,  Lord,  12 

Curragh,  94 

Curzon,  George,  166 

Curzon,  Lord,  203,  208,  258 


D 


Daily  Chronicle,  185 
Daily  Express,  192,  260 
Daily  Mail,  Paris  edition,  192, 

199 
Daily    News,     163,     197,    258, 

260 
Daily  Telegraph,  191,  197 
Dalou,   201 
Darmstadt,  201 
Daudet,  M.  Leon,  4 
Delane,    191 
Delcasse,  M.,  1,  3 
La  D  Spec  he  de  Toulouse,  46 
Derby,  Lord,  95,  99,  128,  165 
In  Paris,  166 
Returns  to  England,  167 
Deroulede,  Paul,  4 
Deschanel,  M.,  123,  136,  205 
Deutsche    Allgemeine    Zeitung, 

267 
Dieburg,   201 
Dilke,  Charles,  197 
Direction  of  Control,  19 
Disraeli,  118,  168 
Dominique,  rue  St.,  24 
Douamont,   64 
Doullens     meeting,      55,      107, 

109 
Doumer,  Paul,  52 

Receives  news  of   Joffre   at 

Neuilly,  53  _ 
Opinion  of  Nivelle  offensive, 

87,  132,  133,  134 
Doumergue,  M.,  126,  150,  227 
Downing  Street,  11 
Driant,  Colonel,  47 
Dubail,  General,  26,  44 
Dubost,  Antoine,   President  of 

the  Senate,  76 
Dufferin,  Lord,  166 
Dunkirk,  31 
Dupont,  General,  38 
Dupuy,  M.  Jean,  149,  228,  260 


INDEX 


281 


L'Echo  de  Paris,  183,  256 
Ecole  Polytechnique,  27 
Ecole  Superieure  de  Guerre,  24 
Einwohnerwehr,  246 
Emperor  Wilhelm  II.,  2J 
Ems,   15 

Engerand,  M.  Fernand,  17,  35 
England,   I,  3,  6,  7,  8,   10,   12, 

16,   17 
Refusal    to    reinforce    Salo- 

nica  Expedition,  59 
English  Fleet,  6 
English  and  French  views  about 

the  War,  191 4,  5 
English  General  Staff,  8 
English  Government,  8 
English  Offensive,  April  9,  82 
Entente,  The,  1904,  1,  8 
Epinay,  14 

Esperey,  Franchet  d'.  78 
Etienne,   M.,  54 
Europe,  1 
Evans,    Sir   Worthington,    175, 

186 
Evening  News,  190 
Expeditionary  Force,  13 


Falkenhayn,  51 
Fallieres,  124,  133 
Family  Herald,  The,  192 
Favre,  Albert,  74 
Ferry,  M.  Abel,  report  on  offen- 
sive, 83 

Most  reliable  statistics,  88 
Fifth  Army,  33,  35 

Under  Lanrezac,  37 
First  Army,  33 
Fleming,  Sir  Stamford,  113 
Fleuriau,  M.  de,  Charge  d Af- 
faires, 11 
Flower,  Peter,  197 


Foch,  Marechal, 

Respect  of  German  com- 
mands, 42 

Removed  by  Joffre  from 
command,  54 

Style  of  conversation,  55 

And  Macedonian  crisis ;  con- 
sidered as  Joffre's  suc- 
cessor, 62 

Created  Chief  of  General 
Staff,  62 

To  remain  Chief-of-Staff, 
Dec,  1917,  93,  95 

With  Wilson  proposed  for- 
mation of  Executive  War 
Committee,  97,  99,  100 

Organised  reserves  for  191 8 
campaign,  104-6 

Suffers  from  Clemenceau's 
dislike,  106,  108,  109, 
122 

Limits  German  troops  in 
Ruhr,  201 

The  Senlis  Conference,  216 

On  the  Armistice,  216 

Occupation  of  the  Rhine,  227 
Fondere,  M.,  143,  144 
Foreign  Office  and  War  Office, 

16 
Forgeot,  M.,  136 
France,  1 

Emerges  from  twenty  years 
of  isolation,  1892,  2 

Depression  after  1870,  4 

Agrees  with  political  leaders 
that  war  is  inevitable,  4,  6, 
7,  12,  14,  16,  17 

Prepared  for  war  with  Ger- 
many, 18 

Expenditure  on  Army  from 
1872-1912,  18 

Ore  and  cast  iron,  28 
Dissatisfaction        with        Ver- 
sailles    Treaty,     253 

Taxation  in,  259 


282 


INDEX 


Franchet    d'Esperey,     General, 

73  • 

Suggested     modification     of 

plans  to  Nivelle,  73 

Frankfort  incident,  166 

Occupation  by  French,  April, 

1920,  201 

French,  Sir  John,  9,  13,  35 

And  Lanrezac,  36,  39 

Suggestion  re  Marne,  42 

Anticipated  end  of  War  too 

soon,  45 

Called  away  from  luncheon, 

54,  95 
French  Ambassador,  13 

French  Army,  17 

French  Channel  coast  open  to 

German  assault,  12,  13 

French  Fleet,  6 

French  General  Staff,  7,  9,  13, 

Defective  strategy,  18 

And  Joffre,  21 

Error  in  estimating  German 

shock  effectives,  25 
And  Plan  XVII.,  25 
Blames  Lanrezac  for  retreat- 
ing, 35 
French    Government    at     1919 
Peace  Conference,  7 
Ignorance  of  Belgium's  atti- 
tude, 9 
French  military  attache  and  let- 
ter re  Kitchener,  24 
French  Military  Mission,  13 
French   Parliament,  27 
French  War  Office,  complicated 

system,   18 
Freycinet,  M.  de,  125,  272 

G 

Galiffet,  General,  26 
Gallieni,  20 

Warning  re  Mauberge,  26 


Draws  attention  to  need  for 

heavy  artillery,  26,  30 
Reaches  age  limit,  33 
On  German  attack,  34 
Battle  of  the  Ourcq,  39 
At  Paris,  41,  95,    108,   123, 

134 
Gambetta,  139 
Gardiner,  Mr.  A.  G.,  163 
Garvin,   160 
General    Election,     191 8,     162, 

173 
General   Staffs  of   France  and 
England,  12,  17 

Unprepared  in  1914,  2y 

Defence  of,  27 
George,  Mr.  Lloyd,  derides  idea 
of  possibility  of  war,  1914, 
5,  10,  12,  60 

Impressed  by  Nivelle,  66 

At  Calais,  67,  80,  81 

Impressed  by  disputes  be- 
tween politicians  and  gen- 
erals, 91 

Recognises  weakness  lying 
in  lack  of  unity,  92,  96 

Dislike  of  Robertson,  98,  100, 
101,  103 

The  antithesis  of  Mr.  As- 
quith,   in 

Supported  by  Lord  Beaver- 
brook,      112,      113,       116, 

ll7 

Made     his     ultimatum     and 

Asquith  resigned,  119 
Formed  a  Government,  120 
Man  made  for  the  occasion, 

121,     128,     129,     I30,     I35, 
136,    I53. 

Party  politics,  154 

Portrait  drawn  by  anonymous 
critic,  154 

The  only  man  capable  of  in- 
spiring enthusiasm,  154, 
156,  158 


INDEX 


283 


Did  good  work  at  Peace  Con- 
ference, 158 
Upheld  interests  of  his  own 

country,   159 
Limited  his   efforts   to   what 

was  feasible,  160 
Friends  advised  him  to  retire 

after      General      Election, 

1918,  161 
And  General  Election,  1918, 

162 
Opposition     to     Winston 

Churchill,  164 
Opposition    to    Lord    Derby, 

l65 
Sensitive  to  newspaper  criti- 
cism, 183 
American  and  French  Press, 

184 
Northcliffe  Press,  187 
At  San  Remo,  204 
Message  to  Poland,  1920,  206 
On    German    payments,    235 
Since  Peace  Conference,  239 
Love  of  secrecy,  241 
Alarm   at   Germany's   objec- 
tion, 243 
Derogations  from  Treaty,  244 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  252 
And  public   opinion,   254 
Irritation  of  France,  256 
Speech  on  Silesia,  265 
And  Poland,  266 
German     ambitions     disclosed, 

1875,  2 

German  and  Austrian  Ambassa- 
dors and  English  neutral- 
ity, 12 

German  Government  and 
French  post-War  activities, 
179 

German  offensive,  March  21, 
1918,  101 

German  retirement,  March  16, 
72 


Germany,  1,  2,  3 

Obtains     retirement    of     M. 

Delcasse,  1905,  3 
Realisation  of  bond  between 
France  and  Great  Britain, 
1908,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7,  9,  13,  14, 

Expenditure  on  Army,  1872- 

1912,  18 
Declaration  of  war,  18 
And  metals,  29 
Buat's      imaginary     journey, 

25. 
Evasion  of  Treaty,  245 

Gillian,  General,  216 
Gladstone,  A  man  of  many  in- 
terests, 160,  176 
Goeppert,  M.,  201 
Goltz,  von  der,  15 
Gortchakoff,  Prince,  1 
Goschen,  Sir  Edward,  13 
Gosse,  Edmund,  154 
Gough,  104 
Grand  Couronne,  58 
Grandmaison,  Colonel  Loyseau 

de,  22 
Great  Britain,  1,  3,  4,  6 

France's   plans   against    Ger- 
man   invasion,    7 

Intervention  in  1875,  15,  16 
Greece,  Sarrail  and,  60 
Greville's,  Charles,  diaries,  196 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  1912,  5 

Letter  of   19 12,  re  views  on 
war,  5,  6,  10,  12,  17 

Renewed  activity,  174,  249 
Grouard,  Lieut.-Colonel,  38 

H 

Haig,  Sir  Douglas,  13 
Fails    Lanrezac,   37 
And  Nivelle,  66  " 
At  Calais,  67,  68 
Much  criticised,  68,  79,  80 


284 


INDEX 


Wished  offensive  to  continue, 

Subordination  to  N  i  v  e  1 1  e 
ended,  91,  95,  97 

Wilson  thought  him  pre- 
eminently suited  to  de- 
fence, 99,  107,  108 

Sent  for  Lloyd  George  and 
advocated  unity  of  com- 
mand, 107 

At  Senlis,  216 
Haldane,  Lord,  3,  10 

His  part  during  the  War,  10, 

11,  94,  95 
Hankey,  Colonel,  66 
Hanotaux,  M.,  33,  35 

On  Lanrezac's  command,  36 
Harding,  President,  248 
Harmsworth,  Mr.  Alfred,  190 
Harmsworth,  Mr.  Esmond,  192 
Hartington,   Lord,    161 
Harvey,  Mr.,  248 
Heilbronner,   Colonel,   72 
Hennessey,  M.  Jean,  originated 

plan  of  unity  of  command, 

1916,  92 
Hermeix,  M.,  12 
Herve,  Gustav,  58 
Herzgovinia,  annexation,   1908, 

3 
High  Command,  15 
Hindenburg,  51 
Hirschauer,  General,  40 

Ordered  to   resume  Craonne 

attack,  84 
Hirson,  24,  31 
Hodges,  Mr.,  181 
Holland,  14 

Hollweg,  Bethmann-,  142 
Homburg,  201 
Home,  Sir  Robert,  105 

Man  of  pronounced  promise, 

168 
Hotel  des  Invalides,  Joffre  at, 

53 


House,  Colonel,  52,  216 

Opinion  of  Wilson,  220 
Hue,  M.,  46 
Hugo,  Victor,  274 
Huguet,  Colonel,  13 
Humbert,  Charles,  149 


L' Illustration,  236 

Industries  of  Occupied  France, 

The,  179 
Italy,  2 

Crisis  in  1914,  46 
Refusal  to  reinforce  Salonica 
expedition,  59 

J 

James,  Lord,  of  Hereford,  166 
Jamieson,  Sir  Starr,  117 
Jaures,   178 
Joffre,  Marechal,  7,  8,  17,  18 

Offered  post  as  successor  of 
Michel,  20 

Vice-president      of      Conseil 
Superieur  de  la  Guerre,  21 

Chief-of-Staff,  22,  26 

On  preparation  in  peace  time, 
27 

Defence  of,  27 

On  Briey,  28 

Explanation  of   Briey  catas- 
trophe, 29,  31 

And  Lanrezac,  33 

Advises  British  of  danger,  35 

Acknowledges  failure,  38 

Greatest  value,  40 

Citation  of  Gallieni,  40 

And    Dubail   at   Conference, 

44 
And  the  Driant  affair,  47 
Refusal  to  resign,  52 
Resigns   command   at   Chan- 

tilly,  53 


INDEX 


285 


Named  Marechal  of  France, 
54,  70,  96,  108,  134 
Jones,  Mr.  Jack,  181 
Jones,  Mr.  Kennedy,  190 
Jouvenal,  M.  de,  136 
Jowett,  no 


K 


Kerr,  Mr.  Philip,  203,  207,  243, 

258 
Keynes,  Mr.,  158,  163,  219,  239 
Kitchener,  Lord,  13 

Warning  to  France,  1914,  23 

Pronounces  against  Salonica 
Army,  50 

His  silence,  55 

At  Fashoda,  66 
Klotz,  132,  234 
Kliick,  von,  25,  35 

Explanation  of  change  in  di- 
rection of  his  Army,  42 

On  German  retreat,  43,  161 
Koeltz,  Captain,  42 
Krassin,  M.,  208,  209 
Kriegspiel,  42 


Labour,    prospects    of    success, 

J75  . 
And  Liberalism,  175 

Lacaze,  Admiral,  JJ 

Lancken,  M.  de,  144 

Landwehr,  The,  25 

Lanrezac,  General,  6,  21,  33 
Receives  Joffre's  telegram,  35 
Relieved  of  his  command,  36 
On  Joffre  and  Dubail,  45 
Opinion    of    Joffre's    silence, 

55 
Lansdowne,    Lord,    1,    n,    95, 

118,   154 

Lansing,  Mr.  Robert,  205,  207, 

220,  223 


Opinion    of    Lloyd    George, 

240,  261 
Laon,  50,  76 

Not  reached  by  Nivelle,  83 
La  Russie   dcs   Tsars  pendant 

la  Guerre,  212 
Lassigny,  66,  72 
Lauzanne,    M.    Stephano,    220, 

222 
Law,  Mr.  Bonar,   n,  95,   112, 

114,  117,  119,  129 
Character,  163,  186,  229 

On  occupation  of   Germany, 

235 
Lee,  Lord  and  Lady,   182 
Lenin,  208,  213 
Lc  Plan  XVII.  (Payot,  Paris), 

22 
On  General  Staff,  24 
On  unpreparedness  in   1914, 

28 
Lc  Revers  de  igi^et  scs  Causes, 

27 
Leygues,  126,  150 
Liebknecht,  179 
Lille,  30 
Litvinoff,  208 
Lloyd,  Mr.  George,  95 
London  meeting  r.e  Nivelle  and 

Haig,  68 
Conference,  19 
Long,    Mr.    Walter,    112,    114, 

115,  116,  117 
Reminiscences     of     Disraeli, 

118 
Made     Colonial      Secretary, 

120,   162 
Longuet,  149 
Loubet,  M.,  124 
Loucheur,  M.,  29 

Came  to  London,  Oct.,  191 7, 

92,     108,     138,    229,    236, 

270 
Lucerne,  22 
Ludendorf,  51 


286 


INDEX 


Criticism   of   Petain's   work, 

90 
Lyautey,  General,  54,  65 
At  Calais,  67 
Speech      in      Chambre      de 

Deputes,  March  6,  69 
Criticism  of  Nivelle,  70 
Expressed    doubts    to    Pain- 

leve,  79 
Lytton,  Lord,   166 

M 

Macaulay,  161 

Macedonia,  Sarrail  in,  59 
Critical  situation,  60 

MacLean,  Sir  Donald,  173 

MacMahon,  Marechal,  124 

Madagascar,  20 

Maginot,  M.,  77 

Minister  of  the  Colonies,  85 

Maine,  Sir  Henry,  epigram,  124 

Malmaison,  Battle  of,  90 

Malvy,  150 

Mamers,  146 

Manchester  Guardian,  177,  197, 
258,   260 

Mandel,  106 

Mangin,  General,  26 

On  Battle  of  Marne,  40 
Captures  Douamont,  64,  66 
Criticises  Nivelle,  74,  81 
Admitted    difficulties    in    ad- 
vancing, 81 
Hostile  criticism  of,  85 
Regarded  as  a  victim,  86 
Finally    dismissed    for    other 
reasons,  87 

Mantoux  given  post  in  League 
of  Nations,  157 

Marconi  case,  185 

Marne,  Battle  of,  28,  30,  38,  40, 
95,  107,  147 

Martini,  Signor,  148,  150 

Masterman,  Mr.,  174,  196 


Le  Matin,  41,  183,  222 

Mauberge,  13,  26 

Maud'huy,  General  de,  37 

Maunoury,  41 

Maxse,  Mr.  Leo,  94,  95 

Mazel,  doubt  of  Nivelle's  suc- 
cess, 71,  79 

McKenna,  Mr.,  173 

Mediterranean,  6 

Meline,  126 

Mermeix,   M.,   71,  255 

Messimy,  Minister  of  War,  19, 
20,  21 
Explanation  of  Briey  catas- 
trophe, 29 
Message       from      Berthelot, 

34 
Orders  to  Joffre  on  retreat, 

39,  77,  80 
Metz,  29 
Meuse,  The,  9,  16,  19,  24,  26, 

,  30,33 
Mezieres    to    Belfort    line,    24, 

26 

Michel,   General,   submits  plan 

of    campaign   to   Messimy, 

19 
Conference,  19 
Micheler,     recommended     pru- 
dence,  75,   77 
Against  offensive  in  Messimy 
note,  80 
Millerand   and   Joffre,   47,   93, 
122,  123,  125,  126 
On  Ruhr  troops,  201 
At  San  Remo,  204 
On  Soviet  Government,  209 
Milner,     Lord,     substitute     for 
Lloyd  George  at  Doullens, 
March  23,  1918,  107,  117, 

157 
Minotto,  148,  152 

Mirmeix,  M.,  50 

The     Mirrors      of     Downing 

Street,  193 


INDEX 


287 


Moltke,  von,  i,  14 

Views  on  France  and  Russia, 
1870,  14 

The  Younger,  14 

And  Peace  terms,  15 

On  an  offensive,  23 

Followed  by  von  Kliick,  42 
Monastir,  Sarrail  takes,  59 
Monis,  126 
Mons,  94,  95 
Montagu,   174 

Moranville,  General  de  Selliers 
de,  letter  in  Pourquoi  Pas, 

9 
Chief  of  Staff,  9 

Morgan,  J.  P.,  117 

Morley,  Lord,  11,  154 

Morning  Post,  172,  192 

Morocco,  54 

Moscow,  178 

Mun,  Comte  Albert  de,  4 

N 

Nancy,  47 

Neuilly,  53 

New  York  Times,  189 

New  York  World,  184 

Nivelle,  44 

Succeeds  Joffre,  53 

Career  of,  64 

Offensive,  66 

At  Calais,  67,  68,  69 

Promise     of     support     from 

Painleve,  72 
Warned    of    German    retire- 
ment, March  13,  72 
Confidence  in  his  plan  of  of- 
fensive, 74-78 
Appointment  disapproved  by 

Painleve,  79 
Informed     by     Painleve     of 
Petain's  views,  April  3,  80 
Unprepared    for   enemy   ma- 
chine-guns, 83 


Himself  ended  offensive,  83 
Conflict  with  Painleve,  83 
Usefulness  hampered  by  in- 
terference, 85 
Superceded  by  Petain,  April 

29,  85 
Further     allegations     against 

Painleve,  86 
Finally  displaced  Mangin,  87 
Numbers  casualties,  88 
Estimate  of  German  losses,  89 
Nivelle  et  Pamleve,  71 
Noailles,  63 

Northcliffe,  Lord,  puffed  by  his 
own  press,  197 
Strong  prejudice  against  Mr. 

Walter  Long,  120 
Quarrel     with     Mr.     Lloyd 

George,  181 
Mirrors  of  Downing  Street, 
194 
North  Sea,  6 

Northumberland,  Duke  of,  181 
Noske,  245 

O 

Oissel,  General  Hely  d',  38 
Ourcq,  Battle  of  the,  39,  42,  108 


Paget,  Mr.,  169 
Painleve,  M.  Paul,  58,  60 

Resigns,  61 

Member    of    Academie    des 
Sciences,  69 

Met  Clemenceau   in   connec- 
tion with  Dreyfus  case,  69 

Difference  with  Clemenceau, 
70 

Minister  of    Public   Instruc- 
tion, 191 5,  70 

Inspired  lack  of  confidence  in 
Nivelle,  70 


288 


INDEX 


Conversation  with  Nivelle,  72 

Interviewed  Micheler,  March 
28,  191 7,  76 

Called  Nivelle  to  a  confer- 
ence, 77,  78 

Refused  to  remain  in  Briand 
Government,  79 

Unready  to  assume  responsi- 
bility for  offensive,  79 

Accused  of  stopping  offen- 
sive, 80 

Wanted  result  without  risks, 
81 

Friction  with  Nivelle,  April 
22,  83 

Confirmed  Poincare's  tele- 
phone message  to  Nivelle, 
.84,  85 

Dispute  continues  about  Man- 
gin's  dismissal,  86 

Came  to  London,  Oct.,  191 7, 

Resignation,  93 
Should  have  demanded  com- 
plete   unity    of    command, 
93,  127,  134,  150,  151 
Closer    knowledge    of    Lloyd 
George  than  either  of  his 
predecessors,  155 
On  Lloyd  George  and  news- 
papers, 183 

La  Pair,  229,  255,  263 

Paleologue,    M.    Maurice,    128, 
206,  212 

Pams,  M.,  123 

Panther,  The,  3 

Paris,  1,  12,  39,  59 

Pau,  20 

Peace  Conference,  1919,  7,  200 

Peace  Negotiations,  207 

Pelletan,  M.  Camille,  4,  123 

Percin,  General,  26 

Pershing  at  Senlis,  216 

Pertinax,   183 

Petain,  19 


Summoned  to  \  ;rdun,  49 
Suggested  as  Commander-in- 
Chief,  63 
As  Joffre's  successor,  70 
Advised  attack,  76,  77 
Approved  by  Painleve,  79 
Approved    of    the    offensive, 
though   not  very  sanguine 
of  result,  80,  82 
Appointed  Chief  of  General 
^  Staff,  84,  85 
Considered   Nivelle  offensive 

unsuccessful,  87 
First  work  to  restore  disci- 
pline and  morale  of  French 
armies,  90,  105,  108,  109 
At  Senlis,  216 
Pichon,  132,  149,  156 
Pierrefeu,  M.  de,  47 
Pitt,  the  Younger,  161,  164 
Plan  XVIL,  28,  31,  33,  3§ 
Plumer,  105 
Poincare,  M.,  4 
On  Gallieni,  41 
At  Elysee,  Nov.,  1916,  52 
And  Petain,  64 
Asked  Ribot  to  form  Minis- 
try, 69,  77 
Telephoned  to  Nivelle  to  de- 
lay attack,  84 
Told  by   Nivelle  that  offen- 
sive was  a  success,  87,  107, 
124,  128,  131,  134 
Determined  that  France  must 
get  what  the  Treaty  gives 
her,  135,  140 
And  San  Remo,  205 
On  the  Armistice,  217 
On    the    English    friendship 

with    Germany,    255 
On  London  Conference,  264 
Poland,  209 

Pollock,  Sir  Ernest,  243 
Presidential     decree    regarding 
Joffre's  duties,  53 


INDEX 


289 


Pringle,  Mr.,    62 
Prinkipo   Plan,  207 

Q 

Quai  d'Orsay,  3,  7,  206 
Quatre  mois  de  guerre,  25,  40 
Queenborough,  Lord,  169 
St.  Quentin,  39 

Battle  of  St.  Quentin,  great- 
est defeat  sustained  by  the 
British,  107 

R 

Rantzau,  Count  de  BrockdorfT, 

243.  244 
Rapallo,  92 
Rapport  de  la  Commission  de  la 

M  ctallurgic  en  France,  24 
Ratenau,  132 
Rathenau,  Herr,  270 
Reading,     Lord      (Sir     Rufus 

Isaacs),  185 
Reeve,  Henry,  196 
Reflections  and   Reminiscences, 

1 
Reinach,  M.  Joseph,  139,  208 
Repington,  Colonel,  97 

Belief     in     Robertson     and 

avowed  enmity  to  Wilson, 

101 
Prejudice  caused  amazement 

in  France,  102 
Conversation    with    Foch    at 

Compiegne,   105,   113 
Book,  194,  195 
Revelstoke,  Lord,  67 

In  Russia,  67 
Revers  de  191 4  et  ses  Causes, 

Le,  25 
Revue  M  Hit  aire  Francaise,  La, 

38 
Revue  de  Paris,  39,  42 

Rheims,  66,  y2,  104 


Rhine,  33 

Rhine  Boundary,  Memorandum 

on,  7 
Ribot,  68 

Appoints      Painleve     to     be 
Minister  of  War,  69,   yj, 
125,  128,  150 
Distrusted       Lloyd      George 
from  the  outset,  155,  156 
Riddell,  Lord,  155,  184 
Robertson,  Sir  William,  56 
At  Calais,  67 
On  Haig's  letter  re  Nivelle, 

6; 

Haig's  position  under  French 
Commander-in-Chief,      67, 

92,  95,  96 
Breaks  with  Lloyd  George,  97 
Lack  of  confidence  in  Lloyd 

George,  98 
Lloyd  George  objects  to  coun- 
try being  represented  in  Su- 
preme War  Council  by  its 
Chief-of-Staff,     97,      100, 
101,  103,  165 
Rodd,  Sir  Rennel,  165 
Rome  meeting  in  January,  191 7, 

60 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,  219 
Root,  Mr.  Elihu,  225 
Roques,  General,  49,  51 
Sent  to  Salonica,  59 
Rothermere,  Lord,  190 
Rothschild,  Lord,  12,  117 
Roumanian  Fiasco,  51 
Roure,  Colonel,  103 
Rouvier,  M.,  Prime  Minister  of 

France,  3,  146,  147 
Roye,  66,  72 

Ruffey,  General,  22,  26,  30 
Russell,  Sir  Charles,  no 
Russia,  1,  2,  3,  14 

Intervention  in  1875,  15 
Held  back  by  France,  27 
Haig  in,  68 


290 


INDEX 


Saint  Dominique,  rue,  18 

In  1914,  44 
Saint-Sauveur,  Mde.,  208 
Salisbury      Lord,      100,      115, 

168 
Samuel,  Sir  Herbert,  174 
San  Remo,  135,  203 
Sarrail,  46 

Campaign  in  favour  of,  1915? 

49 
Given  command  of  the  Army 

of  the  Orient,  50 
Suggested  as  Commander-in- 
Chief,  58 
Offered      Governorship      of 

Paris,  61 
Placed  on  Cadre  de  Reserve, 

62 
Warns      Clemenceau      of 
Petain,  63 
Sauerwein,  M.  Jules,  183 
Sauvigny,  Berthier  de,  66 
Scharnhorst,  247 
Schluffen,  von,  14,  15 

Opinion   on   war   with   Ger- 
many, 22 
Schoen,  M.,  144 
Schwab,  Mr.  Charles,  272 
Secret  des  Fronticres,  Le,  35 
Selves,  M.  de,  140,  143,  144 
Shantung  Settlement,  223 
Simmonds,  Mr.  Frank,  184 
Smuts,  General,  243,  271 
Soissons,  22,  66 
Somme,     Battle     of     the,     51, 

66 
Sonnino,  60 
Spa  Conference,  245 
Stanley,  Sir  Albert,  114 
Steed,  Mr.  Wickham,  189 
Stinnes,  Hugo,  267 
Strasbourg,  45 
Sulla,   160 


Supreme  War  Council  to  meet 
at  Versailles  every  month, 
92 


Taft,  Mr.,  225 

Tardieu,   M.  Andre,  4,  6,  46, 
131,  222 

On  Rhine  occupation,  227 

On  reparations,  236 

On  ratification  of  Treaty  by 
Congress,  238 

Opinion  of  Lloyd  George,  239 

On  coal  crisis,  250 

On   France    after   the   War, 
269 
Temps,  Le,  24,  233,  244,  263 
Tirpitz,  27 
Thomas,  Albert,  JJ 

Influence  on   Lloyd    George, 

157 
Given    post    in    League    of 

Nations,  157 

Thomas,  Mr.  J.  H.,  181 

Thomasson,  Lieut.-Colonel,  23, 

Le   Rcvcrs   de    1914   et   ses 

Causes,  25 
On  artillery,  27 
Three  Years'  Service,  4,  30 
Times  correspondent,  de  Blow- 

itz,  1 
Times,  The,  189,  191,  192 

Merit,  198,  271,  274 
Tirpitz,  von,  15 
Toul,  14 

Trade  unions,  175 
Trentino,  76 

Triple  Alliance,   formation  of, 
1879,  2 

U 

United  States,  16 


INDEX 


291 


Verdun,  26,  41,  63 

Important   positions   retaken, 

90 
Versailles    Council    represented 

by  Sir  H.  Wilson,  93 
Versailles,  Treaty  of,  162,  215 
Victoria,  Queen,  1,  196 
La  Vie  Russe,  213 
Vimy,  63,  66 

Violette,  M.  Maurice,  8,  39,  74 
Viviani,  126,  134,  145 
Vosges,  33 

W 

Waechter,  M.  Kiderlen,  instiga- 
tor of  Agadir  affair,  141 
Characteristics  of,  142,  144 

Waldersee,  Count,  14 

War  Council,  April  6,  for 
which  Ribot  was  probably 
responsible,  80 

War  Office,  11 

War  with  Germany,  255 

Wetterlee,  l'Abbe,  122 

Weygand,  General,  93,  211,  227 

White,  Mr.  Henry,  224 

Wilhelm  I.,  Emperor,  2,  3,  11 


Wilhelm  II.  and  Douamont,  64 

Wilhelmstrasse,  3,  n 

Wilson,  Sir  Henry,  13,  55,  67, 

93, 
Protege  of  Lord  Roberts,  93, 

94,  95,  96 
Appointment  to  succeed  Rob- 
ertson, 99,  100,  101 
Meeting  with  Beresford,  101, 
103,   105,   157 
Wilson,     Woodrow,     President 
U.S.A.,  52,  123,  125,  158, 
162,  218 
Character,  220 

And  fourteen  points,  223,  241 
And  League  of  Nations,  225 
Peace  Treaty,  232 
Wirth,  Herr,  267 
Witas,  M.,  266 
Wolmer,  Lord,   166 
Wrangel,  206,  211 
Wright,  Captain  P.  E.,  105,  154 


Ybarnegary,  M.,  received  by 
Poincare  at  Elysee,  April 
22,  84 

Younger,  Sir  George,  and 
Lloyd  George,  170 


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